

THE SOCIOLOGY OF RACES, CULTURES AND HUMAN PROGRESS

STUDIES IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ASIA AND EUR-AMERICA

BY

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CHUCKERVERTY, CHATTERJEE & CO., LTD

BOOKSELLERS & PUBLISHERS

15, COLLEGE SQUARE,

CALCUTTA

1939

Price

Published by
R. C. Chakravarti, M. Sc.
15, College Square,
Calcutta

This book was known as
THE FUTURISM OF YOUNG ASIA

Printed by
Sasadhar Chakravarti
Kalika Press Ltd.
25, D. L. Roy Street, Calcutta

Preface.

I.

Eur-America had been challenging Asia for about a century. It was not possible for Asia to accept that challenge for a long time. It is only so late as 1905 in the event at Port Arthur that Eur-America has learned how at last Asia intends to retaliate.

Naturally the challenge is twofold: political and cultural. Or rather, to be monistic for once, the political enslavement of Asia by Eur-America engendered also the cultural chauvinism among the scientists and philosophers of the West in regard to the East. Altogether a vast body of *idolas* has grown up under the aegis of that new species of despotism, viz. albinocracy and colonialism.

The reply from Asia is accordingly being offered in two fields of revolt: military and scientific. But, undoubtedly, the more Port Arthurs Asia can possess to her credit side the more effectively will the combined intellect of Europe and America be brought to its senses, and the more easy will it be for Young Asia to purge the world of the occidental *idolas* and usher in the Renaissance of the twentieth century.

Luckily for mankind, with the progress of world-events, with the increased opportunities for international intercourse and with the expansion of the mind generated by new data in anthropology, psychology and sociology, many of the liberal or radical politicians in Eur-America and some of its open-minded scientists and philosophers have begun to join the ranks of Asian insurgents both in politics and science. Thus is being facilitated the subversion of the superstitions which have been dominating the life and thought in the West.

The present volume of essays, disconnected and scrappy-altho they be, is like everything that Asia has done since 1905 in any but another term in the series which is destined to bring about great consummation. It will perhaps be regarded by the αλφ and comrades in the Western world as furnishing to a certain logic or methodology which must have to operate in every *Aufklärung* before the final synthesis or reconstruction is

II.

The *Leitmotif* of this volume—viz. war against colonialism in politics and against “*orientalisme*” in science,—is to be found in the first essay, which was a lecture at Clark University in the United States in February 1917 and which subsequently appeared as an article in the *International Journal of Ethics*, Chicago, July 1918. A good deal of the other essays has likewise arisen out of lectures delivered at the State Universities of California and Iowa, Columbia University, the University of Pittsburg, Western Reserve University (Ohio), Amherst College (Mass.), Rand School of Social Science (New York), and before art societies, churches, women’s clubs, and business men’s associations in different cities of North America.

Some of the views held forth in the present work have been given out in French while lecturing in Paris on the subject of art, once before the *Association Française des Amis de l’Orient* at Musée Guimet (February 1921) and a second time before the *Académie des Beaux-Arts, Institut de France* (July 1921). They constituted also the backbone of the lecture dealing with comparative literature which was given in English at the *Englisches Seminar* of the University of Berlin (February 1922). A part of the material in this book was used for a lecture in German on the social philosophy of Young India delivered before the *Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft* (March 1922) as well as before the “*Deutsche Gesellschaft 1914*” (April) and other societies in Berlin.

The contents of half of these essays are derived from the author’s articles in American journals like the *New York Times* (March 11, 1917), *School and Society* (New York, April 14, 1917), the *Journal of Race Development* (July 1918, July 1919), the *New York World* (September 22, 1918), the *Scientific Monthly* (New York, January 1919), *Journal of International Relations* (July 1919, January 1921), *Open Court* (Chicago, August 1919, November 1919), *Political Science Quarterly* (December 1919, June 1920, March 1921), the *New York Nation* (July 3, 1920) and the *Freeman* (New York, July 28, 1920, and October 13, 1920).

The remaining chapters have appeared in one form or another in the *Hindustan Review* (Allahabad, July 1919), the *Asian Review* (Tokyo, July and October 1920), the *Modern Review* (Calcutta, September 1919, January, March and August, 1920, October 1921), the *Collegian* (Calcutta, No. 1, August 1920, No. 1, October 1921), the *Journal of the Indian Economic Society* (Bombay, 1921), *Rupam* (Calcutta, January 1922), the *Hindustanee Student* and the *Cosmopolitan Student* of the United States and in *Young India* (New York).

Preface.

The article on *Die Lebensanschauung des Inders* which appeared in the *Deutsche Rundschau* of Berlin for January 1922 is in part based on one of the essays. Another essay in German entitled *Die soziale Philosophie Jung-Indiens* has been published in the same monthly for April, and this contains certain facts and ideas not made use of in the present publication.

III.

The appendix is gleaned from the *Collegian*, the fortnightly educational magazine of Calcutta (No. 1, January 1920 — No. 1, January 1922).

The group of Essays, "IV. Tendencies in Hindu Culture", is to be taken up with the author's previous writings in English, *The Positive Background of Hindu Sociology*, Vol. I (1914), Vol. II. Part I (1921), *Love in Hindu Literature* (1916), *Hindu Achievements in Exact Science* (1918), *Hindu Art: Its Humanism and Modernism* (1920), and *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus* (1922).

Group III is backed by the author's studies on China in such publications as *Chinese Religion through Hindu Eyes* (1916) in English as well as *The A.B.C. of Chinese Civilization* (1922) and *North China* in Bengali.

The doctrine of *vishva-shakti* (world-forces) which often appears in these essays was first discussed in a Bengali lecture before the Literary Conference of Bengal held at Mymensingh in 1910. The essay was published in the original in the *Prabāsi*, the Bengali monthly of Calcutta, and then as a brochure in English entitled *The Science of History and the Hope of Mankind* (London, 1912). The theme has also been dealt with at some length in the volume of Bengali essays, *Vishva-shakti* (Calcutta, 1914), which was made out of the editorials in the monthly *Grihastha*.

The entire volume is in its ideological affiliations organically oriented to the author's experiences and investigations which form the subject matter of eight volumes in Bengali under the general title of *Vartamān Jagat* (Contemporary World). This series of books based as it is on travel, has for its theme the survey of tendencies in industry, education, literature, science, art and social development and comprises Egypt, Great Britain, Ireland, the United States, Japan, China, France and Germany. In these travel-books, again, is continued the trend of thought registered in the Bengali book *Sādhana* (Calcutta, 1912) in which were collected some of the author's notes and essays since 1907.

Mohammedan Asia which has been but slightly touched upon in the present work is demanding the author's attention for an independent volume.

Because of the unity underlying the essays herein brought together and because of their „occasional“ origin, repetition of certain facts and ideas was almost inevitable. But the material has been thoroughly revised and brought up to the end of the year 1921 wherever necessary, and repetition will be found to have been reduced to a minimum.

Thanks are due to the presidents and professors of the universities and the editors of the journals as well as to the numerous friends in the East and the West who have collaborated with the author in diverse forms during these several years of travel and study.

Berlin, October 1922.

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I.

The Futurism of Young Asia.

1. A *Critique* of Social Philosophy.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant wrote the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Critique of Applied Reason*, and the *Critique of Judgment*. The basic idea of this Critical Philosophy was to examine the methods and achievements of the human intellect between the great awakening of the Renaissance and the epoch of the French Revolution. Kant's criticism was "creative", it led to a "transvaluation of values" as deep and wide as the "ideas of 1789". On the one hand, he established the validity of the experimental methods initiated by Galileo and Torricelli; and on the other, he pointed out their limitations by postulating the "categorical imperatives" of man as a "moral agent."

If it is possible to generalize the diverse intellectual currents among the Turks, Egyptians, Persians, Hindus, Chinese, and Japanese of the twentieth century into any suitable formula, probably it should be called the "critique of Occidental Reason." Through the political, industrial, literary, and educational institutions and activities of the Orient today there runs a common idea of "criticism." Young Asia has been making a survey of the social philosophy and the culture-anthropology which Eur-America has brought to the forefront between the "industrial revolution" (c 1815) and the unsuccessful rising of the Chinese Boxers in 1900. Scepticism is the fundamental feature in the *Aufklärung* of the modern Orient. "storm and stress" which is bringing a future Asia into being its *élan* in the Mephistophelic doubt as to the validity of the Occidental pretensions.

2. The Doctrine of Superior Races.

Probably the most universally accepted postulate in the thought of Europe and America is that the Occidental races are superior to the Oriental. The burden of school lessons and university lectures and newspaper stories on history in these countries is to emphasize

this notion. The whole world-culture of the previous five thousand years is assumed as but an insignificant preamble to the grand domination of the Orient by the Occident during the last few generations.

But how does the same history appear to the Oriental from his angle of vision? In his eyes it has been the historic role of Asia to be always the aggressor and of Europe to be ever on the defensive. By the test of arms the superior races of the world have been the Asians more often than the Europeans.

We need not go far back into the periods covered by Egyptology and Assyriology. We may begin with the Persians. During the fifth century B. C. the "isles of Greece" were over-run by Darius and Xerxes. Their armies were recruited from every race of Western and Middle Asia including the Hindus of the Punjab in India. Alexander's raid into Asia in the fourth century B. C. was but Europe's reply to the previous Asian adventure.

During the seventh and eighth centuries A. C. the Moslem Saracens pushed their arms into Europe as far as Spain and Southern France. The Pyrenees mountains became the western boundary of Asia, and the Mediterranean Sea an Asian lake. The crusades which were first organized towards the end of the eleventh century (1099) were but attempts of the Christians at self-defence. It was against the tremendous "Asian Peril" of the time that these pseudo-religious wars were directed through pan-European alliances.

The expansion of Asia was undertaken from the north also by the Buddhists and Shamanists through the hordes of the Scythians, Mongols or Tartars of Central Asia. The Carpathian mountains, and not the Urals, remained for centuries the north-western boundary of Asia. "In Asia and Eastern Europe scarcely a dog could bark without Mongol leave from the borders of Poland and the Gulf of Scanderoon to the Amur and the Yellow Sea"¹). The whole of Russia was a "dependency" of the Mongol emperors of China during the thirteenth century. It was not until the beginning of the eighteenth century that Peter the Great rose to militate against the Asianization of Europe and put a stop to Tartar hegemony in Eastern European politics.

But in the mean time Europe had to swallow another aggression from Asia. This began with the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Turkish empire was one of the greatest powers in Europe. The

¹) Yule: *Travels of Marco Polo*.

eastern boundary of Europe shrank eventually under Asian pressure as far interior as Venice on the Adriatic Sea, and Vienna, the capital of the Habsburg emperors. The Turks laid siege to that imperial city once in 1529 and a second time as late as 1682. It was not till 1699 that the Holy League of the Venetian republic, the King of Poland, the Habsburg emperor, and Peter the Great succeeded in resisting any further advance of the Crescent into the lands of the Cross.

What then is the verdict of history on the question of superior races? Did not the Asians enjoy "spheres of influence" in Europe all through the Middle Ages, down to the beginning of the eighteenth century? The period of Asian hegemony covered, in fact, fully a thousand years from a century before Charlemagne till Peter the Great and Louis XIV. Has not the number of Oriental aggressions into Europe been greater than that of Occidental into Asia? Whatever pseudo-history may be taught in the schools and colleges of Europe and America, among the Orientals themselves the memory of their own military superiority is a potent factor in their modern consciousness. It cannot easily fade away, because this was not a romance of legendary heroes in an antediluvian age. It is a fact of the "history of our own times."

The recent history of the world from the European success at Plassey in 1757 to the Asian triumph at Port Arthur in 1905 is certainly the story of European expansion. But in the first place, this, again, is only the reaction of Europe to the Asian event of 1453. And in the second place, does this series of events during 150 years entitle the sociologist to propound the jingo cult of difference between the East and the West? This is the first question in the Critical Philosophy of Young Asia.

3. The Logic of the Occident.

Once upon a time, as Greek cradle-stories tell us, a piece of painting was shown to a lion. It was the picture of a lion being trampled down by a man. The lion was asked as to how he liked that art-work. He replied: "Of course I have enjoyed it very much; but if a lion had painted this, the man would have been at the feet of the lion".

In modern times the whole Orient from Tokyo to Cairo has been a continent of subject peoples. It is the "master" races that have studied the life and institutions of their dependencies, colonies, protectorates, spheres of influence, and "mandated" regions. The East that has been held up to servile and semi-servile Asia by Eu-

America has therefore naturally reflected this "lion in the painting" of the fable.

During the last quarter of the third century B. C. Tsin Shi Hwangti (B. C. 221—210), a Chinese Napoleon, brought China for the first time under one Imperial administration. The Confucian *literati* of his time seem to have been obstacles to his work of political consolidation. So, anticipating the "nation-makers" of war-time Europe and America he instituted a thorough-going censorship of thought and letters. The wholesale burning of all ancient Chinese Classics was ordered by this *sârva-bhauma* or *dominus omnium*, the lord of all. By destroying every vestige of the past he intended to inaugurate a new era of enlightenment and progress. It may be legitimately conjectured that if another Shi Hwangti were to appear in Asia today he would begin by declaring a bonfire of a considerable portion of the Occidental literature on the Orient.

The archaeological, exploratory, and translation work done in and about Asia during the nineteenth century and since under the auspices of Eur-American Governments and Research Societies is indeed marvellous. It is in the interpretation of the unearthed facts and of the data of present-day life, however, that the superstition of the "superior" race chiefly manifests itself.

We shall best understand the methodology of Occidental scholars with regard to Oriental topics if we apply it, say, to the First Book of Homer's *Iliad*. We should then be announcing to the world that the Occident has never known what it is to act in union. The be-setting sin of the European races has always been the mutual jealousy of their leaders. This has rendered the presenting of common front against an enemy impossible even on momentous occasions. Take, for example, the scandalous altercation between King Agamemnon and General Achilles on the Field of Troy. As Nestor lamented:

"Alas, alas! what grief is this for Greece!
What joy for Priam, and for Priam's sons!
What exultation for the men of Troy,
To hear of feuds between you, of all the Greeks
The first in council, and the first in fight!"²⁾

The leaders not only forget the great responsibility of their mission, but the vengeance of Achilles is so "deep and deadly" that he persuades his Goddess-mother Thetis to pray to Jove

²⁾ Derby's translation.

"and supplicate his aid

For Troy's brave warriors, that the routed Greeks

Back to their ships with slaughter may be driven;

That all may taste the folly of their King."

And Thetis actually prays to "Jove, Olympian, Lord of counsel" to "avenge his cause",

"and give to Trojan arms

Such strength and power, that Greeks may learn how much

They need my son and give him honour due."

Out of this personal rivalry, ultimately, "to Greece unnumbered ills arose".

Now what is the cause of this feud between the Greek leaders? What leads to the treason, the anti-national and Trojanizing wrath of Achilles? A most ignoble and detestable feature of European morals, viz. concubinage, as the methodology in discussion will bring it out. A girl Briseis was captured by Achilles. But King Agamemnon ordered him to deliver her to the royal camp for his own use. These are his words:

"I heed thee not!

I care not for thy fury! Hear my threat:

I mean,

Even from thy tent, myself, to bear thy prize,

The fair Briseis; that henceforth thou know

How far I am thy master."

Following the same logic, the scientific interpreters of literature will have to declare that the rulers of Europe are licentious and that the Europeans are a polygamous⁸⁾ race. For, about Chryseis, another captive girl, Agamemnon had shamelessly said to her father:

"Her I release not, till her youth be fled;

Within my walls, in Argos, far from home,

Her lot is cast, domestic cares to ply,

And share a master's bed."

Agamemnon's words to Calchas, the prophet, who points out the iniquity of the act, are also in the self-same strain:

"I rather choose herself to keep,

To me not less than Clytemnestra dear,

My virgin-wedded wife."

In the identical manner will it have to be asserted that "Occident has known but one form of government, and that is alloyed despotism. Calchas, the prophet, "to whom were known t

⁸⁾ cf. the custom in France; Lecky: *European Morals*, Vol. II, 343.

present, and the future, and the past", fears to speak out. For this *rishi* (to use a Hindu expression) is aware that

"Terrible to men of low estate
The anger of a King; for though awhile
He veil his wrath, yet in his bosom pent
It still is nursed, until the time arrive."

And General Achilles also remarks:

"A tyrant King because thou rulest over slaves."

The Western King is not only a despot to his people but also a tyrant at home to his wife whom he compels to passive obedience. Jove's threat is thus worded:

"If this be so, it is my sov'reign will.
But, now, keep silence, and my words obey.
Lest all the Immortals fail, if I be wroth,
To rescue thee from my resistless hand."

This is a slight specimen of the logic of the Occident generally applied to the interpretation of Oriental culture. But advocates of "higher criticism" would forthwith challenge the above interpretation. It may be easily condemned on the simple ground that one must not generalize about millenniums of Occidental civilization from single verses of a single poet. But this very truism disappears from the consciousness of Eur-American "scientists" while they apply their brains to the interpretation of what they call the heart or soul or spirit of the Orient. The injustice of this method is probably the greatest of all factors that have contributed to the rupture of fellow-feeling between the East and the West. And the futurists of Young Asia have their permanent fountain of inspiration in the intellectual pain and ill-treatment they have been accustomed to get from Eur-America.

4. The Alleged Pessimism of the Orient.

Max Müller wrote *India: what can it teach us?* The main trend of his thesis was to indicate that India can teach nothing but "sublime" speculations of an other-worldly character, the psychology of the soul, the ethics of retreat from the struggles of life and the metaphysics of the Infinite. And Schopenhauer, himself a pessimist of the blackest dye, had brought to prominence some of the quietistic passages of the *Upanishads* and the Buddhist *Dhammapada*. Since then it has become almost a fetish in the Western world to take the Orient and pessimism as convertible terms. Especially is Buddhism known in the Occident as the cult of pacifism, annihilation, inactivity, non-resistance, monasticism, and so forth;

and all other cults in the Orient are alleged to approximate this ideal more or less closely. This notion about Asian quietism is one of the greatest *idols* of the modern world. It cannot stand the least historical criticism.

First, the man Shākya-simha, called the Buddha (Enlightened), was but one of the hundreds of India's leaders in the fifth and sixth centuries B. C. They counted among them physicians, surgeons, publicists, diplomats, metaphysicians, sophists, logicians and grammarians. Shākya did not monopolize the whole thought and activity of the time.

Secondly, Shākya was not only the organizer of an order of monks and ascetics, like Pythagoras, but was the teacher also of duties for householders, kings, senators, and soldiers. Personally he was a firm believer in republicanism and the kingless polity of the United States of the Vajjians. Quietism was the furthest removed from his teachings. Most of his followers were energists and active propagandists. They founded charitable institutions, schools, rest-houses, hospitals both for human beings and animals. Asoka the Great (B. C. 270—230), the so-called Constantine of Buddhism, one of the stanch followers of Shākya, was an internationalist. He brought the whole of Western Asia, Egypt, Greece and Macedon within the sphere of Hindu culture.

Thirdly, the religion called Buddhism was never a paramount religion and never had an exclusive sway in India, China, or Japan. The term "Buddhist India" is thus a misnomer, it cannot apply to any epoch of the country's history. Besides, no religion has ever dominated the policy of rulers and ruling classes in India. The State in India has never been theocratic.

Fourthly, even those who called themselves Buddhists did not make it a rule to fly away from the pains of the world. They could still be fighters, traders, presidents and kings. They took part in political intrigues and court revolutions, and could be casuists, when necessary, like the Jesuits of Europe. There are many instances of Buddhist monks organizing themselves into military orders in the mediaeval history of China, Japan, and India.

The alleged pessimism of Shākya-simha's teachings had practically no influence on the general mass of population. The rulers of India proceeded to their work according to the principle of statecraft. These were as far removed from *ahimsā* or non-killing as *āre* Machiavelli's *Prince* and Treitschke's *Politics* from "My Kingdom is not of this world."

The *Artha-shāstra* was compiled within about a century

Shākya's death. The compiler was Kautilya, a Bismarck or Richelieu of India. The militarism of the Hindus would be evident to every reader of this book. Women with prepared food and beverage were advised to stand behind the fighting lines and utter encouraging words to the men at the front (Book X, Ch 111). This is out-Spartaing Sparta. There is here indicated a system of real "universal" conscription like the one which was more or less witnessed during the recent World-War.

Physicians with surgical instruments, machines, remedial oils, and cloth in their hands were likewise advised to stand behind, uttering encouraging words to fighting men (Book X Ch 111).

The futurism of Young Asia is nurtured on such historic truths.

5. The So-called Opening of China.

In 1842, at the end of the Opium War, China is said to have been "opened" by the treaty of Nanking. Since then more than 120 treaties have been concluded between the Chinese and the "Powers". Each treaty is a document of concessions of some sort or other wrung from the "sick man" of the Far East. And yet Eur-American logic describes the treaty of Nanking "as one of the turning points in the history of mankind, involving the welfare of all nations in its wide reaching consequences".⁴⁾ The futurists of Young Asia remember it, however, as the first term in a series of the law of the gun in China.

Between 1858 and 1885 almost the whole of the present-day French Indo-China was carved out of the Chinese empire. By 1898 Russia, Germany, England, and France were masters of "possessions" on Chinese soil. Korea and Manchuria, parts of "Greater China", were passing into Russian hands. As China had no power to resist, the resistance was offered by Japan; because her own independence would otherwise have been precarious. In 1910 Korea became Japanese territory. Since then Manchuria, Mongolia, Kashgaria (Turkestan), and Tibet have virtually passed out of China's hands. China has been opened indeed.

There is not a single harbour in all three thousand miles of coast line in which the Chinese can mobilize their own ships without the consent of the foreigners.

The consular authorities of the foreign powers rule the settlements practically as possessions. Besides, throughout Chinese territory the foreigners are immune from China's jurisdiction. With regard to

⁴⁾ Williams: *The Middle Kingdom*.

this "extra-territoriality" the following remarks about Japan till 1911 will indicate the present status of the Chinese in their own territory: "A nation which had to accept some of the conditions contained in these treaties was not really autonomous. For instance, the Japanese were not allowed to impose more than a small tax upon imports — — — a limitation which deprived them of the control of their own fiscal system, and affected the building up of industries. Moreover, the treaties exempted foreigners, residing in Japan, from the operation of her own criminal laws and secured to them the privilege of being arraigned solely before tribunals of their own nationality. These provisos were disliked, not only because it sometimes happened that a foreigner was judge in a suit in which he was personally concerned, but because of the implication that Japan was unfit to exercise one of the fundamental attributes of every sovereign state — — judicial autonomy."⁵)

Mining, railway, and industrial concessions are enjoyed by foreign commercial syndicates. These lead to the play of back door influence, and are the perennial sources of intrigues. The little political life that pulsates through the corpse of China is thus demoralized.

What through financial indebtedness, what through commercial and industrial wire-pullers, what through extra-territoriality, and what through sympathy and charity of professional friends, Young China has to undergo every day all the "intervention" which Austria wanted to enforce on Serbia in July 1914. Only, China has to submit to the demands of half a dozen Austrias at least. This is the meaning of the "open door" policy loudly proclaimed by all with equal vehemence for about two decades from U. S. Secretary Hay's letter in 1899 down to the so-called Disarmament Conference at Washington (November 1921).

What is the justification of this high-handed intervention in the rights of Chinese sovereignty? The sociologists, students of race-culture, and apostles of peace movements are ready with their answer. The interests of humanity, democracy, and civilization are said to require that China must be opened at the point of the bayonet. It is alleged that by nature the Chinese are averse to foreign intercourse and that exclusiveness is their greatest national vice.

6. The Real Cycles of Cathay.

According to the Critical Philosophy of Young Asia this allegation about China's exclusiveness is perhaps the greatest untruth

⁵) Porter: *Japan: The New World-Power*.

propagated by the "superior races" of the Occident in modern times. Can the combined intellect of Europe and America point to a single period of Chinese history in which the country was closed to foreigners? Is there any "cycle of Cathay" during which the Chinese refused to receive new arts and sciences from outsiders? Is there any epoch of Chinese culture which does not indicate assimilation and imbibing of extraneous influences?

We neglect for the present the intercourse that has been traced by La Couperie between China and Assyria on the evidence of astronomical and other notions. The legends also about Buddhist missions from India under Asoka to China in the third century B. C. need not be considered for want of incontestable evidence.

But during the second century B. C. Chang Kien, the general of the famous Han emperor Wuti penetrated into Western Asia (B. C. 135). He is known to have introduced the Persian vine into China. The opening of the route between the Far East and the "Roman Orient" was thus effected by a Chinese.

In 100 B. C, during the same reign, General Su Wu was deputed to the territory of the Huns in Central Asia. There is in Chinese poetry a touching "farewell" to his wife written by himself on the occasion, which we shall see in a subsequent essay (p. 160).

Chinese silk was well known in Persia. It was probably through Persian sources that Ptolemy and Pliny came to know of it.

During the first century A. C. the Han emperor Mingti sent a deputation to the Central Asian province of Greater India in order to import the images of Buddha and Sanskrit texts (67 A. C.). The connexion between India and China which was thus established lasted continuously for full seven hundred years. According to a Chinese record, in the reign of Hwanti (147—168), "Tienchu (India), Tatsin (Rome, Egypt, or Arabia), and other nations came by the Southern Sea with tribute, and from this time trade was carried on at Canton with foreigners".⁶⁾

China's trade with the Byzantine empire is noticed in Cosmas' *Christian Topography* (530 A. C.) With the rise of Saracen Power, Chinese intercourse was established with the Mohammedans also in the seventh century.

The most active period of the "holy alliance" between India and China was between the fifth and seventh centuries. The Chinese received not only the religion and metaphysics of the Hindus, but also medicine, arithmetic, dramaturgy, folk-festivals, and musical instruments.

⁶⁾ *The Middle Kingdom.*

The greatest epoch of Chinese civilization is the age of the mighty Tangs and brilliant Sung (618—1260). It was an era of Renaissance in poetry, painting, philosophy, pottery, and what not. This was a direct product of Hindu influences. The Chinese of this their "Augustan age" were not only open to foreigners, but were also sending out thousands of artists, missionaries, statesmen, scholars, and architects in order to civilize Japan.

Under the Tangs, the Chinese empire had more than one city which was, like the cities of modern America, the babel of tongues, and the melting-pot of races. At Singan-fu, the capital, in the North West, there lived not only thousands of Hindu families, but Zoroastrians, Mohammedans, and Nestorian Christians. In 877 an Arab trader, Abu Zaid, described the port of Canfu near Hangchau, as the city in which 120,000 Mohammedans, Jews, Christians, and Magians were engaged in traffic.

The Chinese historians were always interested in "barbarian", i. e. foreign countries and peoples. The official histories of the period from Han to Tang dynasty supply accurate information about Syria, Persia, Greece, and Parthia. The Chinese account of Constantinople is more definite and exact than any contemporary Western account of the Chinese capital.

The maritime trade of the Chinese was very brisk during the tenth century. Chinese ships visited Arabia, Ceylon, Malaya peninsula, Tongking, Siam, Java, Western Sumatra, Western Borneo, and certain of the Philippine Islands.⁷⁾ The *Chu-fan-chi* is a record of Chinese foreign commerce by sea during the later Sung period. Chau Jukua, the writer, was inspector of maritime trade at Tsuanchau in the latter part of the twelfth century.

During the thirteenth century Marco Polo, the Venetian, was very well received by the Mongol emperor, Kubla Khan. According to Remusat, "many monks, Italians, French, Flemings, were charged with diplomatic missions to the Grand Khan. Mongols of distinction came to Rome, Barcelona, Valencia, Lyons, Paris, London, Northampton; and a Franciscan of the kingdom of Naples was Archbishop of Peking."⁸⁾

During the next period, that of the Mings, the Portuguese first came to China in 1516. From that date until 1724 in the reign of Yong Cheng the Manchu, the representatives of the modern Europe were heartily welcomed into the Chinese empire. Christian missionaries were entrusted both by the Ming and the Manchu emp

⁷⁾ Hirth and Rockhill: *Chau Jukua*.

⁸⁾ Gowen: *Outline History of China*.

with the work of reforming the Chinese calendars according to the European improvements in astronomy. The Chinese did not display any extra conservatism, but were receptive enough to be taught by foreigners.

But the Christians soon made themselves into "undesirable aliens". It was extreme political necessity, arising from the intrigues and interventions of the missionary force, that compelled the Chinese, as it had previously led the Japanese, to declare their country closed. The Chinese did not forbid the Europeans to enter China in the dehumanizing and humiliating way in which the enlightened, democratic and humanitarian America of 1917 has deliberately proclaimed herself a forbidden land to the peaceful and industrious but militarily impotent or navally weak peoples of Asia.

These aggressions, whether positive or negative, are justified, say the aggressors themselves, on scientific ethnological grounds. But the cumulative effects of such actions have led the Orient to one inevitable conviction, viz. that the pseudo-science of "open door" is really based on two arguments: (1) that nations have a right to "open" any country on earth only if they are backed by powerful guns, and (2) that a country can be "closed" to those races on earth which have virtually no right to bear arms. This belief has been a mighty feeder in the futurism of Young Asia, helpless as it is bound to remain for some time yet.

7. The Comparative Method.

The futurists of Young Asia not only condemn this convenient perversion by jingoes of the historical truths about China's traditional foreign policy and the alleged unassimilability of the Asians in the New World but are prepared to challenge the entire scientific machinery of the Occident in the study of sociology. According to its Critical Philosophy the methods of the Eur-American students of world-culture are vitiated by certain fundamental fallacies. These errors arise from a systematic mal-application of the comparative method in estimating the values of the Eastern and Western achievements.

Christian missionaries and even scientists of research societies take a morbid delight in picking up the worst features of Oriental life and thought. Ultimately through the movies, theatres, and journals, Asia has become to their nationals a synonym for immorality, sensuousness, ignorance, and superstition.

But was it not in Europe that political philosophy and political propaganda were based on such wisdom as is apparent in the following statements? —

"The sun is superior to the moon. St Peter gave two swords to Christ. The Pope is like Sinai, the source of the oracles of God, and is superior to all kings and princes because Mt. Sinai is higher than other hills. Adam was the first king, Cain the first priest. — The most perfect polity can be discovered within the pages of the Old and the New Testaments. — The actions of Samuel or Uzziah or Jehoida or Ehud could be made into a system whereby all future political methods could be judged".⁹⁾

Again, while expatiating on Oriental erotics, the Eur-American scholars with a safe conscience manage to forget the Greek romances of Heliodorus, Longus, and Tatius, for example, among the ancients, the Provençals and Troubadours of France, the *Wacht-Lieder* of the German Minnesingers, the Italian cult of Feminine Beauty such as is summarized by Burckhardt, and the "courtly love" in Chaucer and Gower.¹⁰⁾ In fact, they are blind to the truth that from the adultery among the gods described, e. g. in the *Odyssey* (Book VIII) and the erotic frescoes from Pompeii in the national museum of Naples down to the sex-exciting advertisements of today founded on the principles of experimental psychology (applied to business) the erotics of an intense and direct as well as suggestive character has had a continuous sway throughout the Occidental world.

"Amongst the civilized nations of Europe", again, as Frazer writes in "Balder the Beautiful" volume of his *Golden Bough*: "superstitions which cluster round this mysterious aspect (menstruation) of woman's nature are not less extravagant than those which prevail among savages. In the oldest existing cyclopaedia, the *Natural History* of Pliny, the list of dangers apprehended from menstruation is longer than any furnished by mere barbarians. According to Pliny, the touch of a menstruous woman turned wine to vinegar, blighted crops, killed seedlings, blasted gardens, brought down the fruit from trees, dimmed mirrors, blunted razors, rusted iron and brass (especially at the waning of the moon), killed bees, or at least drove them from their hives, caused mares to miscarry, and so forth. Similarly, in various parts of Europe, it is still believed that if a woman in her courses enters a brewery the

⁹⁾ Figgis: *From Gerson to Grolius*.

¹⁰⁾ Smith: *The Greek Romances of Heliodorus etc.*, London 1855; Perkins: *France under Mazarin and Richelieu*, Vol. I, p. 191; Lecky: *European Morals*, Vol. II, p. 343; See Dodd: *Courtly Love in Chaucer and Gower*, Boston 1913; Fletcher, *Religion of Beauty in Woman*, New York 1911; Neilson: *Origins and Sources of the Court of Love*, Boston 1899; Mott: *System of Courtly Love*, New York 1896; Caine: *Love-Songs of English Poets (1500—1800)*, New York 1892; B. K. Sarkar: *Love in Hindu Literature*, Tokyo 1916.

beer will turn sour, if she touches beer, wine, vinegar, or milk, it will go bad; if she makes jam, it will not keep, if she mounts a mare it will miscarry, if she touches buds, they will wither, if she climbs a cherry tree, it will die." Havelock Ellis, also, in his *Man and Woman* quotes reliable opinions of medical men about the survival of such notions in modern England. The psychological context to which such superstitions have been adapted for ages is not fundamentally different from that among the Hindus among whom flourishes the custom of segregating the menstruous women.

Molière's *L'Etourdi* (1655) furnishes us with a picture of the relations between a master and his servant. We have the following in Act III, Scene IV:

"What? May I not beat my own servants?

He is my valet to use as I please."

Such postulates of the master-psychology in seventeenth century France must not be ignored by the students of racial evolution.

Generally speaking, however, Western scholars commit three fallacies in the application of the comparative method to the study of race-questions.

In the first place, they do not take the same *class* of facts. They compare the superstitions of the Orient with the rationalism of the Occident, while they ignore the rationalism of the Orient and suppress the superstitions of the Occident. They compare the thoughts and activities of the higher intellectual and economic grades of the Occident with those of the illiterates and paupers and half-fed masses of the Orient. But intellectual fairness demands that mentality and morality should be compared under "the same conditions of temperature and pressure".

Secondly, the Eur-American sociologists do not apply the same method of *interpretation* to the data of the Orient as to those of the Occident. If infanticide,¹¹⁾ superstition and sexuality for instance have to be explained away or justified in one group of races by "historical criticism", or by anthropological investigations, or on the strength of studies in adolescence, Freudianism, psychoanalysis, and so forth, these must be treated in the same way in the other instances as well. We have seen before how the value of a Homer or a Buddha in cultural perspective depends on the method of interpretation.

In the third place, the Occidental scholars are not sufficiently well grounded in "comparative chronology". They do not proceed

¹¹⁾ Recommended by Lykurgus, Solon, Plato and Aristotle; Lecky: *European Morals*. Vol. II, p. 26.

to the work of striking a balance between the claims of the East and the West, age by age, i. e. idea by idea and institution by institution in a time-series. They compare the old conditions of the Orient with the latest achievements of the Occident, and they ignore the fact that it is only in very recent times that the same old conditions have disappeared from the West.

8. The Age of Modernism.

The present is the age of pullman cars, electric lifts, bachelor apartments, long distance phones, Zeppelins, and the "new woman". In their Oriental studies the Eur-American scholars seem to assume that these have been the inseparable features of the Western world all through the ages. Had they been really conscious that some of these were not known to their grandfathers, and others even to their fathers, they could easily resist the temptation of finding some essential distinction between Occidental and Oriental "ideals." Most of the emphasis laid on the influence of latitude, altitude, temperature, and "general aspects of nature" on civilization and *Weltanschauung* could then be automatically condemned as unhistorical. Anthropology and objective history are the only antidotes to such subjective race-psychologies.

The material condition of Germany in the latter half of the eighteenth century is thus described by Lewes in his *Life of Goethe*:

"Chemistry did not then exist, . . . alchemy maintained its place among the conflicting hypotheses of the day. . . . The philosopher's stone had many seekers.

"High roads were only found in certain parts of Germany. . . . Milestones were unknown . . . Public conveyances were few and miserable; nothing but open carts with unstuffed seats.

"The furniture even of palaces was extremely simple. In the houses of wealthy bourgeois, chairs and tables were of common fir; . . . carpets . . . beginning to loom upon the national mind as possible luxury. . . . Easy chairs were unknown."

It is clear that so far as economic conditions are concerned, nobody in the eighteenth century could announce the dictum: "East is East, and West is West". In spite of all the advantages of climate there was no "industrial revolution" in Europe until toward the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. The peoples of Asia from Chandragupta to Kanghi would not have found any fundamental difference in Europe from Pericles to Frederick the Great. Contemporary sociologists like Professors Huntingt-

and Dickinson who are following in the wake of Bodin, Montesquieu, Buckle and Hegel, in the "geographical interpretation of history" should ponder over this fact.

German social life in the time of Goethe should appear to have been almost Confucian. Says Lewes:

"Filial obedience was rigidly enforced, the stick or strap not unfrequently aiding parental authority. Even the brothers exercised an almost paternal authority over their sisters."

The modern freedom of the individual was thus unknown even about a century ago. The subjection of women also was a fact.

To quote Lewes again, "Indeed the position of women was by no means such as our women can hear of with patience; not only were they kept under the paternal, marital, and fraternal yoke, but society limited their actions by its prejudices still more than it does now. No woman of the better class of citizens could go out alone; the servant girl followed her to the church, to a shop, or even to the promenade." Calhoun's *Social History of the American Family* is full of similar facts for the New World from Colonial times on. The sociologist who seeks to find a distinctively new type of humanity in the Oriental woman can supply his own correctives if he remembers such facts from not very remote epochs of Occidental history, and of course if he gets oriented to the subject as described in Bebel's classic, *Die Frau*¹².

Let us look to the history of criminal law and capital punishment in England; and we shall see how late into recent times barbarity and inhumanity have reigned in modern Europe. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century there were about two hundred and fifty offences for which the sentence was death. It is only since 1861 that capital punishment has been restricted to the offences of murder, treason, and piracy. But until 1837 even smuggling and rioting were punished with death. In 1835 a street urchin of nine years of age was found guilty and executed under law. He had broken the window of a shop and stolen paint worth only two pence. Until 1832 people were condemned to death for breaking into houses, stealing sheep and horses, and for counterfeiting coins, and until 1823 for stating false facts before marriage registrars. In George I's reign sixty new offences were placed on the Statute Book as meriting death penalty; about one hundred and twenty more had been added since about the Restoration of Charles II (1660).

¹² cf. the position of women in Greece; Lecky: *European Morals*, Vol. II, pp. 281—288.

Education is today the birth right of every man and woman in the Occident. But such a statement could not be made before 1870. The educational advance in Eur-America during the last half-century must not be regarded as the norm of the Western world for the previous three millenniums.

Of the English people married even so late as in 1843 thirty two per cent of the men and forty nine per cent of the women could not read and write. They signed their names on the marriage register with a cross. The great Bill which universalized education was passed in 1870.

According to the findings of Guizot, the French minister of education, in 1833, "the teacher was often regarded in the community on the same footing as a mendicant, and between the herdsman and himself the preference was for the herdsman. Consequently the situation of the schoolmaster was the most often sought after by men who were crippled, unfit for any other kind of work"¹³). It was not until the establishment of the Third Republic in 1870 that education became universal in France.

Are the sociologists then justified in making a case for the historical difference in the "view of life" or outlook on the universe between the East and the West? The Critical Philosophy of Young Asia says "No" on the strength of comparative history, and condemns the "racial" interpretation of civilization as too subjective and superficial to deserve the serious attention of the pragmatic student of institutions and ideals.

9. The Event of 1905.

The story of modern Japan is a verification of this critical philosophy of Young Asia. The triumph of Japan over Russia is thus of profound significance in social science.

The fact is generally misinterpreted in the Western world. Diplomats in Eur-America see in this the nucleus of a pan-Asian crusade against the whites. But the fear is utterly unfounded. Neither religion, nor race, nor language, nor all combined are strengthening principles in the making of alliances. No effective federative could be formed among the little Hellases of antiquity. The confederacy of Delos, the Achaean League, the Aetolian League were all failures.

The Mohammedan Caliphate broke very early into sovereignties, subsequently into myriads. The alliances in mediaeval Europe were kaleidoscopic in character. The Christian Powers, for the last four hundred and fifty years failed to organize a com-

¹³) Compayré: *History of Pedagogy*.

policy against the "infidel" Turks. Even the success of Japan was due to the fact that Russia was not actively assisted by her Christian brethren against the non-white pagan.

The last war also has shown that the grouping of belligerents by colour, race or religion is yet as far from being a question of practical politics as it ever was in history. Turkey was the ally of Germany against France and England (1914—1918). And today (November 1921) France has made a separate treaty with one section of Turkey — namely, the "Nationalist" Angora Government presided over by Kemal — while the other section (the old Constantinople puppet) is being supported by Great Britain. The problem of each Asian people will then have to be fought out separately against its own special enemies with the support of such Powers, Oriental and Occidental, as may for the time being happen to be interested in its fortunes.

The event of 1905 is a formative force in the futurism of Young Asia from altogether another angle. In the first place, the recognition of Japan as a first class power has purged the atmosphere of the science-world of a great part of its arrogance and superstition. It has compelled moderation in the tone of the Occident in regard to the Orient. It has demolished the "papal infallibility" which Eur-American scholars had been ascribing to their races during the nineteenth century. The logic of the "white man's burden" has thus become an anachronism except only to the blindest fanatics.

In the second place, the events at Port Arthur and on the Tsushima Sea have proved in the only manner intelligible to the world that modernization is neither the monopoly of the whites, nor a very complicated and difficult process. The time-value of the sum-total of modernism is, pragmatically speaking, not more than twenty five or thirty years. Let us note the facts.

In 1853 Commodore Perry presented Japan with the electric telegraph, steam locomotive, telescope, clocks, maps, agricultural machinery, and such other "curios". But it was not until 1870 that the first line of telegraph was set up between Yokohama and Tokyo. The first railway line of 18 miles was constructed in 1872. And it was really during the period between 1880 and 1886 that the Japanese seriously commenced novitiate in Eur-American culture. Within two decades of her "freshman" stage, however, she was master enough of the new arts and sciences to be able to browbeat a white aggressor. If there had been any difference between the East and the West in 1853, or 1867 or 1886, it was completely broken down in 1905.

It is clear that in spite of the epoch-making "industrial revolution" brought on by steam the West had not gone very far ahead of the East. It shows also that the Asian civilization with which Japan started on the race about 1870 was not essentially distinct from the Eur-American, but that it was slightly poorer and "inferior" only because it had not independently produced the steam engine. Thus, scientifically speaking, there is nothing miraculous in the phenomenal developments of new Japan.

Since 1905 Japan herself has indeed been anxious to proclaim to the world that she is different from, and superior to, the rest of Asia in her ideals, institutions, and methods. But this notion is confined within the circle of a few diplomats, professors who virtually hold diplomatic posts, and such journalists as have touch with prominent members of Parliament. It is, in fact, preached in foreign languages by a section of those intellectuals who have to come across, or make it a point to write for, Eur-American statesmen, scholars, and tourists. The masses of the Japanese, and these diplomats themselves at home are always conscious of the real truth. They all know that ever since the days of Prince Shotoku Taishi (A. C. 573—621) and the scholar-saint Kobo Daishi (774—835), i. e. ever since the very dawn of their civilization, the constitution, social hierarchy, poetry, architecture, painting, divinities, and even folklore and the superstitions of Japan have been either Chinese or Hindu.

But it is not difficult to explain the recent Japanese manifestoes and publications. These are designed to report to the Eur-American governments, universities, and libraries that Japan is radically distinct from the Asia that is under subjection to the Powers. All these are simply measures of self-defence on the part of Japan and reveal the essential weakness of the little of Asia that is left free. Without such shifts Japan cannot come in line with the other "superior races" whose logic has been dominating the market. Japan has learnt by bitter experience that the white nations would not admit her into their caste of first class powers if she were to appear to them in "native" *kimono* and *geta*, or were to offer to the foreign guests their unsugared *ocha* (green tea) without milk and *khasi* cakes. She must varnish her yellow self white in order that she may be granted the dignity of a ruling race. The Japanese bankers and officials, captains and policemen are therefore compelled to have the Eur-American paraphernalia of public life. This is abhorred by most of them in their heart of hearts. But they must swallow because this is the price of their recognition as the only "civilized" state of Asia.

Japan must also have the logic and psychology of the whites with regard to the rest of Asia. The present Japanese view about Chinese and Hindu civilizations, so far as it is jingoistic, is merely an aspect of this compulsory Occidentalization. Unless this claim of separateness from the Asians is strongly put forward, the Occident would hesitate to treat with Japan as a peer. It was by urging such distinctions from the semi-subject Chinese and the subject Hindus and Mohammedans that she induced America to revise and modify the Immigration Bill (1917) especially in her favour. Young Asia accepts the entire situation as a natural corollary of the long-standing aggression of the Occident. It therefore does not condemn Japan, but rather pities her isolated condition. The establishment of another Japan on continental Asia is the only possible therapeutics for the current international pathology. And to this the political doctors of Young Asia are addressing themselves.

Old Asian institutions and ideas are still paramount in Japan. It is not a fact, and it cannot be psychologically conceived, that the Japanese were Eur-Americanized during the brief period under review. None of her Oriental characteristics have stood in the way of Japan's growth as a modern "industrial power".

As Uyehara tells us in *Political Development of Japan*, "Young people of England and America would be shocked if they were told that boys and girls are not allowed to choose their life partners for themselves."

A class of "untouchable" outcasts still exists in Japan. They are called *Eta*. They live in the outskirts of towns and villages. Though they have been legally enfranchized since 1872, the social prejudice against them has survived.

Shinto is generally taken as equivalent to ancestor-worship. But, according to Harada, in 901 the number of deities worshipped by the Japanese was 3132. The Japanese deities may be grouped as (1) stellar bodies, (2) the elements of earth, air, fire, and water, (3) natural phenomena, (4) prominent natural objects, as mountains, trees and caverns, (5) men, (6) animals. There is a Japanese proverb to the effect: "What god we know not, yet a god there dwells."¹⁴

In Gulick's *Evolution of the Japanese* we have the following passage: "Whenever my wife took my arm as we walked the street to and from church, or elsewhere, the people looked at us in surprised displeasure. Such public manifestations of intimacy was to be expected from libertines alone, and from these only when they were more or less under the influence of drink."

¹⁴) *The Faith of Japan*.

In spite of these and other social features objectionable from the latest Eur-American standpoint, Japan has succeeded in making herself into the "great Far Eastern ally" of England and the phobia of the United States. Young Asia therefore legitimately asks the question: "Are not the customs and conventions of the Orient of at least the same political and military significance as are those of the Occident?" The answer has been given in the event of 1905.

10. The Demand of Young Asia.

In the name of religion the missionaries, and in the name of science the scholars, have been rousing the worst passions of Oriental humanity. They dare do this because they know that Young Asia is unarmed and disarmed. And they can afford to exasperate eight hundred million human beings as long as these peoples remain unrepresented by independent armies, independent navies and independent air-fleets.

The existence of Japan as the only free soil of the Asians is not an effective means to bring the Western world to its senses. Japan, although a first class power, is still not strong enough to command the respect of the nations. She has not really stood on her legs as yet. It was only a decade ago, in 1911, that the humiliating "extra-territoriality" clauses were withdrawn by the Powers from their treaties with Japan. She is too weak even to suppress the anti-Japanese journalism of the foreigners in the heart of her capital. And in foreign politics she is in perpetual danger of being cornered by the whites. In fact, the subjection of the rest of Asia to the non-Asians is a standing menace to her own safety. She has ever to be on the alert against another "Russian advance" of 1904.

There is one tremendous fact that weighs heavily upon the mind of Japan, both its government and its people. That fact is the domination by Eur-America of entire Asia from Manilla to Cairo. 1. elementary need of self-preservation thus happens to induce Japan to resist by all means any further advance of Eur-American domination in the Orient. The night-mare of this "white peril" is fundamental fact of Japanese politics, internal as well as international. Through her alleged aggressions in China, the unfortunate background of nations, Japan is only preventing a Chinese fate for herself by strengthening her lines of defence against Western invasion through Burma, India and Indo-China. And as long as China continues to be enslaved by ever-expanding European empires and receive nothing more solid than lip-sympathy from the American on-lookers, Japan can hardly be blamed for trying to snatch pieces of the Far Eastern loot for an Asian people.

Notwithstanding the solicitations of the syndicalists and international anti-militarists events are everywhere tending to the great cataclysm when the adjustment of the relations between the East and the West would have to be submitted to the final court of appeal—the arbitrament of the sword. But before that inevitable day comes the road to world's peace may be considerably smoothed through the judicious cooperation of the intellectuals of the Occident and the Orient.

Young Asia does not want sympathy or charity. The demand of Young Asia is justice—a justice that is to be interpreted by itself on the achievements of its own heroes. The militant unrest of the revolutionary Orient is born of the same desire for a “bearable life” which Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria, backed as he was by Great Britain, demanded for Macedonia from Turkey in October 1912 with probably questionable justification.

The Orient cannot stop short of achieving the equality of treatment as between the Asians and the Eur-Americans. And this not only in ambassadorial speeches and parliamentary manifestoes, or presidential messages, but also in the discussions of learned societies, in school rooms, theatres, moving picture shows, daily journals, and monthly reviews.

The abolition or mitigation of race-prejudice existing at present is possible only under two conditions:

First, there must be an ethical revolution in Eur-America. The Occident must learn to treat the Orient—its present day morals, manners and sentiments, its struggles and failures in the only way which would be tolerated by the dignity of man. There must not be one standard for judging human flesh in the West, and another standard for judging it in the East.

Secondly, there must be a psychological revolution in Eur-America. The very attitude from which the scholars have approached the Orient has to be completely abandoned. The fact of nineteenth century success and overlordship must be banished from the field of scholarship: Oriental culture has to be weighed in the balance under the same conditions of study as the Occidental.

Only then, in the event of Asia recovering its natural rights from the temporary aggressors and illegitimate usurpers, will sanity prevail in the deliberations of the great Peace-Council convened by the Parliament of Man. The futurists of Young Asia are looking forward to that spiritual re-birth of the world.

II.

Asia and Eur-America.

Leavings of the Great War (1914-1918).

1. The War and Asia.

Spiritually speaking, Asia was temporarily paralyzed during the World-War. Down to 1914 the continent had depended for its culture mostly on influences radiating from West to East. And the war closed the flood-gates of these currents. For example, the slow but steady development of China was arrested. Still clearer was the plight of Persia—the one Asian country which was in utter need of western science and finance, especially for railways and irrigation. She was then completely cut off. Egypt and India have suffered too. The number of merchants, scholars and travellers who came to the West for inspiration fell off almost to zero.

The only Asian country to advance has been Japan, because she was able to step into the industrial and commercial vacuum created by the withdrawal of Germany and Austria. Through being able to furnish maritime transportation, Japan expanded enormously in the fields of Eastern and Southern Asia, the South Sea Islands and Latin America. And yet her cultural intercourse with Eur-America was considerably cut short owing to the uncertain conditions that kept Japanese politics in suspense all through the war period.

But, on the other hand, in Asia there has been a second great effect of the war which is not to be ignored. This conflict has been, potentially at least, a mighty factor toward Asia's advance in the near future. For the war has given Asia the one thing she needed—a complete change in the diplomatic grouping of powers and in the values obtaining in the political psychology of all nations.

The *status quo* which obtained from the opening of China by the Nanking Treaty in 1842 down to 1914 was very detrimental to the realization of Asia's natural and legitimate aspirations. But this state of affairs has now received a very rude shock. One fact—that England was compelled to retain Japan as the *de facto* protecto

British interests in Eastern and Southern Asia and to draw on the military assistance even of China—this one fact has entitled Young Asia to visualize a continent not dominated by England.

Another fact has set Young Asia to thinking. During all that period from 1842 down to 1914 Asia got not one chance—except in the Russo-Japanese War (1905)—to break the hard-and-fast line of distinction between East and West which Westerners had drawn, to prove its fallacy. The war has altered also that perspective in international life. For example, India alone placed 1,500,000 men and more on the fronts of Europe and Asia. These Indians bore their full share of the brunt of the fighting in Flanders in 1914, and their merit was heartily recognized by the French. Incidentally, they proved to Asia that India's fighting men can stand the rigors of any climate.

2. Revolution vs. Reaction.

The New Asia can discover two forces of a diametrically opposite character in the world politics of today. These are manifest, first, in the conditions of international diplomacy brought about by the "Peace", and secondly, in the spirit of universal unrest focussed and embodied, for the time being, in the Bolshevik soviets of Russia. The one, represented by the association of the victorious allies, miscalled the League of Nations, has reproduced the reactionary regime of the Congress of Vienna, the Holy Alliance, and the dictatorship of Metternich, the arch-protagonist of absolutism. The other has for its counterpart, to continue the analogy from the past century, the revolutionism militant, which born in the "ideas of 1789", maintained its checkered career by combating the powers that be in 1815, 1830 and 1848. The problem of world-reconstruction of our own times is therefore bound to repeat, may be during comparatively shorter intervals, the great conflict between revolution and *status quo* on well known historic lines. It is in and through the fire-baptism of this new war or series of wars that Asia seeks liberation from the imperialistic and capitalistic domination by Europe and America.

This is not the first time in human development when grandiloquent phrases and sonorous shibboleths have been invented to camouflage the old Adam. The present generation of intellectuals and statesmen have but taken the cue from their great grandparents of the Napoleonic era. Who, indeed, could have been more emphatic in proclaiming from house-tops the principles of a "lasting peace", the "just division of power", etc. in their schemes

for the "reconstruction of social order" than were those diplomatists of the early nineteenth century?

Nor has human nature been re-made overnight to warrant us in believing that we are far removed from the age of scramble for spheres of influence. In the new doctrine of self-determination of peoples that has been employed with vigour against the Germanic and Turkish interests one can easily recognize the old statecraft of the balance of power, only "writ large". From the standpoint of allies it is in fact the same thing turned inside out. As such it bids fair to be the greatest disturber of the tranquillity of Europe. The bunch of new buffer-states that have been conjured up to lie between the Germans and the Russians is in reality a row of live storm-centres where the Great Powers will have to encounter legion of old Balkan problems. And at least half a dozen Alsace-Lorraines have been manufactured by recklessly giving away German populations over to Italy, France, Poland, Tchecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia. One great hope of the enslaved nations of Asia lies in the activities of these German "irredentas" each of which is pregnant with the seed of a new war.

3. Evacuation of Asia.

It is obvious in any case that at the present crisis the New Orient can contribute to the Occident only a most paradoxical offer. The one serious question that is worth considering today is the question of the evacuation of Asia by the armies, navies and air-fleets of Europe and America. The expulsion of the West from the East is the sole preliminary to a discussion of fundamental peace terms. For the greatest problem before the statesmen of the world-reconstruction in the interest of durable peace is that of the freedom of Asia. Not until this has been solved satisfactorily are there any chances for the genuine social-industrial democracy of Man hoped for by the international socialists or for the conventional League of Nations championed by the capitalists and the capitalist-bossed intelligents.

Humanity is in the sorest need of an emancipated Asia, independent of foreign control, unhampered in any legitimate line activity. Every inch of Asian soil has to be placed under sovereign state of the Asian race, no matter whether soviet, communal, republican, monarchical, democratic or autocratic. the present there is the urgent call for at least another Japa fifty, sixty, or seventy million people on continental Asia, ab work its own mines, finance its own administration, and man it polytechnic colleges.

Is the political consciousness of Europe and America alive to these demands? Certainly not. For, the one fact which has been systematically ignored both by the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is that the last war arose neither out of the nationality problems in Europe nor out of the class-struggle in the Western world but essentially out of the keen rivalry for dominating the lands and seas of Asia. And yet where did Asia stand at the peace conference? Virtually no where. The Congress at Versailles had practically no problem as to the reconstruction of Asia left for solution to the diplomatic tug-of-war. For, the fate of Asia had already been sealed. Asia was doomed months before the humiliating armistice was swallowed by the Germans, long before the ignominious surrender of the German navy.

4. Bolsheviks and the British Empire.

Asia was reshaped almost automatically through the Bolshevik unmaking of the Russian Empire. The collapse of military Russia left Asia absolutely to the tender mercies of British Imperialism. The hegemony of England over the Asian continent was thus brought about not more by the war itself than by one of its by-products, the Russian Revolution.

In 1914 the equilibrium of Asian politics rested on three important props. The first was the Anglo-French treaty of 1904, the second the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, 1906 and 1911 and the third the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. These three arrangements had served to stabilize for a decade the balance of power in Asia.

The *Entente* was a final confession of defeat on the part of the French in their imperialistic race with the English. Since the loss of Egypt in 1882 and the humiliation at Fashoda in 1898 France had been used to pursuing a pinprick policy with her rival wherever she could. But to shunt her off from the Asian tracks England gave her a free hand in Morocco. French mastery in Indo-China however was not questioned in any way. The French sphere of influence in Siam, moreover, was clearly delimited, and of course like that of every other power France's finger in the Chinese pie remained undisturbed.

Having eliminated France from the Asian game or rather having localized French ambitions within fixed areas the British proceeded to strengthen the new friendship of Japan on the morrow of her victory at Port-Arthur and on the Tsushima Sea. For Japan

was the strongest of the powers likely to compete with her in China and the Chinese waters. Besides, Japan might eventually become the rallying-ground of rebels and political refugees from India and Burma. The British overtures could not but be welcomed by the Japanese themselves as the line of least resistance was the only advisable course for Japan. She needed, furthermore, the backing of a first class European power. She agreed, therefore, to help England put down revolutions among the Hindus and Moslems of the British Empire, and glibly proclaimed the policy of open door in the Far East. England was thus assured of the *status quo* in Southern and Eastern Asia.

The next great force to reckon with was Russia. But the loss of her navy in the Japanese War, the humiliation abroad, and the revolution at home had deprived the bear of its claws and nails. England, therefore, had nothing serious to fear from the Northern Colossus against whose solid advance in Siberia and Manchuria through the concession of the Chinese Eastern Railway (granted by the Cassini-Li Hung Chang convention 1896) she had been forced to contract the Japanese Alliance in 1902. The rising German power, on the other hand, was threatening, to be a portentous menace to the British world dominion. Consequently Great Britain managed to put in abeyance the traditional Russophobia and by a sudden change of front successfully pooled her interests with her greatest enemy in Asia since the Crimean War of 1856—57. The upshot was the Anglo-Russian Convention leading to a friendly settlement of claims in Persia, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Tibet. The Middle Eastern Question was thus closed satisfactorily for the British Empire.

That question like all other questions in Asian and colonial politics was indeed opened by Germany's ultimatum to the established powers in 1914. But for all practical purposes there were no changes in the situation as long as there was a fighting Russia. The extinction of her military power, however, since Nov. 9, 1917 created a huge gap in the politics of Asia. The consequence was a violent shifting of its centre of gravity. For one thing, the equilibrium of China, so far as the Powers are concerned, has been completely upset. Its stability cannot be restored until and unless the issues finally decided in the Yangtze Valley between England advancing through the South and through Tibet and Turkestan, and Japan advancing from the East and through Manchuria and Siberia, every other sphere of Russian influence, however, England stepped in as a matter of course. Today she is thus the sole arb

of the fate of the entire Middle East, and the so-called Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919 has only legalized the *de facto* robbery.¹⁾

5. A Monopoly in World Control.

Even without the Great War the Russian Revolution would have bequeathed to the British Empire the undisputed suzerainty over Persia, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Tibet, and the lion's share in the control of Central Asia and China. Add to this the results of the War. Mesopotamia has been conquered from Turkey, Arabia and Armenia are British protectorates, the Palestine zone is in Franco-British hands. With the exception of French complications in Syria and Japanese in Kiao-chao England finds herself the exclusive master of the situation. The entire sea-front from Suez to Singapore is British. And over the whole land mass between the South Asian Seas and the series of Mid-Asian waterpartings, the Caucasus, the Karakum Desert, the Hindu Kush, and the Tianshan, Great Britain's will is law.

Verily, this single-handed domination of Asia is the greatest peril the world has ever known. Never was British Imperial and colonial power more formidable than it is today. The triumphs of England over the Spanish Armada and over Louis XIV after the reconstruction at Utrecht or even her expansion since Waterloo are but insignificant beginnings of world-subjugation compared with what is in store for her from now on after the eclipse of Russia and Germany as powers. The British Empire has besides been insured for a few decades at least against the challenge of a powerful enemy. The last and only possible rival of England has been brought to its knees. The united militarism of the Allies has now made the world safe for *Pax Britannica*.

Nay, democracy has thus been granted a safe asylum among the children of men! For, in sooth, is not the expansion of Britain in naval power, commerce, colonies, and protectorates, or those new-fangled mandatories tantamount to the conquest of liberalism, liberty and law on earth? This is how the average American has been taught to regard the end of the war. Indeed the entire intellect of the United States has not seen any further than this. How could it? The mind of man even in the twentieth century, even after the event of November 7, 1917 is as indolent as in the days of Duns Scotus

¹⁾ In 1922 one must observe, however, that both in Persia and Afghanistan Great Britain has been compelled by the force of circumstances to practise a policy of retreat.

and Galileo. It is tenaciously clinging to the old political moorings. It is tremendously afraid of new *mores* in international ethics. And the brain of America used as it is to the comfortable atmosphere of a thoughtless optimism induced by the century-old seclusion of the Monroe Doctrine is naturally too timid to rise to the height of the occasion. Men and women, inured to the unquestioning dogmatism of Browning's "All is well on earth" since "God is in His Heaven", are the least expected to look facts squarely in the face. When therefore the bullion power of the United States determined to enter the lists of the armageddon as the St. John the Baptist of world democracy, on what other political psychology could the quixotic adventure be based except on the postulate that the world is safe for democracy, civilization and humanity as long as it is safe for the British Empire?

But even America, pragmatic as she is, cannot long remain blind to accomplished facts. She cannot help asking the question now that the peace is tending to create new wars: "How is the world to be delivered of the British peril?" France has long been a non-entity, at best only a second fiddle. For the time being Russia is pulverized and enfeebled, although her message is quite powerful all the world over. The Germans can hardly raise their head for a generation. And Italy, although growing, is not yet a formidable power.

The only protests can come from Japan in regard to Eastern Asia, if at all. But they are bound to be too feeble. Little Nippon is dazed by the extraordinary changes that have taken place. Even her own independence may be in danger. She cannot any longer look for self-defence in the mutual competition among the Great Powers, for virtually there are no Great Powers left. The complete annihilation of German influence in the Pacific and the Far East is certainly not an unmixed blessing to the Japanese people or to the Asians as a whole.

Is then the American merchant marine and navy destined to contest the British monopoly of world control? Or, is an Anglo-American Alliance going to be the terror of the second quarter of the twentieth century? Perhaps the so-called Disarmament Conference at Washington (November 11, 1921) furnishes the first term in answer to these queries.

6. Achievements of the War.

Every cloud, however, has its silver lining. The Orient is blind to the fact that so far as Europe is concerned, the achieve-

of the war are already great. Notwithstanding the problem of German irredentas and other minorities, Europe is certainly going to be a far more decent place to live in than before. The nationality principle for which Kosciusko died and Kossuth fought, and to which Bismarck and Mazzini gave a recognizable shape has at length been thoroughly realized. It has in fact been carried to its furthest logical consequence. The slogan, "one language, one state", may not in all cases turn out to be as convenient in practice as it is mystical and romantic in theory. Europe may need federations and Zollvereins in order to modify the extreme atomistic organization of the new ethnic polities. The causes of friction, besides, between neighbouring tariff or administrative unions may long continue to be at work. Besides, the French policy of using Poland against Russia and Germany or Tchecho-Slovakia against Germany and Italy or the British strategy of helping Greece against Turkey and Italy in the Mediterranean will follow automatically from the "human nature" in international relations as embodied in the Hindu Kautilyan doctrine of *mandala*²). But, on the whole, the anachronism of race-submergence and race-autocracy that prevailed on a large scale between the Jura and the Urals and between the Baltic and the Black Seas has been rung out once for ever.

Not less fundamentally than the problem of nationality has the foundation of sovereignty been reconstituted. The People's participation and control in industry and "public law" have almost been tending to revive the old guilds, local units, and "direct" democracies. The power of the peasants and urban working classes in the administration of national interests is coming to the forefront in referendum, municipalization and public ownership schemes. The corporations are growing in legal authority. The form of government in every state of Europe is thus tending to be far more liberal than the idealists could ever conceive. The age of Lenin's anti-property democracy, labor republic or proletarian dictatorship is perhaps yet rather far off from universal acceptance, but the phenomenal expansion of the rights of the people or "constitutional liberties" is a settled fact. And "progressive taxation" as well as the repudiation (partial or complete) of national debts are bound to emerge as the principles of the "new order" in public finance. Democracy (*swaraj*) has sunk deeper into the human soul than it did in 1848 or 1870.

²) Vide the present author's *Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*, Leipzig 1922.

Last but not least in importance must be admitted the enrichment of European polity through the creation of a new democratic type in the Soviets of Russia. This new species of constitution is a distinctively original contribution to the social development of mankind. In so far as the agrarian organization is concerned, the almost spontaneous emergence of soviets throughout the length and breadth of Russia indicates that these institutions are essentially akin to, if not identical with, the traditional *Mirs* of the Slavic peasants. Only, these village communities, or autonomous "little republics" of rural communes, have been harnessed to the new problem of controlling the factors of production in the interest of the working class. And in the industrial field, the same communal principle has been introduced into guilds. As such, the Russian experiment is of profound significance to the medieval, i. e. to the economically and intellectually "backward" countries of the present day, where agricultural "communities" or industrial guilds in one form or another have obtained from time immemorial. For it is demonstrating that in order to evolve a democratic republic every people need not, item by item, repeat the industrial revolution, capitalistic regime and the centralized parliamentary system by which Western Europe and the United States were transformed in the nineteenth century. The new nationalities of Eastern Europe and the Balkans as well as the subject and semi-subject peoples of Asia have thus got before them the precedent of a new popular sovereignty. The experiments in the republican constitution such as are being conducted in Russia are going to be the starting-point of all nationality-movements anywhere on earth.

7. The Fallacies of Neo-liberalism.

But, on the other hand, through the impact of the war, an intense wave of militarism has enveloped all ranks of the Asian and African peoples from Manila to Morocco. The vindictive nationalism of the last two decades has been lifted up to the spiritual plane in Asia's consciousness.

This circumstance will be regretted no doubt by the liberal or rather radical forces of new Europe and new America, such as the Communists, Syndicalists, Anti-militarists and "International Workers of the World". For, from the stage at which they themselves have arrived theirs is today the creed of internationalism and disarmament. But can it be expedient for the suffering races to trust themselves peacefully to the vague dreams of a millennial utopia?

For obvious reasons Asia cannot afford to be misguided by such a hallucination, brilliant though it be, nor to have confidence in the *ignis fatuus* of Western good-will. The liberals and radicals of the new Orient have to be militarists perforce. Theirs is the natural and necessary reaction to the oppressive "white man's burden" of the last century.

The goal of nationalist Asia is however identical with that of internationalist Eur-America. The emancipation of mankind from all possible sources of exploitation, atrophy and degeneracy is the common objective of both. The class-struggle of the West thus becomes anti-alienism or race-struggle in the East; because for all practical purposes capitalism is there embodied in the foreign rulers and foreign captains of industry. Until foreign domination is overthrown, the socialists and labor leaders of Asia must have to advocate the tenets of nationalism, backed by indigenous capitalism if need be. Asia's struggle with her own capitalists is of course *not* in abeyance for the present, but will be accelerated as soon as the foreign incubus is subverted.

The neo-liberals and socialistic or communistic radicals of the Western world seem moreover to harbour the illusion that the form of government at home cannot but affect the colonial policy of nations. Theoretically it should, but actual history is different. Evidently the Western liberals are ignorant of the conditions of foreign commerce and empire in Asia. But can they forget the fact that justice in home politics has ever gone hand in hand with injustice and tyranny abroad? And are there any grounds for admitting that the popular governments of the Western world are less detrimental and ruinous to the dependencies and protectorates than are the formally autocratic states?

Look to France, the "cradle of liberty." Which of the colonial powers has been a more criminal offender on this score than the French republic? The exploitation of Indo-China³⁾ by France has surpassed even the notorious repressiveness of the Dutch in Java and the East Indies. The treatment of the Chinese Empire since 1842 and subsequently of the Chinese republic by the Powers has left no warm corner in Young China's heart for one "foreign devil" as against another. It was not possible likewise for Young Persia to make any distinction between Czaristic Russia and constitutional England whether as regards the forceful partition of a weak

³⁾ Ireland: *Far Eastern Tropics*, p. 155 (Between 1900 and 1905 Indo-China contributed forty million francs to France).

people's territory into spheres of influence or as regards the interpretation of those spheres. Italy has not displayed greater humanity, or fair play in occupying the Turkish Island off the Southwest coast of Anatolia (against the terms of the treaty of 1912) than did Germany in seizing Kiao-chao.

The inroads of America, again, although Monroe-doctrinated, through the Hawaii and Philippine Islands into the Asian sphere cannot be less dreadful in Japanese estimation than was the slow but steady Russian avalanche which culminated in the event of 1904. Belgium has come in contact with Asia only in the Customs service of Persia. Yet the Belgians have succeeded in earning the Persian hatred even more bitterly than the English and the Russians. The Ottomans tried alliance with every denomination of Christianity and with every species of European nationality. All have been found equally wanting. And India's long experience with Great Britain has brought into relief the fixed idea of all imperialism viz., that, be the Cabinet liberal or tory, no subject race must be dragged into the whirlpool of party politics. About every specimen of Eur-America therefore Young Asia is entitled to generalize to the effect that

"His honour rooted in dishonour stood,
And faith unfaithful kept him falsely true."

But perhaps the neo-liberals would meet New Asia with a ready made rejoinder: "Well, you are talking only of the chauvinists, the junkers and jingoes, the bourgeoisie and capitalists of Europe and America. They are the enemy of labor everywhere on earth. But the working classes of the different nations bear no grudge against one another. They are not committed to any distinctions of race, or to any policy of exploitation." The best reply to such a position of alleged internationalism in the labor world is the systematic maltreatment and persecution of Chinese and Japanese "immigrants" by the people of the United States. That story has out-pogro the pogroms of Romanoff Russia. In this instance, however, curious enough, friends of Asian labor were the American bourgeoisie and capitalists. The anti-Asian Immigration Bills of 1904 and 19 were the direct consequences of the resistance offered by organized labor force of America.

Can any economist or ethnologist prove that the Tchechs, Slovaks, the Sicilians, the South Italians, the Serbs or Greeks are more assimilable or Americanizable than are Orientals? In their European homes the Slav and the Latin peasants do have a higher standard of life or better civic sense or richer

outlook than have the unskilled laborers of Asia. Culturally or economically the European immigrants are not more conveniently situated with regard to the domicile in the United States than are Orientals of the same social standing.

Are the leaders of the workingmen awakened to the injustice perpetrated on the Asians in the U. S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand? It is not surprising, therefore, that "Thou, Brutus, too?" is the only remark with which the radicals of the Orient can greet their comrades of the Occident. With whom, then, is Asia to flirt? With the bourgeoisie or with the proletariat of Eur-America? It is too much to expect that Asia should be able to discriminate between the Jew and Gentile, the Greek Church and the Methodist, the republics and the monarchies, the employer and the laborer, while reacting to the despotism of the ruling races. Young Asia expects the labor parties and socialists of Europe and America to demonstrate their distinctiveness from the bourgeoisie classes by championing the freedom of subject races in an effective and convincing manner.

8. Bulwark of World Peace.

The new Asia fully realizes the situation. It knows that the Orient has nothing more to lose. It has grown desperate in the consciousness that the only future that awaits the peoples of Asia is an extermination like that of the dodo or the bison. It has, therefore, accepted the challenge and ultimatum of Eur-America. It has also formulated its own demands in response. These are being pressed into the world's notice not indeed loud enough, for as yet Asia is unarmed and disarmed. But humanly speaking, it cannot remain armless for an indefinite period. The day of reckoning is not far off.

The time is fast approaching when Europe and America will have to admit that their peoples must not command greater claims or privileges in Asia than the peoples of Asia can possibly possess within the bounds of Europe and America. The West will then be compelled to appreciate the justice of the demand that the Asians must enjoy the same rights in Europe and America as Europeans and Americans wish to enjoy in Asia.

In the meantime the world is witnessing the dawn of a new era in international relations. The idealists of revolutionary Russia have made their *debut* by dissipating to the winds the secret and other treaties of the old regime as so many scraps of paper, and by declaring the independence of subject races both Asian and European. This is the first instance in the annals of diplomacy and

foreign policy when Europe has been honest and sincere to Asia. This is the first time in modern history when the East and the West have been treated on equal terms. This is why intellectuals of the New Orient hail with enthusiasm the birth of Bolshevism as a spiritual force. For they find in Young Russia their only Western colleague in the task of making the world safe from economic exploitation, colonialism and foreign rule.

Syndicalists, Anti-militarists and other radicals of Eur-America, howsoever they may differ among themselves in regard to tenets of labour or politics are at least equally united with Bolsheviks in so far as the freedom of Asia is concerned. They are seeking to prevent the workingmen of colonial powers from fighting against the rebels in the dependencies or in any way helping the imperialist armies, fleets and munition factories.

The surest bulwark of international peace will then be furnished by an alliance of the international socialism of continental Europe with the militant nationalism of Young Asia until the new Metternichs are forced to capitulate and find their proper place in the limbo of oblivion. Simultaneously from the insular angle let the British Labor Party, if it chooses to be sincere, warm itself up to bring out an Anglo-Saxon edition of Bolshevism and manufacture it in a shape understandable by the sluggish intellect of the newly fleshed imperialists of America. Ultimately through this grand *rapprochement* will the principles of the Russian Revolution, like those of the French, become the first postulates of a renovated age of World-Liberation. It is on such an understanding that the platform of cooperation between the Sinnfeiners of Asia and fighters for the New Order in Eur-America can be erected for the emancipation of the races and classes from political and economic thralldom.

9. The New Germany and Young Asia.

In the coming decades Germany, robbed as she is of her infant colonies, has a great role to play in the emancipation of Asia. From now on Young Asia will classify the great powers of the world into two fundamentally different groups. One will be called the colonial powers, and the other the non-colonial. It is to this latter category that the New Germany belongs. The most important incident in the present German constitution lies herein. Not that Germany is republican or democratic or socialistic but that the German-speaking peoples are non-colonial bids fair to be one of the supreme factors in the international relations of the twentieth century.

The crushing defeat sustained by German arms entailing, as it has, the loss of colonies promises almost to be a blessing in disguise to Germany. For it has served to enlarge the horizon of German ambitions and energies. It has enfranchised German idealism from the narrow territorial limits of the Teutonic race. German *Kultur* has at last been compelled to take note of the many races outside of Europe in whose service and development Germany's humanists and cosmopolitan thinkers must have to devote their brains and brawns.

The new *Freiheitskampf*, the coming war of Liberation, to which the diplomacy, science, arts and philosophy of Young Germany are addressing themselves is accordingly not to have for its objective merely the regions of *Mittleuropa* on the lines of the little *Vaterland* for which the heroes of 1806—1813 fought. No, the Kleists and Schillers of Germania in the twentieth century are destined to evoke the romanticism of their compatriots for the emancipation of much larger areas of the earth's surface. The continent of Asian peoples who are striving to achieve their freedom and shatter the fetters of the colonial powers is looming large in the consciousness of Germany's liberators as a great field for cooperation and comradeship on which to work out the spiritual reconstruction of mankind.

These colonial powers are the common enemy of Young Asia and New Germany. Automatically therefore German idealists have their natural allies in Asian revolutionaries.

The present is not the time for a Schopenhauerian pessimism for the German race. There is still a great future before Germany, greater than she ever could imagine for herself while she was carving out little slices from China or Africa or taking possession of tiny unknown islands in the South Seas. German statesmen, intellectuals and manual workers have only to open their eyes and see that their place in the sun is yet assured in and through the friendly cooperation which is being extended to them by the peoples of Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan, India and China.

The few crumbs which the British Empire may choose to grant to the Germans, its vanquished and humiliated enemies, from out of its table by way of commercial concessions and favours in the markets of its colonies, dependencies and mandated areas,—although temporarily these doles may be useful in Germany's economic and financial reconstruction,—can only add insult to injury in the estimation of every normally thinking German. But Germania's genius has far more honourable and much more momentous work to do for the world.

It is to the dignity of being an ally in the liberation of colonies and dependencies that the New Germany as the greatest non-colonial power of today is being invited by the manual and brain workers of Asia. A free Orient is sure to offer infinitely greater chances to German brain and bullion than Germany can reasonably expect from the self-seeking charity of her hated enemies of yesterday. The grim determination with which German working men and leaders of public life have been grappling with the facts of defeat and humiliation and act up to the terms of the victors to the very letter,—notwithstanding the exchange difficulties and financial crisis brought on by the exorbitant indemnities, notwithstanding the loss of industrial regions in Alsace-Lorraine and Silesia, and notwithstanding the expensive and demoralizing army of occupation in the Rhine Province,—this sullen and proud endeavour will be crowned with its highest achievements and reward only when the teeming Asian millions (half the humanity of the world as they constitute in themselves) will be brought under the banners of Asian *Swarnj* and thrown open to the free competition and free intercourse of the nations.

The New Russia has started on its career by declaring the independence of Asian colonies and dependencies or protectorates. Colonialism will have its greatest enemy among the Russian peasants, workers and intelligentsia. The people of the United States, also, which may almost be described as half non-colonial (notwithstanding its aggressive Mexican policy and notwithstanding its Haiti, Santo Domingo and the Philippines) are actively championing the cause of Asian independence, thanks to the optimism and historic love of liberty among the Americans.

It now remains for Germany to speak out and act in the manner in which the Orient expects that a great race bent on the revindication of its claims should act both for its own honour and national self-assertion as well as for opening out new vistas in international relations and world-culture. The infiniteward energism of "Fausts" of Young Asia as well as their Siegfried-like *sādhana* (*Sben*) for freedom will supply the *Volksseele* of Germania not with its spiritual nourishment but will also furnish for it a bra *milieu* of hopefulness and the perennial springs of creative yu

Persia and the Persian Gulf (1906—1919).

While the heat of the armageddon has forged new peoples of Europe into self-conscious statehood, the knell of national existence has been tolled on one of the oldest peoples of the world. The slow but steady passing of Persia was probably the greatest though the most unobserved and the least talked-of event of world politics during the Great War. The imagination of mankind has indeed been fired by the emergence of Ukrainians, Tchecho-Slovaks, and so forth, as more or less sovereign units in the international family. Democracy also has acquired a new lease and a new sanction for humanity through the theory of self-determination promulgated by the radicals of Bolshevik Russia and popularized by the President of the United States. But, as if to demonstrate the Rembrandtesque chiaroscuro in social evolutions, the world is silently witnessing the shades of annihilation that are fast enveloping the nearly fifteen million Shiahite (heterodox) Moslems of the Middle East.

The tragedy of Persia is not, however, an unknown phenomenon, not at any rate to the people of America. For it was an American citizen who, not long ago in 1912, exposed to the world at large the fact of the "strangling" of Persia. This honest disclosure elicited from Asia at that time a profound admiration for the American character; which was only equalled by another almost synchronous incident consisting in the official declaration of the United States that it would not participate in the Six-Power-Loan to the nascent Chinese republic on the ground that the action might necessitate intervention in the internal administration of China. But since then Persia seems to have dropped out of the consciousness of politicians in Asia and Eur-America. They are probably waiting to be startled one day by the news that "Baytud Din", or the Home of Religion, as the land is known to its people, has formally passed into a dependency.

1. Reconstruction in the Persian Gulf.

And yet, paradoxically enough, it is true that all through the war period Persia actively engaged the brains of the diplomatists and war-chiefs of the belligerents. It could not be otherwise. For it is the Persian Gulf that has ever remained the objective of all railway enterprises for connecting Asia with Europe and bringing the undeveloped regions of the East under the domination of the advanced Western races.

The war no doubt gave an undue prominence and notoriety to the almost completed Berlin-Bagdad Railway, the artery of a might-have-been Eur-Asian Empire for Germany. In reality, however, in this as in other adventures of colonial exploitation the Germans were but the last in the field. For it was only in 1903 that the Anatolian Railway Company (German) obtained the concession for extending the Constantinople-Konia line (1872, 1888) to Bagdad, whereas England and France have been enjoying railway concessions in Asia Minor ever since the Crimean War (1857). Besides, in 1895 the thousand mile line from Cairo-Port Said to Kuwait (at the head of the Persian Gulf in Turkey) was almost on the point of being negotiated between the powers that be for an all-British route from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Australasian Zones. Even more important in world-politics was the Russian project of penetrating northern Persia as far as Teheran, or Hamadan (the ancient Ecbatana, the capital of the Median Empire, not far from the historic rock of Behistun which bears the inscriptions of Darius), or Yezd in Central Persia. This was to have been effected by extending the trans-Caspian line from Merv or Kushk and the trans-Caucasian railroad from Tabriz, the terminus that was reached during the war time (1915). The Russian scheme also contemplated reaching the warm waters of the South Asian Seas at Bushire, or Bunder Abbas or Chabbar or Gwadar.

A rather curious fact in connection with this trans-Persian railway project of Russia is that she had the active coöperation of England definitely since January, 1912. This seems to be inconsistent with the traditional Russophobia of the British. But it is not strange because, as is well known, Russia had recognized the "special interests" of Great Britain in the Gulf and had declared that it lay outside the scope of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 31, 1907.

England had also been relieved of another thorn in her side. Because the Anglo-French Entente of 1906 put a stop to France pin-prick and obstructionist policy with regard to England, enemy of Egyptian and Fashoda memories, in the Persian Caspian as in other spheres. Finally, in 1914 the French firmly cemented the new British friendship by surrendering, in consideration of financial compensation and new rights in Gambia (West Africa) the privileges and immunities of the traffic in arms with Mas'at in the Gulf of Oman, which the Anglo-French treaty of 1862 accorded to France.

By the time, therefore, that the war began in Europe two old competitors of the British Empire had been eliminated

the Middle East. The Persian Gulf was then a British lake. It is superfluous to add that it became necessarily a most powerful challenge to the military and naval might of the Germans, the latest of the empire-seekers. The magnitude of Germany's ambition in this direction and the depth of her disappointment at failure can be intelligible only if the world fully realizes that Britannia did not rule the waves of the Irish Sea and the Bay of Bengal more securely than she did the sheet of water about 500 miles long and 200 miles wide between Arabia and Persia. The western littoral, i. e., the seacoast of Turkey in Asia was for over a quarter of a century as British-dominated as the eastern, i.e., the Persian shore, and further on, the Mekran Coast.

At the northwest head lies Kuweit which under British influence virtually declared its independence of the Ottoman Empire in 1899. In 1914 it occupied the same status in international politics as Mongolia and Tibet with regard to China and the Powers since 1907. Contiguous to this region which was covetously looked for by the Germans as the possible sea-terminus of the Bagdad Railway lies Mohammerah in the northeast corner of the Gulf, at the mouth of the Karun River, within the jurisdiction of the Shah of Persia. This area also has long ceased to acknowledge Persian suzerainty and has been a *de facto* British protectorate. It is in fact the base of the British Oilfields in Persia. When the war broke out, therefore, the Shatt-el-Arab from its mouth as far inland as Basra, about sixty miles in Turkish territory, was a thoroughly British river.

Coming down the Arabian littoral, we have the Bahrein archipelago noted for the pearl fishery. Here since 1861, as in Cyprus since 1878 and in Egypt since 1882, the British rather than the Ottoman flag has been in the ascendant. Further down, the so-called Pirate Coast with the important port of Debai has been under the control of the British Resident at Bushire since 1853. This brings us to Cape Musandin, the tip of the Arabian Coast which juts into the Persian side at Bunder Abbas. Here indeed we have the Gibraltar of the Middle East commanding the Straits of Ormuz, the narrow entrance to this Asian Mediterranean. For, the province of Oman which is the hinterland of the Pirate Coast, as well as the island of Maskat came to recognize British guardianship during the Napoleonic wars, while Bunder Abbas is the terminus of the "British sphere" in Persia as delimited by the Anglo-Russian Agreement.

Now, on the eastern side, the littoral from Bunder Abbas to Mohammerah, i.e., the entire Persian shore of the Gulf, lies within

what is technically known as the "neutral sphere" according to the same document. But actually the fine port of Lingah, as one proceeds up, is under British domination, and Bushire, further up, has long been the Shanghai of this zone, where the British Resident's will is law.

Only once was this hegemony of England in the Persian Gulf liable to be seriously threatened. In 1901 during the dark days of Great Britain while she was preoccupied with South African affairs the Russian papers were rabid in their open avowals for the seizure of Bunder Abbas as counterpoise to British Kuwait. In fact Russia did not hesitate to declare her intention of Russifying entire Persia. But the balance of power in the Middle East turned in favor of England as soon as the close of the Boer War left her energies free to attend to the situation. As against the Russian manifesto for monopolizing Persia Lord Lansdowne pronounced the British article of faith in 1903 in the following terms: "We should regard the establishment of a fortified post in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests which we should certainly resist with all the means at our disposal." Thus was enunciated the English Monroe Doctrine for the Persian Gulf. And this *status quo* was accepted by Russia in 1907 as a solution of the question.

It is not astonishing therefore that since the Anglo-Russian agreement the Turks should have automatically looked upto Germany as their natural ally, and that the Persians should have been pro-German or rather anti-ally in sympathy during the war. But the war found Germany and Turkey absolutely without any footing on the entire Ottoman littoral. For long before the war the British had succeeded in frustrating German overtures at Kuwait and at Sargah on the Pirate Coast. Similarly Turkey's attempts to restore huzerainty in Kuwait, Bahrein, Oman and Maskat had failed throu British backing of the local Sheikhs, Sultans, Chiefs or Governo And of course it could not take long to quell the few pro-Germ (-Turk) upheavals in the Gulf region. The disturbances at Mac were put down by a British Indian Army in 1915; and in 1 a British force was posted at Bahrein to meet eventualities. the Persian shore likewise the few anti-British risings were sh suppressed in 1915 and 1916. On the other hand, the tables turned by the fall of Bagdad and the conquest of Mesopot March 1917. The Turco-Germans had to be systematically c defensive since then. Thus came to end the chances of C. ever questioning England's position in the Gulf.

The only Powers that could afterwards compete with England were England's allies and comrades in arms. But, as noted above, France had renounced her claims in the Gulf in 1906 and 1914. She is not likely to reopen the question in future, for the French interests involved are too trivial. Russia also had indeed been friendly, but her desire to have a Port Arthur on the South Asian Seas would surely have needed England's watchful attention. With the revolution of March 1917, however, and especially the total military and economic collapse under Bolshevik régime since November of the same year Russia had temporarily at least ceased to be a controlling factor in world politics. Consequently at the beginning of 1918 England found herself the undisputed ruler of the Gulf. This towering predominance has finally been sealed by the unconditional surrender of Turkey in October 1918, and the ignominious failure of Germany on all fronts in Africa, Asia, and Europe.

2. The New Persia in *Realpolitik*.

Persia is one of those few countries which like the seven Latin American states, Mexico, Salvador, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile, remained technically neutral during the hemispheroidal armageddon. It is in fact the only country in Asia excepting its neighbour Afghanistan and the Dutch Indies that did not declare itself formally against Germany's challenge of the British world-empire by a counter Eur-Asian combination. But in spite of its official neutrality Persia was a theatre of military operations not less active than were German Shantung and British Egypt. And of course it was constantly disturbed by such intrigues and secret manoeuvres of the belligerents as are inevitable among neutral peoples when practically whole mankind is in arms.

In the summer of 1914 when the war broke out in Europe Persian politics were in a very unsettled condition. The Third Majlis (National Council or Parliament) had just been elected, and the young Shah Ahmad Mirza ceremonially crowned (July 21). But since the abolition of the Second Majlis which was perpetrated in December 1911 in order to placate Russia and Great Britain in their demands relating to the appointment of foreigners in Persian public service, the constitutional or nationalist party had been left without any controlling hand in the administration. It is notorious, further, that throughout the *risorgimento* or revolutionary period since August 1906, the royalist, arbitrary and reactionary elements in Persia have had the systematic backing of the two interested Powers. This circumstance had the inevitable result of throwing the liberals,

democrats and advocates of reform, like the Young Turk party in the western Moslem state, into the arms of Germany, and of compelling them to seek in her the only possible deliverer of the Middle East. The war, therefore, found Persia sharply divided in sentiment, the Shah and the Court party pro-ally, and the people or Young Persia pro-German (-Turk).

It was certainly easy enough to bring about the severance of official Persia's relation with the Central Powers, as in the cases of Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, and Ecuador. In 1915 German, Austrian and Turkish ministers left Teheran. But during the first two years of the war anti-British risings of the people occurred frequently in Southern and Eastern Persia. Specially affected were the areas about Isfahan and Shiraz. Intensely serious was the situation in the port of Bushire which, therefore, had to be kept under British occupation from August to October. Seistan also on the Afghan frontier, the ever-debatable ground between England and Russia, came virtually into British hands. Finally in 1916 Kerman was occupied.

In the meantime Northern and Western Persia had the European war brought home to it through the Russian advance from Azarbaijan, the British advance towards Kut, and the Turkish resistance to both from the Bagdad Zone. By 1916 the failure of the British in Mesopotamia enabled Turkey to occupy Kirmanshah and Hamadan in Persia and thus cut off the Russian army from the contemplated coöperation with the British on the Tigris.

But in March, 1917, the fall of Bagdad and the disappearance of Turkey from the Mesopotamian region placed western Persia and Kurdistan within the sphere of British influence. The sway of the British power was further extended northwards through the dislocation in the Russian army because of the revolution (March 16), and especially through its total collapse under the Bolshevik régime (November, 7). In 1918, therefore, England may be said to have automatically stepped into the vacuum, in the Urumiah basin and Azarbaijan, created by the retirement of Russia from the war. It is clear therefore that from the military standpoint Persia was less exploited than Belgium and yet the violation of Persia seemed to be the least known event of the Great War.

How is it that such a thing could happen in Asia without comment or even notice on the part of the students of international law or of the humanitarian democrats of the world, while precisely the violation of an European Persia that was often the *casus belli* of this war of all nations? The explanation is sought in the fact, not candidly and avowedly recognized,

Persia had ceased to be a Persian state long before the war broke out.

In a sense Persia's *status de jure* was indeed that of Belgium, as England and Russia had agreed in 1907 not to permit each other to intervene in the affairs of the land. But in actuality Young Persia's efforts at reconstruction on the lines of constitutional monarchy were thwarted by the Powers at every step. Shah Mohammed Ali (1907—1909) used to be aided and abetted by them so that he might curb the parliamentary endeavours of the people. Early in 1908 the First Majlis had even to encounter Russo-British demands to the effect that it must obey and submit to the Shah. In June it was totally overthrown and demolished by the Shah with the "Cossack Brigade" commanded by a Russian colonel. The Persian revolution could not, however, be thus nipped in the bud. The people mustered strength in the provincial cities, marched from Tabriz and Isfahan on Teheran the capital, deposed the Shah (July 16, 1909) and restored the parliament. The way before this Second Majlis also was beset with difficulties by the Powers. Taking advantage of the revolutionary unrest, Russia quartered troops at Tabriz and other cities in Northern Persia, and England issued an ultimatum demanding the surrender of the roads in Southern Persia to be policed by the British Indian army at the cost of the Persian Customs Department (October 16, 1910).

Nor was this all. The ex-Shah's intrigues with the royalists in Persia were winked over by England and Russia in spite of the terms of the protocol by which he had been pensioned off. In fact, the Powers violated international law by allowing him to organize the invasion of Persia from Russian territory in July 1911. To make the situation still more difficult for the people, Russia, assured of England's connivance in Persia because of the Morocco crisis in Europe for which England needed Russian help against Germany, sent a fresh ultimatum. Young Persia was stung to the quick thereby, declared a general boycott of Russian and British goods (December 11), and together with the Moslems of Turkey appealed to Germany for sympathy in distress. The Persian boycott, however, proved abortive like the Chinese boycott of America in 1905, because it was an instance of measuring one's strength with a giant. The constitutionalists were completely humiliated, for in a fortnight the Second Majlis fell before a *coup d'état* of the Cabinet (December 24) which considered it impossible and useless to oppose the joint overtures of Russia and England. The understanding was then formally forced from Young Persia that it must not engage the

services of foreigners without first obtaining the consent of the two Powers. Azarbaijan became practically a province of Russian Trans-Caucasia, and in 1913 the British despatched an Indian regiment to police Shiraz against the raids of Bakhtiyari and other tribes. Since 1907 Persia had thus been drifting between the Scylla of complete foreign subjection and the Charybdis of the Imperial autocracy encouraged by the Powers.

The violation of Persian neutrality was therefore a normal fact of Middle Eastern politics in pre-war times. And this was a natural consequence of the fact that for purposes of international politics there were three Persias to be reckoned with. The partition of Persia had been consummated by England and Russia through a mutual agreement on August 31, 1907, just a year after the constitutional triumph of Young Persia (August 5, 1906). The Majlis was not consulted by the Powers prior to the act, nor has that body ever recognized the tripartite division of the country in its administrative or financial measures. But so far as the larger world is concerned, the territorial reconstruction in Persia was a *fait accompli* contrary to the now universally acknowledged postulate of self-determination for peoples. The juristic aspect of the Persian situation has been paralleled in November 1917 by the American-Japanese Agreement (Lansing-Ishii pact) about China without consulting that country at all.

The three divisions are:

1. The Russian sphere, or Northern Persia covering as far interior as the outskirts of Isfahan (the ancient capital, e. g. under Shah Abbas the Great, the contemporary of Elizabeth) and Yezd, the last stand of Zoroastrianism in its homeland. It includes the richest Persian province of Azarbaijan, the once flourishing tract known as Khorasan, and Teheran, the modern capital.

2. The British sphere, or Southern Persia, with Bunder Abbas as its western terminus, which commands the straits of Ormuz leading to the Persian Gulf as the Gibraltar of the Middle East.

3. The "neutral" sphere, or Central Persia, having for its base the entire Persian Gulf littoral and the Karun River, with the apex at Zulfikar, the point where the Russian Empire, Afghanistan and Persia meet. Its boundaries skirt such cities as Khanikin on Turkish frontier, Isfahan and Yezd on the north, and Kerman to the south. Shiraz, the home of Saadi and Hafiz, lies within sphere. It includes the historic province of Fars from which country derives its name of Persia.

What, now, is the meaning of these three spheres? It was clearly explained by the Agreement itself. Thus, for instance, in regard to Southern Persia, Russia undertook to guarantee England's monopoly of rights and opportunities by agreeing not to seek any political or commercial concessions for herself or any of her citizens or for the citizens of other countries. She assured, further, that she would not oppose the British Government or its subjects in the acquisition of such concessions. The concessions were of very wide scope embracing railway, banking, telegraph, roads, transport and insurance. Southern Persia was thus to be a preserve for Great Britain unmolested by anybody and positively supported by Russia. Similarly Northern Persia was to be Russia's unchallenged preserve insured and guaranteed by the British Empire.

In Central Persia or the so-called neutral zone neither Power was to have exclusive rights or privileges. It was, technically speaking, a buffer whereon the back-door influences and intrigues, that are as a rule manipulated secretly in such areas, 'could have a free play. But to all intents and purposes it was in reality a British sphere, because all important interests within the area were in British hands. British concessionaires had been navigating the Karun River since 1888. Mohammerah at the northeastern head of the Gulf, though nominally a province of Persia, was as noticed above a *de facto* dependency of England like Hyderabad, Egypt and Tibet. The whole Gulf coast was dominated by the British navy from Bushire and Bunder Abbas. Besides, the Maidan i-Naphthun Oilfields which lie within 140 miles N. N. E. of Mohammerah in the neutral sphere were exclusively British according to the terms of the oil concession wrung from the Shah in 1901.

Along with these facts is to be taken into consideration the treaty between Russia and Persia negotiated in 1901 by which the "most favored nation" treatment in commercial matters was to be reserved for the countries already enjoying it. In view of all these conditions the preamble to the document of 1907 in which the solicitude of England and Russia is expressed as to respecting the "integrity and independence of Persia" would at once appear to be a camouflage that deceives nobody. And only the third-rate nations would tolerate the chimerical sham in the loudly proclaimed "open door" alleged to be obtaining in Persia. No self-respecting Power could be lured by this *ignis fatuus*.

The truth about the Persian situation was certainly not hidden from Germany, just as the United States can not be hoodwinked by mere scraps of paper into believing that there is an "open"

door in China in spite of the "special" interests of England, Russia, France and Japan, or that the integrity and sovereignty of the Chinese republic are consistent with the extra-territorial, judicial, customs and other concessions enjoyed by the Powers. It was Germany's interest, therefore, to restore the independence and annul the partition of Persia. As a new-comer she naturally questioned the *status quo* of the Middle Eastern politics established by the first interlopers.

But the miserable failure of German navy, army and diplomacy, and the utter pulverization of the Ottoman Empire, together with the unlooked-for dismemberment of the Russian Colossus, have brought about a most marvelous reconstruction in the map of Asia. The British empire has thus been left not only with the monopoly control over the destiny of entire Persia which has been legally sealed by the so-called Anglo-Persian Treaty (1919),¹⁾ but also with undisputed suzerainty over every inch of the seafront from the Suez to Singapore and over the entire land mass south of the great series of Asian water-partings, the Caucasus, the Karakum Desert, the Hindu Kush and the Tian Shan, as well as with opportunities for steady advance from this solid base into the Volga basin and the basins of the Obi and the Yenisei. The complete subjugation of Asia (with the solitary exception of Japan which happens to maintain her independence at home and dispute British advance in China and on the Pacific) by Great Britain appears thus to be the final solution of the Eastern question,²⁾ that was opened with the Crimean War of 1856—57 and was almost closed by the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 in regard to Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia.

¹⁾ Formally, at any rate, the treaty has since been annulled and England should seem to have encountered a temporary rebuff in the Middle East (1922).

²⁾ The question is being reopened in a new form by Bolshevik Russia championing the freedom of Asia from colonial thralldom and also by the recent German-Russian commercial agreement (Rapallo—Genoa, April 1922).

Asia in Americanization.

1. The Race-Problem of the New World.

To the student of economic history and sociology the immigration problem of North and South America is of profound scientific interest. For, the peopling of the New Hemisphere by the children of the Old World since the days of Columbus and the Pilgrim Fathers is but the latest stage of the same world-movement of which the previous phases are embodied in the settlement of Celtic and Roman Europe by the Franks, Goths, Vandals, Huns, Angles, and Saxons, or the still earlier colonizing of ancient Eur-Asia by the members of the Indo-Germanic (Aryan) family, viz., Greeks, Romans, Persians, Hindus, etc., or the valley of the Hwang-ho by the Scythians (Tartars) of Central Asia, the Mesopotamian Doab by the Dravidians of Southern India, and the "gift of the Nile" by the pharaonic invaders from the hills of Nubia and Eastern Africa.

The problem of race-fusion in present-day America is essentially identical with the race-problems in other ages and climes. There are, however, two significant differences. In the first place, what has been accomplished in Asia and Europe through centuries and even millenniums is being effected in America in generations, if not in decades. And in the second place, the solution of the problem is being attempted in the New World much more consciously than in the Old, thanks to the cumulative experience of humanity, and thanks to the marvelous power with which modern science has endowed mankind to conduct experiments, to forecast the future, to select the desirables, to reject the undesirables.

It is this conscious and deliberate creation of new men and women out of the old human material within the shortest possible time that imparts to the American phase of the age-long process of race-mobilizations a distinctive character; and this is the function of Americanization.

The problem may be easily stated. The New World must derive its raw flesh and blood from the Old. The object, however, is neither to relieve Europe and Asia of their over-population and poverty, nor as the idealists would assert, to afford the scum of humanity a chance to rise in the scale of civilization. These, no doubt, are the "by-products" of immigration. But first and last, the aim natur-

ally is national, i. e., to serve "America first". The considerations that count most are: first, to have an adequate supply of hands for the farms, factories, forests and mines of America; secondly, to build up communities of men and women who could enrich in diverse ways the social and intellectual make-up of American life, and last but not least, to create a body of citizens with whom loyalty to America in times of distress and war would be but a second nature. These are the foundations of the minimum program of Americanization that lies before the educators, social workers and political leaders of the United States.

2. America's Ultimatum to Asia.

So far as the Americanization of immigrants from Asia is concerned the problem has ceased to exist. The New Worlders do not want to Americanize the Asian laborers. The men, women and children of the Orient have been postulated to be "unassimilable" before anything was attempted in the way of "adopting," naturalizing, assimilating or amalgamating them.

The question has now practically been closed by treaties and legislation. To a certain extent the attitude of the employers of labor was different from that of the laborers. But, on the whole, the verdict of the United States as of Canada was the exclusion of Asian labor-force from the right of setting foot on the soil of the New Hemisphere. And so America has finally declared herself to be a forbidden land to the Oriental peoples.

The closing of Canada¹⁾ to the laborers of Asia has been effected: (1) by the Chinese Exclusion Law of 1903—1908, which demands of every immigrant of the Chinese race a landing tax of \$500; (2) by the informal Japanese-Canadian agreement (1907), which limits Japanese immigrants in Canada to 400 persons a year, and (3) by the landing-tax of \$200 on every Hindu immigrant, as well as by the regulation (1910) of "continuous journey" from India (a prohibitive ruling because there is no *direct* steamship route between India and Canada).

The United States has been closed²⁾ to Asian labor by the following measures: (1) The Chinese Exclusion Law of 1904, which re-enacted without limitation, modification or condition all previous suspension or restriction laws relating to the immigration

¹⁾ The Immigration Situation in Other Countries, pp. 61—75, in *the Report of the Immigration Commission Series* (Washington, D. C.).

²⁾ Hall: *Immigration*, pp. 327—335; Mills: *The Japanese Problem in United States*, p. 277.

of laborers, skilled or unskilled, from China; (2) the "gentlemen's agreement" of 1907, by which Japan has bound herself to grant passports to no laborers except such as are "former residents, parents, wives or children of residents," and "settled agriculturists;" and (3) the sweepingly restrictive Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, which has unconditionally forbidden the immigration of laborers from Asia (*minus* China and Japan, provided against separately) by latitude and longitude.

In the policy of exclusion the United States has thus been less indirect and more thorough than her northern neighbour. And this has allayed the unrest of labor-unions and their journalists and politicians. It is obvious, however, that the employers of labor have been considerably hurt by these measures, for they have been deprived of man-power especially at a time when labor shortage is being felt on all sides because of the demand of the Great War for "human bullets."

But this apparently satisfactory "settlement" of the Oriental question is so drastic, inhuman, discriminative (and hence unjust) that it bids fair to be the most acute disturber of the world's peace in the coming decades. It is America's *ultimatum* to the Orient. The problem has thus passed beyond the limits of a merely local labor-legislation or "domestic" industrial dispute into the arena of international politics. For, the present situation is virtually a standing challenge to Young Asia to venture on opening the doors of America in the same manner in which China and Japan were opened by the Eur-Americans during the middle of the nineteenth century. This affront is constantly provoking the humiliated and embittered Asians to demonstrate to the world that the edge of the Damascus blades has not been dulled for good.

3. The Oriental Factor in the Immigrant Population.

During the period from July 1900 to March 1909 Canada admitted altogether 1,244,597 immigrants of all nationalities. The Oriental element in the immigration between 1901 and 1909 is represented by the following figures: Chinese, 3,890; Hindu, 5,185; Japanese, 12,420. The number of Asians during this period was thus only 21,495, i.e. about one fifty-eighth or less than 2 per cent of the total arrivals.³⁾

The present immigrant population of the United States, is, roughly speaking 34,000,000 (adults 15,000,000, children 19,000,000).

³⁾ *Immigration Situation in Other Countries*, p. 52.

This is about one-third of the total population (whites and negroes). Of this the number of foreign-born whites over twenty-one who cannot speak English is approximately 3,000,000.

The Asian factor in the immigration that has produced this vast foreign population is infinitesimally small. It was less than 3 per cent in 1910. Even at its height (between 1871 and 1880) it was less than 6 per cent. The total arrival from entire Asia between 1821 and 1903 amounted to 421,190, i.e., 2.06 per cent of the whole immigration.⁴⁾ The percentages of Asian immigration (including 100,000 Levantines of Turkey in Asia, Syrians, Armenians, Arabs and Turks) on the basis of the total admitted from all races are given in the following schedule from the *Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration* (1906):

	Total all Races	China	All Asia
		<i>per cent</i>	<i>per cent</i>
1861—1870	2,377,279	2.7	2.8
1871—1880	2,813,191	4.4	5.4
1881—1890	5,246,613	1.2	1.3
1891—1900	3,687,564	0.4	1.9
1901—1905	3,833,076	0.33	3.0

From 1901 to 1910 the total arrival was 8,795,386. Of this only 243,567, i.e., about 2.7 per cent represented the immigration from all Asia. According to the *Thirteenth Census of the United States* (vol. i, p. 781) the Asia-born population in 1910 was counted at 191,484 and the Europe-born at 11,791,841. Asia furnished 1.4 per cent of the foreign-born population and Europe 87.2 per cent. For 1900 the figure for Asia had been 120,248 and for Europe 8,871,780, and the percentages 1.2 per cent and 85.8 per cent respectively.

Let us study the figures in detail and by race. The number of Hindu laborers in the United States was never large. In 1909 the figure was 337, in 1909—10, 1782. In 1913 the entire bulk of Hindus ("immigrants" proper as well as merchants, students and travellers) amounted to about 5000 persons. From 1911 to 1916 the total arrivals gave the figure 1372. The following statistics speak for previous years: 1906, 271; 1907, 1,072; 1908, 1,710.

The Hindu element in the Asian immigration did not rise to conspicuous proportions, and since the mobilization of labor from India to the United States began as late as 1906 it could influence American conditions to any appreciable extent. 1

⁴⁾ Hall: 342.

legislation of 1917 has disposed of the Hindu laborers before they became a real "problem".⁵⁾

In 1910 Japanese in the United States numbered 72,157, and in 1913 about 95,000. The immigration down to 1898 never comprised batches of more than 2000 a year. From 1891 to 1900 the total arrival was 26,855 and from 1901 to 1910 129,797. The movement began practically in 1885 when emigration was first legalized by Japan. It is well known that from 1638 to 1868 the Japanese government did not allow any of its citizens to cross the "dark waters" under penalty of death.⁶⁾

Chinese immigration was longer in duration and larger in volume than Japanese or Hindu. But it never rose as high as 5 per cent of the total immigration. The number of Chinese in the United States never reached 150,000 at any one time, and only once rose above 110,000. During the thirty-two years of "free" immigration (1848—1880) the number of immigrants from China never rose above 20,000 a year, nor averaged for any decade more than 14,000 per year. From the first Exclusion Act of 1882 the arrival down to 1910 was 105,482. From 1820 to 1910 China's contribution totaled 334,426. Deducting the departures, the number of Chinese in the United States in 1910 was 73,531, and in 1916 about 60,000.⁷⁾

But from 1881 to 1910 a portion of the "new immigration" (i.e., that from Southern and Eastern Europe) amounted to over eight millions and a half: Austro-Hungarians, 3,096,032; Italians, 3,008,920; Russians, 2,456,097. The volume was thus more than 81 times that from China for the same period. For 1899—1908 the total Slavic immigration alone was 1,687,199, i.e., about sixteen times the Chinese immigration of three decades. During one decade 1891—1900 Russia alone supplied to the United States 593,703, i.e., about double the number that China contributed in ninety years (1820—1910). From 1901 to 1910 the "new immigration" was measured at 65.9 per cent of the total arrivals in the United States. The percentage has been steadily on the increase. It was about 75 per cent at the beginning of the Great War (1914).⁸⁾

⁵⁾ *Statistical Abstract of the United States (1916)*, pp. 106—107; Jenks: *The Immigration Problem*, p. 253.

⁶⁾ Steiner: *The Japanese Invasion*, pp. 17—19; Mills, p. 2.

⁷⁾ Mary Coolidge: *Chinese Immigration*, pp. 424—427, 500; Gulick: *American Democracy and Asiatic Citizenship*, p. 138—139.

⁸⁾ Roberts: *The New Immigration*, p. 362; Balch: *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens*, p. 461.

4. The Basis of Discrimination.

It is evident that the waves of Asian invasion did not assume any formidable magnitude. And yet prohibitive special legislation has been enacted by America to put an absolute stop to the tide of immigration from China, Japan and India. It is evident also that the United States has no objection to supplying its labor market with men, women and children from the villages of Portugal, Spain, Sicily, South Italy, Greece, the Balkans, Galicia, Bohemia, Lithuania and Russia, not to speak of the northern countries of Teutonic Europe.

Is there anything in the causes of migration that tempts America to be more favorable to Europe than to Asia? The point would be clear if we analyze the forces behind the mobilization of labor.

The historic migrations of ancient and medieval times took the form chiefly of military usurpations, political annexations, tribal settlements, or racial "colonizings." The Aryan immigrations into Greece and India, the Tartar invasions of China, and the "barbarian" inroads into the Roman Empire are instances of such mobilizations of warrior hordes seeking "a local habitation and a name." The processes by which the Red-Indians, the Aztecs and the Incas were exterminated by the Christians of the colonial period in order to make room for the races of the Old World are likewise of the same category. But surely the immigration into Canada, the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, etc., during the last 150 years is not at all of that warlike character.

There is a vague idea abroad that America has been peopled by the political refugees, liberators and revolutionaries, who found autocratic and conservative Europe too hot for their propaganda. It is also thoughtlessly believed sometimes that the New World has enlarged its numbers mainly by granting asylum to the men and women who escaped from the religious persecution and horrors of intolerance rampant on the other side of the Atlantic. The political disturbances in Europe of 1830 and 1848, and the earlier Puritan and Huguenot revolutions have no doubt influenced the American population both in quality and quantity. But, as a rule, both these notions are statistically untenable. In recent years especially, except in the case of a certain number of Jews and Poles (and this again for very limited periods) political and religious oppression may be practically ignored as a source of emigration from Europe. Besides, the Lafayettes, the Kosciuskos, the Frederick Lists, the Kossuths, those apostles of freedom and emancipators of subject peoples, belong to the intellectual middle class; and even though temporarily

financed and impoverished they are not counted among that immigrant mass which has to be handled at Ellis Island and Angell Island.

There is but one grand cause of the movements *en masse* from one land to another; and that is economic, the pressure of population on the means of subsistence. This Malthusian motive underlies even the earlier migrations of a military character by which Asia, Europe and Colonial America were settled during different periods of history. It is *the* force, the greatest single cause, that has impelled Europe in the nineteenth century and after to unburden herself of her teeming millions and send them forth as seekers of gold dust to the mines, oilfields, ranches and workshops of the Eldorado of the world. It is the same economic urge that is pushing Asia to the under-peopled banks of the Amazon and the Mississippi.

The New Worlders have chosen to be hospitable to the hungry folks from Europe, but when Asia is at the door crying for bread they have grimly determined to offer only stones. Of course they are perfectly within their rights when they manipulate their turnpikes according to their own discrimination, admitting some, refusing others. With their machine-guns, air-planes, "tanks" and submarines, and now militarized and navalized as they are to the *nth* term of their man-power, they are not certainly in the plight of the original inhabitants of America, the Peruvians or Mexicans; and presumably they do not fear the appearance of Pizarro or Cortez from the Asia of the twentieth century. But as the project of world's peace on permanent foundations is emphatically proclaimed from house-tops in these days, Young Asia deems it within its province to argue out the basis of discrimination on which America has embarked upon the exclusion of Orientals.

In what respects, then, are the laborers of the Orient less desirable as prospective American workmen and citizens than the immigrants from Europe? Are the conditions of American agriculture, manufacture and transportation more peculiarly suited to the habits of life, "genius" and temperament of the European masses than to those of the Asian laboring classes? Can the native and long-naturalized laborers of America point to a single economic or social feature in which, say, the Slavs or Latins of Eastern and Southern Europe are, *under natural conditions*, more conveniently situated with regard to the domicile in the United States than are the Caucasian (Aryan) Hindus,⁹⁾ Mongolo-Tartar, Chinese, and Malaya-

⁹⁾ "Pure-blood Hindus belong ethnically to the Caucasian or white race and in several instances have been officially declared to be white by the

Mongoloid Japanese? These are the interpellations by Young Asia that await answer from the economists, ethnologists, labor-protagonists and legislators of America. And the same queries may be legitimately raised by the American capitalists and employer classes in their stand against the labor-view of the Oriental immigration.

5. Asians vs. Latins and Slavs.

We would, therefore, make out a qualitative inventory of the stuff that the United States is anxious to Americanize.

Among the "new immigrants" in American industries, on the average, 74.8 per cent could not read and write. According to the *Abstract of Immigration Commission's Report* (1907-1910) on "Immigrants in Manufacture and Mining" (p. 211) 91 per cent were illiterates among Magyars, 87.5 per cent among Slovenians, 84.4 per cent among Slovaks, 82.6 per cent among Roumanians, 80.5 per cent among Greeks, 79.9 per cent among Poles, 78.1 per cent among Bulgarians, 77.3 per cent among Lithuanians, 74.5 per cent among Russians, 71.3 per cent among Serbians, 70.9 per cent among Croatians, 67.5 per cent among South Italians, 65.8 per cent among Syrians, and 47.5 per cent among Portuguese.¹⁰⁾

What, now, is the tradition of economic life to which these immigrants had been used for centuries in southern and eastern Europe? As a rule, the Jews constituted the middle class in their European homes. They had been more urban than rural, as Joseph points out in the *Jewish Immigration to the United States*, and had possessed almost a monopolistic control over the industry, commerce, and banking of the communities. The rest of the "new immigration," however, has invariably consisted in the main of the peasant classes, agricultural hands and unskilled laborers.

The cultivators of Russia, Roumania or Galicia had never heard of steam gang-plows that break up a hundred acres in a day or two. Theirs were the implements that the Babylonians had worked with millenniums ago, and that have been partially displaced only yesterday by the "industrial revolution" in the more advanced countries of the world. Tchechs, Slovaks and Serbs used wooden utensils in the stall and the house. Their technology furnished them only with the primitive fork, rake and plough. In their estimation

United States Courts in naturalization proceedings." *United States Census* (1910), Vol. i, p. 126.

¹⁰⁾ Roberts: 370. According to the *United States Census* (1910), vol. i (p. 1186) the illiteracy of Chinese in the United States was 15.8 per cent and that of Japanese 9.2 per cent.

human labor was cheaper than any labor-saving instrument. It could be had, in fact, almost for nothing. Clark mentions in the *Old Homes of New Americans* the story of a Bohemian peasant who condemned the extravagance of a farmer because of his erecting a fence around his pasture instead of having a man to watch his sheep and a girl to watch his geese. The economic life under the most favorable circumstances was not unlike that of the "peasant proprietors" described by Arthur Young in the eighteenth century. There was "variety of work," as Professor Emily Balch observes in *Our Slavic Fellow-citizens*, employment indoors alternating with field work. Men, women and children "coöperated" in the tending of chickens, geese and ducks in the perspective of "gardens with their rows of tall sun-flowers and poppies."

The primitivism in husbandry might at its best suggest indeed of Theocritean idylls. But one must not miss the dark cloud in the silver lining. These arcadias were nests of appalling poverty. Lord noticed in Italy the proverbial destitution of the famished Irishman, thousands of weary straw-plaiters earning "four cents a day," and thousand others who dip in the water of a spring or rivulet a handful of leaves or a few fresh beanpods to be eaten as salad with their dry hard bread.¹¹⁾ And the Greek peasant, as Professor Ross puts it so graphically in *The Old World in the New*,¹²⁾ lived on greens fried in olive oil, ate "meat three times a year," and kept "without noticing it the 150 fasting days in the Greek calendar." The cooking of Austro-Hungarian Slavs was done in earthenware vessels on primitive ovens, and their houses were furnished with products of the spinning wheel, needle and dye-pot. The standard of life governing such communities is obvious. It was mud floors, vegetarianism (not the cult of faddists, of course, but the virtue of a necessity), no underwear.

The village was the center of their social existence; their outlook embraced only the petty concerns of the neighbourhood. Civic sense was the furthest removed from their consciousness. "When the Italian pays his 2 or 3 per cent to the government, he says: it has gone to the king."¹³⁾ Servility was ingrained in their physiology. The Slav peasant automatically took off his cap to those dressed like gentle-folk, known or unknown.¹⁴⁾ Individuality was not dreamed of in domestic life. Among the Croats the young men and women

¹¹⁾ *The Italian in America*, p. 235.

¹²⁾ Page 183.

¹³⁾ Brandenburg: *Imported Americans*, p. 53.

¹⁴⁾ Balch: p. 42.

were not accustomed to choosing their mates for themselves, the marriage being arranged by parents or guardians. It was the fear from the demons in the elements that nourished their religion. The Franciscan friars, writes Brandenburg,¹⁵⁾ beg money at Naples from Italian emigrants by saying that "they would ward off the fearful dangers of the voyage and in the new wild land America by purchasing prayer-cards." And undoubtedly they were as innocent of the problems of child labor, newspapers, trade unions, bank accounts and birth control as is the man in the moon.

This is the cultural outfit of immigrants from the European hive of humanity. Altogether, then, the migration from southern and eastern Europe to America has reproduced, on continental scale, the exact process by which the "deserted villages" of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century became instrumental in the urbanization and industrialization of England, France and Germany. It is a step in the transformation of the entire world from the feudal to the "industrial" regime, from the lower to the higher standard of "necessaries, comforts and decencies of life." It is carrying forward the dynamics of economic history that was first operated by the application of the steam-engine to cotton-manufacture in 1785.

To America, therefore, these guests from Europe can but contribute their primitive midwifery, agricultural superstition, high birthrate, and rural ignorance. In American cities they make their presence felt by room and clothing that reek with odors of cooking and filth. Like Bohemians in the country towns of Texas they displace old American settlers from their favorite habitations. Jews are shunned by "Americans" because they eat garlic; Greeks because they are mere barbers and dirty shoe-shiners; Italian fruiterers because they come from Naples, the city of rogues and rascals, or because their women are notorious for cat-like fecundity; and Slavs because, as Kuokol writes in *Wage Earning in Pittsburg*, of their rows and fights when they get drunk on pay-day or when celebrating a wedding or christening. These are the people that are easily duped by the "managers" of political parties, and materially help lowering the level of public life. They can be handled without trouble by employers and captains of industry, and are pounced upon by capitalists to be exploited as tools in the breaking of strikes. They thus militate against the effectiveness of workingmen's associations. They spoil the labor market and demoralize the proletariat class. †

¹⁵⁾ Page 141.

all respects they embody an enormous drag and dead weight upon America's advance in civilization, democracy, and efficiency.¹⁶⁾

Such is the raw material that the United States is eager to wash, scrape, chisel and polish, to assimilate, to manufacture 100 per cent Americans of. If these specimens of humanity be worth a nation's spending millions on, how can the unprejudiced mind be indifferent to the potentialities of those other human beings *of the same socio-economic standing* that come from across the Pacific? Does hunger affect the muscular organism and the nervous system of men and women differently in the East and the West? Is primitive agriculture the parent of worse poverty and lower standard of material existence in Asia than in Europe? Are the illiteracy and superstition of the white cultivators better adapted to the democratic institutions and labor organizations of republican America than are those of their yellow and brown peers? Or are the social and moral values of American life likely to deteriorate less through the influx of Occidental medievalism, nescience, boorishness and serfdom than through that of the Oriental? Young Asia wonders as to how it is possible for the brain of America to make a choice between Europe and Asia "under the same conditions of temperature and pressure."

6. Persecution of Asians in America.

No new objection can be urged against Asian immigrants from the viewpoint of labor, sanitation, morals, or culture in addition to what is valid against the "new immigration." Intellectually economically, and politically, the Americanizability of the unskilled laborers from Asia is on a par with, not a whit less than, that of those from Europe. The "pre-industrial" life with its medieval hygiene and civics does not qualify the Slav or the Latin for the duties of the American citizen in peace and war to a far greater extent than it does the Chinese, Japanese, and Hindu immigrants. As a matter of fact it need be admitted in all fairness that the prejudice of "Americans" against the "new immigration" is really as strong as against the Oriental. Emotionally speaking, it could not be otherwise.

But it is very remarkable that under the same "stimulus," viz., an equally keen anti-foreign race-feeling, the people as well as the government of the United States have "reacted" differently to the two groups of foreigners. The differential treatment of the Asian and the European immigrants in America is a striking fact of considerable importance to students of behavioristic social psychology

¹⁶⁾ Roberts: p. 295.

On the one hand, the patriotic Americanizers have been trying their best to abolish the "race lines," the "little Italy's," the "little Hungary's," etc., from their cities. They are thoroughly convinced, as they should be, that these "immigrant colonies," these clan-communities, these towns within towns, present the greatest hindrances to Americanization by perpetuating Old World traditions, customs and ways of thinking. Rightly, therefore, are they determined to do away with the segregations as far as practicable in order to assimilate the "new men, strange faces, other minds" from Europe. On the other hand, American behavior towards Asian immigrants has been the very antithesis of this attitude. The only method directly calculated to prevent fusion, amalgamation or even assimilation has been pursued in the treatment of Orientals. It is a story of systematic ostracism, localization, persecution and torture from beginning to end. Young Asia has at last been forced to realize, like the Jew in medieval Europe, that in this land of the free "sufferance is the badge of all our tribe."

The people of India have few specific grievances against America. On the whole, the treatment of Hindus in the United States has not been unsympathetic. And the anti-Hindu animosity of American laborers could not rise to a tragic intensity, because the Hindu labor movement was too short-lived and small in bulk to grow into a "nuisance." As Hindus have no government and flag of their own to protect their interests and sense of the dignity of man, the United States had no trouble in managing the situation. The American public turned a deaf ear to the half a dozen feeble protests from Hindu leaders in the States. The insolent conduct of the immigration officers at the ports, who make it a point to suspect and harass Hindu merchants, students, and travellers as laborers or "public charges" *in posse*, continues however to be a source of Young Asia's chagrin against America.

The first anti-Japanese propaganda was formally started in 1900, i.e., within about fifteen years of immigration from Japan. In 1905 Japanese had less than 100 children of school-going age scattered in different wards of San Francisco. But the School Board ordered them to be segregated in a separate Japanese school. The same year the State Legislature of California declared the marriage of whites with Mongolians (i.e., Japanese and Chinese) illegal and void. The "school problem" and the problem of miscegenation gradually led to the formation of the Asiatic Exclusion League, which was directed solely against Japan, for Chinese exclusion had already been legislated in 1904, and the Hindu labor-movement had ha

begun. The "gentlemen's agreement" of 1907 finally excluded Japanese laborers from America. Since then California and Arizona have passed Alien Land Laws (1913). These are discriminative exclusively against Japan. According to these laws leases of agricultural land by "other aliens" (i.e., those not eligible to citizenship, e.g., Japanese) are limited to three years, and ownership to the extent provided by existing treaties. The injustice of these laws would be apparent from the fact that subjects of the United States are accorded the same rights as other aliens by the land laws of Japan.¹⁷⁾

During all this period Japanese have submitted to humiliating treatment¹⁸⁾ in restaurants, lodging houses, hotels, moving picture shows, and theatres. Even the Y. M. C. A. has not hesitated to deny them the use of gymnasiums, swimming tanks, athletic fields, etc. Japanese have been excluded from fraternal orders and trade unions. They have not been allowed to employ women as help. Members of the Japanese consulate have been compelled to leave the residences of their own liking because Americans of the neighbourhood prevented the grocery stores from supplying the "Jap" with provisions on threats of boycott. Add to these the unnoticed and unpunished assaults on Japanese in the streets of American cities, and the indignities suffered by high class Japanese on board American ships and at the ports of landing. After all this comprehensive de-Americanizing of "Mr. Jap" the intellectuals of America dare declare: "Orientals are unassimilable!"

7. Anti-Chinese "Pogroms" of the United States (1855—1905).

As Chinese immigration was the oldest and most voluminous of the labor-movement from Asia, the anti-Chinese antipathy of America was the most intense and monstrous. In fact, Japanese inherited the anti-Chinese prejudice, and Hindus the anti-Japanese in the chronological order of their arrival; as, in the psychology of American labor, the last immigrant is the worst. Japanese came to America about three years after the first Chinese exclusion law (1882) had been passed, and Hindus reached the Pacific Coast about the time when the anti-Japanese movement was finally drawing to a head (1905—1907).

In 1851, i.e., three years after the discovery of gold in Sacramento Valley there were about 25,000 Chinese in California.

¹⁷⁾ Mills: pp. 197—226; Gulick: *The American Japanese Problem*, pp. 336—339.

¹⁸⁾ Steiner: pp. 46, 81—83.

They were hailed by the Governor as "one of the most worthy of our newly adopted citizens." But in 1855 the Foreign Miner's License Tax was passed to push Chinese out of the mining fields. Since then for a whole half century the popular and governmental (state as well as federal) attitude of America towards Chinese was one of unvarnished iniquity and hypocrisy, as Prof. A. C. Coolidge admits in *The United States as a World Power*.¹⁹⁾

Chinese had to pay special capitation tax, special police tax, special fishing license. In addition to this discriminative legislation the Chinese government had to accept in 1868 some of the objectionable terms of the Burlingame treaty which, however, was, on the whole, the only decent piece of transaction between America and China down to 1905. By this document China agreed to the denial of American citizenship to persons of the Chinese race. Nor is this all. The ballot was forbidden to Chinese living in America. Schools were closed against them. They were not allowed to give evidence on the witness stand even in cases affecting their own property. They suffered open torture in public places and residential quarters. In normal times it was "mob-law" that governed their person and property. The dictates of American demagogues created a veritable reign of terror for them. By 1876 the persecution of Chinese had become so chronic that the Six Companies at San Francisco had to lodge formal complaints to the proper authorities against the assaults and atrocities of Americans.²⁰⁾

In 1880 an American commission was forced on the imperial government at Peking. By hook or by crook it compelled China to invest the United States with right and authority to modify the Burlingame treaty against Chinese interests, so that Americans might have the legal freedom to "regulate, limit or suspend Chinese immigration" at their own convenience. The first Chinese exclusion bill followed hard upon this in 1882. The American public was not to be satisfied yet. Violent outrages continued to be perpetrated on innocent Chinese men, women and children in the Western States. In 1885 and 1886 Chinese were stoned, mobbed, looted and murdered in Wyoming, Washington und California.²¹⁾

By the treaties of 1868 and 1880 the "most favored nation" privileges had been mutually assured between China and the United States. The Chinese legation, therefore, requested the federal govern-

¹⁹⁾ Pages 335—337, 356; Foster: *American Diplomacy in the Orient*. pp. 300, 301, 306.

²⁰⁾ M. Coolidge: pp. 69—82, 129, 255—277.

²¹⁾ M. Coolidge: pp. 188, 271.

ment to respect the stipulations of those treaties and protect the life and possessions of Chinese living on American soil. Chang Yen Hoon, the Chinese minister demanded of the United States an indemnity of \$276,619.75 for outrages on Chinese. The indemnity was not granted. Nor did the federal government care to redress the wrongs in any way.²²⁾ On the contrary, law after law was sanctioned in direct violation of treaties.

To this conduct of the United States stands in bold relief the behavior of China in regard to the carrying out of treaty stipulations. In 1858 the government of Peking had paid America an indemnity of \$735,258.97. In subsequent years the Chinese Empire invariably paid indemnities to all foreign powers even to cover the losses outside "treaty ports" for which it was not legally responsible.²³⁾ The cynic would probably remark that treaties are meant to be kept only by unarmed nations.

In 1888 by the Scott Act America cancelled the legitimate "return" certificates of 20,000 Chinese who had temporarily gone out of the United States on short trips. They were thus mercilessly deprived of their house and home without compensation. In 1892 Chinese were declared unbailable by the Geary Law. It enforced also the compulsory registration of every Chinese immigrant for purposes of identification. Under this ruling *bona fide* students from China have been marked and photographed in nude state. The immigration authorities have been pleased to violate the "most favored nation" clauses of treaties by thus indiscriminately applying the conditions for laborers to the "exempt" classes. And instances of wealthy Chinese merchants refused admittance into America or detained and maltreated in the immigrant-sheds at the ports on the suspicion that they might be laborers are only too frequent. The treatment of the officially invited Chinese exhibitors to the St. Louis exhibition (1904) was perhaps the most scandalous in this uniformly disgraceful history of America's relations with Chinese. This together with the Exclusion Law of 1904 was "the last straw that broke the camel's back." Half a century's high-handedness and atrocity at length prevailed with Young China to declare a boycott of American goods, ships, institutions, and missionaries in 1905; but political pressure from the aggressive Power compelled it to withdraw even this weapon of self-defence.²⁴⁾

²²⁾ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1886, pp. 101, 154—158.

²³⁾ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1886, pp. 105, 140—143.

²⁴⁾ *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1890, pp. 228—230; 1892, pp. 138, 140, 442—143, 147—156; M. Coolidge: pp. 197, 221, 466, 471.

A tragedy also has its humorous side. Whenever the Chinese legation applied to Washington, D. C., to take note of the violation of treaties indulged in by the states or by their citizens and indemnify the Chinese for the losses sustained, the federal authorities used to take refuge under the peculiar constitution of the United States by which the "nation" is prevented from intervention in "state" affairs.²⁵⁾ On several occasions, however, they have not had the courtesy to even acknowledge the thrice-repeated appeals and requests from the Chinese ministers. Rather, they have taken the liberty of administering pungent rebukes to the official representatives of China for not servilely accepting the wishes of America and trying to advance the Chinese view of the case in dignified and emphatic protests.

Is it surprising, therefore, that Young Asia should regard America's "inquisition" of China and her people as unparalleled in inhumanity in the modern annals of interracial relations except perhaps by the infamous partitions of Poland and the blood-curdling anti-Jewish "pogroms" in Russia? No wonder that in the United States Chinese are compelled to live in Chinatowns, the "ghettos" of the New World. And yet America's "scientific" students of the immigration problem have the face to glibly remark about the exclusiveness and unassimilability of Asians! Do they want Young Asia to understand that America's charity to the Chinese (1907), embodied as it is in the partial return of Boxer indemnity, is at once, an expiation for all her previous sins as well as a justification for her gagging the Chinese mouth until Doomsday?

8. The Crime of Colour.

As we have seen, the high-standard American laborer has socio-economic and cultural reasons for bearing prejudice against the Jew, the Italian, the Greek and the Slovak. The prejudice against the Asian laborer is presumably not at all different from that in kind or even in degree. During the early years of the discovery of gold on the Pacific Coast (1848—1852) American prejudice against Spaniards and Frenchmen also had been no less deep and bitter. Historically speaking, Chinese, the "new immigrants" of the days, only inherited the previous anti-Spanish and anti-French animosity of America.

A comparative study of all these immigrations brings out an important fact that the *rationale* of American prejudice is essentially

²⁵⁾ M. Coolidge: p. 271.

the same in each case. It consists in the natural desire of the native workman to close the labor-market to foreign competitors. To the employers of labor, of course, the race of the laborer or his nationality is of no special significance. They care mainly for the "hands," no matter whose.

But why is it that the identical anti-foreign sentiment of the labor unions has not led to identical anti-foreign propaganda and anti-foreign legislation? Why is it that one group of foreigners is isolated, tortured, and legislated out of the country, while at the same time there are deliberate efforts to educate, adopt and assimilate another group of equally (if not more) obnoxious "Dagoes?" How are we to explain that there has been proposed no definitively Slavic exclusion or Jewish exclusion law in the United States? How is it possible for the collective mind of a nation to discriminate between two communities of the same mentality, same economic status, and same socio-civic outlook?

The reason is not to be sought in the religious difference between Asia and Europe. For the states as well as the federal government tolerate every "ism" on earth from mariolatry, transubstantiation and immaculate conception to Mormonism, Christian Science and free thinking. Besides, in modern times, the laboring classes are not, as a rule, fanatical enough to examine people's articles of faith before entering on social intercourse. Confucianism, Buddhism, and Sikhism, as such, are not balanced against Christianity or Judaism in the mind of the masses in the twentieth century.

Do the physical features, the physiognomic expressions, then, account for the differential treatment of the Asian and European immigrants by the laborers and their leaders in America? One might be tempted to say "Yes." But, humanly speaking, native Americans themselves are too often familiar with the accidents of embryology to demand an ideal grace of line and proportion of limbs as the *sine qua non* of friendships, unions or communal gatherings. And surely their aesthetic repugnance is not daily aroused by every instance of deviation from the anthropometrically perfect cephalic index or by every aberration from the Venus of Melos type.

What, in the last analysis, is the fundamental *differentium* between the Asian laborer and the European laborer? The Asian is yellow and brown, the European is albino, i. e., colourless or white. It is the complexion of the skin that is ultimately responsible for the exclusion of Asia from the labor market of America. It seems almost ridiculous that so much should depend on so slight distinctions.

Race-prejudice, especially as it has developed in the United States, is at bottom practically tantamount to skin-prejudice. According to humanitarians this may indeed be a regrettable phenomenon, but as long as it exists it is impolitic to be blind to the fact or minimize its social significance and explain it away by ethnological investigations. It is an open question, moreover, if colour-prejudice or race-prejudice in any of its forms is ever likely to disappear from the human world. Until, however, the prejudice is removed or modified and mitigated by conscious educational and social service agencies, it is reasonable to recognize that the anti-Asian animus of America would remain a most powerful *casus belli* between the East and the West. It behooves the American captains of industry and entrepreneurs, therefore, in the interest of the world's peace to reopen the question of Oriental immigration and have the "assimilability" of Asian laborers studied by economists and sociologists on less prejudiced and more equitable grounds.²⁸⁾

Like Europe the United States has not yet had the time and "preparedness" enough to display excessive land-hunger or market-quest, or zeal for the exploitation of weaker peoples in extra-American territories. But the persecution to which innocent Orientals have been exposed in America without redress from the legally constituted authorities, and the humiliation meted out by the authorities themselves in the shape of laws and agreements are convincing evidences that America and Europe are birds of a feather so far as aggression is concerned. In Young Asia's political psychology, therefore, the *ultimatum* of American labor to the Orient for the "crime of colour" affords the same stimulus to vindictive will and intelligence as does the steady annihilation of enslaved and semi-subject races by the dominant European Powers and the notorious postulate of the "white man's burden" that pervades the intellectuals, journalists, university circles and "upper ten thousands" of Eur-America.

In primitive times the world's peace was disturbed by incidents like the rape of Helen or of Sita. In the Middle Ages religious fanaticism added fuel to the fire of the normal tiger-instincts in man. The other day the great armageddon was advertized as being fought over the alleged violation of Belgium and the sinking of the *Lusitania*. But all through the ages territorial expansion, dynastic prestige, commercial monopoly, military renown of *digvijaya* (c

²⁸⁾ Dr. Rajani Kanta Das, a Hindu, lecturer on World-Trade in New York University, has recently been appointed by the Federal Board of Labor report on the conditions of Hindu working men and farmers on the Pacific Coast (1922).

Sarkar, The Futurism of Young Asia.

quest of the quarters), and so forth, have dictated the call to arms. Now that there remains no more of land, water, and air to be seized except possibly on Mars, the peace of the world is being recklessly staked by the aggressive races on the colour of the skin. It is in this way that the organic struggle for self-assertion maintains its continuity by changing its camouflage and ostensible motive from generation to generation, and that might establishes its historic right to rule mankind. Young Asia is fully conscious of the situation, and has been preparing itself to contribute to the grand cosmic evolution from its own angle of vision.

For the present, Asia's retaliation may easily take the form of an economic boycott of the United States. It is unfortunate that Americans should have lost the moral hold on the Orient when they can least afford to do without it. In and through the Great War there has been sung the swan-song of the Monroe Doctrine and America's policy of isolation. Her provincialism is already a matter of history. Already the financial center of gravity of the world has been shifted to New York. The American merchant marine has been expanding at an enormous rate under our very eyes. And with its power and serviceability immensely multiplied by the Panama Canal, Uncle Sam promises to be the inter-continental transportation agency of nations. Besides, during the last two decades American capital has more than doubled itself. What through manufactures, what through shipping, and what through bullion the United States today is in the greatest need of expansion, an enlarged horizon, an empire of foreign commerce and culture, a world-penetration all along the line. Is it expedient for America to have a discontented Asia to reckon with *now*, in view of the fact that the possibilities of the Orient, as a paying field for American enterprise cannot be overlooked even by those to whom Latin America is looming large? The crisis is a challenge to the intellect and prudence of the United States: A monumental world-problem is hanging on the capacity of the American brain to rise to the height of the occasion and bring about a fair adjustment between the claims of Young Asia and the right of the United States legislature, from the platform of interracial justice and good-will.²⁷⁾

²⁷⁾ The immigration law has been revised in 1921. According to the new regulations the annual quota of each foreign country must not exceed 3 per cent of the total number of the nationals which the last census gives as residents of the United States. But there is no limit to the number of *bona fide* students, travellers, merchants, lecturers etc. who enter the United States without the idea of permanent residence.

9. Americanism in the New Asia.

America's place in Asian consciousness is not, however, all conditioned by her treatment of the Oriental immigration question. Asia's reactions to the immigration policy of the United States are not therefore the exclusive factors determining Oriental-American relations.

Not only China and India but even Japan have on the whole nothing but the warmest feelings for the people, institutions and movements in the United States. America has succeeded in winning the heart of Asia simply because of her traditional love of freedom and democracy as well as her innate open-mindedness and receptivity to new ideas. Whatever might be the diplomatic manoeuvrings behind the Conference at Washington (1921) which was designed to straighten out some of the new international problems that have appeared all over the world since the Armistice (November 11, 1918) and which in fact was but a continuation of and appendix or corrective to the hastily manipulated and ill-digested Congress of Versailles, and howsoever formal or meaningless might be the declarations in regard to China's sovereignty or to the diminution of armaments, Young Asia cannot afford to think of any international grouping for its oppressed peoples without counting upon the United States as its inevitably the first and foremost advocate and supporter.

Although the United States has helped the imperialistic nations of Europe to maintain and expand their dependencies in Asia as the chief result of the war, it was paradoxically enough during the war that America's name became a household word in Asia as the friend of freedom for peoples who are still subject to foreign nations. It may be remarked that the greatest change in Asian political mentality, — and the greatest diplomatic revolution in the Asian *status quo* which is becoming more and more established—was brought about by America's entrance and effective participation in the war.

As America took a definitive stand the politics of the war assumed a new character. So much so, indeed, that the war of 1917—18 was almost a different war from that of 1914 in so far at least as Asian idealism was concerned. This phenomenal, almost mystical transformation was engendered by certain shibboleths which President Wilson had, the cleverness to exploit from the new vocabulary coined by Bolshevik Russia. Such shibboleths were found in the doctrine of self-determination.

And if Wilson took advantage of Bolshevism, Young Asia took advantage of Wilson in a manner which was the least suspected by himself. Whether or not the United States was destined to be a

hammer to smite Prussianism, she was fated to be, thus felt the idealists of the Orient, a most powerful curb and bridle on the imperialism of England. The dangerous phrase, "freedom of the sea", for instance, was not understood by the common sense of mankind in its petty technical (legal and juristic) significance such as it obtains in the treatment of neutral shipping on high seas in times of war. Laymen and women in Asia as in Eur-America understood this slogan in the larger but simpler political acceptance, which could only mean the deliverance of the world from the military, naval and mercantile domination of the seas by Great Britain.

At any rate, Asians were enthusiastic in the belief that though President Wilson's self-determination measure did not expressly mention the subject and semi-subject peoples of Asia, this declaration of faith at the time of the peace and afterward was bound to be interpreted by the world's idealists and the international jurists as applying to Asia quite as much as to the submerged races of Europe. For the next three or four decades political agitation in Asia will be carried on according to slogans which America has popularized in the heat of this Armageddon. These would have as vital a significance to the radicals of Young Asia as were the "ideas of 1789" for revolutionary Europe in 1830 and 1848. In fact, the nationalist leaders in India took advantage of the situation by despatching to President Wilson himself a formassly drafted memorandum in regard to the question of self-direction for India (1918).

10. New Asian States and America.

Political agitation and activity is already rife in Asia as an aftermath of the war. The political map is in for vast changes in India as elsewhere. Already, by the dismemberment of Turkey and Russia, the war has altered the face of the western and northern parts of the continent.

Take Russia—the revolution there, with the theory of Sovietic administration, has split up Russian Asia into at least four important political zones. First, to the west is Transcaucasia, including Armenia in Turkey and Azerbaijan in Northwest Persia. Next comes that enormous *terra incognita* vaguely known as Central Asia, or as Turcomania, which lies between the Caspian Sea and the Balkash Lake. It includes the Trans-Caspian Province, the Desert of Karakum and, paradoxically, the most fertile region in the world, Bokhara. Bokhara has two million people, and though little known outside, is a seat of living Moslem culture quite as influential as even Cairo. This region also includes the great Kirgiz steppes.

The third zone is what might be called Central Siberia, stretching between Tomsk, on the Obi River, and Irkutsk, on Lake Baikal. It is a mining region. All the important minerals—gold, coal, iron, copper, tin—are found there. The fourth zone, stretching from Trans-Baikal Province to the maritime provinces on the Pacific, is primarily agricultural.

Then take Turkey. Her defeat has led to the loss of Arabia by secession and of Palestine and Mesopotamia by conquest. All that remains of Turkey in Asia, as we used to see it on the maps, is the fragment called Anatolia, or Asia Minor, especially after the Greek war of aggression (1921) manipulated as it was by British gold and diplomacy.

And what does this mean for the future? It means the possibilities in the world for six or seven new centres of political life. And this would involve, as a matter of course, an unprecedented expansion of foreign and especially of American enterprise, financial backing and technological assistance in order to develop these new Asian states. Each of these regions needs railway and mining engineers. Besides, in Mesopotamia, river-engineering can drain the marshes and revive the glories of ancient Babylon and mediaeval Bagdad, while in Turcomania the Amu Daria's channel can be diverted back to the Caspian Sea and convert the arid plains and treeless wastes into a land of plenty like another Egypt.

None of these new nationalities are going to remain "mandated" areas or buffer-states. They are born to put an end to the submerged Asia. Along with them is entering into the world activities a nationalized, self-conscious Asia, which has raised the cry: "If self-determination was the thing for Europe, what's wrong with a doctrine of self-determination for us?"

Asia expects the United States to be something like a "big brother" to her struggling subject and semi-subject nationalities. By the Monroe Doctrine (1823), all through the nineteenth century, the United States has been the moral guardian of the New World. In Europe, it has been England's historic policy to be the diplomatic friend of lesser states. But situated as she is in Asia, she requires to be watched and guarded against in her policies regarding Persia, the Yangtse Valley, Egypt and, last but not least, India. Young Asia looks forward to a day when America, like Japan, will assume the role of guide, philosopher and friend, and will co-operate with her in bringing a free Asia into being.

That consummation—*Swarāj* of Asia—would be the greatest bulwark of international peace and the surest safeguard of the

world's democracy. Abraham Lincoln pointed out that no nation could permanently exist half slave and half free. Go just one step further. How can humanity hope for permanent tranquillity and happiness when it is half self-determined and half subjected? And Asia, be it remembered, is the home of more than half the human race.

11. India in the United States.

America seems responsive to the demands of Asia. In regard to India, for instance, an American Commission has been founded at Washington to support the *Swaraj* movements in that country. And American papers have given publicity to the following news served by the Associated Press from Delhi on Nov. 4, 1921:

"All-India Congress Committee, consisting of 200 delegates today adopted a resolution, with only seven dissenting votes, adhering to the policy of "civil disobedience," including non-payment of taxes and complete non-cooperation. Mahatma Gandhi . . . emphasized the seriousness of the proposed non-violent revolution and uttered a warning against adopting the measure in light-hearted manner It had been supposed the Congress might resort to more violent methods. Several of the speakers advocated a more advanced program."

Commenting on this complete boycott of British administration by the *swarajists* (self-rulers) of India, the New York *Nation* wrote quite a characteristically American editorial note in its issue of November 16 while the "disarmament conference" was holding its debates at Washington. "This inconspicuous dispatch", said the editor, "bears news which may prove to be more momentous for the future of the world than any congress of the Western nations. At least it concerns the future not only of British rule in India but white dominance of Asia."

The following twelve charges against British rule in India were unanimously adopted on December 5, 1920 at Hotel Mc Alpin, New York, at the first national convention of the American "Friends of Freedom for India:"

"(1) We charge that for 150 years, the official oligarchy of Great Britain has ruled and dominated India in the exclusive interests of the British Empire and that such rule has been opposed to the welfare of all the Indian people,

"(2) We charge that as a direct result of British exploitation, the native industrial system has broken down and has almost wholly disappeared, so that workers in the native crafts have been forced

to abandon their accustomed and preferred callings, to work on the land and in factories in order to provide such foodstuffs and other products as British imperial necessities demand.

"(3) We charge that as general ignorance and illiteracy were a necessary condition to the successful exploitation of the resources and people of India, Great Britain has steadily and persistently cut off the means of education as is evidenced by the educational appropriation of \$1,838,338 out of an annual budget of about \$600,000,000 in 1920—21. As a result the Indian people of today have not opportunities equal to those which existed prior to the time that Britain seized India.

"(4) We charge that through a carefully fostered system of scanty credit, excessive taxation, enforced exportation and beggarly pay, Great Britain has literally starved the people of India by the millions in spite of the fact that India, left to herself, would be able to raise sufficient food to nourish her entire population.

"(5) We charge that under British rule, native women have been drawn into the horrors of prostitution in order to satisfy the lust of the soldiery who, for the purpose of supporting the mastery of the foreign rule, have been maintained under unnatural conditions in tremendous numbers and at the expense of the Indian people.

"(6) We charge that with the double object of financial extortion and of drugging the free spirit of India, Great Britain has devised a system of opium monopoly and traffic which not only deliberately seeks to corrupt the body and mind of the Indian people, but to extract the last penny from those whom it succeeds in corrupting, and further, that the responsible managers of this system have sought to create new drug victims among the little children.

"(7) We charge that under British rule, deeds of violence, deaths from plague, venereal disease, sickness and misery have increased.

"(8) We charge that British rule has sought to destroy the indigenous culture of India, its philosophy, art and literature, to crush the pride of the people and to alienate them from their traditions and to hold them up to the contempt of the world as an ignorant people.

"(9) We charge that the policy of British rule in India has been a systematic destruction of initiative in administration and executive control of all public functions, in order to make self-government in India impossible in the course of time and on the partial success

of which policy the Britishers justify before the world the necessity of the prolongation of their control.

"(10) We charge that during the past few years a course of ruthless suppression and oppression has been entered upon by Great Britain in order to overcome the rising tide of indignation and the demand for freedom which have been the inevitable result of foreign rule so that today, in all of India, the native population is deprived of the very last vestige of those human rights which our Declaration of Independence declared inalienable.

"(11) We charge that there is today a demand throughout the whole of India for independence from the rule of Great Britain; that this demand is based, among others, upon acts similar to those of which we complained in our Declaration of Independence.

"(12) We charge that Great Britain has, in order to conceal her iniquitous conduct, created an extensive system of propaganda and espionage and persecution throughout the world which has been skillfully employed in this country and that all real news and correct accounts of what is now happening in India has been wholly suppressed except for what comes through by underground means at the risk of the life and liberty of the messenger."

These categorical pronouncements from Americans, most of whom by the bye are 100 % Anglo-Saxons, indicate that the ideal of political freedom is not in the mind of the United States, — in the mentality at any rate of a section of the American public, — limited by latitude and longitude. The advocacy of freedom for India is the acid test for American liberalism and love of liberty. For in championing India's emancipation the people of the United States are deliberately calling into being a new free state or bundle of free states outside of the boundaries of Eur-America. And secondly, in so fraternizing with the Hindus and Moslems of Asia America is forced to part company with the British Isles with which she is connected by more than one cultural link.

India's freedom has evoked the active sympathy and cooperation of America's working men and farmers no less than that of the lawyers, professors, preachers, merchants, bankers and journalists. In May 1920 the American Socialist Party passed the first resolution ever passed by any American Party for India's national independence. At the first preliminary conference as well as at the first annual congress of the Farmer-Labor Party a similar resolution was adopted. Both these parties availed themselves of the help of Tarak Nath Das, Sailendra Nath Ghose and Basanta Koomar Roy in their deliberations on India.

The "Industrial Workers of the World", known usually as I. W. W., is a purely industrial but revolutionary organization and is not a "party" in the political sense. The great press of the I. W. W., consisting as it does of 14 weeklies, monthlies and dailies in eight different languages, have published some of the best editorials on the struggle in India that have ever appeared in the United States.

While the deportation of Hindu political refugees was being pushed by the Federal Government owing to the pressure of Great Britain, American labour organizations of all denominations from the conservative American Federation of Labor to the I. W. W. passed resolutions against the projected expulsion of Indians and for their right to asylum in the U. S. as well as for India's freedom. Dozens of labor organizations appointed "India committees" of their own men whose business consisted in arranging mass meetings on India and distributing news about India among labour-journalists. It was the systematic and steady support of the labor organizations which eventually proved to be the chief factor in Young India's triumph over British intrigue with the government at Washington, D. C.

In order to help the political refugees from India the All-Central Council of the Trade Unions in Seattle was prepared to do "anything within their power." On being asked if they would call a general strike in Seattle they replied: "Yes, we will see that no Indian is deported from Seattle harbor." (Three Indians had been held in Seattle on the Pacific Coast). And leaders of the Hindustan *Gadar* (Revolution) Party at San Francisco had reasons to believe that they could depend on the promise of American Unionists.

Young India's anti-Britishism has found champions among the members of the U. S. Congress also. In connection with the discussions over the Treaty of Versailles the case for India formed part of the speeches of Senators Joseph I. France, La Follette and George Norris (1919). Recently on May 11, 1922, "the fight for independence for India was officially recognized", says the *Boston American*, "by the cities of Boston and Cambridge through their representatives (the Mayors) at a dinner given in observance of the Independence day of that nation."

A View of France.

1. Prevalent Notions about France.

In India as elsewhere France is known to the people at large as the manufacturer of perfumeries. A firm like the Parfumerie Lubin of Paris has an extensive market in India. It is as old as 1798 and is proud of its association with Empress Josephine, a copy of one of whose orders the director would exhibit to the visitor. And he makes it a point also to emphasise that the stuff in which his firm deals is the essence of natural flowers worked up in the laboratory at Cannes in the Alpes-Maritimes province and is thus totally different in quality from the goods sold by other nations, say, by Germany.

Or perhaps the reputation of France consists in the glass products manufactured by the Compagnie des Cristalleries which has its *usines* or factories at Baccarat, a town located in the east between Nancy and Strasbourg. In this instance at least the reputation is well justified. For to enter the museum of the company in Paris and visit the collection of vases and furniture, all crystal ware, in its spacious showrooms, is once more experiencing the interplay of forms and colours with which one is familiar in the halls of porcelain in the Imperial Palace at Peking. Not until you go again to Kyoto to watch the living art of silk embroidery can you realise how in the twentieth century conditions of mechanical industries the French people are maintaining the tradition of medieval aesthetics in a manner which might excite the jealousy of the cloister-protected calligraphists and fresco-painters.

All the same, Baccarat is a synonym for luxury,—the company specializes in catering to the royalties and plutocracies of the world. But just as in regard to India the world has come to identify it with the land of the Buddhas and the Chaitanyas and ignore altogether its Charlemagnes and Richelieus, in regard to France also the modern mind, especially the Anglo-Saxon puritan or rather the Anglo-American Cato, has created an impression that the French people are pastmasters chiefly, if not exclusively, in perfumeries, table services, ladies' garments, pastries, culinary arts and such luxuries all along the line. Nay, in certain quarters French society,—"gay Paris,"—is alleged to be the nurse of questionable morals.

2. The Atmosphere of Paris.

Young India has need to be thoroughly disabused of these notions.

Come to "Comedie Française", the theatre founded by Molière (1622—1673) and see the *Maman Colibri*, a prose play in four acts by Henry Bataille, and watch how one touch of the pathos of contemporary French "comedy" (which, by the bye, is steeped in the tragedy of *King Lear* or of *Othello*) makes the whole house sob like an assembly of infants with streams of tears rolling down their cheeks. It is a drama of family life conceived in the setting of modern social conditions. But this French masterpiece in the conflict of emotions exhibits a profound grasp of the spiritual urge of life, beside which, as artist, Goethe is nothing but medieval, Shakespeare too primitive and elementary, and Kalidas and Euripides simply archaic or pre-historic. And yet in his message Bataille is their peer. The playwright of Paris is a prophet like all great humanists of history.

The man in the street of Paris does not see only the advertisements of vaudevilles and cinemas. Lines like the following inscribed on the statue of Alfred de Musset (1810—1857) also arrest his attention on a foot-path at Palais Royal:

"Rein ne nous rend si grands qu'une grande douleur
... Les plus désespérés sont les chants les plus beaux
Et j'en sais d'immortels qui sont de purs sanglots."

Here is the French passport to romanticism. It declares:

"Nothing makes us so great as doth a great sorrow,
The most hopeless are the songs the most beautiful,
And I know some immortal songs which are nothing but sobs."

The world of which these lines from *La Nuit de Mai* gives a hint is, from another angle, Schiller's "*einer andern Flur*" and "*einem andern Sonnenlichte, einer glücklichern Natur*." Lovers of Shelley know how to "pine for what is not" and announce that "our sincerest laughter with some pain is ever fraught."

It is indisputable that nowhere else except in Paris can you find the stimulating atmosphere which one breathes in its art-galleries because nowhere else except in France have flourished the greatest painters of the present and the last generation. Today Bernheim-Jeune is exhibiting the new artistic anatomies created by Cézanne in his architectural grouping of colour-masses, and tomorrow one finds in the same *Maison* the dreamy violets "casting a dim religious light" over the floating flowers and nature's plenty of Claude-Monet's workmanship. Or, again, Renoir's sculpturesque construc-

tion of volumes in metallic red is presented to the public by Durand-Ruel, who on another occasion invites the city to view the peasants, meadows and towns in Pissarro's gouache and pastels.

In Paris, however, one does not have to visit the Louvre or the Luxembourg galleries in order to get acquainted with specimens of beauty. The entire city with its Concorde and Carousel, its Champ de Mars and Avenue des Champs-Élysées, its Place de la Nation and Trocadero, is one mammoth museum of living glories in sculpture and architecture. Paris is unparalleled from the point of view of the "city as art-gallery."

In the number of *librairies* selling higher literature and of stores dealing in *objets d'arts*, curios and antiquities, Paris seems to lead off all first class cities. In the kiosks at the street corners the Parisian buys not only the women's magazines and the journals of dress, sport and travel, not only the bourgeois *Journal* and *Intransigeant* and the bolshevik *Humanité* and *Clarté* but also serious periodicals like the *Revue des deux mondes* and *La Nouvelle Revue Française*, and magazines like the *Revue Scientifique*, *La Nature*, *La Science et la Vie*, *Revue Generale des Sciences* etc. A Japanese will easily appreciate the significance of this observation. For an American also it will be a rare experience to come across the *Scientific Monthly*, *Science* or the *Journal of Industrial Hygiene* in the newspaper booths of New York streets.

If church-going is a mark of religious life an occasional visitor may watch the kind of people who kneel down on their seats at the Notre Dame or the Madeleine to be satisfied that even the well-fed men and women of France,—bankers, journalists, lawyers, scientists,—have not yet bidden adieu to the conventional rituals of Catholicism. Notwithstanding the glare of cafés at night the home is still the centre of *la vie parisienne* almost exactly as it was in medieval Eur-Asia. And in the mentality of Young Paris such as one can size up in the *vers libre* of La Rochelle, the anti-militarist, one will come in touch with more genuine mysticism than one finds in that of the professional mystics and traders in spirituality who often hail from the East to the West.

The standard of Paris is set by a Le Chatelier, the metallurgist, author of *Le Silice et les Silicates*, and inventor of apparatus which transforms industrial processes in mining, explosives and furnaces, but who still preaches with all the emphasis he can command the value of theoretical studies, or a Painlevé, the mathematical genius, who was admitted into the *Institut de France* while quite young, and who was raised to the head of the war-office, nay, of the Cabinet

during the most critical period in French history, in whom, moreover, not only Young China but all Asia can find a champion of independence.

Paris, again, is the city where Mercereau, the rising man of letters, in his small apartment draws once every week between 100 and 150 men and women representing the "seven arts" although he never offers the attractions of a salon, and where Gleizes, the most extreme of all cubists, lectures on the beauties of the novel forms in art, which perhaps are hardly intelligible except to the initiated, with the enthusiasm of a discoverer of the "new Egypt" in Mars.

3. French Discoveries and Inventions.

These are no doubt the superficial remarks of a casual traveller. But let us dive deeper. It is not necessary, however, to prepare an inventory of French achievements in modern culture from palaeontology to sinology by rummaging among the chapters of the two solid volumes of *La Science Française* (1915). We can sample out the general trend of life and level of thought in France by a much simpler process.

In 1907 a plebiscite was taken in France on the question as to who should be regarded as the greatest man of French history. Was it Victor Hugo? Was it Napoleon? Was it Rousseau? Was it Descartes? Was it Charlemagne? The verdict of the French nation was "Louis Pasteur" (1822—1893), the biologist, who had died fourteen years previous to this popular appraisal of the country's heroes.

It is not easy to label with Pasteur the name of any single science because his investigations, each a discovery, have renovated every science from chemistry to zoology. His researches in racemic acid and crystalline dissymetry gave birth to the science of stereochemistry. His theory of fermentation brought forth bacteriology. He is universally recognized as the father of the "scientific" study of medicine, in as much as he founded the germ theory of disease with all its applications in the problems of infection, antiseptic surgery, microparasitology, toxins, anti-toxins, serums and vaccines. Today not only physicians interested in the cure of rabies have to look up to Pasteur as one of the greatest benefactors of humanity, but every class of biologists, no matter whether botanists, physiologists or zoologists, have to remember him while developing the lines of investigation initiated by him in the studies on micro-organism causing silk worm diseases and on the floating matter of the air.

A nation which has sense enough to single out such a man as A. I. in its calendar of notables is certainly not a crowd of pleasure-seekers, materialists and sybarites.

We shall now speak of another phase in the civilization of France, namely, of French engineering feats. The engineers of the United States are noted for their achievements in this direction. So let us see what a committee of American experts has to say about their French comrades. Here follows a rather long extract:

"It will suffice for our purpose to name a few of the great French engineers whose achievements have made them famous. Such are Ferdinand de Lesseps the builder of the Suez Canal; Eiffel, who conceived and constructed the tower that bears his name; Perronnet, Poncelet, Hennebique and Mesnager, civil engineers of world-wide reputation; Sauvage and Couche in railroad engineering; Sadı Carnot the discoverer of some of the most fundamental laws of thermodynamics; Etienne Lenoir; Beau de Rochas and Fernand Forest, who by their pioneer work in the development of the internal combustion engine prepared the way for the automobile and the aeroplane; Gramme, who developed the dynamo-electric machine, and took an important part in the discovery that dynamo machines are reversible, i. e., capable of being employed as motors; Baudot, the designer of a multiplex system extensively used; Marcel Depres, who was a pioneer in the electric transmission of power; Foucault, who first discovered the losses of power in dynamos due to eddy currents; Mascart; Joubert; Hospitalier; André Blondel and Mourice Le Blanc all of whom made important contributions to electrical engineering science and standards; the illustrious Ampere and Coulomb who, though generally classified as physicists, have powerfully contributed through their basic discoveries to the progress of applied electricity; Elie de Beaumont; Combes; Callon; Houy; Albert de Lapparent; Haton de La Goupilliere; de Launay; Daubree, all mining engineers or geologists who have contributed largely to engineering progress.

"In metallurgy may be mentioned Sainte-Claire Deville, whose laboratory experiments opened the way to much metallurgical progress; Reaumur, who discovered the process by which castings of cast-iron may be made malleable and which to-day is of great industrial importance; Moissan, who in his electric furnace first succeeded in reducing oxides hitherto deemed unreducible, and produced a whole series of new carbides; Grumer, to whom we owe many of our scientific conceptions of the complex reactions of the iron blast furnace; Pierre Martin, who first succeeded in manufac-

turing steel in an open hearth furnace; Osmond, the father of metallography; Heroult, who (though ignorant of the work done at the time by the American metallurgist Hall) invented the electrolytic method of extracting metallic aluminium from its ores, and whose electric furnaces are playing an increasingly important part in the metallurgy of steel; Pourcel, who contributed so much to the early introduction of the Bessemer process on the Continent and was a pioneer in the manufacture of ferro-manganese; Henri Le Chatelier, eminent chemist and metallurgist, whose inventions of the thermo-electric pyrometer and numerous other contributions have made possible much important progress in the art of treating metals; Schneider, of the Creusot Steel Works; Leon Guillet and George Charpy, productive workers of great talent."

The above report was drawn up by I. N. Hollis of Worcester Polytechnic Institute, H. M. Howe of Columbia University, A. C. Humphreys of Stevens Institute of Technology, and A. Saubeur of Harvard University and has been printed in *Science and Learning in France* (Chicago, 1917) edited by J. H. Wigmore.

4. Knowing France.

To say that France is unknown in India will, however, be resented as an insult and surely condemned as a hyperbole. For, the civilisation of France from Descartes to H. Poincaré, from Lamarck to Pasteur, from Molière to Maupassant, and from Montesquieu to Jean Jaurès conveys a distinct message which is as varied and complex as are the different cross-sections of the Indian intelligentsia to which it is addressed.

But the objective experience of the past sixteen years has endowed Young India with an altogether new and a higher standard in the very conception of "knowing" and understanding a thing. Out of its titanic conflicts with the world-forces India has evolved a theory of knowledge which, although not quite original in modern psychology, was at any rate unknown in Asia previous to 1905.

In regard to France, for instance, Indian thinkers have begun to interrogate themselves thus: "How much of our knowledge of French civilisation is the result of our own activities? Which contributions of France to the progress of mankind have we been able to assimilate through the endeavours of our own path-finders, scouts, and star-gazers? How many great men or great discoveries of France has India discovered for herself? In other words, how much of French science and learning in India is *self-determined*?" Evidently this self-questioning attitude is but a corollary to the

methodology of *swarājīc* creation which is bound to belittle any consummation, however useful and lucrative at first sight, that is not conquered and possessed by dint of one's own *shakti* (force).

And certainly Young India is right in its self-criticism and in its doubts regarding the efficacy of the work accomplished by its immediate precursors. Because it is notorious that France has been made known in India almost exclusively by alien interpreters. The India of 1921 has to admit the defects of its great men of the recent past in so far as it has still to study the French revolution through British eyes and the French constitution in American translations. No Indian pioneer has yet been inspired to introduce French philosophy, science, or art to the attention of his compatriots. India's understanding of France is in consequence neither a creative process in her self-determined experimentations nor a product of her conscious energizings to grasp the world at every point.

In the second place, the tyranny of the English language in modern Indian life and culture has definitely been recognized as inconsistent with Young India's theory of knowledge. Knowledge is capture, conquest, possession, an intimate enjoyment of nature's secrets and mankind's glories. India cannot be said to possess France until the French arts and sciences are accessible in India's own language. India has long submitted to the despotic hegemony of a foreign tongue. In its attempts at understanding France, Young India cannot afford to continue that thralldom.

The problem is quite simple. If Charles Gide's book on economics is good enough to be swallowed line by line by the B. A. students of Indian universities when it is diluted in English and manufactured by a foreign publishing house, why should not the same material be considered palatable (perhaps even for the lower, the Intermediate, classes) once it is available in Telugu, Urdu, Marathi, Bengali or Hindi? The boycott of the foreign book-products is a most essential part in every scheme of *swarāj* in education.

Young India is therefore seriously demanding such an educational policy as will take immediate steps to render de Quatrefage's *De la méthode dans les sciences*, Claude-Bernard's *Introduction à l'étude de la médecine expérimentale*, Orthlieb's *L'Aéronautique*, Moureu's *Notions fondamentales de chimie organique*, Moulon's *Puériculture*, Brunhes' *La géographie humaine*, Meillet's *Introduction à l'étude comparative des langues indo-européennes*, Dwelshanver's *La psychologie française contemporaine*, Durkheim's *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, Lévy-Bruhl's *Les fonctions mentales dans les*

sociétés inférieures, Joseph-Barthélemy's *Le problème de la compétence dans la démocratie*, Raphael-George Levy's *Banques d'émission et trésors publics*, Fauré's *L'Art Moderne*, Gide and Rist's *Histoire des doctrines économiques*, Pelliot's *Asie Central*, and other books available in the languages which the university students speak in their homes. Evidently such books produced by the German intelligentsia are also in need of being *naturalized*, so to say, in India.

To defer this question of enriching the vernaculars to an indefinite future while concentrating all or a principal part of the energy on buildings and furniture, indispensable as they are, can but betray a lamentable lack of statesmanship on the part of India's educational leaders. The assimilation of French or German culture in India is ultimately only a question of financial patronage to be extended by persons who are interested in national expansion to the compilers, translators, or authors of books in the Indian languages and to the publishing societies or scientific and literary academies.

The paucity of technical terms in the vernaculars is only an excuse of "politicians" who have no other weapon with which to combat Young India's theory of knowledge except sheer obstinacy and the Satanic will to retard human progress by any and every means. Japan did not wait for the evolution of scientific terms in the Japanese language before she proceeded to assimilate the standard European and American works on medicine, engineering, and metallurgy.

And yet the Japanese who know little English and less French, German, Dutch, or Russian, have learned how to direct the air-machines, sub-marines, and seismometres, conduct creditable experiments in biological chemistry, and play with financial statistics as nimbly as with the figures on the chessboard. But although Japan is a first-class power and has to her credit the event of Port Arthur, triumphs in the Yangtze Valley, and the famous "racial equality" doctrine broached at the Congress of Versailles, no philologist has yet ventured to assert that the capabilities of the Japanese language as an instrument of modern expression are richer than those of any of the Dravidian or the Aryan languages of India.

The day of bamboozling Young India is gone. Young India is thoroughly conscious that technical terms "grow" in exactly the same manner as the thought itself or the expression thereof tends to grow. It knows moreover that the vocabulary can be "made" to order, i.e., created by the fiat of a *parishat*, *sammelan* or *mandala*, to serve as conventional symbols for certain defined purposes. And finally, the technical terms can be revised and improved at will from

year to year or from quinquennium to quinquennium, whether by the authors themselves or by learned societies.

The question of the Indian language thus occupies to-day a foremost place in the thought in connection with the problem of knowing and understanding or Indianizing the civilization of France. But the theory of knowledge as a function of linguistic *digvijaya*, as conquest of the world by means of one's own language, or as absorption of the resources of human attainments in the *sârva-bhaumic* (universal) empire of one's mother-tongue, came into prominence with the birth throes of the National Council of Education, Bengal, in 1905. It remains for the stalwarts of the national education movement in its second phase, which is developing before our eyes, to place the "ideas of 1905" on the annual budget of Young India and systematically carry them out as one of the irreducible minima of its constructive educational policy. Not more than a sum of Rs. 500,000 is likely to be needed in order to equip *within three years* any leading Indian language as the medium to be used in the highest instruction corresponding to the standard which the existing universities offer at the present moment.

5. The Challenge to Young India.

Knowing and understanding are not however passive receiving, they involve reacting and reconstructing as well. For, knowledge is a function of life; it is a process in utilization, i.e., creation of values. This doctrine of life as self-assertion is Young India's distinctive contribution in contemporary social philosophy. It has been formulated in unmistakable terms in Jagadish Chunder Bose's comprehensive analysis of the "responses", which in its entirety is but the theoretic correlate of the modern Indian *sâdhanâ* (strivings) for conquest and expansion. Young India therefore does not believe that one can be said to know or understand a thing as long as one is not in a position to exploit and transform it for one's own ends.

In examining Young India by its own standard France might therefore naturally ask: "What have the Indians done in the way of making use of French institutions, movements and ideals in order to promote their own vital principle; in order to advance the interests of India's own growth and development?" France has not as yet had palpable evidences of India's self-consciousness. Where in France are the French people to look for the manifestations of Indian energy and self-assertion, for the responses of India's life-force to the thousand and one stimuli of the world forces? France

can feel the vital urge of Poland, Tchecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Jugo-Slavia, for they are all active and persistent in their pressure on French resources. But to France India is a cipher, an inert automaton, a geographical expression and not a living organism.

All that the French people know about the India that is dead has come to them through the antiquarian efforts of their own *indianistes* from Chézy, Bergaigne and Burnouf to Sénart, Lévi and Foucher. Their *Société Asiatique* does not seem ever to have felt the impress of an Indian "indianist". The economics and politics of India since 1857 have likewise found a place in French consciousness through the investigations of France's own consuls and diplomats like Valbazen, S. H. Barthélemy, Maindron, Aubin, Metin, Piriou, Chailley, Clavery, etc. Has any Indian publicist ever thought of addressing the French democracy on the question of India in world-politics?

Even the latest of the political movements in India (1905—1921) has been made known to France in *Le Monde Illustré*, a weekly, in as complete and succinct a manner as possible not by an Indian but by a Frenchman, Maurice Bourgeois. Finally, again, on the cultural aspects the nationalist activity in India is being interpreted by another Frenchman, Leandre Vaillat, who has been contributing a series of articles to the daily *Figaro*.

Altogether France has not learned a single thing about India or the world from the work of an Indian of the present age.

India has not declared herself in France, she has lacked self-expression. India has failed to take advantage of the French language in order to convey to the world what is her standpoint in science, arts, philosophy and international relations. India does not maintain in Paris a single bureau of information, commercial, political or cultural, in order to let the French *sociétés*, clubs, *réunions*, *maisons*, and *académies* feel that she is doing something to recreate mankind. India is not represented in France by a single delegation of responsible individuals who might collaborate with the leaders of French life on their own platforms in the field of thought or of social endeavour. In the French world of experience, therefore, India does not figure as a conscious unit.

The reproach is not unfounded. The world has indeed a right to say: "You Indians were forced to learn English virtually, if not ostensibly, at the point of the bayonet. Your Rammohan Roys had no alternative before them but found English colleges. Thus came to be adopted the ways and means of making a foreign domination over you easy and perhaps permanent. Incidentally, of

course, you have been able to assimilate something of the modern spirit owing to the education you have received in your English schools. And you have also been able to show a little sign of rejuvenation during the last three generations by literary, scientific or journalistic activity. But all these marks of new life in India manifest themselves chiefly in English and are to that extent some of the phases of Great Britain's colonial culture. Altogether they indicate your own weakness and the strength of your alien master by whose administration and educational system you have been introduced to the larger world."

Undoubtedly India has yet to demonstrate before the bar of civilised humanity that like the people of Japan she has the virility in her to make use of western civilisation, or for that matter, the institutions and ideals of modern life, without the compulsion, tacit or open, from a western rule. For, a race that is alive and wishes to remain alive would know how to seek the best allies of its life and power from here and there and everywhere.

And the Frenchman may be pardoned if he throws out the same challenge in the following manner: "Let India show her mettle to the world by displaying her strength in French language, in French institutions, and in French public life. Let India be determined to prove that at least in one instance she has learned to choose her love independently and through her own eyes. We shall then recognize that foreign subjection has not been able to extinguish the freedom of the Indian mind." The same challenge may come to India from the German or the Russian side as well.

This challenge is an invitation to a trial of strength. It is worthy the serious consideration of those who represent and engineer the vital impulses of Young India. It is time that Indian intellectuals should begin to be in evidence among Latin, Teutonic, Slavic, Yellow and Semitic peoples.

India has to give solid testimony to the fact that she does not claim her position in international polity on the strength of an English chaperon. India has to make known by her daily attitudes and reactions that she is a respectable colleague and peer of the other nations. Further, India is to demand her place in the sun on the ground that she is capable of interpreting herself in her own way and also of having herself heard in the standard dialect, whatever it be, of diplomacy and science.

It thus becomes absolutely necessary for several hundred Indians of distinction to experience equality and practise comradeship *not in an intermittent or casual fashion but from year's end to year's end,*

with the other makers of current history and with the other founders of new landmarks in human civilisation. To establish this kinship with *vishva-shakti* (the world-forces) and to help reconstructing the world-structure are important aspects in the foreign policy of Young India which can no longer be overlooked by its leaders whether interested in the sciences, industries and arts, or in politics, public life and journalism.

6. A Call to Comradeship.

The moment is opportune. For, Young India's achievements in diverse fields since 1905 have already won for it a recognition in Asia, Europe and America,—not only in council-chambers and in the lobbies of parliaments but also in scientific associations and among the people at large. The world is therefore now willing to know India "intensively" and meet her on terms of friendship and equality. Thus, on behalf of the Frenchmen of science Paul Appell, one of the most renowned mathematicians of the present day, offers his greetings to Indian intellectuals and cordially invites them to co-operate with savants in France in the work of extending the bounds of learning and enlarging the domain of the rights of man.

The letter of welcome, dated Paris, the 9th February 1921, is being reproduced below:

"C'est du fond du coeur que j'envoie aux savants et aux étudiants hindous l'expression des affectueuses sympathies des professeurs et des élèves de l'Université de Paris. Nous travaillerons avec eux aux progrès d'une culture humaine, mise désormais au service de la Liberté et de la Justice."

The letter is signed by Appell in his capacity as member of the *Institut de France* and as rector of the University of Paris. The "French Institute" is the central scientific organisation founded by Napoleon in 1795 to co-ordinate the activities of all the highest learned societies of France, called the *Académies* which are at present five in number. In the estimation of the world of savants the Institute of France corresponds to the Royal Society of Great Britain.

The Rector of a French University may be described as roughly equivalent to the Chancellor or president of English and American universities. But there is one important distinction. In France the head of a university is the administrator also of secondary instruction for one of the seventeen educational districts (technically known as *Académies*) into which France (including Algeria) is divided. In French official language Appell is *recteur de l'Académie de Paris*. Says President Appell:

"It is from the bottom of my heart, that I send to the savants and students of India (N. B. In France as in the United States the term "*hindou*" is *geographical* and therefore includes Mussalmans and others who are not Hindu by faith) the warm sympathies of the professors and students of the University of Paris. We shall work with them for the advancement of a human civilisation such as will be directed henceforth to the service of Liberty and Justice."

In these few lines as in everything that he has done in his life Appell is recognized by the representative men of France as a true child of the French revolution. And India finds her "ideas of 1905" fraternizing herein with the spirit of 1789, another instance of the elderly West lending a helping hand to the rising East.

There are universities and some very celebrated too where a man becomes president, chancellor or governor not because his scientific attainments, if fortunately he should happen to possess any, automatically raise him to the head of the Faculties, but because he commands a social pull, perhaps because he is a successful broker. Such presidents might as well have shone as directors of a brewery or of a cigarette-manufacturing company, for the simple reason that the accident of their birth enables them to gracefully approach the moneyed aristocracy for funds;—a no mean qualification, however, in contemporary civilisation when the efficiency of instruction and the heightening of the educational standard are invariably dependent on the expansion of the budget.

But Appell owes his position entirely to his address in the world of science. Specialists in mathematics can judge for themselves the value of his *Théorie des fonctions algébriques et leurs intégrals*, *Principes de la théorie des fonctions elliptiques* and *Traité de mécanique rationnelle* (in three volumes). In astronomy also his name is quite well known. And just as during the war another French mathematician, Painlevé, rose to the highest political office in the state and came to be the most discussed man of France, so also the name of Monsieur Appell became a household word in the city and in *mofussil* in connection with his services as director of *Secour National* (or *Jātiya Sevi Samiti*, to use the current Indian expression) which was instituted by the government to relieve the people in distress of all sorts.

The call to comradeship from Paul Appell is for the people of India a message of welcome into a life of expansion. It furnishes an atmosphere of co-operation between the East and the West on the one hand and of unhindered competition in brain-powers between India and the world on the other. And coming as it does from

one of the first citizens of the French republic the noble message deserves a generous response from the apostles of Greater India.

7. French Economics and India.

Business men in India will be interested to learn that some of the greatest bankers, engineers, statisticians, and manufacturers of France are keenly studying the trend of Indian trade. The success of Japan and the United States in their trade relations with India during the last few years has opened France's eyes to the possibilities in the same direction.

So far as India is concerned, she has everything to gain by the entry of another industrial power in her sphere whether as intermediary between market and market or as ally in the development of her own resources. For, the soundest economic policy for India is certainly to provide for the fullest and widest competition between the foreign forces of capital and talent in her agriculture, mining, forestry, workshop, and commerce.

Now, there is another angle of approach from which France has been taking interest in India's work. Herewith a letter which Monsieur Yves-Guyot, président of the *Société d'Economie Politique* of Paris, has been pleased to address to the economists of India.

Yves-Guyot was formerly a member of the Chamber of Deputies. He was also the minister of public works. He has for some long time been the editor of the *Journal des Economistes*, a monthly publication. His *Agence Economique et Financière* is a daily. Yves-Guyot's writings on economics are known in Italy, Great Britain and the United States, some of them being available in English.

Here follows the letter in the original from which the first line which is of a personal character is being removed (Paris, le 20. février, 1921):

"La science économique est une science internationale comme l'arithmétique et la géométrie. Les frontières ne delimitent pas les vérités qu'elle a acquises et celles qu'elle recherche. Ce n'est pas d'elle qu'on peut dire: vérité en deçà du Pyrénées, erreur au delà. Ce qui est vrai à Paris c'est également à Bombay ou Calcutta.

"Les physiocrates français du XVIIIe siècle sont les véritables fondateurs de la science économique: et Hume et Adam Smith n'ont pas nié l'influence qu'ils avaient exercée sur eux. Jean Baptiste Say, Frederic Bastiat, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu ont maintenu leur tradition qui représente la société d'économie politique de Paris.

"Nous serions très heureux d'entrer en communication régulière avec les économistes de l'Inde. Nous sommes convaincus que les échanges des idées qui en résulteraient seraient utiles au progrès de la science économique.

"Les faits qui viennent de se dérouler ont prouvé que son importance ne cessera de grandir. La plus grande partie des calamités qui affligent le monde proviennent de l'ignorance des lois scientifiques qu'elle a dégagés."

The letter reads in English as follows:

"Economics is an international science like arithmetic and geometry. The frontiers do not set any limits to the truths it has discovered nor to those which it seeks to bring out. It is not of this science that one might say: truth on this side of the Pyrenees, error on the other. What is true at Paris is equally true at Bombay or Calcutta.

"The French physiocrats of the eighteenth century are the real founders of economic science; and Hume and Adam Smith have not denied the influence which they had exercised upon them. J. B. Say, F. Bastiat, P. Leroy-Beaulieu have maintained their tradition which is represented also by the Société d'Economie Politique of Paris.

"We shall be very happy to enter into regular intercourse with the economists of India. We are sure that the exchange of ideas which will result therefrom will be useful to the progress of economics.

"The events which have come to pass of late have proved that the importance of this exchange will not cease to grow. The greatest part of the calamities which afflict the world arise out of the ignorance of the laws which the science has revealed."

The political economy adumbrated here is the well known orthodox economics of the classical school. One of its special features is the emphasis on the doctrine of free trade (*libre-échange*). Not that entire French thought is obsessed by this economic theory. Professor Charles Gidé, for instance, maintains a different attitude in his *Revue d'Economie Politique*.

We need not enter into a discussion of the merits of the several schools of economic thought. It need only be observed that Yves-Guyot's letter embodies the message of official French economics to India for scientific cooperation and intellectual exchange. The world of science will value it as a document of contemporary civilization similar to many others in and through which India's expansion is being achieved, i.e. a Greater India is being born and bred.

8. India in French Communism.

French interest in India is not confined within the circle of intellectuals, bourgeoisie and commercial classes.

The French dailies not only of Paris but also of the provinces, representing all shades of public opinion and political grouping, have begun to enlighten their constituencies in regard to the recent developments of what they invariably characterize as the "revolution" in India.

A writer in the *Clarté*, the Communist weekly of Paris, interprets the movement on the basis of the current news in the following manner. Every day, says he, "the nationalist movement is growing in India." It is being "definitely directed towards the achievement of an entirely independent government, *swa-rāj*, a word synonymous with *sinn-fein*. The leaders of the revolution have been working along several lines simultaneously.

"At Calcutta the conductors of the taxis, tramways, and autobus went on strike in conjunction with the students of schools and colleges. This combined action had the object of boycotting the reception organized by the government in honour of the Duke of Connaught. The strikers declared that they would resume their normal functions as soon as the Duke left the city.

"The second line of revolutionary activity in India is manifest in the agitation and turmoil among the agriculturists. At Muzzaffarpur in Bihar and at Fyzabad in the United Provinces have been repeated the events of Rai Bareilly. Over two thousand peasants took part in the rising and tried to paralyse the actions of the police."

"The reason for such revolutions," says the French communist, "is not far to seek. The most important cause is the fact that Great Britain has systematically prevented the development of India's national industries. The Indians want to build factories in order to exploit the natural resources of the country. But the British government has for a long time adopted the policy which is the surest to counteract such enterprise on the part of the people. For it has by all means prohibited in India the development of scientific and technical education.

"The nationalist leaders have therefore embarked on a program of founding industrial and commercial schools. These technical schools are known generally as "national" schools. Recently, as may be gathered from the *Bulletin d'Information Indienne* (Paris) such schools have been founded at Ahmedabad, Surat, Lahore. Benares, Bombay, Calcutta, Aligarh, etc. These institutions are all independent of the control of Great Britain.

"Another cause of revolt is the press legislation by which Great Britain has sought to crush the freedom of thought and the growth of democratic opinion. Since 1910, 350 printing presses and 300 journals have been suppressed, 500 publications proscribed, £ 40,000 sterling has been demanded as security and forfeited—think of such a large sum lost by the people in a country so poor as India—and 200 presses and 130 journals have been prevented from making their appearance."

The Paris Bolshevik points out, further, that "in the budget of the British Indian government 63 per cent of the expenses is ear-marked for the army and the navy while only 6 per cent is devoted to public instruction. At present not more than 8 per cent of the entire population can read and write. And not more than 4 per cent of the children of school-going age can attend schools."

Indian revolution has thus succeeded in finding an able interpreter in the ranks of French communism. The labour leaders of France have come in line with those of the United States in championing the right to freedom of the Indian people.

Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity¹).

1. Method of Approach.

We propose to briefly review three great religions of mankind in their historical as well as psychological relations. Let us assume for our present consideration the fact that every religious system advances, in the first place, a set of hypotheses generally known as theological dogmas, in the second place, a body of practices and notions that for the absence of a better term may be called superstitions, and in the third place, a code of moral sanctions. As a rule, it is the higher intellectuals in a community that are interested in the doctrines of theology, and the man in the street in the theatrical, scenic or anecdotal aspects of God, the soul, and the other world. The morals, however, though they depend in the last analysis on the individual's status in the economic grades or classes of a people, may for ordinary purposes be taken to be the outcome of its general consensus and collective tradition. In a study of comparative religion we must take care to point out exactly which of these three phases of socio-religious life we have singled out for discussion, for it is clear that it would be unscientific to compare the popular superstitions and folk-beliefs of one faith with the metaphysical speculations in which the high-browed Doctors of Divinity indulge in another.

As it is always convenient to proceed from the known to the unknown, we shall begin with Christianity, or rather use Christ-lore as the peg on which to hang Buddhism and Confucian-cum-Taoism for analytical and historical investigation. And in stead of dealing with abstractions we would appraise each of these world-religions in its concrete embodiments.

2. Christ-lore in History.

Dante, the greatest poet-saint-mystic of Roman Catholicism, was very much agitated over the "she-wolf" (moral and political muddle of his time). He used to predict the advent of a "Greyhound", a *Veltro*, or Deliverer, who would restore on earth the Universal Italian Empire, both temporal and spiritual. His prophecy finds expression in several eloquent passages of the

¹) Chiefly based on the author's *Chinese Religion through Hindu Eyes* (Shanghai, 1916).

Divine Comedy. Thus Virgil, the "master and guide" of the poet, gives the following hope in the first canto:

"This beast
At whom thou criest her way will suffer none
To pass, and no less hindrance makes than death:
To many an animal in wedlock vile
She fastens, and shall yet to many more,
Until that Greyhound come, who shall destroy
Her with sharp pain. He will not life support
By earth nor its base metals, but by love,
Wisdom and virtue; and his land shall be
The land 'twixt either Feltro. In his might
Shall safety to Italia's plains arise,
For whose fair realm Camilla, virgin pure,
Nisus, Euryalus and Turnus fell."

The same apocalyptic faith in a *Yugavatāra* or God-incarnate-in-man has maintained the optimistic Hindu in all ages of national distress. The advent of Messiahs to embody the successive *Zeit-geists* is thus guaranteed in the *Gītā* by Lord Krishna Himself:

"Whensoever into Order
Corruption creeps in, Bhārata,
And customs bad ascendant be, —
Then Myself do I embody.
For the advancement of the good
And miscreants to overthrow
And for setting up the Order
Do I appear age by age."

Mediaeval Christianity did not produce only one *Divine Comedy*. Each of the Gothic Cathedrals of the thirteenth century Europe is a *Divine Comedy* in stone. It may be confidently asserted that the spiritual atmosphere of these noble structures with their soul-inspiring sculptures in alabaster and bronze has not been surpassed in the architecture of the East.²⁾

We shall now exhibit a few specimens of Christian anthropology. On Xmas and New Year days the folks of Christendom are used to forecasting their lot according to the character of the first visitor. And what is the burden of their queries? "What will be the weather?", they ask, and "what the crops?" How, besides, are they to "fare in love and the begetting of children?" And

²⁾ Vide the present author's *Hindu Art: Its Humanism and Modernism*. (New York, 1920).

a common superstition among the *Hausfrauen* enjoins that wealth must come in, and not be given out on these days. Such days and such notions are not rare in Confucian-Taoist and Buddhist Asia.

It is well known, further, that in South West England as in parts of Continental Europe there are several taboos in regard to food. Hares, rabbits, poultry, for instance, are not eaten because they are "derived from his father", as the peasant believes.³⁾ There is nothing distinctively Christian in these customs and traditions. Asians can also heartily take part in the processions attending the bathing of images, boughs of trees etc. with which the rural population of Christian lands celebrate their May pole or summer festivities. And they would easily appreciate how men could be transformed into wolves through the curse of St. Natalis Cambrensis.

Would the ritualism, the rosary, the relic-worship, the hagiology, the consecrated edifices, the "eternal" oil-lamps in *Waldkapellen* (forest-chapels), pilgrimages, prayers, votive offerings, self-denial during Lent, fasts and chants of the Christians scare away the Shintoists, Buddhists or Taoists? By no means. Indeed, there are very few Chinese, Japanese or Hindus who would not be inspired by the image of Mary. Nations used to the worship of Kwanyin or Lakshmi could not find a fundamentally new mentality or view of life in the atmosphere of a Greek or Catholic Church service. And the doctrine of faith (*bhakti*, *saddhā*), the worship of a Personal God, and preparedness for salvation (*mukti*) are not more Christian than Buddhist or Hindu.

Men and women who do not feel strong without postulating God would produce almost the same philosophy of the Infinite and of the immortal soul if they happen to be intellectual. But if they happen to be emotional or imaginative as human beings generally are, they would create more or less the selfsame arts (images, pictures, *bas-reliefs*, hymns, prayers, rituals, fetishes, charms). Humanity is, in short, essentially one,—in spite of physical and physiognomic diversities, and in spite of deep historic race-prejudices. The effort to understand the nature of God or the relations between Man and the Divinity is the least part of a man's real religion. The *élan vital* of human life has always and everywhere consisted in the desire to live and in the power to flourish by responding to the thousand and one stimuli of the universe and by utilizing the innumerable world-forces.

³⁾ Gomme: *Ethnology and Folk-lore*.

3. Confucianism and Buddhism Analyzed.

But before we proceed further it is necessary to have definite connotations of the terms Confucianism and Buddhism, so that we may know precisely as to what phenomena they correspond with in Christianity. For the terms are really ambiguous and elastic.

In the first place, Confucianism is the name wrongly given to the cult of public sacrifices devoted to *Shangti* (the One Supreme Being), the *Tao* (or the Way), and ancestor-worship that has been obtaining among the Chinese people since time immemorial. This cult of what is really an adoration of nature powers happens to be called Confucianism simply because Confucius (B. C. 551—479), the librarian at Lu State in Shantung, compiled or edited for his countrymen the floating Ancient Classics, the *Yi-king* (Book of Changes), the *Shu-king* (Book of History), the *Shi-king* (Book of Poetry) and others in which the traditional faith finds expression. The work of Confucius for China was identical with that of Ezra (B. C. 450) of Isreal who edited for the Hebrews the twenty four books of the Old Testament that had been burnt and lost. In this sense, or thus misnamed, Confucianism had existed among the Chinese long before Confucius was born, in the same manner as the Homeric poems had been in circulation in the Hellenic world ages before Pisistratus of Athens had them brought together in well-edited volumes.

In the second place, Confucianism is often considered as not being a religion at all, because it is wrongly taken to be equivalent to positivism i.e. a Godless system of mere morals, and hence alleged to be necessarily inadequate to the spiritual needs of man. The fact, however, is quite otherwise. The Socratic sayings of Confucius, that are preserved in the *Analects*, the *Doctrine of the Mean*, and other treatises, have indeed no reference to the supernatural, the unseen or the other world. The fallacy of modern sinologues consists in regarding these moralizings as the whole message of China's Super-man. Strictly speaking, they should be treated only as parts of a system which in its entirety has a place as much for the gods, sacrifices, prayers, astrology, demonology, tortoise worship, divination and so forth of Taoist China as for the purely ethical conceptions of the duty towards one's neighbor or the ideal relations between human beings.

Thirdly, this alleged positivism or atheism of Confucius, and the pre-Confucian religion of ancient China, which for all practical purposes was identical with the polytheistic nature-cult of the

earliest Indo-Germanic races have both to be sharply distinguished from another Confucianism. For since about the fifth century A.C. the worship of Confucius as a god has been planted firmly in the Chinese consciousness and institutions. This latter-day Confucius-cult is a cult of nature-forces affiliated to the primitive Shangti-cult, Heaven-cult, Tai (Mountain-) cult, etc. of the Chinese. In this Confucianism Confucius is a god among gods.

Similarly in Buddhism also we have to recognize two fundamentally different sets of phenomena. There are two Buddhisms essentially distinct from each other. The first is the religion or system of moral discipline founded by Shâkya (B. C. 563—483), the son of the president or archon (*râjan*) of the Sakiya republic in Eastern India, who came to be called the *Buddha* or the Enlightened (the Awakened). Shâkya founded an order (*sangha*) of monks, and adumbrated the philosophy of twelve *nidânas* (links between ignorance and birth) and the ethics of the eightfold path. In this Buddhism, which should really be called Shâkyaism, Buddha is of course neither a god nor a prophet of God, but only a preacher among the preachers of his time. The system is generally known as *Hinayâna* (or the Lower Vehicle of Buddhism). Its prominent tenet is *nirvâna* or the cessation of misery (annihilation of pain).

But there is another faith in which Buddha is *a* or rather *the* god. This Buddha-cult, or Buddhism strictly so called, cannot by any means be fathered upon Shâkya, the moralist. It chanced to evolve out of the schisms among his followers. Buddha-worship was formulated by Ashwaghosha and came into existence as a distinct creed about the first century A. C. in northwestern India during the reign of Kanishka the Indo-Tartar Emperor. This faith, also called *Mahâyâna* (The Greater Vehicle), was theologically much allied to and did not really differ in ritual and mythology from, the contemporary Jaina and Puranic-Hindu isms of India. It is this Buddhism with its gods and goddesses that was introduced from Central Asia into China in A. C. 67, from China into Korea in A. C. 372, and from Korea into Japan in A. C. 552.

The contrast between Shâkya the preacher and Buddha the god, or Confucius the moralist and Confucius the god has its parallel in Christology also. Modern criticism expresses this contrast, says Bacon in the *Making of the New Testament*, in its distinction of the gospel of Jesus from the gospel about Jesus. The distinction between Shâkyaism and Buddhism, or between Confucianism as the system of tenets in the body of literature compiled by Confucius and Confucianism in which Confucius figures as a Divinity, as a

colleague of *Shangti* is the same in essence as that between the teachings of Jesus the Jew and the teachings, say, of St. Paul about Jesus the Christ who is god in man.

4. The Doctrine of *Avatāra*, (Deification of Man.)

The incarnation-myths of the *Rāmāyana* and similar legends of the *Jātakas* (Birth Stories) must have developed as early as the epoch of Maurya imperialism (B. C. 322—185). While the poets of the Rāma-legend sang,—“For Vishnu’s self disdained not mortal birth, And heaven came with him as he came to earth”, and Krishna proclaimed in the *Gītā* section of the *Mahābhārata*—“Forsake all *dharma*s (ways, *Taos*, creeds), make Me alone thy way”, the sculptors of India were carving *bas-reliefs* in order to represent scenes in the life of Shākya deified as the Buddha. The post-Asokan but pre-Christian sculptures at Bharhut (second century B. C.) leave no doubt as to the prevalence of a faith in Buddha whose birth was believed to be super-natural and whose career was to anticipate ideologically the holy ministrations of the Syrian Messiah. Besides, the mind of India had become used to such emphatic announcements as the following:

“I am the Father, and the Fostering Nurse,
Grandsire, and Mother of the Universe,
I am the Vedas, and the Mystic word,
The way, support, the witness and the Lord.
The Seed am I of deathless quickening power
The Home of all, the mighty Refuge-tower.”

Buddha-cult was thus born and nurtured in a perfectly congenial atmosphere.

The Pauline doctrine of Jesus as an *avatāra* i.e. God incarnated in man was also quite in keeping with the spiritual *milieu* of the age, rife as it was with the notions of Redeemer-gods. Here an Osiris, there a Mithra was commanding the devotion of the civilized world as a god who was resurrected after death to save mankind. Parallel to the development in Iran which transformed Zarathustra from the man-prophet-singer of the *Gāthās* into a super-natural and semi-divine figure there was in Israel the continuous and progressive re-interpretation of traditional beliefs and symbols, as Canon Charles points out in the *Religious Development Between the Old and New Testaments*. From the third century B. C. on, as a consequence, whole histories centred round such conceptions as

soul, spirit, sheol, Paradise, Messianic Kingdom, the Messiah, the Resurrection. The idea of the Redeemer was taking definite shape, for instance, in the following verses of the *Psalms of Solomon* composed about the first century B. Cc:

"Behold, O Lord, and raise up unto them
Their King, the son of David,
At the time in which thou seest, O God,
That he may reign over Isreal Thy servant,
And gird him with strength that he may
Shatter unrighteous rulers
And that he may purge Jerusalem from
Nations that trample her down to destruction."

In India the rhapsodists of the Vālmīkian cycle were singing of the advent of the Messiah as Rāma, and the Shākya monks elaborating the Buddhist stories of incarnation (*Jātaka*) in the self-same strain. Nor was China to be left without an *avatāra* or a deified personality. In the fourth century B. C. Mencius, the St. Paul of Confucianism, calls his great Master *Chi Ta-cheng* or the embodiment of highest perfection. Three hundred years after his death Confucius was made Duke and Earl. Sze Ma-chien, the Chinese Herodotus (first century B. C.), describes him as the "divinest of men". But by the end of the first century A. C. the birthplace of Confucius had become a goal for the pilgrim and even emperors wended their way to pay respects to his shrine. In A. C. 178, says Giles in *Confucianism and its Rivals*, a likeness of Confucius had been placed in his shrine as a substitute for the wooden tablet in use up to that date. In 267 an Imperial decree ordered the sacrifice of a pig, sheep and an ox to Confucius at each of the four seasons. The first complete Confucian temple was built and dedicated in 505. About 555 it was enacted that a Confucian temple should be built in every prefectural city, for the people had come to "look upon Confucius as a god to be propitiated for the sake of worldly advantages".

This heroification and deification of Confucius was not an isolated phenomenon in the Chinese world, for China was also simultaneously transforming Lao-tsze, his senior contemporary, into a Divinity. The Taoist writers had begun to describe their great prophet as an incarnation of some superior being who came among men in human shape in every age. They told also the various names under which he appeared from the highest period of fabulous antiquity down as late as the sixth century, making in all seven periods.

Indeed, the spiritual experience of the entire human race was passing through almost the same climacteric. Zoroastrianism was evolving Mithraism, Chinese classics were evolving the worship of Confucius and Laotsze, Hinduism was evolving Buddha-cult, Krishna-cult, Râma-cult etc., and Judaism was in the birth-throes of Christ-cult.

5. *Rapprochement* in Religious Psychology.

How much of this common element in Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity was the joint product of the same socio-religious antecedents? How much again is autochthonous to China, India and Asia Minor, i.e. absolutely independent of each other's impact? The question of the indebtedness of one race to another in metaphysics and religion cannot be solved satisfactorily for want of positive evidence. But the historic background was unified and internationalized enough to admit of an extraordinary fusion of cultures. One theatre of such cultural intermixture was Central Asia. Here during the early centuries of the Christian era police notices were written in Chinese, letters inscribed in a form of Sanskrit. But the string with which the wooden tablets were tied was sealed mostly with Greek seals bearing the image of Athena or Heracles. Here, then, as Laurence Binyon remarks in *Painting in the Far East*, we touch three great civilizations at once: India, Greece, China.

This race-fusion or cultural inter-marriage must have been in full swing while the incarnation-myths of the Hindus, Jews and Chinese were in the period of gestation i.e. during the first three centuries of the pre-Christian era. For, conscious and deliberate internationalism was the distinctively original contribution of Alexander to Eur-Asia. The whole epoch beginning with his accession to the Greek throne may be presumed to have been one in which race-boundaries were being obliterated, cultural angularities rounded off, intellectual horizons enlarged and the sense of universal humanity generated. It was a time when the Aristotelians, Platonists, Cynics and Stoics were likely to meet the Apocalyptists, Zoroastrians, Confucianists, Taoists, Nirvânists, and Yogaists on a common platform, when the grammarians and logicians of Alexandria were probably comparing notes with the Hindu Pâninians and Darshanists, when the Charakan Ayurvedists (medical men) of India could hold debates with the herbalists of Asia Minor, when, in one word, culture was tending to be developed not from national angles but from one international viewpoint and placed as far as possible on a cosmopolitan basis.

The courses of instruction offered at the great universities of the world, e.g. those at Honanfu, Taxila, Pataliputra, the Alexandrias and Athens, naturally comprehended the whole encyclopaedia of arts and sciences known to both Asia and Europe. The *literati*, *bhikshus*, *magi* and *sanyāsins* of the East could not fail to meet the mystics, sophists, gnostics and peripatetics of the West at out-of-the-way inns or caravanserais or at the recognized academies and seats of learning. What we now describe as Universal-Races-Congresses and International Conferences of scientists may then have been matters of course; and everybody who was anybody—Hindu, Persian, Chinese, Jew, Egyptian, Greek — was necessarily a student of *Weltliteratur* and a citizen of the world. The social systems of the different races that were thrown into that whirl-pool were profoundly influenced by this intellectual expansion. Inter-racial marriages may be believed to have been things of common occurrence, and everywhere there was a *rapprochement* in ideals of life and thought. Mankind was fast approaching a common consciousness, a common conscience and a common standard of civilization.

One of the forms in which this uniform psychological development of the different races was manifesting itself consisted in the elaboration of "Great Exemplars," *Avatāras* or "Supermen". The types of ethical and spiritual "perfection", or highest ideals and norms in human personality, that had been slowly acquiring prominence in India, in the Hellenistic world, and in China during the preceding centuries at last began to crystallize themselves out of the solution of race-experience and emerge as distinctly individualized entities. The world-forces or nature-powers of the antique world, viz. Mother Earth and the elemental energies, furnished no doubt the basic foundations and the nuclei for these types or patterns. Folk-imagination in brooding over the past and reconstructing ancient traditions had sanctified certain historic personalities,⁴⁾ legendary heroes or eponymous culture-pioneers, and endowed their names with a halo of romance. Philosophical speculation had been groping in the dark as to the mysteries of the universe and had stumbled upon the One, the Unknown, the Eternal, the Absolute, the Infinite, the Ideal. Last, but not least, are the contributions of the "lover, the lunatic and the poet", — the Mark, the Matthews, the Mencius, the Vālmiki, the Ashwaghosha

⁴⁾ W. Ridgeway: *Origin of Tragedy*, 1910, and *Dramas and Dramatic Dances of Non-European Races in special reference to the Origin of Greek Tragedy*, 1915.

—who came to weld together all these elements into artistic shapes, "fashioning forth" those sons of God,—concrete human personalities to embody at once the man-in-God and the God-in-man.

6. The Ethical Postulates of China, India, and Christendom.

The ethical conceptions or moral codes of a race are bound up so inextricably with its economic and social institutions that for all practical purposes they may be regarded as almost independent of its strictly religious thought, its theological doctrines, and the hypotheses of its prophets or thinkers regarding the nature of Godhead, the soul, and the relation between man and the Creator. While, therefore, the "whole duty of man" is sure to differ with race and race, nay, with class and class, and also with epoch and epoch in each race and in each class, it is still remarkable that the most fundamental categories of moral life all the world over have been the same. The ethical systems of historic Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity are broad-based on almost identical notions of the Good and the Right.

But here it is necessary to make a few special remarks about Confucianism. In the first place, suggestive sex-ideas associated with such concepts as "immaculate conception" in Christlore, or "energy" (*Shakti*, the female "principle") in Buddhist mythology have absolutely no place either in the *Classics* compiled by Confucius the man or in the religion in which Confucius is a god. From the standpoint of conventional morality, Confucianism is the most chaste and undefiled of the great world-religions.

In the second place, one must not argue from this that the Chinese mentality is what Confucianism presumes it to be, for China is not mere Confucius magnified. Every Chinese is a Confucianist, and yet something more. Like the Japanese who is at once a believer in Shinto (the Way of the Gods), a polytheistic cult of nature powers, a Confucianist as well as a Buddhist, the men and women of China, almost each and all, are Taoists (followers of Laotsze's mystical cult of Tao or Way or Natural Order) and Buddhists at the same time that they offer sacrifices to Confucius and Shangti. When the head of the family dies, says Wu Ting-fang, the funeral services are conducted in a most cosmopolitan way, for the Taoist priest and the Buddhist monks as well as nuns are usually called in to recite prayers for the dead in addition to the performance of ceremonies in conformity with the Confucian rules of "propriety". The *mores* of Chinese life, eclectic as it is, cannot thus all be found in the teachings of the *Classics* alone.

One need not be surprised, therefore, to find in the Chinese *Weltanschauung* or view of life a place for the pessimism that one meets with in the announcements of Jesus. "He that loveth father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me", said He. And further, "if any man cometh unto Me, and leaveth not his father and mother and wife and children, he cannot be My disciple." Here is the origin of the system that, backed by St. Paul's recommendation of celibacy for Christ's followers, ultimately developed into Christian monasticism and the ethics of retreat from the "world and the flesh." The self-same doctrine of holiness by means of asceticism and self-mortification has had a long tradition in pre-Confucian China as well as in China since the age of Laotsze and Confucius. Even in the earliest ages of Chinese history perfection, holiness, or divinity were held to be exclusively attainable by dispassion, apathy, will-lessness, unconcernedness about the pleasures and pains of life, quietism, or *wu-wei*. Emperor Hwang-ti of hoary antiquity is mentioned by Chwang-tsze (fourth century B. C.), the great follower of Lao-tsze, as having retired for three months in order to prepare himself for receiving the *Tao* from an ascetic who practised freedom from mental agitation.

Along with this pessimistic strand of Christianity Chinese moral consciousness can also display the mystical leanings of Jesus as manifest in such declarations as "The Kingdom of God is within you", or "My Kingdom is not of this world." Thus, says Chwang-tsze: "Be free yourself from subjective ignorance and individual peculiarities, find the *Tao* in your own being, and you will be able to find it in others too, because the *Tao* cannot be one in one thing and another in another." And according to the *Tao-te-ching*, the Bible of Taoism, "mighty is he who conquers-himself", and further, "if you keep behind, you shall be in front," or "he who is content has enough." These are the tenets of passivism and non-resistance that Jesus stood for when he advised his followers to "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's."

We need not dwell here on the ascetic or pietistic ideals and institutions of Buddhism, as the Plotinuses, the St. Francises, the Jacopone da Todis, the Boehmes, the Ruysbroeks, and the Guyons of India are too well known. But we have rather to emphasize, on the other hand, the fact that transcendentalism, idealism or mysticism is not the only attitude or philosophy of ethical life advanced by or associated with the religious systems of the world. Not less is the ethics of positivism, i.e., of humanitarian energism (*viriyā*) and social service or brotherhood (*sarva-sattva-maitrī*) a prominent feature in Buddhism,

in Christianity and in the moral dicta of the Chinese sages like Confucius, Moh-ti, the preacher of universal love, and Mencius, the advocate of tyrannicide.

There is no doubt a great difference in the manner in which the categories have been stated in the three systems, especially as regards the intellectual analysis or psychological classification of the cardinal virtues and vices. But from the viewpoint of moral discipline, none but a hidebound linguist or a student of formal logic can fail to notice the pragmatic identity of life governed by the "eightfold path" of Shākya, the "five duties" of Confucius and the "ten commandments" of the Bible. Nay, like the Mosaic dictates, the Confucian and Shākyan principles are too elemental to have been missed by the prophets of any race.

The most important tenet in Confucius' moral creed is to be found in the idea of "reciprocity." It is thus worded in his *Doctrine of the Mean*: "What you do not wish others should do unto you, do not do unto them." In a negative form this is indeed the golden rule of *Luke*: "As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise." In all treatments of fellow-beings Shākya's injunction also is "to put oneself in the place of others" (*attānam upamāṃ katvā*). We read in the *Dhammapada*:

"All men tremble at punishment, all men fear death: Putting oneself in the place of others, kill not nor cause slaughter.

All men tremble at the rod, all men love life. Being as one would be done by, kill not nor cause to kill."

Reciprocity is thus the common golden rule of the three world religions.

The formulation of this rule was the distinctive contribution of Confucius to Chinese life. His catechism of moral discipline points out, further, that the duties of universal obligation are five, and the moral qualities by which they are carried out are three. The duties are those between ruler and subject, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder brother and younger, and those in the intercourse between friends. Intelligence, moral character and courage, these are the three universally recognized moral qualities of man. The performance of these duties is the *sine qua non* of "good manners" or propriety. In the Confucian system the tenet of reciprocity leads thus to the cult of "Propriety." In the Shākyan discipline also we have the same propriety in the doctrine of *sīla* (conduct). The path leading to the cessation of misery is described in the *Digha Nikāya* as consisting in right belief, right resolve, right speech, right behaviour, right occupation, right effort, right

contemplation, and right concentration. It is obvious that some of the conditions stated here, especially those in regard to speech, behavior, and occupation, are other-regarding, i.e. have a social significance in the system of self-culture.

Lest the social energism of Shâkyan morals be ignored it is necessary to point out that *appamâda* (vigilance, strenuousness and activity) is the first article in the Buddhist monk's creed of life. Shâkyâ wanted his followers to be moral and intellectual gymnasts and "move about like fire". Such were the men who built the first hospitals of the world for men and animals, established rest-houses and planted trees for wayfarers, popularized the trial by jury and the methods of election, voting, and quorum in democratic assemblies, and founded universities, academies and other seats of learning in India, China, and Japan.

The World's Great Classics.

Edmund Spenser in his *Faerie Queene* describes a park, wherein there was

"No tree whose braunches did not bravely spring;
No braunch whereon a fine bird did not sitt;
No bird but did her shrill notes sweetly sing;
No song but did contain a lovely ditt."

The description is so similar to a famous account of tanks in a garden in Sanskrit literature that one might be almost tempted to suggest that the great Elizabethan got the idea from the Hindu Bhatti (c 650 A. C.). For in the Indian poet's *Kāvya* we read:

"No water but with dainty lotus on,
No lotus that did not a bee entrap,
Not a bee but hummed a musical note,
No note that did not enrapture the soul."

Now, "fruitfullest Virginia" and "Indian Peru" had indeed been added to the world known to the poets in Spenser's days. But Hindustan was still a veritable *ultima thule*. Sane criticism will, therefore, declare that in the description of nature human imagination has independently produced identical pieces in the East and the West.

Let us now turn to a more antique world. Two great "national" epics of mankind have been produced in two different regions under similar conditions. The result has been the similarity of products. Virgil wrote his *Aeneid* during the age of Augustus, when the greatness of the Romans was an established fact. In and through the story of Aeneas, the mythical founder of the Latins, Virgil has given us a prophetic account of the glorious mission of his successors. The whole destiny of the Roman race has been embodied in the hero. Virgil was an idealizer of his country's history, a Livy in verse, so to speak.

The same enthusiasm inspired Kalidas when he wrote his *Raghu-vamsha* ("House of Raghu"). During the fourth and fifth centuries A. C. the great Gupta Augustuses were paramount sovereigns over India. It was an epoch of all-round success in arms and arts, in fact, the period to conjure with even in the twentieth century. The greatest poet of India wanted to immortalize the achievements of his contemporaries, but took for his theme the "pre-historic" or semi-mythical dynasty of Hindu Aeneases.

Common conditions inspired common art work. The philosophy underlying the Latin and the Sanskrit epics is the same, namely, "Nothing succeeds like success." The ancestors of a successful people must certainly have been super-men! Virgil and Kalidas read the past in the light of the present. The Hindu poet was as great a nationalist or patriot or jingo as was the Roman. Thus in Kalidasa's chauvinistic idealism his heroes were nothing short of

"Lords of the lithosphere from sea to sea,
Commanding the skies by air-chariots."

1. Eur-American Methodology.

These are specimens from widely different epochs of literature. But it is not difficult to perceive that the poetic soul reacts to the stimuli of the universe in much the same way in spite of differences in time and space.

During the last few decades, however, aesthetic appreciation has unfortunately been obsessed by pseudo-scientific theories of climate, race and religion. The science of criticism has managed to construct a geography of artistic temperament, and men and women have been taught to interpret art-ideals and art-motifs in terms of latitude and longitude. The most notorious of these anthropological démarcations of the art-sphere is the distinction between the Occidental and the Oriental zones.

In what manner, then, does the modern Eur-American critic approach the creations of Asian literary and artistic genius? The method would be clearly understood if we apply it to some Occidental classic. Let us take the *Iliad* of Homer.¹⁾ According to this orthodox school of interpretation we need only cite a few detached passages and then emphasize the conclusion as applicable to the entire continents of Europe and America and as valid for three millenniums. We should have to pronounce, for instance, the sweepingly universal judgment that in the West the position of the wife has ever been servile, subjection of women being the most prominent characteristic of society. For Juno, "the stag-eyed Queen of Heaven", says to Jove:

"Tell me, deceiver, who was she with whom
Thou late held'st council? ever 'tis thy way
Apart from me to weave the secret schemes,
Nor dost thou freely share with me thy mind."

And what is the husband's reply to this challenge?

¹⁾ *Supra*, pp. 4-6.

"Expect not, Juno, all my mind to know;
 My wife thou art, yet would such knowledge be
 Too much for thee; whatever I deem it fit
 That thou shouldst know, nor God nor man shall hear
 Before thee; but what I in secret plan,
 Seek not to know, nor curiously enquire."

Further, as the wife intends to be obstinate, Jove assumes the full role of the master. The tyrant does not hesitate to threaten the slave thus:

"Presumptuous, to thy busy thoughts thou givest
 Too free a range, and watchest all I do;
 Yet shalt thou not prevail, but rather thus
 Be alien'd from my heart—the worse for thee!"

Thus has the woman always been treated by man in the Western world. Europe can in this and similar ways be proved to be a continent of autocracy, polygamy, concubinage, superstition, and licentiousness, as Asia has been proved to be by Eur-American critics to their own satisfaction.

We would now apply the same method of literary criticism to another stalwart of Europe, Dante. By way of retaliation the Oriental critic can easily spot out the passages in the *Divine Comedy* that are derogatory to European character. Do we not read Dante's bitter complaint against corruption in contemporary Italian politics? The following Dantesque refrain is too well-known:

"Ah, slavish Italy! thou inn of grief!
 Vessel without a pilot in loud storm!
 Lady no longer of fair provinces,
 But brothel-house impure! . . .
 While now thy living ones
 In thee abide not without war; and one
 Malicious gnaws another; ay, of those
 Whom the same wall and the same moat contains.
 Seek, wretched one! around thy sea-coasts wide;
 Then homeward to thy bosom turn; and mark,
 If any part of thee sweet peace enjoy."

This is a picture of political disunion; but the anthropological art-critic can find in the great Italian epic material enough to generalize, if he wishes, about the negation of all domestic morals and public virtues in Christian society. It is on the strength of such passages maliciously manipulated by Eur-American "scientists" that Asia has come to be treated as a synonym for all that is unmanly, impious, imbecile and unchivalrous in Occidental estimation.

2. The New Criticism.

Reprisals and retaliations are undoubtedly justifiable weapons in literary as in material warfare. It is out of vindictiveness that people have resort to them. And surely Asia today is pervaded by the spirit of revenge; for the mal-treatment that she has received at Eur-America's hands is profound and extensive, really "too deep for tears." But no system of values can look for permanence on a war-basis. War is a force in social economy only because it raises issues and clarifies the surcharged atmosphere. Life's dynamics however must proceed to erect new structures on the new foundations created by the change in *status quo*.

What, now, are the demands of the New Orient in regard to reconstruction in the art-world? On what basis does Young Asia seek to place the new art-criticism? What are the terms of its transvaluation of values?

According to the viewpoint of Young Asia the race-psychologies established during the last two generations in the minds of Eur-American scholars need a thorough overhauling. The manifestations of the human spirit should be attacked historically and statistically without any preconceived subjective or metaphysical notions as to ethnic stocks. It is the findings of this method alone that can place the art-products of the world in the proper sociological perspective.

To unbiassed students of history, the human propensities that evolved themselves in Hellas and Hindustan are, numerically speaking, almost the same. The objective tests of behavioristic psychology, again, would bring out the same *kind* of mentality among the Hindus, Chinese and Moslems as among the Hellenes, Romans and Teutons. Differences of characteristics may surely be proved to exist between people and people in quantity, variety, and quality; but they are not such as to constitute the basis for radical race-distinctions. The different nations do not represent permanent divergences in *Weltanschauung* or outlook on the universe.

The culture-anthropologists and diplomats have attempted to demonstrate a fundamental distinction between the East and the West. But they have fallen into serious errors because they have not tried to compare the phases of culture, epoch by epoch, and item by item. For, the list of analogies, parallelisms, identities, and coincidences that can be detected between the historic civilizations of the East and the West is formidable. These analogues and duplicates are to be found not only in the realm of ideas, postulates, hypotheses and beliefs, but also in the field of institutions, conventions, observances and practices.

Some of the parallelisms are indeed superficial, but even in such cases the channels of mental operations indicate a profoundly general agreement in psychological content and sociological context. This is not necessarily due to the migration of ideas or institutions from the East to the West, and *vice versa*; because this cannot be proved by positive historical evidence in many instances. Most of these identities are really independent growths or accidental convergences and point to the fundamental unity of the human make-up. Indebtedness can undoubtedly be traced to foreign sources in certain incidents. But the very fact of their naturalization and assimilation to the conditions of new habitat indicates, again, the essential psychological uniformity of mankind.

The "unspeakable" Turk, the "impossible" Irishman, the "jingo" Britisher, the "barbarous" German, the "inscrutable" Japanese, the "unchanging" Chinaman, the "dollar-worshipping" American, and the "mystical" Hindu have displayed through their actual history the same responses or reactions to the stimuli of the objective world, the same imaginativeness and the same intellectuality, "under the same conditions of temperature and pressure." The existence of differences in superficial particulars, in social conventions and modes of external expression is due principally to language, economic status or grade of material development, and temporary political vicissitudes. This must not be magnified into the alleged bed-rock of a science for the classification of races according to the mentalities, views of life, or the so-called "ideals" of culture. In an historic or analytical study of Hindu or Chinese morals, manners and sentiments, for instance, we shall not find anything exclusively oriental. The achievements of every great civilization in the past or the present are essentially cosmopolitan or universal.

3. Classicism and Christ-lore.

The Homeric and Vālmikian epics have innumerable parallels, so much so that when the Greeks under Alexander first came in contact with the literature of the Hindus, they did not hesitate to believe that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* had been translated into Sanskrit. Recent scholars have, however, tried to demonstrate that it is Homer who owed his plots to the Hindu *Rāmāyana*. The rape of the Hindu queen, Sītā, and the war to deliver her from the monarch of Lamkā, the Indian Troy, can have but one and the same message to all mankind in the "heroic" ages. The chastity of the women-folk, the bravery of the men, the triumph of the

hero, and the ruin of the foe,—this and allied *motifs* characterize all the heroic poetry sung by the earliest strolling bards of the world. Achilles and Penelope or their cousins are well known characters in Hindu literature.²⁾

The Greeks used to believe also that Heracles, Apollo, Dionysius, and other deities of their pantheon were worshipped by the Hindus under different names. Even in modern times, on the other hand, the influence of India has been traced by scholars in the ideas of Pythagoras regarding the transmigration of the soul, the mystical Orphic cult, and the philosophy of Plato. In all these the attempt to trace the indebtedness of one race to the other shows at least how “pragmatically” alike the phenomena really are.

Many superstitions and folk-customs of the Hindus and Hellenes were almost identical. Bacchic revelries, Eleusinian mysteries, the birth of heroes like Hercules through the impregnation of mortal women³⁾ by gods, the hundred-headed Typhaeus, the doctrine of physiological “humours”, the medical recipes and oaths of Hippocrates, the flight of Gods in disguise as animals from the attacks of giants, oracles, showers of blood, the divine origin of music, dark chambers in temples,—these and other items have their replicas or analogues in Hindu tradition.

The battle of the “hundred-handers” in Hesiod’s *Theogony* is as much Hindu as Greek. The Vishvâmitras of the Hindu *Purânas* have undertaken the same titanic conflicts⁴⁾ with the powers that be as have the Prometheuses of Hellas. Jimutavâhana⁵⁾ is a peer of the Aeschylean hero in soliciting the vulture to devour him completely and relieve his agony. The tribulations of Chând Sadâgara owing to his defiance of God’s decree are only paralleled in the story of Ulysses.

The “unity of time” in a play was the basic Greek canon of dramatic criticism. Hindu dramaturgy also laid down the same rule. Curiously enough, even the number of persons allowed to appear on the stage was held to be 5 in both Greece and India.

In physical science the ideas about the general properties of matter were identical in the two culture-areas. The Hindu Sâmkhya

²⁾ Lillie: *Râma and Homer*, London, 1912.

³⁾ Grote: *History of Greece*, Vol. I, p. 471.

⁴⁾ Bhartihari: *Niti-shataka*, stanza 80; Kennedy: *Bhartihari's Shatakas*, Boston, 1913.

⁵⁾ Vishvanâtha: *Sâhitya Darpana*, or Mirror of Literature (Mitra and Ballantyne's transl. (Calcutta, 1865—66), p. 126.

doctrine of the indestructibility of matter can be easily recognized as Empedoclean. The atomic theory of Democritus could be fathered on the Hindu Kanāda. The Hindu Vedantic monism was preached by the Eleatics.

Was the mentality of "haughty Rome" far removed from that of the Hindus? Let us see. The Roman mind was notoriously superstitious though practical just as the Greek was essentially mystical and speculative. The Roman augurs studied omens in the flight of birds. The eagle was to them a herald of good, the owl, of bad. The enigmatical sayings of the Sibylline books controlled the public as well as the domestic life of the Roman citizens.

The classical mind was no more shocked than was the Hindu when it saw almost every crisis in the epics regulated and tided over by the intervention of gods. Like those of the Greeks, again, the customs, festivals, myths, and ceremonies of pre-Christian Rome e.g. the twelfth night festivities, the Dii Lares (offerings to ancestors), cattle-blessing, etc. could be easily assimilated to the Hindu system. This is no news to students of comparative philology and comparative mythology. They are aware of the common cultural beginnings of the three races. Similarly the Hindus who wrote the *Bṛihat Samhitā* would be quite at home in the midst of the superstitions of Pliny's *Natural History*. There was nothing peculiarly Latin in Roman morals, manners and sentiments. Kissing a wife in the presence of one's daughter was considered disgraceful in Rome.⁶⁾ The ideals of greatness that Livy attempted to teach through his prose epic, the *History of Rome*, viz. high righteousness, stern sense of duty, sanctity of home life etc. would be no less acceptable to the Hindus than to the Romans.

We can thus detect Hellenic and Latin elements in Hindustan. Nor would Christ-lore be found absent among the incidents of Hindu life. The mystical and other-worldly leanings of Christianity may be dittoed by the Hindus, Buddhists and Jainas also. The cult of the Infinite, the preparation for *mukti* (salvation), faith in a Personal God, the worship of God-incarnate-in-man (*Avatāra*), the doctrine of love (*bhakti*), etc. are as much Hindu as Christian. In fact, Christianity, like Pythagoreanism and Platonism, has been traced to Hindu thought.⁷⁾ On the other hand, Buddhism (*Mahāyānism*) has been supposed in recent years to have been inspired by Christian notions.

⁶⁾ Lecky: *European Morals*, Vol. II, p. 300.

⁷⁾ Lillie: *India in Primitive Christianity*, London, 1909.

Then there is the story of Infant Krishna in India, in which one may be easily led to read an echo of the Christ-myth. The story of Josaphat again is still passing for a holy legend in Christian countries. But scholars are aware that it was adapted from genuine Buddhist legends prevailing in Byzantine (Graeco-Roman) Syria in the sixth century.

The Hindu mind is nurtured on the same stuff as the Christian. No conception of life is exclusively Occidental.

4. From the Mediaeval to the Romantic.

The analysis of virtues and vices in Dante's *Divine Comedy*, its purgatorial machinery, its cult of Beatrice or Divine Philosophy, and its general theologico-moral message are typical gifts of the highest mind in mediaeval Europe. These, however, do not appear to the men and women brought up in the atmosphere of the Hindu *Purāṇas* as Italian or Roman Catholic patents. And we have already seen in the previous essay how Dante's solicitude for the *Veltro*, the Deliverer, and the faith of the *Gitā* in the *Yugāvatāra* are identical.

Spenser's *Faerie Queene* was the embodiment of the Renaissance culture. But neither his allegoristic scheme nor his over-seriousness jars upon the spiritual consciousness of the Asians. Everybody is familiar with the moralism of this "poet's poet". Here is a specimen:-

"What warre so cruel, or what siege so sore,
As that strong affections doe apply
Against the forte of reason evermore,
To bring the sowle into Captivity?
Their force is fiercer through infirmity
Of the frail flesh; relenting to their rage,
And exercise most bitter tyranny
Upon the partes brought unto their bondage:
No wretchedness is like to sinful vellenage."

How much of this condemnation of "the world and the flesh" is peculiarly European? This Spenserian stanza on the virtues of "Temperaunce" could indeed have a place in the Hindu *Mohamudgara* (The Cudgelling of Senses) or Bhartrihari's *Vairāgya-shataka* (Hundred verses on Renunciation), or the Pali *Dhammapada*. And if Buddhism is the philosophy of restraint, surely Spenser would be hailed as a *Rishi* or "superior man" in China, Japan, and India.

In Molière's *L'Etourdi* (The Blunderer), as we have seen once before, we may find incidents which are not more European than Asian. Corruption among police to which we have reference in Act IV, Sc. iv is an item in point. Some of the signs of love described in the same scene are quite universal. A female character in Act I, Sc. iv was adept in the art of fortune-telling. Even a belief in such a thing as the "astral body" occurs among the people of France in the seventeenth century (1655).

We have the following extract from a dialogue in the French Shakespeare's same piece: "You are clothed with a celestial body, which looks very much like you, but it could change into some other form in a moment. I am in terror lest you should grow into the dimensions of a giant and your face turn hideously ugly all over." The people who were taking delight in such scenes and were being catered to by one of Europe's greatest humourists could sit in the same theatre somewhere in Asia side by side with Oriental spectators. Where, on earth, for instance, are not to be found people who could take childish advantage of the fact that old men cannot tolerate any jokes about death (Act III. Sc. iv)?

Goethe liberally utilized in his *Faust* the innumerable superstitions and folk-beliefs relating to Black Arts, magic, "godless curiosity", the power of wizards over supernatural beings or demons, prevalent among the Germans of the eighteenth century. Is there anything of specifically Teutonic *Kultur* in all this? Goethe, besides, had faith even in the transmigration of the soul.

The Tantrist of Hindu dramas e. g. the *Mâlali-Mâdhava* undertakes to bring about the union of lovers by employing his esoteric science. The Taoist priest of Chinese literature ransacks the whole universe, as in Po Chui's *Never-ending Wrong* to find the whereabouts of Ming Huang's beloved Taichen. These Oriental characters can equally say with the Spirit in Goethe's *Faust*:

"In floods of being, in action's storm,
Up and down I wave,
To and fro I flee,
Birth and the grave,
An infinite sea,
A changeful weaving,
An ardent living;
The ringing loom of Time is my care
And I weave God's living garment there."

If in passages like this we have to read the beginnings of romanticism in Europe we need only understand that romanticism has been a native Asian commodity as well.

Altogether, then, one should admit that, as art-works, these masterpieces of literature may undoubtedly be *sui generis*, but that from the standpoint of "ideals", they are rooted in the universal passions and emotions of man. The "ideals of the East" are to be found in these Western products as much as in the *Clay Cart*, the *Birth of Kumāra* (War Lord), and the *Kavi-kamkana-chandī*.

5. Folk-Imagination.

Delight in the stories of adventure, interest in the romantic, the humorous and the marvellous, and sympathy with the fortunes of heroic personalities, whether fictitious or real, are not confined to any particular race. These are ingrained in the "original nature" of man, so to speak, and form part of his theatrical instincts, love of play and sense of fun. The stories of the *Rāmāyana*, the *Iliad*, the *Cuchulain*, the *Beowulf*, and the *Nibelungenlied* cater to the same demand among different peoples.⁸⁾

It is easy to pick up the Oriental elements in the tales and chronicles of European literature, in Boccaccio, Chaucer, and Froissart, for example. La Fontaine himself admitted the Oriental origin of some of his *Fables*.⁹⁾ It is not, however, in these "derived" or borrowed and ostensibly similar instances alone that the *Decameron* or the *Canterbury Tales* appeal to the Oriental mind. Readers of "Tales within Tales" e.g., the *Pancha-tantra*, the *Kathāsarit-sāgara* (Ocean of the rivers of stories), or "Legends of Thirty-two Thrones", find the same dramatic interest in the non-Oriental sections of European stories as in their own. The Vikrams and Prataps, the Charlemagnes and Richard Cœur de Lions, the Robin Hoods and Arthurs of Hindu ballad literature likewise call forth a sympathetic response from Occidental imagination.

The troubadours of Provence, the minnesingers of mediaeval Germany, and the minstrels of England could easily change place with the *Kodans* of Japan, the warrior-*chārāns* of the Rajputs and Marathas, and the Asiān *Volksdichter* of all ages. Both in the East and the West these bards have sung of love and hatred, of war

⁸⁾ Ridgeway: *Origin of Tragedy* (1910), *Dramas and Dramatic Dances of Non-European Races* (1915).

⁹⁾ Ed. Chavannes: *Contes et Légendes du Bouddhisme Chinois, Fables Chinoises du VII^e au VIII^e Siècle, Cinq cents Contes et Apologues*. The migration of folk-lore is traced by Chavannes in his studies.

and intrigue. The patriotism and the sense of duty stirred up by them have been of the same stuff, and their vendettas and defiance have assumed the same character. Chivalry and austerity, obscenity and ribaldry, simplicity and straightforwardness are equally reflected in the Eastern and Western lores.¹⁰⁾

The mysteries and miracles of mediaeval Europe as well as the "passion plays" of Oberammergau and Erl have had their counterparts in India too. Chambers *Mediaeval Stage* is an account as much of the *ludi* of the folk, feasts, pageants, buffooneries, folk-dances, and folk-drama of Europe as of the *Yātrā*, *Rāmlīlā*, *Bharat-mīlāp*, and *Gambhīrā*, of India with slight verbal modifications.¹¹⁾

Masks of beasts besmeared with filth are not yet things of the past in European festivities.¹²⁾ Christian manners grant "indulgences" to the moralities which are practised in connection with "vigils" or "wakes" (i.e. all-night watches that are enforced on the anniversary or dedication day of churches). Summer festivals in the Occident are notorious for such "moral holidays." A quaint old reflection on folk-life in the Western world comes from the Puritan Fetherston who in his *Dialogue against light, lewde and lascivious dancing* (1583) says that he has "hearde of tenne maidens which went to set May, and nine of them came home with child." All this is not psychologically, ethnologically, or climatologically distinct from the Asian practices wherever they may be detected by sociologists or Christian missionaries.

Some of the Buddhist *Jātaka*-stories of the pre-Christian era, as well as of the tales prevalent among the various peoples of India today are common to those with which the Europeans and Americans are familiar, e.g., in Grimm's collections. Thus the stories of St. Peter in disguise as beggar being entertained by Bruder Lustig, of *Brüderchen* and *Schwesterchen*, of the substituted bride, of the ass in Kaden's *Unter den Olivenbäumen*, of Teufel smelling human flesh, of the queen's order to kill Maruzedda's three children and bring their liver and heart, of the daughter telling her father, the king, that she loves him like salt and water, of gold-spitting princes, and pearl-dropping maidens, belong to the tradition of both Hindustan and Europe.

¹⁰⁾ Tawney: *Kathā-sarīt-sāgara*, Calcutta, 1880; *Kathā-kosha*, London, 1895; Conant: *Orient Tale in England*, New York, 1908.

¹¹⁾ B. K. Sarkar: *Folk-Element in Hindu Culture*, London, 1917.

¹²⁾ Chambers: *Mediaeval Stage*, Vol I, pp. 93, 115, 145, 149; Stubbs: *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents* (1869-78), p. 149; cf. Lecky: *European Morals*, Vol. II, pp. 288, 367.

Even the folk-customs, folk-superstitions, and folk-beliefs of the different parts of the world bear on them the marks of a common mentality. The popular May-festivals of Europe and the Spring-celebrations all over India are born of a common need and satisfy the same hunger of the human heart. The agricultural observances, harvest rites, ceremonial songs, and rustic holidayings of the Christian are akin to those of the Hindu. The history of medicine and surgery in Europe from the earliest times exhibits innumerable superstitions of which the analogues are to be found in the Orient.¹³⁾

6. Inductive Generalization.

The evidences of culture-lore as well as of folk-lore are thus contrary to the alleged difference in the mentality, philosophic stand-point, and world-view between the Eastern and Western races. The "ideals" of life have been statistically and historically the same in Asia and Eur-America. The student of culture-systems can, therefore, declare his inductive generalization in the following words of Walt Whitman:

"These are really the thoughts of all men in
all ages and lands,
This is the grass that grows where the land is and the
water is,
This is the common air that bathes the globe".

¹³⁾ Martinengo-Caesaresco: *Essays in the Study of Folksongs*, London, 1914; John Moyle: *The present ill state of the practice of physik in this nation truly represented*, London, 1702.

View-Points in Aesthetics.

1. Two Specimens of Art-Appreciation.

A gifted Indian painter writes to me from Calcutta (March 9, 1921): "If I had spent years among the museums and exhibitions of Paris I could never have reproduced a replica of that art in an Indian city."

The artist's argument is thus worded: "People—including our greatest men—come back from Europe with a changed point of view which they cannot adjust to Indian conditions. Our ideas must live and grow on Indian conditions—however much our education and outlook may be finished and enlarged by foreign travels and intimate contact with the living phases of a living civilisation."

The writer is not only an artist of distinction but is also the author of writings on several phases of Indian painting and sculpture. He is familiar, besides, with the art-history of the world in both its Asian and European developments.

Almost in the same strain Mr. "Agastya" gives his reactions to the "art of a Bengali sculptor" in the *Modern Review* for May 1921. Says he: "Though the subject is Indian there is nothing in it which could not come from the chisel of a non-Indian sculptor. Indeed our grievance is that in Mr. Bose's (Fanindra Nath) works we search in vain for the revelation of the Indian mind of an Indian artist, the peculiarity of his point of view, and the traditions of his great heritage."

"Agastya" also, like my friend the painter, attacks the problem from the standpoint of a "question larger than the merits of his (Bose's) individual works." "What is the value", asks he, "of a long training in a foreign country which disqualifies an artist from recognizing and developing his own national and racial genius? A nation can no more borrow its art from abroad than its literature."

The problem is explicitly stated by "Agastya" in the following terms. "We are told," writes he, "that Mr. Bose perfected his training by his travels in France and Italy. We are not told if he ever studied the masterpieces of old Indian sculpture and extracted from them the lessons which no Greek marble or bronze could teach him." Further, "an Indian artist," as we are assured by "Agastya", "is destined to tread a path not chosen by artists of other nationalities."

From his communication in the *Modern Review* Mr. "Agastya" appears to be "an authority on Indian sculpture." He is at present, as may be gathered, engaged in deciphering with his "old eyes dim with age" some of the worm-eaten palm-leaves on image-making now rotting in the archives of the Palace Library at Tanjore." Consequently he claims to be resting "in a place of telescopic distance" and to "have a more correct perspective and a wider and a dispassionate view of things, unattached by temporary values or local considerations." It must be added that "Agastya" also has cared to devote attention to Ruskin, Leighton and other Westerns.

2. The Current Standard of Aesthetic Appraisal.

These statements, coming as they do from two authorities, might be strengthened by passages from the writings of other Indian writers who are known to be connoisseurs and art-historians or art-critics. For, virtually with no exception the field of art-appreciation is being dominated in India by one and only one strand of thought. And this "monistic" critique of aesthetic values which our archaeologists and essayists have chosen to advocate in season and out of season is essentially none other than what Eur-American "orientalists" and "friends of the Orient" have propagated in regard to the "ideals" of Asian art and civilisation.

There are two conceptions underlying each of the above specimens of art-appraisal.

First, there runs a hypothesis as to the "Indianness" of Indian inspiration, i.e., the distinctiveness of Hindu (or Indian?) genius, or, in other words, as to the alleged antithesis between the "ideals of the East" and those of the West.

Secondly, both writers have pursued certain canons in regard to the very nature and function of art itself. In their appreciation of paintings and sculptures they seem to be guided exclusively by the subjects painted and carved, in other words, by the story, legend, or literature of the pictorial and plastic arts. That is, while travelling in the realms of art they continue to be obsessed by the results of their studies in history, literary criticism, and anthropology.

This methodology of art-appreciation has long awaited a challenge. It is the object of the present essay to offer this challenge.

3. The Boycott of Western Culture.

Let us follow the first point in the current standard of art-appreciation systematically and comprehensively to its furthest logical consequences.

If the exhibitions of paintings, sculptures and decorative arts conducted under the auspices, say, of a *Salon* like the *Société des Artistes Français*, in Grand Palais (Paris) every spring, or the collections of Assyro-Babylonian cylinders, Greek vases, Roman sarcophagi, Etruscan urns, the safety-pins of Roman Gaul, the keys of Saalburg, Renaissance bronzes, and the mosaics, coins, and *terra cottas* of different epochs in the museums of Europe and America, and the studies concerning these monuments published in the monographs of learned societies, or, visits of investigation to the edifices of Moscow, the basilica of Algeria, the Byzantine sphere of influence in Asia Minor and Eastern Europe. not to speak of the Acropolis and the Gothic Cathedrals should have to be ruled out as of questionable importance in regard to the spiritual equipment of an Indian creator of art-forms because in sooth the East is postulated always to have been and ever in the future to remain different from the West, can we not dogmatize with the same emphasis that writers of novels, dramas and lyric poetry in modern Marathi, Urdu, Bengali, Hindi, Tamil and other Indian languages are not likely to imbibe any inspiration or derive any creative suggestions from Whitman, Browning, Sudermann, Ibsen, Dostoyevski, and Hervieu? And yet what else is Indian literature of the last two generations but the product of India's intimate acquaintance with and assimilation of Western literary models?

If the frescoes of Ajanta and the bas-reliefs of Bharhut, if the South Indian bronzes and Rajput-Pahari illustrations, if the *gopurams*, the *shikharas* and the Indo-Moslem domes and minars are to exclude from India's aesthetic vision the superb architectural immensities engineered by the American designers of sky-scrapers, the styles of Kiev and Novogorod, the glories of Florence and Ravenna, the Parthenon and the Notre Dame, why should not Kural, Kalidas, Vidyapati, Tukârâm and Tulsidâs monopolize the imagination of every rising genius in the field of Indian letters? Should Hari Narayan Apte have produced another volume of *Abhangs*? Should the creator of *Bande Mâtaram* have compiled another *Kathâ-sarit-sâgara*?

Pursuing the current logic of art-appreciation we should have to dictate that Indians must by all means avoid the contact of Lavoisier and his disciples, of Humboldt, Pasteur, Agassiz, Maxwell, and Einstein because in order to be true to Hindu "heritage" it is necessary to boycott everything that has appeared in the world since Leibnitz, Descartes and Newton! No Indian, therefore, we must accordingly advise, should investigate the acoustics of the

violin because not much on this subject is to be found in the mediaeval *Sangita-raṭnākara*! And since the only mechanical engineering of which our great encyclopaedia, the *Bṛihat Samhitā*, is aware is the dynamics of the bullock cart, no Indian if he wishes to remain a loyal Indian must pry into the mysteries of the printing press, wireless telegraphy, the Zeppelin, and long-distance phones!

From the identical standpoint the student of Hindu heritage in polity should be asked to come forward with the message that India's Indianness is to be found only in Kautilya or that from the great vantage ground of the *Arthashastra* and of the Tamil inscription discovered at Uttaramallur Young India can afford to declare a contraband of Rousseau, Washington, Mill, Mazzini, Treitschke, and Lenin!

Perhaps the advocates of the current method in art-appreciation will consider our students of philosophy to be the best representatives of Indianness and of the distinctive Hindu spirit because during the period of over half a century they have failed to produce anything superior to mere paraphrases, translations and commentaries of the ancient *Darśhanas* and have thus marvellously succeeded in demonstrating that they were incapable of assimilating and extending the thought-world exhibited by masters from Bacon to James and Wundt.

And certainly the apostles of Indianness of the Indian mind will as a matter of course fail to appreciate the achievement, whatever be its worth, of Vivekānanda simply because on account of his Western leavening this Carlyle of Young India happened to realize and exploit the dynamic possibilities of the Vedānta such as were undreamt of by Shamkarāchārya.

The absurdity of the current methodology in the appraisal of life's values is patent on the surface.

4. Achievements of the Modern Mind.

Our Vishvakarmā had succeeded in inventing a bullock cart. He could not hit upon the steam engine. Is this why the bullock cart is to stand for "spirituality" and the steam engine for gross materialism? Is this why the bullock cart should be regarded as the symbol of Hindu genius, and the railway and all that has followed it of the Western?

But how old is the steam engine in the West as an aid to transportation or manufacture? This machine was unknown to the Vishvakarmās of Greece and Rome and of Europe down to the French Revolution. The difference between the East and the West

in materialism is then not a difference in "ideals" but only a difference in time which can be measured by decades.

What the bullock cart is to the steam engine, that is all that Hindu genius had produced during the epochs of its creative history to all that Western genius has produced during, roughly speaking, the last two hundred years. Previous to the advent of the recent phase of civilisation East and West ran parallel, nay, identical in the "point of view", in "genius", in "spirit".

Here is a test case. The music of Beethoven, nay, the "harmonies", "symphonies" and "overtures" of modern Europe would have been as unintelligible in the Middle Ages, to Dante and his predecessors for instance, as they are still unintelligible to us in Asia simply because we have not advanced further than the discoveries of our forefathers in the thirteenth century.

If today an Indian *ostad*, but one who is conversant with the theory of Indian music, — a condition perhaps very difficult to fulfil in the present state of the art — were to attempt mastering the technique of the great "composers" — a class of artists probably unknown in Indian tradition — of this new West and on the strength of that equipment proceed to improvise some novel forms for our own *rāgas* and *rāginis* should he be condemned as a dilettante or should he be appreciated as the true disciple of our own *swadeshi* Bharata and Dhananjaya? And if a failure, should he not be honoured as the first term in a long series of pioneering experiments?

The instance of music is offered as a typical problem for Young India because music is perhaps *the* line of creative activity in which Indian "genius" has taken the least step forward in centuries. Even the elementary work of matching appropriate "chords" to the notes of a melody or of devising a musical notation has not been attempted as yet.

5. The Alleged Indian Point of View.

From achievements let us pass on to the analysis of ideals, the same problem, in fact, turned inside out. The question may reasonably be asked: What is the Indian spirit? What is the distinctive Hindu or Oriental ideal?

Is it to be detected in the *charkhā*, the handloom, and in cottage industry? But previous to the "industrial revolution" mankind nowhere knew of weaving factories, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Krupp Workshops.

In the "village communities", those so-called rural republics, as every Indian has learned to repeat *ad nauseam* since the publication

of Metcalfe's *Report*? But England also should appear to be quite possessed of the Hindu spirit because there, says Gomme the anthropologist and historian of civics, the "localities" have "survived all shocks, all revolutions, all changes, and their position on the map of England is as indestructible as the country itself." Has Metcalfe said anything more or different about India, the country *sui generis* of *pañchāyat* and "local government?"

In agriculture? But all through the ages civilization has fundamentally been agricultural. And today not only in France, Russia and Germany, but even in the United States agriculture (including *go-sevā* or cow-"worship") is the greatest single occupation of the people.

In land-revenue as the principal item of public finance? But the backbone of the national treasury even under the Roman Empire was furnished by the realizations from land, nay, from crown-land.

In the *shrenis*, *ganas*, corporations or guilds? But these economico-political unions have served the same social, religious, ethical, literary and artistic functions of the Europeans in the Middle Ages as in India.

In monasticism and *sādhvism*? But in a religious map, say, of England in the sixteenth century previous to the dissolution of monasteries the country will appear to have been dotted over almost with as many cathedrals, churches, *āshrams*, *mathas*, *tapovans*, "forests", as our own *punya-bhūmi*, sacred Motherland.

In the sanctity of the home and in the reverence for the female sex? But even in 1921 entire Latin Europe, as we understand from Joseph-Barthélemy, the liberal suffragist, in his *Le Vote des Femmes*, is disposed, although without *pardāh* (veil), to look with disfavor on the public and political activities of women. And in the Anglo-Saxon world, even in go-ahead America¹), although the tremendous economic developments of the last century have inevitably led on to the recognition of the independent status of the woman in law and politics, it is the "society" obsessed as it is with the ideal of the *Hausfrau* which still rules the "proprieties" of the "eternal feminine" in the daughter, the bride, the wife, and the mother.

What, then, are the elements in the Indian "atmosphere" which differentiate it, whether item by item or *ensemble*, from other atmospheres? Where are to be discovered the specifically Indian "traditions" of human evolution?

¹) Cf. the position of the woman in the colonial period and since in Calhoun's *Social History of the American Family* (1918)

In the "enlightened despotism" and *pax sārva-bhaumica* (peace of the world-empire) of the Mauryas, Guptas, Pālas, Cholas, Moghuls, and Marathas? But one has only to envisage Versailles or study the seventeenth century of European civilisation with open mind in order to be convinced that there has not occurred anything in the history of the world since the days of the ancient Egyptians more dehumanizing and demoralizing than were the autocracy, intolerance, luxury, effeminacy, and licentiousness which Europe has exhibited under her Bourbon and other pharaohs.

6. Race-Ideals in Fine Arts.

Perhaps here one should be interrupted with the remark that the *rasas* or emotions with which paintings and sculptures deal belong to a category altogether distinct from the psychological processes involved in the making of exact science, industrial technique, material invention, and social or political institution. It might be suggested, in other words, that although the sciences may be conceded to be universal, international, cosmopolitan, or human, fine arts are on the contrary essentially racial, national, local or regional.

For the present we need not enter into a discussion as to the correct physiological and psychological basis of the mentalities operating in the different orders of creation. We shall only single out certain types from the art-history of the world at random and examine if they really point to any psychological diversity, any divergence in *rasa* between race and race.

Let us consider the epochs of European art previous to the moderns, say, previous to Da Vinci, Rembrandt, and Velazquez. The sociology of that Western art will be found to be governed by the same *rasas*, the same ideals, whatever they be, as that of the Hindu. We have only to visit the galleries or go around the world with eyes open, i.e. with an eye to the pragmatic meaning of the diverse art-forms in the life's scheme of the different peoples.

The sculptures of Greece and their Roman copies do not tell any story different from the images of the Hindu gods and goddesses. The art of Catholic Europe (both Roman and Greek Church), embodied in the architecture, painting, stained glass, mosaic, bas relief, and statue, is one continuous worship of the Unknown, the Infinite, and the Hereafter, which the Hindu or the Buddhist considers to be a monopoly of his own *shilpa-shāstra* and temple paraphernalia.

Ecclesiastical art was practically the only art of Europe until about three centuries ago. From an intensive study of the Notre

Dame alone (such as the orientalists and archaeologists are used to bestow on our Ajantas and Bharhuts), from an analysis of the elongated statues, the design of parallels, the transcendentalized anatomies, the morals on the façade, the chimerical animals on the roofings, the ritualistic basis of its internal arrangements, and the metaphysics of its mystical theology any Asian can satisfy himself as to the existence in Western civilisation of everything which he considers to be essential to "spirituality."

To what extent has this old religious mentality or superstitious attitude disappeared from modern Europe? Even today a Catholic priest is shocked to see the nudes in the Museum of Fine Arts at Boston or in the Luxembourg galleries at Paris. While examining the paintings and sculptures of the saints or the illustrations of the Biblical stories, should he chance to come across a "modern" treatment somewhere hard by, he knows that he has committed a sin against the most important commandment. This is the attitude also of every "decent" Christian woman, especially among Catholics,—the more so in the villages. What more does Indian "intuition" demand? And catholicism is still the predominant religion in Eur-America.

Cornelius, Overbeck and other painters of German romanticism in the early years of the last century must have out-Hindued the Hindu in their practice of *dhyāna*, *yoga*, meditation. In order to derive inspiration they renounced their family ties and came all the way to Italy, because, verily, they believed, as says Lewes in his *Life of Goethe*, that highest art was not achievable except by *sādhus*, *sanyasis*, Capucins and Rosicrucians.

Even in the "idealistic" interpretation of art-philosophy it is possible to find the alleged Hindu principles in Western speculation. If Croce's Italian *Aesthetic* is too contemporaneous, one can cite Schiller from Germany of a few generations ago. For, says he in his *Use of the Chorus in Tragedy*: "The aim of art is to make us absolutely free; and this it accomplishes by awakening, exercising and perfecting in us a power to remove to an objective distance the sensible world." Here then we have a European philosopher preaching the Hindu doctrine of *nukti*, *moksha*, freedom.

Nay, the art of Bolshevism counts among its spiritual antecedents the same "Hindu" mentality. As can be gathered from Reau's *Russie: Art Ancien*, for about two decades previous to the Sovietic revolution of 1917 the art and craft circles of Young Russia had carried on a propaganda in favour of going back to religious paintings, images, and so forth.

It is indeed absolutely necessary for every student of a so-called Hindu type of inspiration in art to be familiar with the Christian iconography and symbolism in the researches of Martin, Cahier, and Didron. More modern and novel eye-openers from the same standpoint will be Male's *Art religieux du XIII^e siècle* (available in English) and *Art religieux de la fin du moyen âge*.

Should we still have to suspect a difference in life's attitudes between the East and the West as exhibited in art-structures, let us observe the Napoleonic *Arc de Triomphe* at Paris. The arch is a *jaya-stambha* — like the one our own Raghu constructed on the Gangetic delta in Eastern Bengal—consecrated to the victories of the *grande armée* from 1792 to 1815. The sculptures illustrate the scene in the history of revolutionary France with special reference to Austerlitz (1806).

No man of common sense will dare remark that in this memorial of military glories Napoleon or the French nation intended to display a characteristically French or European ideal of civilisation. The obelisks and pylons of Luxor and Karnak had anticipated the same ideals of mankind three thousand years ago. We may come to the Persia of Darius or even nearer home and say that if a monument in stone were erected by Samudragupta's (c 370 A. C.) architects and sculptors in order to illustrate the lengthy literary monument composed by Harishena in honour of the emperor's *digvijaya* (conquest of the quarters) the descendants of this Hindu Napoleon would have always seen in their own Rome the solid testimony to the same Egyptian or French *rasa* (emotion).²

Where, then, are the distinctive racial traits and psychological attitudes in the world's architecture, sculpture, and painting? Nowhere. Such differences have never existed in the mentality of which history furnishes the objective evidence.

7. Aesthetic Revolution.

But in the first place the moderns in Eur-America have succeeded in profoundly secularizing the arts. In the second place they have attained certain conspicuous results in technique and treatment of the material. It is questionable if we can credit them with the creation or discovery of an essentially new *rasa*, a characteristically modern emotion,—except what is automatically implied in the new subjects of secular experience.

² Albert Hoffmann: *Denkmäler*, 2 vols. (1906), in *Handbuch der Architektur* Series, Stuttgart

Whether there have emerged some new emotions or not, the advance of the creative mind in technique is already too obvious. And continuing the previous parallelism, one may almost remark, although with great caution in regard to the application and interpretation of the analogy in the field of aesthetics, that what the fishing canoe is to the submarine, that is all Classic and Christian art to the art of the last two hundred years, and that is all Hindu art to European art since the Renaissance.

This revolution in fine arts is indicated by Professor Lewis in a public lecture on the "Logical in Music" given at Harvard University in the summer of 1917. While analyzing the "First Movement" in Beethoven's *Third Symphony* this lecturer on musical appreciation remarks: "The logical development of the thematic material in the first section to the climax has the same place in the history of music as the French Revolution in world's history. It swept away the 'Classical' in music by establishing the influence of the 'individual passage.' Measures 280—283 are epoch-making. Herein is born the 'romantic movement' which gives rise to 'modern beauty.'"

Perhaps these words do not convey any sense to the ordinary Asian student of art. This is all the more corroborative of the fact that in art technique as in everything else India, nay, Asia has failed independently to evolve this last epoch of human attainments.

For Young India today to appreciate and assimilate the new achievements of mankind in aesthetics as in the utilitarian sciences and arts is not tantamount to inviting an alleged denationalization. That is, on the contrary, one of the chief means of acquiring strength in order that the Orient may push forward the creative urge of life and contribute to the expansion of the human spirit as the offsprings of Maya and Vishvakarmā should be able to do.

8. Historical Art-Criticism.

But all this analysis of sociological ideals, *Weltanschauungen*, and other philosophical platitudes in the style of a Hegel or a Taine is the least part in the appreciation of art. It is the most irrelevant and the most superficial element in genuine *shilpa-shāstra*. We are thus led to the discussion of the second point in traditional art-criticism, viz. the question of the importance of the story, the legend, or the theme in sculptures and paintings, and in aesthetics generally.

It must be admitted at the outset that in this respect the methodology of art-appreciation prevalent in India or Japan is but an echo of the conventional manner in which art-products are usually evaluated in the *bazaars* and learned societies of Eur-America. The method consists in describing the pieces limb by limb, telling the subject matter, counting the number of figures, trees or utensils, naming the animal, directing attention to the costume, and finally, if old, ascertaining the date.

The manner is familiar to those who have to use the catalogues of museums, expositions, show-rooms, and art dealers' salons. This is the "method in archaeology" as described by Reinach in *De la méthode dans les sciences*. Essays which appear in newspapers and magazines and even in such reviews as are devoted exclusively to fine arts hardly ever rise above this descriptive plane. The traditional method is thus one adapted to the kindergarten stage of art-education.

Equipped with this canon the art connoisseur comes to study in the Notre Dame the economic organization of the French *shrenis* (gilds) of masons and glass-cutters in the thirteenth century just as he tries to reconstruct the dress, manners, jokes, funeral ceremonies, dance, rural institutions, and commercial activities of ancient India in the bas-reliefs of Sanchi. In the Venuses and Apollos of Classical Europe the conventional art-critic studies perhaps the physiognomies of the Aegeans, Pelasgians, Cretans, Ionians, Etruscans, Florentines, and others, in the Madonnas he will detect the faces of the wives of the Italian Renaissance painters, Spanish or Russian nuns or the milkmaids and peasant women of the Netherlands, in the Buddhas he marks the Afghan, Central-Asian, Punjabi, Nepalese, Mongolo-Dravidian, Chinese, Javanese, Siamese or Japanese types, and within the Indian boundaries he tabulates the goddess Shakti according to her aboriginal, Kashmiri, Bengali, Tamil and other features.

Such studies are important in themselves. Their value as aid to identification and "classification in a series" is unquestionable. They offer material contributions also to the geography of art-migration, the science of ritual, superstition, and religious observances, economic history, ethnography, and to the study of many other phases of human civilisation. Readers of Michaelis' *Ein Jahrhundert kunstarchäologischer Entdeckungen* could never dare suspect the utility of such investigations.

But how much of these studies is real analysis of *rasa*, genuine art-criticism? Absolutely nothing.

9. Philosophical Art-Criticism.

Not all art critics, however, are exclusively interested in these descriptive, historical, economic, anthropological or sociological aspects of fine arts. There are connoisseurs who try to attack the problem from what may be called the psychological point of view. They analyze the ideas, the ideals, the "nine *rasas*", the message, or the philosophy of the paintings and sculptures.

When these art-philosophers see the landscapes of Sesshiu, the great Japanese master of the fourteenth century, they read in the *rasa* of his pines the symbolism for longevity, in that of his bamboos the allegory of chastity, and in that of his plums all that is implied by taste and elegance in *belles lettres*.

If they come across Chinese silks depicting mountain scenes with snows and pines or perhaps a solitary man seated in a certain pose these metaphysicians of aesthetics will discover therein the cool contemplative calm of Chinese consciousness conducive to the quest of the Beyond.

In the same manner they would have interpreted at least half a dozen works of Corot (1796—1875)—his mornings, evenings, shepherds playing on the flute in moonlight—as philosophical allegories pointing to quiescence, passivity, and the communion of the soul with nature, were it not for the fact that Corot happens to be a Frenchman and a European and that *ergo* the "message of the forest" must by no means be attributed to a beef-eating materialistic Westerner!

Likewise will these philosophical connoisseurs find a mystery in the paintings illustrating Râdhâ and Krishna simply because by their conventional pose and dress such as are described in literature the figures can easily be identified as the sacred persons of semi-mythical tradition. With equal energy do such critics run into ecstasy over a Giotto's (1276—1337) *St. Francis receiving the wounds of Jesus on his own person* or over a Murillo the Spanish master's (1616—1682) *Immaculate Conception* and *Angel's Kitchen* because these stories possess a spiritual "polarization" in the folk-psychology.

And in the portraits of a Rash Behari Ghosh or an Andrew Carnegie or in the statues of a Ranade or a Clemenceau the metaphysicians of *rasa* will manage to discover the idea, the soul, the allegory of the person, so to speak, and try to point it out, in a language which satisfies none but the initiated, in the facial expression, in the eyes, in the forehead, in the jaw-bones, in the lips and in the chin.

It is out of such Hegelian analysis of the "souls" of paintings and sculptures that critics have generalized as to the fundamental distinction in spirit between the East and the West.

These are clever investigations undoubtedly, and perhaps not unnecessary. But here, again, we ask: How much of all these is art-criticism? Absolutely nothing.

10. The Themes of Art.

Both the historical and the philosophical art critics are focusing their attention on one thing, viz. the legend, the story, the theme. While evaluating the workmanship, the *shilpa*, of the artist they are not at all studying the *shakti*, the genius of the sculptor or the painter as creator of beauties nor the magic touch of technique by which he has been able to produce the *rasa*, whatever it be. They are interested in everything else, i.e., all that lies outside the sphere of beauty and the artist's *rasa*. They are concerning themselves with the history, the literature, the geography and the biography of the themes with which they are already familiar or about which, may be, they wish to derive some new information.

Of what avail, from the standpoint of aesthetic enjoyment, is it to know that Cimabue (1240—1302), the "father of modern painting", was the first artist to paint from the living model or to be told that the expression of a portrait is exactly what one knows of the person? Do we gain anything in art appreciation by indicating that certain pictures on *terra cottas* or certain bas reliefs on walls or on sarcophagi are vivid illustrations of the armageddons in the *Iliad* or the *Purānas*? Similarly to emphasize that the message of Omar Khayyam has found the aptest expression in certain paintings is nothing but beating about the bush, promenading far beyond the vestibule of the temple of art. All this is like reading the description at the bottom of a piece and on that strength announcing that over here there is the picture of a mouse.

Such descriptions or expressions (i.e., interpretations) are the minimum expected of every painter and sculptor. One or other of the so-called nine or of the thousand and one *rasas* (emotions) may be postulated about every piece of work, Oriental or Occidental, ancient or modern. But when we enter the sphere of art we must take care not to insult the artist by asking such puerile, elementary and extraneous questions. We come to understand him in his own language, in his own idiom, in his own technique.

And that language, that idiom, that technique are absolutely independent of the theme, the legend, the story, the message. The art-world is a sphere by itself with its own "conditions of temperature and pressure", its own zones of influence, its own canons, statutes and bye-laws. It can only betray our naive simplicity if we obtrude our knowledge of history, biography, psychology, drama, lyric and epic upon the productions of the painter and the sculptor when we come to interrogate them.

11 *Svarāj in Shilpa.*

It is now time to cast aside the negatives and enunciate our position in as positive a manner as possible. What are we to understand by the emancipation that is being advocated here of art from the despotism of literary criticism, historical or philosophical analysis, ethical or religious studies, and democratic, bolshevistic or nationalistic propaganda? What is the meaning of the thesis that we should have to conceive *shilpa* as a *svarāj* in itself, i.e. to treat art or the creation of "beauties" as a self-determined entity in human experience? In what sense is it possible to concede to painting and sculpture an absolute autonomy whether as modes of objective description or subjective expression?

The problem will become lucid if we take an analogy from the domain of music. If I say that *behag* is a melody which is played at midnight or that it is suggestive of the depths of mountain solitude, or that it is evocative of the emotions, the *rasas*, of a pensive mood, am I using the language of music? None at all.

Or, if in order to illustrate the beauty of *behag* I begin to sing a song which is tuned to that melody and then point out the exquisiteness of the words and the charm of the ideas in them, am I using the language of music? None at all.

All this at best is but literary criticism which does not touch the stuff of which music is made.

If I am to appreciate *behag* as the master devised it I must have the capacity to analyze the sounds and the "phrases of sounds", and discover the integral and "organic" concatenation of sounds. I should be in a position to point out the logic of these sound-combinations and detect the consistency in the development of the "sound-sentence" and the sound-paragraph from beat to beat, rhythm to rhythm, phrase to phrase. It should be necessary, for instance, to explain why a "phrase" from *todi* melody can serve but to create a melodic inconsistency in the system of *behag*.

There is a logical "necessity" in the order and sequence of the rhythm constituting each "musical form". It is the function of musical appreciation to deal with that organic necessity in the creation of sound-structures.

The sense of the sounds, thus grasped, possesses an independent existence. It must not be confounded with the sense of the subject matter of a song which is set to that sound-structure. Music itself has absolutely no connection with the meaning of the words, the significance of the song, the philosophy of the poetry. Indeed to confound music with song is a sign of puerilism in an individual, and if committed by a race it can only point to the primitive stage of development so far as this particular art is concerned.

Let us now illustrate the autonomy of art in the domain of poetry. If I say that Jogindra Nath Bose has produced a great epic because it deals with Shivaji, a historic hero, or because his *Prithvirāj* is a call to national unity, or that Rajani Kanta Sen is a great poet because he writes devotional hymns, or that the poets of Young Bengal are performing great things in poetry because they sing to the country, to nationalism, and to democracy, am I using the language of poetry? None at all.

The message does not make poetry. The subject matter does not make poetry great.

The subject matter, the message, the philosophy, the social ideal, the "criticism of life" may have to be appreciated or condemned on their own merits. But poetry itself will have to stand on its own dignity. You may condemn the *rasas* dealt with in a work, i.e., the message of the author from your particular ethical point of view and yet you may worship him as a great poet.

One does not have to be a Roman Catholic in order to feel that the author of the *Divine Comedy* is a first class creator of characters and situations, of problems and possibilities. *Paradise Lost* does not depend for its strength on the cult of militant puritanism on which it is reared. Men who are the furthest removed from the religious controversies and political *rasas* of the English people in the seventeenth century or of the Italians in the thirteenth can feel in the atmosphere of these two creations the Titanic might of Himalayan upheavals.

Whatever be the subject matter, the poet will have to be judged as poet solely by his manipulations, his treatment of the material, the machinery he has invented in order to make the material speak, the individuality and fruitfulness of his technique. We need only ask: "What new personalities have been manufactured by the

author? What new attitudes and rearrangements of ideas? What devices, what complexities, what surprises? Are the creations attempted important, integral, and organic enough to enrich human experience?"

The autonomy of poetry as a mode of literary expression depends on the "artistic necessity" pervading, as it must, the organism of vital situations and ideas. Not to create this artistic necessity through the medium of language is not to be a poet. To fail to discover and appreciate this artistic necessity is to fail in understanding poetry.

12. The Art-In-Itself or Pure Art.

We should now be able to analyze and understand the artistic necessities in painting and sculpture.

Let us begin with a simple query in regard to modern French paintings: How do the Cézannes differ from the Corots in so far as both Cézanne and Corot are landscapists? If you wish to detect a Chinese *Tao* or a Wordsworthian "Nature's holy plan" you are at liberty to interpret both these masters alike. But wherein lies the individuality of each as *shilpin*, as artist? How has each created his own beauties, his own "message of the forest"? Here then we have to find some new criterion of art. The problem lies in the *how*.

Indeed, when we are face to face with one thousand landscapes executed by several hundred painters and get used to viewing them from different angles and in different moods all those descriptive, historical, philosophical and idealistic criticisms are bound to disappear. We are forced to meditate upon the art-in-itself, the only feature in all these productions which is of supreme importance to the painters themselves, in other words, upon "pure" art.

The same problem arises when we are in a gallery of sculptures where the exhibits are to be counted by hundreds, and including the miniatures, by thousands. The question of photographic likeness or the symbolism of the executions then retires into the background; and even in spite of ourselves real aesthetic criticism makes its appearance. We begin to discuss the "hows" of each masterpiece.

It is possible for some while to remain satisfied with cataloguing the Natarâjas as South Indian and Sinhalese, the Buddhas and Târâs in terms of latitude and longitude, the Apollos and Venuses according to the cities where they were unearthed, and

the Madonnas according as their pose agrees with or varies from the Cimabue patent. One may also enjoy a diversion by classifying the distortions in anatomy as much from the Pharaonic, the Aegean, Korean, Japanese and Hindu executions as from the statues on the façade of the treasury at Delphi or from those on the portals and tympanum of the cathedrals in France.

But the multitude of specimens and the plurality of types, inevitable as they are, compel us at last to come down to the fundamentals of beauty and truth in *shilpa* and to try to decipher the alphabet of plastic and pictorial art.

13. The Alphabet of Beauty.

Drawing, painting, bas relief and sculpture deal with the subject-matter of anatomy, botany, and the other branches of natural history, but they are not governed by these sciences. These arts are regulated by the science of space, geometry, the *vidyā* of *rūpam*, the knowledge of form, morphology.

The language of the painter and the sculptor is, therefore, point, line, angle, cone, square, curve, mass, volume. The creators of beauty speak the vocabulary of positions, magnitudes, dimensions, perspectives. If we are to associate with the manipulators of these forms we must learn how to employ the terminology of obliques and parallelograms, prisms and pentagons. We must also have to practise understanding the message, which in every instance is spiritual, of the lumps, patches, contours, balls, depths, and heights.

We can only make ourselves a nuisance in the company of painters and sculptors if we speak a jargon which is utterly incomprehensible to them. Such jargons, not to be found in the dictionary of art, are the technical terms known as the tibia, the clavicle, the cerebellum, the stirnum, the pelvic girdle. Other jargons like these are the dicotyledons, the conifers, the palmates, the pinnates. More such jargons are love, anger, hatred, malice, compassion, and the rest of the *rasas*, whatever be their number according to the latest experiments in "individual psychology."

To a *shilpin* there is only one organ of sense, and that is the eye. The artist does not, however, view the world as a theatre of minerals, plants, and animals, nor of the races of men with their physical, mental or emotional characteristics. In the geology and anthropo-geography of art there are recorded only the forms (and also the colours). The optic nerves, or for that matter, the entire sensibility of the artist *as artist* can not respond to anything but

these shapes and hues,—the most fundamental “generalizations” that can be deduced out of the world’s structure.

And what does the artist create? Not necessarily the doubles or replicas nor even the interpretations or symbolisms of the forms which arrest his eyes, but whatever his form-sense, his *rasa-jñāna*, dictates to him as worth creating. If out of his readings of the crystallography of the universe he can give birth to a type by his constructive will he is an artist. If he can render his types readable, i.e. intelligible to the eyes of his fellowmen, in other words, if he can make his creations, the progeny of his form-sense, live in the imagination even of a section of his community he is a master.

The creators of Apollos, Buddhas, Madonnas, Natarâjas, Râdhâs. Shaktis, Venuses, and Vishnus happen to be masters because their *rasa-jñāna* bodied forth these types out of “airy nothings” endowing a “local habitation and a name” to “things unknown”, and because these formations will talk to human beings as long as the world endures,—even when the dialects of the human language cease to be spoken, even when Greek mythology, Buddhism, Mariolatry, and the other conventional religious systems of mankind become things of the past.

The painter and the sculptor do not construct leaves, trunks, branches, arms, lips, thighs, loves, angers, hatreds. They are interested solely in the juxtaposition of forms, in the intermarriage of shapes, in the permutation and combination of masses and surfaces.

There is a blank wall, or a blank sheet of paper, silk, or canvas. The function of the artist is to fill it with designs, necessarily of geometry, but not necessarily the Euclid of the class-room. It is a geometry which serves the form-sense of the *shilpīn*.

Or, there is a log of wood, a lump of clay, or block of stone. The function of the sculptor simply is to fashion out of this dead mass an organism of objects in space. The structure will naturally be made of cones, cavities, flats.

Perhaps we have already before us a Natarâja of Ceylon, a Venus of Melos, a Buddhist or Christian animal in prayer, or an Immaculate Conception. But the “reality” of these formations from the painter’s or sculptor’s geometry is not to be tested by their resemblance with or divergence from the types that are known to exist on earth. These *rupams* have a validity all their own.

The geometry of Maya or Vishvakarmâ has architected a new world the denizens of which are *ipso facto* as real as anything of

flesh and blood, or sap and tissue. The artist's creations are born on their own anatomy and physiology, on their own statics and dynamics. The solar system of *shilpa* moves independently of the solar system of nature.

The creations of mass in space are problems in themselves. And a "message" is immanent in each problem, in each contour in each coexistence of forms, in each treatment of colour. No *rupam*, however irregular, "unnatural", abnormal, nebulous, hazy, vague, or dim without its specific *meaning in space*. Not a bend without a sense, not a lump without its philosophy, not a bit of coloured space without its significance—in the scheme of art-geometry. We do not have to wander away from these lines, surfaces, curves, and densities in order to discover the "ideals" of the maker. The ideals are right there speaking to my eyes.

A "still life", a few slices of cucumber on a plate, the struggle of a fish in a net, the drunkard on a donkey, a pose of the arm, the leaning of a head,—things which are not at all counted in an inventory of "spiritual" assets, Hindu or Christian—can still awaken awe, curiosity, wonder, in short, can possess a most profound spiritual mission through the sheer influence of mass, volume, position, or colour-arrangement. And, on the other hand, the thousand times memorized subjects of religious history, howsoever propped up by social inertia, may fail to excite even a thrill in our vascular organism and may thus leave our personality absolutely indifferent to their call simply because of an amateurish handling of patches and lumps.

One may have an emotional prejudice or unfavorable reaction of *rasa* against certain eye-types, certain lips and jaw-bones, certain other racial physiognomies, and of course, against certain distortions and multiplicities of limbs. But one must not import the reactions, responses and experiences of one's life-history into the world of art and make them the criterion of art products.

If I condemn a face in sculpture or an arm in bas-relief on such grounds I shall only be betraying impatience with the artist. In order that I may be competent to condemn a shape executed in *shilpa* I must be qualified enough to advance the sculptural or pictorial grounds, the grounds which belong to the sphere of the *shilpin's* experience.

In the world of art it is irrelevant to urge that in Bombay the female types are different or dress themselves differently from those known in Bengal. Nor does it help anybody in the creation or appreciation of art to proceed to psychanalyze the sensibilities of a

young man of Kashmir and declare that a Madras beauty is likely to fall flat on his aesthetic personality.

Whatever be the type created by the artist, whether it be a Japanese Hachiman or the ten-handed Râvana, the supreme question for him as well for us is its consistency on sculptural or pictorial reasons. What we are to seek in his forms, normal or abnormal, is nothing but their organic synthesis in accordance with the logic of aesthetics. What may be considered to be abnormalities or absurdities in the world of nature may happen to be quite justified by the grounds of art.

14. Structural Composition or Morphology of Art.

These aesthetic grounds are the foundations of artistic necessity. They constitute the "spiritual" basis of paintings and sculptures (as of music and poetry) considered as structural organisms or vital entities, i.e. as contrasted with mere mechanical manipulations.

The space on the canvas is naturally to be divided into different sections and subsections. The problem is to divide it in such a manner that the different parts form one harmonious whole,—limbs of an integral entity. Easier said than done!

The same problem of "grouping" is the essential feature in the sculptor's art. He stands or falls on the organic necessity he can evoke of the different limbs for one another in the structural whole.

The form-sense, the *rasa-jñāna*, is thus ultimately the sense of "composition". This sense of composition, which is the soul of the geometry of beauty, does not defy analysis, as a mystic in art-appreciation might rashly assert. It can be analyzed almost as exactly, as positively, as objectively, as anything that is thought out or otherwise accomplished by man. It is on the possibility of such analysis that an "experimental psychology of beauty" can come into existence.

But this sense of composition can, however, be realized or analyzed only after the *rupam* has been created, i.e. only after a thing of beauty has been manufactured to add to the known forms in the universe. It can hardly be taught from mouth to mouth in a school of arts nor communicated from master to disciple in the studio of the artist.

The sculptor and the painter are not before me to explain with a compass, as it were, the warps and woofs of their art-texture, why, for instance, their spacing is such and such, or how they have been led to conceive such and such proportions in their handiwork. No,

the formations must explain themselves. The key to the crystallography of art is contained in the very specimens.

And their sole language is the voice of *rupam*, the vocabulary of masses, volumes and poses, and the necessary lights and shades. If these forms do not convey any meaning to me about their morphology or structural composition, either I have no eye for art (an eye which certainly is very rare among men and women), or the artist himself is a quack.

From the standpoint taken in the present thesis, literary descriptions, howsoever short, which it has been the custom to tag at the bottom of art-objects, are in almost every instance a hindrance to genuine art-appreciation. Invariably they serve to shunt off the eye and the mind from the track of *rasa*, *shilpa*, and *shakti* (genius) of the artist to absolutely irrelevant and extraneous matters.

15. The Idiom of Painting.

Up till now it has been possible to speak of painting and sculpture in a parallel manner, as if they were the same arts. But these two arts are not identical as modes of creation. The language of the painter is substantially different from that of the sculptor. In the appreciation of art accordingly, in *shilpa-shūtra*, we have to employ two different languages adapted to the two spheres.

So far as composition or art-crystallography is concerned, so far as artistic necessity is sought, so far as the organic consistency of the whole is the object of our investigation, painting and sculpture can be treated in one and the same breath. But this composition, this organic consistency, this logical necessity in the art-texture is achieved in sculpture in a manner quite different from that in painting.

The sculptor speaks essentially the language of dimensions. The painter's language is essentially that of colour. The permutation and combination of *rupams* and their harmonic synthesis are brought about by the sculptor through his three-dimensional solids; whereas for the same object the painter depends almost exclusively on the mixing of tints and gradation of colour.

It is not only the perspective that evokes volume in the painter's work. Painting becomes "sculpturesque" or three-dimensioned through colour also. The American Max Weber's blues have the solid texture of Chinese porcelains. The French Renoir's metallic red brings forth the volumes of human flesh.

The brush can achieve what the chisel does, viz, manufacture a structural composition. The *vidyā* of *rupam*, the science of form,

the geometry of aesthetics, thus bifurcates itself in two directions: the composition of plastic arts and the art of colour-construction.

16. Form and Volume in Colour

The question may naturally be asked: What does one mean when one says that colour is laid at the service of form? How can *rupam* be constructed out of colour?

Ordinarily colour is known merely to influence us with its tints. The agreeableness or disagreeableness of the effects on optic nerves is the sole quality we generally attribute to the combination of hues produced by the painter's artistic chemistry.

In Asia especially it is difficult to take colour in any other association and conceive the mechanics of hues in any other light. Because Oriental art-history does not make us familiar with very many "pure paintings."

The paintings of ancient and mediaeval India, for instance, should not be called paintings in the strictest sense of the term. Most of these specimens are really "drawings", but coloured drawings.

Hindu artists were primarily draftsmen. They made lines and constructed shapes with the pen or the pencil as it were. These "pencil-sketches" or designs were the most important elements in the workmanship of the *shilpins*. To them colour was very secondary. It was added almost as a second thought, so to speak, on the background or the surface prepared by the drawing.

Shall we call such pieces of old Indian *shilpa* paintings on the ground that they possess a variety of tints and also display a remarkable discretion in the selection and treatment of these tints? We can do so if we please only in the same manner, however, in which we are entitled to describe the coloured bas-reliefs in pharaonic tombs at Dehrel-bahri and other sites as paintings.

Be this as it may, the point to notice especially in connection with the handling of colour is that, neither in coloured bas-reliefs nor in coloured drawings can we find the mass, the depth, the volume, in short, the "architectural" or sculptural quality, which comes to our attention as soon as we view a work in which the drawing is nowhere but in which the artist uses his brush and practically nothing but the brush. It is this exclusive employment of the brush and the consequent manipulation of paintings without the support and background of drawings, which is one of the greatest contributions of the modern, especially of the contemporary Occident to the achievements of mankind in *rupam*.

In such "pure paintings" the idiom that the artist speaks is that of colour and nothing but colour. It is with colour that he constructs shapes, erects forms, brings about light and shade, arranges the perspective, and redistributes the forces of nature for the world of art. Colour alone has thus been made to evolve the dimensions of sculpture on canvas and to produce the harmony of structural composition.

17. The Geometry of Sculpture.

Paintings and sculptures are then universal in their appeal simply because their spiritual basis is geometry, the most abstract and cosmopolitan of all *vidyās*, which is known to be the groundwork of all knowledge in the Platonic grammar of science. Curiously enough, anthropologically speaking, the primitive patterns and designs of all races (including the "savages" of to-day and the pre-historic forefathers of the "civilised" nations of history) are preponderantly geometrical, strictly so called. The specimens of decorative arts,—Peruvian, American-Indian, Maori, Central-African,—with which we are familiar in the ethnological museums of the world, point overwhelmingly to the manipulation of lines, triangles, squares, hexagons etc. (animal and plant devices must not be overlooked however) in a manner for which a comparatively modern parallel is to be sought in the "arabesque" of Saracenic fine arts. The same universal principles of aesthetics can be watched (allowance to be made for the master's creative *rasa-jñāna*) in all epochs of art-development, no matter whatever be the latitude and longitude, whatever be the subject matter, the superstition and the *esprit des lois*.

Take Plate III, *Le Sommeil des Femmes* in Mallon's *Quatorze Sculptures Indiennes* (Paris, 1920).

This piece of bas-relief consists of two horizontal sections, one-third at the top being devoted to two semi-circles enclosing an inner triangle with the vertex cut out.

The principal two-thirds is divided, again, vertically into two sections, two-thirds of which at the left forms a square. This square is divided horizontally into two sections, of which the lower rectangle is more full than the upper.

The figure seated erect helps making a small square to the left and an agreeable rectangle with the reclining form to the right. It reaches right up to the parallelogram at the top with a ball. It serves also with a cross to connect the shapes in the rectangle at the bottom with the top.

The vertical parallelogram at the right consists of two figures, of which one is erect. The lower half of this figure is covered by a parabolic shape, thoroughly supple and pliant, the two extremities of which are firmly fixed on to a semi-elliptical cylinder.

We do not have to examine the piece anatomically or anthropologically. From top to bottom, from right to left we are here viewing nothing but a drama of forms and the interplay of light and shade. Every curve tells a story to the eyes, every wave brings its message to the spirit. We do not care to know if it is a Buddha seated or a Yasodhârâ sleeping, or the women of the concert party enjoying repose on the spot. We do not have to inquire if the piece comes from Afghanistan, if the artists are Central-Asian, Hellenistic, or Indian, if the legend is derived from the *Jâtakas*.

We feel that the sculptor has contributed to the experiences of our life another creation of shapes, another truth in patterns and designs, another thing of beauty which is a joy for ever and to all mankind. One may view the piece from any angle, to be extreme, even upside down. It will not lose its quality of composition in any event. The melody of rhythmic contours in this bas-relief is constant and perpetual.

The composition here is very simple, almost elementary. Perhaps this is the reason why the pattern of this structure is to be found in its essential details as much in "pagan" Greece as in Christian cathedrals. Morphologically it is indeed an A. B. C. in art-formations. It is a real "primitive" of art-technique.

A very close resemblance to this type is furnished by Plate V, *Le Parinirvâna*. There, among other things a special significance is to be attached to the oblique in the centre, which to the reader of the story is meant to indicate a person lying on the bed. But the artist's *rasa-jñâna* has counselled him to the effect that an ordinary horizontal would not provide the desired effect. He wants to create an aesthetic diversion in the midst of the monotonous group of parallel verticals.

A religious devotee will perhaps see in this piece one of the most solemn incidents visualized in stone. But in art-appreciation, in *shilpa-shâstra*, it is nothing but the "mystery" of an inclined plane which has been exploited by the sculptor in an exquisite manner. Where is the artist or the art-critic who will have to be told the story of the Great Passing Away in order to be responsive to the call of these universals in sculptural geometry?

We can then understand easily why Natarâja is one of the most signal contributions of India to the history of world's sculpture.

To the anthropologist it is perhaps a Dravidian devil in his bacchanalian orgies, to the mystic it is an emblem of the cosmic music of the world-process, or, may be, of something in tune with the Infinite, to the student of literature it is but a Tamil embodiment in bronze of a Shaiva story.

But to the sculptor with his *rasa-jñāna*, his sense of form and composition, wherever he be, but to one who speaks his own language and is true to his *shilpa*, Natarāja is a most original creation in the ripple of bends and joints. The balancing of diverse masses in motion, the swaying of the volumes away from one another, the construction of imaginary circles within circles, the grouping of unseen parallels in movements and poses, and the gravitation of all the varied shapes to a common centre of dynamic rhythm — all these constitute an epoch-making attainment of unity in diversity, of the correlation of matter and motion, which possesses a meaning in the idiom of *rūpam* as much to the Western as to the Eastern artist.

To a student of the geometry of dance the fantasy of forms exhibited by the Sinhalese or South Indian Natarāja will not fail to suggest the design of the group of dancing figures on the façade of the Opera at Paris (for which, by the bye, American millionaires are said to have offered a price worth its weight in gold). The Tamil Natarāja type of sculpture-formation is one of the permanent glories of man's creative *shakti*.

18. The Mechanism of Colour-Construction.

We shall now mention some achievements in colour-construction to illustrate the universal in artistic geometry.

Every painter has an idiom of his own in the matter of spacing and grouping. Among the moderns Cézanne, for instance, has created a type of composition, almost a formula, which he has followed in almost all his major works. Whether the shapes be trees, or fruits or human figures, this master begins by dividing his canvas by a vertical structure almost into two equal divisions. The right and the left as well as the top and the bottom are then filled in with such details as will evoke a sense of their balancing and belonging to each other.

Cézanne's anatomies are always questionable like those of the old Spanish master Greco (sixteenth century). But his colour-masses have an undeniable effect as much because of his symmetry of construction as on account of the sense of proportion he observes in the handling of different tints.

Corot's geometry is altogether different. The parts of canvas do not balance one another as in a symmetrical scene. He produces his volumes invariably by dark greys of which the entire gamut is laid under contribution. The harmony of such thus created possesses a characteristic individuality which sets off the maker from other designers of landscapes.

But let us sample out some of the great masters of Andrea Del Sarto (1487—1531) has a piece at the bottom of which there is the caption, *Charity*. But what will a person see who does not know how to read, whose sole capital is his eyesight? A Hindu pearl merchant who was present in one of trips to the Louvre remarked: "The face looks quite Italian, does it?"—especially because he can read French and knows that picture is exhibited in the Italian rooms. My guide-book says "the model for the artist's figure was always 'his beautiful but dissolute wife who ruined and then deserted him.'"

What, now, is the art-value of this piece? As in reproduction we cannot watch the effects of colour-harmony we have to be satisfied in the present examination exclusively with noting the structural composition in the abstract. If we want a parallel from the Indian side we may point out one of those family pictures of the Shaiva pantheon in which Durgâ is seated with her children on both sides. But this analogy does not carry us any way nearer to the aesthetic.

An artist with his *rasa-jñāna* will find in the entire construction of this piece the form of a pyramid. It is made up by the stately pose not of a thoroughly perpendicular figure but of one slightly curved, like the leaning tower, from the vertical towards the right. From the extremities indicating the toes of the child at the base to the apex of the coiffure the inclined plane is quite obvious. The parallels of the masses—arms and thighs—introduce variety in structure, while as is noticeable even in the reproduction the white patches of different shades at the top and at the bottom to the right and to the left set off the light blue of the drapery.

We do not really have to know if the figure is that of a man or of a woman. If instead of human babies we had here a bunch of guinea-pigs or puppies, and if instead of a woman seated straight with legs stretched towards the right and eyes gazing towards the left we had a boulder of granite or alabaster in the same pose and architected into groups of the same contrasts as in the present piece we should still have the harmony of, say, a mountain scenery, of a composite triangle of masses and hues. This is a symphony of

shapes comparable in its general morphology to the *chālī* of Durgā worshipped every autumn in the villages and towns of Bengal or to the composition of the miniatures described as *Vishnu with attendants* among the exhibits of the *Bangiya Sāhitya Sammilan* or of the Varendra Research Society of Rajshahi.

Almost to the Sarto-type belongs Murillo's *Holy Family* which also can hardly fail to suggest to the Hindu his own pantheon. This of course is more complex in design than the Sarto. Here the group in the centre is linked up with the one at the right by an oblique line and with the other at the top by a bird device. The corners at the top are not kept empty and the centre in the left is filled in with dark. From the apex with its parabolic arch made by the extension of arms in a rounded form down to the greyish neat lump of animal structure at the bottom in the middle the whole constitutes one organic piece of workmanship.

The *Birth of the Virgin* by the same painter is likewise another exquisite masonry work in colour. It possesses the most remarkable design of a right-angled triangle, placed at an agreeable distance from both ends of the canvas, as the pattern for a cluster of human masses. The tall straight figure at the right is the perpendicular. From the apex to the tip of the tail formation at the left there is the hypotenuse. The whole makes a solid geometry of shapes in all possible poses.

We do not have to know if the shapes are he or she or it. Luckily, the Asian has no "polarization" in regard to the legend. We are therefore free from the tyranny of tradition and can enjoy the *rasa-jñāna* of the master all the better.

Corresponding to the Sarto and closely following the pyramid-type there is a Da Vinci (1452—1519) known as *Virgin, Infant Jesus and St. Anne*. A special feature to note in this piece is the absence of the self-conscious fore-finger which according to the present writer is so conspicuous a blemish in Da Vinci's *Bacchus* and *St. John the Baptist*. That is a mannerism which is not justified by the composition of the forms. But the typical *Mona Lisa* coquetry (?) is obvious in the two faces of the piece under discussion.

Altogether, however, as a structural design this is not only among the best that Da Vinci has produced but may be considered to be among the masterpieces of composition in painting, although perhaps not listed as such in the conventional catalogues of art-wonders. Any body with a sense of colour and of light and shade will find here a diversity of forms laid out in a harmonious device.

It must be understood that the mechanism of colour in painting can after all be very vaguely described in language either by the terminology of colour-chemistry or of prismatic analysis. The most minute investigation will fail to reach the processes of creative metabolism in the master's *rasa-jñāna*. There is accordingly no recipe, no formula for the manipulation of beauties in colour, although their objective background is unquestionable. The manufacture of beauty is the *shilpin's* "trade secret". Only in this sense can there be a mysticism in art.

These four specimens, all drawn from Europe, are universal masterpieces because their geometric composition is superb and because the interlacing of *rupam* achieved in these happens to be brought about by the most delightful magic of colour harmony. You may be unfamiliar with the legends, you may not know how to philosophize about *rasa*, spirit or idea, you may eliminate the racial elements in the human faces, if you please; but you will feel that the creators of these forms in colour have a message even for you whether as artist or as student of art.

Such are the universal laws of *rasa-vidyā* or aesthetics, such the most generalized canons of *shilpa-shāstra*, such the fundamental art-geometry of *rupam* (i.e. of form and colour), such the positive foundations of beauty, such the absolute principles of the mechanics of creation to which Young India invites both the East and the West.

Old India in the New West.

Modern civilization begins in 1776 with the publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. Its formative period may be taken to have closed with 1815, when the fall of the Napoleonic empire, on the one hand, and the almost assured success of the "industrial revolution" on the other were laying the foundations of a new inter-political system and a new socio-economic order throughout the world. Ever since the year 1 of this new culture India has been in intimate touch with the West; for by the Regulating Act of 1772, the year of the partition of Poland, England took charge of the administration of the eastern provinces of the present British India.

It goes without saying that the achievements of the Occidental world in industry, science, philosophy and the fine arts during the nineteenth century have profoundly influenced the thoughts and activities of the people of India, as of other regions in Asia. But what is most likely to be missed by the student of culture-history is the fact that even the ancient and medieval civilization of the Hindus has been one of the feeders of this modern civilization itself; i.e., that the cultural movements in Europe and America since 1776 have been affected to an appreciable extent by the achievements of free India down to that period.

1. Naval Architecture.

In the days of the sailing ships and oaken vessels¹⁾ the naval engineering of the Hindus was efficient and advanced enough to be drawn upon with confidence for European shipping. At Madapollum, for example, on the Madras Coast, many English merchants used to have their vessels yearly built. The Hindu ship-architects could ingeniously perform all sorts of iron work, e.g., spikes, bolts, anchors, etc. "Very expert master-builders there are several here," says the English traveler, Thomas Bowrey in his *Géographical Account of Countries Round the Bay of Bengal* (1669-1675); "they build very well, and launch with as much discretion as I have seen in any part of the world. They have an excellent way of making shrouds, stays, or any other riggings for ships."²⁾

¹⁾ See the reproductions of ships (mediaeval European) in *Histoire de la marine française* by Bourel de la Roncière: W. C. Albott's *Expansion of Europe*.

²⁾ Page 72, etc.

Writing even so late as 1789, on the eve of the industrial revolution in Europe, Solvyns, the French traveler, could still recommend, in his *Les Hindous*, the Hindu method of uniting the planks as "not unworthy of the imitation of Europeans." He says: "In ancient times the Hindus excelled in the art of constructing vessels, and the present Hindus can in this respect still offer models to Europe."³)

In the building of a boat the Hindus began by choosing a large piece of timber which they bent as they pleased. To the two ends of this they attached another piece thicker than it, and covered this simple frame with planks; "but they have a particular manner of joining these planks to each other, by flat cramps with two points which enter the boards to be joined, and use common nails only to join the planks to the knee. For the sides of the boat they have pieces of wood which outpass the planks. This method is as solid as it is simple."⁴)

Some of the Hindu methods were actually assimilated by the Europeans. Thus, as the French writer observes: "The English, attentive to everything which relates to naval architecture, have borrowed from the Hindus many improvements which they have adopted with success to their own shipping."⁵) Further, the Portuguese "imitated" the pointed prow in their India-ships. This was a characteristic feature of the grab, a Hindu ship with three masts.⁶)

The industrial and material culture of Old India was thus sufficiently vital to influence contemporary Europe at the threshold of the nineteenth century civilization. The tradition is reported also by old American sea-captains that fishing boats like the sloop, yawl, cutter etc. so common in the United States⁷) waters were modelled in the "colonial period" on Hindu patterns.

2. The So-Called Bell-Lancasterian Pedagogics.

During the formative period of the modern educational systems in Europe and America, the pedagogy of the Hindus, especially on its elementary side, has played an important part.

³) Vol. III, sixth number, ed. 1811. Ed. 1789, cited by Mookerji in his *History of Indian Shipping*, p. 250.

⁴) Solvyns, Vol. III, sixth number, ed. 1811.

⁵) Mookerji, p. 251.

⁶) Solvyns, Vol. III, fourth number, ed. 1811.

⁷) The colonial "bungalow" style of American buildings has its prototype in the "bangla" architecture of the cottages of Bengal; such, for instance as are mentioned in the *Padma Purāna*. And India has taught not only the printing of the famous calico cloths for which the city of Calicut was noted,

It is well known that primary education was grossly neglected in America during the first half-century of her independence. In England even so late as 1843, 32 per cent of the men and 49 per cent of the women had to sign their names on the marriage register with a cross. Illiteracy was the rule in France also at the time of the Revolution, as Arthur Young observed. Guizot's educational commission (1833) found that "the ignorance was general" and that "all the teachers did not know how to write."⁸)

In an age of paucity of "public schools" private educational efforts naturally elicited the people's admiration. And none drew more sympathy and support than Andrew Bell's (1753—1823) "mutual-tuition" or "pupil-teacher" or "monitorial" system of school management. His first school was founded in England in 1798, but in less than a dozen years 1000 schools were opened to teach 200,000 children.⁹) This "mutual instruction" was a craze in France also under the Restoration.¹⁰) The same system known in America after Lancaster (1778—1838), the English rival of Dr. Bell in theology was in vogue in the New England States during the first quarter of the nineteenth century.¹¹) It could become so universal simply because of its cheapness as it did not involve the appointment of teachers. And as to its educational value, Bell was so enthusiastic as to declare, after visiting Pestalozzi's School at Yverdun in 1815, that in another twelve years mutual instruction would be adopted by the whole world and Pestalozzi's method would be forgotten.¹²)

What, now, is the origin of this much-applauded mutual-instruction or monitorial system, the so-called Bell-Lancasterian "discovery" in Pedagogy? Historians of education are familiar with the fact that the plan of making one boy teach others has been indigenous to India for centuries.¹³) Bell, himself, in his *Mutual Tuition* (Pt. I, ch. I, V) describes how in Madras he came into contact with a school conducted by a single master or superintendent through the medium of the scholars themselves. And, in fact, in England the monitorial system or the method of making every boy at once a master and a scholar is known as the "Madras system."

but the „gingam“ so popular in American summer clothing also derives its very name from the Indian district of Ganjam.

⁸) Compayré, *History of Pedagogy*.

⁹) Painter's *History of Education*, p. 305.

¹⁰) Compayré, p. 515.

¹¹) Parker, *History of Modern Elementary Education*, pp. 102, 241, 264 etc.

¹²) Quick's *Educational Reformers*, p. 352.

¹³) Compayré, 6, 514; Painter, p. 305; Meiklejohn, *An Old Educational Reformer, Dr. Andrew Bell*, pp. 25—26.

England's debt to India in pedagogics has been fitly acknowledged in the tablet in Westminster Abbey, which describes Andrew Bell as "the eminent founder of the Madras System of Education, which has been adopted within the British empire, as the national system of education for the children of the poor."¹⁴)

3. *Shakuntalâ* and the Romantic Movement.

The romantic movement in Germany and England, with its after-math, the English pre-Raphaelite movement, has been one of the greatest forces in Europe's modern letters and art. The poetry of Old India has furnished an impetus to this current also of nineteenth century thought.¹⁵)

The *Shakuntalâ* of Kalidas, the Hindu dramatist of the fifth century A.C., was Englished by Jones in 1789. Forster's German rendering (1791) of it from the English version at once drew the notice of Herder (1744—1803), the great champion of comparative methodology and *Weltliteratur*. And Herder introduced it to Goethe, on whom the effect was as tremendous as that of the discovery of America on geographers and of Neptune on students of astronomy. Goethe's ecstasy expressed itself in the ultra-enthusiastic lines:

"Wilt thou the blossoms of the spring, the fruits of late autumn,
Wilt thou what charms and enraptures,
Wilt thou what satisfies and nourishes,
Wilt thou in one name conceive heaven and earth,
I name, Shakuntala, thee, and in that is everything said."

These are the words of a man who in 1771 had dramatized the narrative of Götz, a medieval bandit. The sentiment in favor of the Rousseauesque "state of nature," the love of "ancient reliques," the Bolshevik revolt against the *status quo* of art, the subversion of classic restraint, the lyric abandon to the promptings of the imagination, the awakening of the sense of wonder, and the craving of the soul for the unknown, the mystery—a great deal of all that was later to be associated with Scott, Shelley, Schiller, and Lamartine had been anticipated and focused in that drama of "Storm and Stress." It is not strange, therefore, that the great "futurist"

¹⁴) Narendra Law's *Promotion of Learning in India by Early European Settlers*, p. 49, 61.

¹⁵) See the chapters on "Die Gebrüder Schlegel", "Novalis" etc. in R. Huch's *Blütezeit der Romantik* (Leipzig, 1920). Passages from Herder, Goethe, Schiller and others are reproduced in P. T. Hoffmann's *Der Indische und der Deutsche Geist* (Tübingen, 1915). The author's interpretations, however, are thoroughly unreliable as being too chauvinistic.

of the eighteenth century, the father of modernism in European literature, should have welcomed the Hindu Shakespeare as warmly as he did the Elizabethan. For in Goethe's eyes wistfully looking for more light, more spontaneity, more freedom, both shed the "light that never was on sea or land," the one as the star of the Middle Ages, the other as the sun of a hitherto unknown world.

Shakuntalâ left an indelible impression upon the literary activity of this pioneer of romanticism. It is the story of a woman with child deserted by her lover. The Gretchen-episode in the tragedy of Faust may thus have been inspired by the dramatist of India. At any rate, German critics have pointed out that the conversation between the poet, the manager and the Merry Andrew in the prelude to *Faust* is modelled upon that in Kâlidâsa's play, in which the manager and one of the actresses talk as to the kind of performance they are to give. *Shakuntalâ* occupied a great place in the dramatic and lyrical imagination of Schiller also, in whose *Thalia* Germans are familiar with his Indian reminiscences. It is well known, besides, how the *schöne Weiblichkeit* which he failed to discover in the Greek classics he found at last in the Hindu drama.

The *Shakuntalâ furore* has lasted till almost today. One of the noblest "overtures" in European music is the "*Shakuntalâ* overture" of the Hungarian composer Goldmark (1830—1915).

4. The *Gîtâ* in Europe and America.

Another force that Old India has contributed to the life and thought of the modern world is the profound optimism of the *Gîtâ* (ca. B.C. 600—200?); a section of the *Mahâbhârata* (the Great Epic). The *Gîtâ* was translated into English in 1785. It was popularized in Germany by Herder and Humboldt. Since then its *Leitmotif* has been absorbed by the sponge-like minds of the greatest thinkers of Europe and America. It may be said to be held in solution in almost every great "poetical philosophy" or "philosophical poetry" of our times down to Bergsonian "intuition."

In the first place, the *Gîtâ* is the philosophy of duty and *Nishkâma Karma* (work for its own sake), of the "categorical imperative." In the second place, it tries to solve the mystery of death, which is but an aspect of the larger and more comprehensive problem of the evil. The solution is reached in the conceptions of the immortality of the soul, the infinite goodness of God, the nothingness of death and the virtual denial of the existence of evil. Such postulates are of the deepest significance as much to the

lover who seeks an "eternal" union of hearts, as to the warrior who must bid adieu to the body in order to save the soul. This Bible of Old India has therefore influenced not only the *Imitation of Christ* by Thomas à Kempis but also Tennyson's *In Memoriam* and Browning's *La Saisiaz*, both inspired by the death of friends.

The "obstinate questionings" in Browning's poetry are the same as those of Arjuna in the *Gîtâ*, viz.:

"Does the soul survive the body?
Is there God's self—no or yes?"

The answer in both *La Saisiaz* and the *Gîtâ* is in the emphatic affirmative. It is a message of hope to suffering humanity. Men and women in distress can brace their hearts up if they are assured that somehow through God's mysterious dispensation the good persists in and through the evils that are apparent. This Hindu optimism is voiced also by Walt Whitman, the voracious student of world-thought, in the following words:

"Roaming in thought over the universe
I saw the little that is Good steadily hastening towards immortality,
And the vast all that is called Evil
I saw hastening to merge itself and become lost and dead."

Tennyson had made only a tentative and halting statement to the same effect:

"Oh, yet we trust that *somehow* good
Will be the final goal of ill."

But the paean of the Upanishadic *Ânanda* (or bliss) and *Anrita* (or immortality) rises clearly forth in Browning, thus, —

"Why rushed the discord in, but that harmony should be prized?"

Further,

„The evil is null, is nought; is silence, implying sound;
On the earth the broken arcs; in the heaven, a perfect round."

The syllogism of the *Gîtâ* leads, indeed, on such-like arguments, to the more drastic conclusion:

"Up then! and conquer! in thy might arise!
Fear not to slay the soul, for the soul never dies."

Even militarism and man-killing are thus not evils in Hindu optimism. No wonder that the *Gîtâ* should have been a source of inspiration to the most diverse minds seeking comfort and strength. It could not fail to be a trumpet to the prophets of Duty, and such prophets were Carlyle, the sage of Chelsea, and Mazzini, the political mystic of the Italian regeneration.

With the memorable words, "Close thy Byron, Open thy Goethe", Carlyle sent forth his *Sartor Resartus* to the English people, as the manifesto of an all-round Germanism. This German *Kultur* was the idealism of Kant, Lessing, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, the nearest European ally of Hindu monism. It opened the Anglo-Saxon mind to the sense of the infinite, of the majesty of the spiritual self, and electrified the soul to the recognition of the "duties that lie nearest thee." The gospel that taught people to "make thy numerator zero in order that the quotient may be infinite" converted the Bostonians of the trans-Atlantic world from Lockites into metaphysicians. This "new thought" of the day was worshipped by Parker and Emerson around the *Dial*. The New England Transcendentalists thus became kinsmen of the Hindus.

5. Manu as the Inspirer of Nietzsche.

Nietzsche's Dionysian cult is one of the latest great forces in world-culture. The web of recent Eur-American life is being supremely invigorated by the warp of the Nietzschean *Will to Power*. It is interesting to observe that almost the whole of this new cult is reared on Hindu humanism and energism. Old India has contributed its hoary Manu as the master-builder in order to boss the super-men who are to architecture the Occident of the twentieth century.

Nietzsche, like the "futurists" of all ages, believes that the world is in need of a thorough-going "transvaluation of values." How is that to be effected? The means to the re-humanizing of humanity have been devised, says he, by the Hindus. "Close thy Bible, open thy Code of Manu" is his prescription. And why? Because Manu is the propounder of an "affirmative" religion—the religion of the "deification of power," whereas Christianity is the creed of the slave, the pariah, the *chandāla*.¹⁶⁾ Says Nietzsche: „One breathes more freely, after stepping out of the Christian atmosphere of hospitals and poisons into this more salubrious, loftier and more spacious world. What a wretched thing the New Testament is beside Manu, what an evil odour hangs around it!"¹⁷⁾

In Nietzsche's estimation Manu is also a better because more frank teacher of political science than the philosophers, insincere as they are, of the Western world. Thus, "Manu's words again are simple and dignified; Virtue could hardly rely on her own strength alone.

¹⁶⁾ *The Will to Power*, Vol. I, Book II, p. 126.

¹⁷⁾ *The Twilight of Idols*, p. 46.

Really it is only the fear of punishment that keeps men in their limits and leaves every one in peaceful possession of his own." 18)

In international politics Hindu theory since the days of Kautilya (fourth century B.C.), the Bismarck of the first Hindu empire, has been candidly Machiavellian. Nietzsche finds greater truth in the mercilessly correct view of inter-statal relations given by the Hindus than in the hypocritical statements of Occidental statesmen whose actions belie their words." In Nietzsche's language,

"Rather what Manu says is probably truer: we must conceive of all the states on our own frontier, and their allies, as being hostile, and for the same reason, we must consider all of their neighbors as being friendly to us." 19)

This is the celebrated doctrine of *Mandala* (circle of states) fully described in Kautilya's *Artha-shāstra* and Kāmandaka's *Nīti*, both treatises on politics.

The fundamental reason for Nietzsche's sympathy with, and advocacy of, Hindu culture is to be found in the fact that the Hindus were keenly alive to the animality in human life and interests, and that their *Weltanschauung* embodied the joy of living in its entirety. As Nietzsche observes, Manu has "organized the highest possible means of making life flourish." Further,

"The fact that, in Christianity, 'holy' ends are entirely absent, constitutes my objection to the means it employs My feelings are quite the reverse when I read the Lawbook of Manu, an incomparably intellectual and superior work It is replete with noble values, it is filled with a feeling of perfection, with a saying of yea to life, and a triumphant sense of well-being in regard to itself and to life, the sun shines upon the whole book. All those things which Christianity smothers with its bottomless vulgarity, 'procreation, woman, marriage, are here treated with earnestness, with reverence, with love and confidence.'" 20)

It is this secular outlook, this positive standpoint, this humanism that, according to Nietzsche, has given a sanctity to life in Hindu thought. "I know of no book," says he, "in which so many delicate and kindly things are said to woman, as in the Lawbook of Manu; these old graybeards and saints have a manner of being gallant to women which perhaps cannot be surpassed."* "The breath of a woman," says Manu, on one occasion, 'the breast of a maiden, the prayer of a child, and the smoke of the sacrifice are always pure.' Elsewhere he

18) *The Will*, Vol. II, Book IV, p. 184.

19) *The Will*, Vol. II, Book IV, p. 183.

20) *The Antichrist*, pp. 214—215.

says; "There is nothing purer than the light of the sun, the shadow cast by the cow, air, water, fire, and the breath of a maiden."²¹⁾

6. India in the Universities and Movies.

During the romantic period while Shelley was singing of "Champak odours" Schiller was trying to adapt *Shakuntalâ* to the German stage and Heine was discovering the "*schönsten Ort*" on the banks of the Ganges. The latter's "*Die Lotosblume ängstigt*" has subsequently been set to music by Schumann.

French romanticism was perhaps fed more on Mohammedan than on Hindu sources, e.g. the *Orientales* of Victor Hugo (1829) and of Lamartine (1834). Le Conte de Lisle (1820—94) is known to have travelled "in the Indies". Victor Cousin (1792—1862) had not, however, failed, eclectic as he was, to make use of the Hindu contributions brought to light in his days. In his *Histoire de la philosophie* as in Janet's *Histoire de la science politique* the Western will find the Hegelian interpretation of the Hindu "spirit". Besides, the misery of the "untouchable classes" in Indian population had evoked a powerful French tragedy, *Le Paria* (1821) by Delavigne, which at "Comédie Française"²²⁾ Theatre served to give a fillip to the spirit of social equality that had been fostered by the "ideas of 1789".

Sanskrit poetry has been quite lucky in its European translators. Griffith's exquisite English verse has popularized the *Râmâyana*, the *Raghuvamsha* and other epics and lyrics. In French the translations by Bergaigne, Victor Henry, Hérold and others are well known. The *Indische Liebestyrik* by Rückert (1788—1866), a poet and scholar, master as he was of diction, has enriched German poetry²³⁾ with love songs from Kâlidâs, Bhâravi, Bhartrihari and Jayadeva.

During the nineteenth century, especially in its latter half and since, the universities of Eur-America have almost vied with one another in introducing Indic subjects, *indianisme*, or indology in their curricula. The result is well known to savants who are interested in the publications of the Royal Asiatic Society through all its Branches, the *Société Asiatique*, the *Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft*, the American Oriental Society, and so forth. The

²¹⁾ *The Antichrist*, p. 215.

²²⁾ A. F. Hérold: *L'Inde à la Comédie Française et à la Comédie Italienne en 1770* (Paris 1911).

²³⁾ A. F. Remy: *Influence of India and Persia on the Poetry of Germany*, Columbia University Studies, New York.

investigations of these learned societies may be said to be chiefly, if not exclusively, oriented to theologico-metaphysical scholarship, to archaeology, and to philology, especially to the grammar of the "dead" languages. The kind of work which has been done in this direction can be easily sampled out from Sylvain Lévi's account of French indology (with bibliography) in a chapter of *La Science Française* (Vol. II, 1915) and in C. Brockelman's *Die morgenländischen Studien in Deutschland* in the *Zeitschrift der D. M. G.* (1922).

Modern India has remained a taboo in these learned societies until almost to-day. But as the interest in the living Indian languages is already evident in the scholarly work of Grierson in England and Jules Bloch (*La Formation de la langue marathie*, 1914) in France it is not perhaps to be doubted that contemporary India is likely soon to be attacked by orientalists,—from the philological angle at any rate. The School of Oriental Studies in London may be said to have set the example (1912).

But while the "upper ten thousands" in the field of science have neglected the present-day life and institutions of India, consuls, diplomats, governors, missionaries, merchants and travellers have tried to furnish Anglo-American, French and German literature with reports of what is going on in the South-Asian dependency.²⁴) Contemporary Eur-American fiction and drama are therefore in a position to exploit Indian themes for modern art. The Western "masses" derive their knowledge about India and the East from these sources,—and more especially perhaps from the cinemas and moving picture theatres which either seek to dramatize the extant story-literature or otherwise attempt to objectify the impressions of their own agents who are deputed to the spot in order to collect first-hand information.

The India that has thus passed current in the lay mind of Eur-America can be visualized in one of the masterpieces of contemporary German drama, the *Spiegel-Mensch* (Mirror-Man) of Werfel (1920), which has been described as "a second *Faust*" in *La Nouvelle Revue Française* of Paris. All the important incidents in this play take place in the East which is exhibited with its snakes and magic, its alleged pessimism and superstition.

The Indian references in Sudermann likewise are anything but flattering. The Hindu hermits are brought in in his "*Es lebe das Leben*". In his "*Die Ehre*" the dramatist shows not only the

²⁴) See the present author's *Die soziale Philosophie Jung-Indiens* in the *Deutsche Rundschau* (Berlin, April 1922) for the criticism on "colonialism" and idealistic (as well as one-sided) interpretations.

tropics with their palms, oranges, parrots and monkeys, the Sumatra tobaccos and spices, the regions of Central Asia, the Tibetan grandee, and the custom prevailing in Tibet of entertaining the guest with one's wife, but also India with its hot climate, its water-pipes, shawls, light blue sapphires, and its golden image of Ganesha, the god of success, riding a rat.

Such specimens of *indianisme* abound in the Eur-American letters of the present-day. These are in fact acquiring a wide notoriety through the interest that has been recently popularized in mysticism and "Hindu philosophy" or the so-called Hindu "point of view". The success of Vivekānanda's *Vedānta* Societies in the United States, the inroads of theosophy upon contemporary "new thoughts", and last but not least, the Tagore-cult which the Nobel-prize has served to establish for mankind since 1912,—all these have been tending to divert Eur-America's attention from the India of flesh and blood, the India of human interests and ambitions to the India of phantasy and romance. But fortunately during the same period the revolutionism militant of Young India has succeeded in creating a reaction in the Occidental estimate of the Indian spirit.

One must not ignore the important part that the India-sections of the museums in Great Britain or the Fine Arts Museums of New York, Boston, Cleveland and other American cities, the *Musée Guimet* of Paris, the *Museum für Völkerkunde* in Berlin, or the Tretiakov Gallery in Moscow have played in contributing not only to the studies in comparative art-history and art-technique but also to the enrichment of modern Western plastic arts by furnishing hints and suggestions. In Vincent Van Gogh, the Dutch master's *Letters of a Post-Impressionist* the student of painting is familiar with the *motifs à la japonaise* which were being introduced in Europe about the middle of the last century. India's part in the technique of post-impressionist art will be apparent to observers of the new "artistic" anatomies exhibited by the "moderns" since Cézanne.²⁵⁾

7. Sanskritic Culture and the "Comparative" Sciences.

The greatest *differentium* between the modern civilization and all that the world witnessed between the Chaldaean ages and the eve of the industrial revolution is the phenomenal expansion of the human mind. This has brought in its train a catholicity of interests

²⁵⁾ B. K. Sarkar: *Hindu Art: Its Humanism and Modernism*, 1920.

and toleration of divergent views. In this emancipation of the intellect from the thralldom of parochial and racial outlook, Old India's contribution has probably been the most helpful and significant. The reason is not far to seek. The "discovery of Sanskrit" by the European scholars of the eighteenth century opened the portals to the series of sciences called "comparative." And it is this that has rendered possible the recognition, though not complete yet, of the fundamental uniformity in the reactions of man to the stimuli of the universe.

The first fruit of the discovery was "comparative philology." Jones founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal at Calcutta in 1784, and in 1786 hit upon the hypothesis of a common source of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Gothic, Celtic and Persian. The linguistic survey was pursued more systematically by the poet Schlegel, who, in his *Die Weisheit der Indier* (1808, *The Language and Wisdom of the Indians*) announced that the languages of India, Persia, Greece, Italy, Germany, and Slavonia were the daughters of the same mother and heirs of the same wealth of words and flections. Comparative philology was scientifically established by Bopp's *Das Conjugations-system* (1816) and *Comparative Grammar* (completed in parts between 1833 and 1852).

Once the unity of the Indo-Aryan or Indo-Germanic languages was realized, the road was opened to the interpretation of ideas, ideals, rituals, customs, superstitions, folk-lore, etc., on a more or less universal basis. This has ushered in the sciences of comparative mythology and comparative religion, for which Max Müller's *Sacred Books of the East* series is chiefly responsible. The investigation has not stopped at this point. Secular, economic, political, and juristic institutions and theories have been attacked by the methodology of comparative science, and the result has been works like Gibelin's *Etudes sur le droit civil des Hindous* (1846), Mainé's *Village Communities* (1871), *Ancient Law*, and *Early History of Institutions* (1876) and Gomme's *Primitive Folkmoorts* (1886) and *Folklore as an Historical Science* (1908). More "intensive" studies have indeed compelled a modification²⁶ of the conclusions of the pioneers; but, on the whole, in the field of social science Sanskrit culture has been demanding a gradually enlarging space.

The trend of latter-day scholarship is to detect, through the ages of history, the close parallelism and pragmatic identity between

²⁶) *Vide Bibliography D.* in the present author's *Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*.

Hindustan and Europe not only in theology and god-lore, but in rationalism, positive science, civic life, legal sense, democratic ideals, militarism, morals, manners, and what not. The evidences from the Hindu angle are being supplemented in recent years by the findings of Egyptology, Assyriology, and Sinology, i.e., the sciences dealing with extra-Aryan culture-zones. The establishment of a comparative psychology of the races, past and present, Oriental and Occidental, is thus being looked for as the greatest work of anthropological researches in the twentieth century. The data are already varied and extensive enough to employ the energies of a "new Montesquieu" such as Myres expects in his *Influence of Anthropology upon the course of Political Science* (1916).²⁷⁾

²⁷⁾ Cf. Lowie's *Primitive Society* (New York 1920) and note the changes which have become inevitable in social science since Morgan's *Ancient Society* was published in 1877.

Oriental Culture in Modern Pedagogics.

The sciences of "specialists" have been every day passing into the A, B, C of the man in the street. The trade-secrets of yesterday are the common-sense of mankind to-day.

Drawing is no longer the subject exclusively meant for those who would join the guild of artists in life. The natural and objective sciences are not deemed to-day proper studies only for those who would devote themselves to the investigation of the truths of the physical world. Manual training and discipline of the senses are no more the foundation solely for architects and engineers. All these are now integral parts of every scheme of general culture, and included in the irreducible minimum of school-syllabuses. Thus has modern pedagogics enlarged the meaning and scope of education.

I. Asia in Liberal Culture.

It is in conformity with the trend of these modern postulates of liberal education that the place of Oriental culture among the subjects of instruction in schools and universities has to be adjusted. Absence of interest regarding the Oriental races, whether as to their achievements in the past or movements and tendencies in the present, should be treated as a vestige of medievalism, an anachronism in the light of the progress already made in educational theory and practice.

It may be said, however, that the East is nowadays not the *terra incognita* that it used to be even about two decades ago. The developments among the Oriental peoples in politics and culture have been compelling the attention of the larger world since the beginning of the present century, especially since 1905. But that attention, so far as it is serious, is still practically confined to a body of specialists. First, there are the missionaries, to whom the Orient has always appealed as the land of heathens who should be introduced to the Christian God. Secondly, there are the pioneers of commerce, who are on the lookout for a wider market or industrial exploitation in the undeveloped regions of the globe. And lastly, there are the philologists, archeologists and anthropologists, who explore the Orient as a vast museum of human paleontology, of fossils, curios, arrested growths and abnormal types of mentality, in any case, "inferior" specimens of human culture.

To the journalists Oriental interest means interest in the picturesque or scenic side of Japan, China, India, Persia and Egypt. The laymen and women of Europe and America have thus learned to think of the Orient as something fundamentally different from the Occident, and they associate it with the thousand and one oddities, absurdities and unintelligible mental and moral traits. And they read and hear of the Orient only as long as it is presented as the land of queer superstitions, impossible social conventions and "wonder"-exciting institutions.

It is now time that this state of things should cease. The Orient has to be approached from a thoroughly new angle. It has to be planted firmly as an ingredient in the intellectual consciousness of men and women. Modern pedagogics has to recognize ancient and medieval Oriental culture as well as the voice of the modern Orient among the necessary items in the equipment of every educated mind. In other words, Oriental lore must no longer be the trade-secret of the "Orientalists," those specialists in things Oriental, but must be *laicized* for the general mass of mankind.

Specialized studies need not be minimized, nor the scholarly work of comparative philologists and antiquarians underestimated. Probably even more work has to be done along these very lines. But the most important problem for pedagogists to-day is to see that school boys and girls and university students do not grow up and finish their academic life with the idea that Chinese, Hindu, Japanese or Mohammedan topics can be safely neglected as belonging to the class of uninteresting "electives." This prejudice against a knowledge of Oriental topics is, however, bound to obtain until and unless its exclusive character as the monopoly of the Oriental departments of universities is removed by the pioneers of educational reform. And this would involve a considerable overhauling, not so much of the curriculum of studies, as of the pedagogic apparatus and the art of teaching in presenting the various subjects of instruction.

2. Chinese Poetry.

Let us see what China can teach us through her poetry. We know how,—

"Dante once prepared to paint an angel:

Whom to please? You whisper Beatrice.

"Rafael made a century of sonnets,

Made and wrote them in a certain volume

Dinted with the silver-pointed pencil;

Else he only used to draw Madonnas,
 These the world might view—but One, the volume.
 Who that one, you ask? Your heart instructs you."

This is how Robert Browning imagines the pen trying to be the brush, and the brush the pen. How is such a transformation possible? asks the poet in his usual self-questioning fashion. The great secret here is Love. Says he:

"Ay, of all the artists living, loving,
 None but would forego his proper dowry,—
 Does he paint? He fain would write a poem,
 Does he write? He fain would paint a picture;

Put to proof art alien to the artist's
 Once and only once, and for One only,
 So to be the man and leave the artist."

But in China for the painter to be poet and for the poet to be painter is nothing extraordinary. The Dantes of China were Rafaels and Rafaels Dantes,—and this almost invariably. Probably the greatest of such Dante-Rafaels was Wang Wei of the Tang period. Wang is well known to art historians as the founder of the so-called "southern school" of Chinese painting. The medium of this school is simple ink. Wang has had a tremendous influence on medieval Japanese art of the "black and white" style.

Wang's compatriots did not live in a world apart. The spiritual currents which called into being the masterpieces of these painter-poets and poet-painters of the Far East were not in any sense distinctive of the "Middle Kingdom." The more we come in touch with the *élan de la vie* of China, the more we are impressed by the universal elements in her fine arts and *mores* such as the modern world has at last learned to appreciate in the mankind of pharaonic Egypt.

We have some very absurd notions about China's culture. Somehow or other we have been taught by ethnologists to believe that because the Chinese belong to the Mongolian race they possess a mentality not easily conceivable to the people of the Indo-European races. This sort of pseudo-anthropological generalization is utterly baseless.

Let us have a bit of China's mind, say, of the second century B. C. We shall reproduce here a few extracts from a poem which was addressed by a general to his wife on the evening of his expedition against the Huns of Central Asia. The verses read in English as follows:

"Awake, my dearest, for the stars have set,
The grief of parting must be bravely met;
And yet the dreary marches weight my mind
As thro' defiles and desert plains they wind.

"And then at last, the awful battle field,
Where I must fight and naught to foemen yield,
But, Oh! the bitter paralyzing pain,
To think that we must never meet again.

"But courage, we will think of young love's day
And all the pleasures which therein did stay,
And this shall cheer me on the toilsome road,
And help you here to bear your weary load.

"Then with what joy we shall renew our life,
When I return safe from the dreadful strife,
But if, alas, the Fates should death decree,
My spirit shall forever live with thee."¹⁾

Each stanza is the picture of a conflict of emotions; and altogether the poem exhibits an artistic blend of affection and duty, of hope and fear, of life and death, which is to be found few and far between in the whole range of world's poetry. We notice how the two master-passions, viz., love and war, have rendered this little lyric into a crystal of the eternal man's joys and sorrows.

3. China's Paintings.

To-day in the twentieth century, whenever the Eur-American connoisseurs think of Asian art, they envisage Hokusai's Fuji scenes and Utamaro's *genre* pictures. Indeed since the Dutch master Vincent Van Gogh started the craze *à la japonaise*, modern art itself has been profoundly influenced by the Japanese masters. This practical appreciation of Old Japan by the West, sincere as it is, has of course been greatly accelerated by the political impact of the New Japan on international relations. It is through such art affinities and cultural *ententes*, however, that the *rapprochement* between the East and the West will undoubtedly be facilitated to no mean extent. Young Asia's debt to Japan in this regard is certainly of a vast magnitude.

But now that the achievements of Japan are well established in modern art-consciousness it is only meet that we should enter deeply into the workmanship of the Asian creators of the things

¹⁾ From Budd's *Chinese Poems*. *Vide Supra*, p. 10.

of beauty. In the first place, Japanese themselves are aware and students of the history of civilization have learned from the publications of the *Kokka*, the art journal of Tokyo, that the foundations of Japanese pictorial art lie in the executions and accomplishments of China's painters. But it is not merely this historical fact of Chinese masters being the inspirers and teachers of Japan that we have need to acknowledge. For in the second place, the absolute merits of Chinese art-work stand on a thoroughly independent basis. In many instances it is high time for art-criticism to admit that Japanese color prints, howsoever clever in themselves, are but child's play by the side of the stately *Kakemonos* wrought by Chinese hands.

We are prepared to go further and assert that until the appearance of chiaroscuro in Europe, there was nothing in the world's art that could compare with the profound color masses and noble grouping of figures executed by the great men of Cathay. Take the Byzantine, Italian or the Renaissance masterpieces. Let us forget, for the time being, and as non-Christians, we are bound to ignore the fact that these are representations of holy scenes, chapters of religious books, so to speak. Stripped of their ecclesiastical setting, the appeal of these tapestries is very frequently anything but aesthetic. We must make exceptions, however, in favor of the Fra Angelicos, Massaccios, Francescas, and Giotto. But generally speaking, what is the value of this religious art *as art*? To modern eyes, especially to the de-christianized standpoint and non-christian outlook, the Titian-red, the golden orbs, and the oval or round faces of the Virgin are the very reverse of beauty and holiness. How few of these performances have a consistent architecture of forms! How few of their color constructions convey pleasure to the sense of sight!

The Christian arts live to-day as all religious arts everywhere live, like quite a few of those for instance in Hindustan—only because they are propped up by a superstition or a traditional lip-service to the name of some divinity. Thus do the vested interests of an organized religion place a damper on the free exercise of creative imagination by perpetuating a reverence for techniques which could not stand by themselves in the ever-recurring process of transvaluation of values.

But in travelling through the realm of China's glories, we seem at every step to hit upon the very essentials of artistic greatness, viz., the artist's mastery over the geometry of forms and the "personality" of color. In Chinese paintings we can afford to

eliminate the religious themes without a sense of loss. Here indeed the themes count virtually for nothing, the workmanship stands on its naked dignity. The encyclopedia of art will not be impoverished in China as it is sure to be in Russia, Italy or India, and for that matter, in almost all old countries, if the hieratic elements were removed. There will be left a vast amount of non-symbolical secular beauties which can be a "joy for ever" to every man and woman on earth.

The Chinese masters do not influence us by appealing to the sense of the godhead or the after-world, to that of veneration for the holy family or scheduled saints, or to the mysteries of heaven and hell. Even in their most earthly paintings their treatment evokes in our minds the sense of majesty, awe and grandeur. The landscapes, social scenes, and portraits of Chinese art live in the aesthetic *psyche* thoroughly independent of their legend or story. In themselves they are the most effective inspirers of the entire gamut of passions and sentiments. Of all the ancient and medieval paintings of the world the masterpieces of China are thus the most "self-determined" in their content. This spiritual *sva-rāj* (self-rule) or *Selb-ständigkeit* necessarily makes of Chinese creations the most "absolute" art, the most universal, the most human, in other words, the greatest specimens of "art for art's sake." The alphabet which all races can read with equal pleasure and instruction is then to be seen at its best in the arrangement of contours and volumes of color on the silks of the Far East.

4. A. Modern Superstition.

But during the last five or six decades it has been the fashion to classify the ideals of life or systems of philosophy under two main headings: Occidental and Oriental. It is generally supposed that the Occident stands for one type of life and thought, and that the Orient stands for another type of life and thought. So that modern philosophers and statesmen consider their task "smoothly done" if they can mark or underline some items as Occidental and some other items as Oriental. This racial classification of philosophy does not stop merely at the statement of the alleged difference in outlook and standpoint. There are extreme race-culturists also to whom the dictum, "East is East and West is West" is a gospel-truth.

It is the mission of philosophy and function of science to classify. Generalizations and laws are the triumphs of human intellect. But unfortunately, and it is a paradox, the more generalized a statement is and the more universal its bearing and application

are supposed to be, the more distant from the concrete and the further removed from the reality it becomes. The highest generalizations are thus, practically speaking, the greatest errors, and at any rate, the most unreal entities. Not only the generalizations of Hegel and Buckle but the generalizations of almost every thinker have been found wanting when applied to the actual facts known to the human beings of flesh and blood. The race-classification of culture and philosophy is the latest of the world's pseudo-scientific generalizations, which, apparently very brilliant, have been the source of erroneous dogmatisms, superstitious slogans, and dangerous half-truths.

Let us examine the facts of the world's philosophical evolution. There is no one system of thought or ideal of life which can be called typically Occidental; there is no one type of thinking or school of philosophy which can be marked off as Oriental. There have been philosophies and philosophies both in Asia and Eur-America. Neither in the East nor in the West can we treat of philosophy in the singular number. Every inch of the world's soil has, in short, known a "pluralistic universe." Which of these thousand and one culture-types or ideals of life or schools of philosophy is to be treated as Occidental, and which as Oriental? At what bit of thought can we lay our fingers and say: "Here is Asia; this is Hindu, this is Chinese, this is Persian?" At what bit of ideal can we lay our fingers and say: "Here is Europe; this is Hellenic, this is German, this is Russian, this is American"?

5. The Pluralistic Universe.

Jakob Boehme, the greatest Occidental mystic of the sixteenth-seventeenth century was regarded by the Germans as "the typical Teutonic Philosopher." Now if a mystic be the exponent of German thought, what is Nietzsche the energist? what is Treitschke the militarist? Goethe, the author of *Götz*, made his *début* by championing the *Sturm und Drang* ideal initiated by the novelist Klinger. But Goethe himself was most vehement in condemning the "storm and stress" movement when Schiller brought out his *Robbers*. Which of these elements in Goethe is German? Again, if Schiller the poet of "nationalism" be the embodiment of German Kultur, Goethe the friend of Napoleon is thoroughly un-German.

Germany has been the nurse and home of Europe's greatest music-masters. But if Bach and Beethoven represent German musical genius, what is Wagner the revolutionist in the technique, modes, and ideals of musical composition?

The painters of Young Germany in the early years of the nineteenth century adopted ascetic ways of life in order to be initiated in the mysteries of highest art. They came all the way to Italy and sedulously shut themselves out from the society of women and worldlywise people in order that they might be favoured with spiritual illumination. Now if this other-worldlyism is Germanism, Bismarck the "blood and iron" statesman is certainly not a German. And would modern Germans care to recognise Schopenhauer the arch-pessimist of the world as a German, and consider him a kin of their inspiring idealists, e.g., Fichte and Pestalozzi? In fact, Germany alone during the last century has witnessed as many systems of thought and ideals of work as human life can admit of. Who would dare to generalize Germany into a single slogan or formula, and remark: "This is Germanism, here is German *Kultur*"?

Such is the actual fact among forty, fifty, or sixty million human beings in a single country of Europe. Is it not *prima facie* absurd to imagine, as is generally done, that any one idea or ideal is the exclusive characteristic of four hundred million Chinese or three hundred million Indians? It would be equally unphilosophical to hold that any system of philosophy has dominated the Hindu mind or Chinese mind for six thousand years. The facts of philosophical development in India indicate that there is no such thing as a Hindu philosophy, but that the philosophies in Hindustan have been as varied as the Platonic and Aristotelian, as the "associational" and "transcendental", and that the whole story is one of growth in diversity and pluralism. One word "Buddha" or one word *Yoga* (meditation) or one word *Mâyâ* (illusion) does not explain the whole trend of Indian thought. Similarly one word "Confucius" or one word "Taoism" does not sum up the "cycles of Cathay."

6. Hindu Synthesis.

And the most unfortunate thing is that a few postulates of the people regarding the nature and attributes of God, the metaphysics of the soul, and the creed of religious life, have been taken in Europe and America to be the whole of Hindu philosophy. A parallel instance of injustice would be if an Indian were to regard the Bible, the doctrine of Transubstantiation, the Original Sin, Immaculate Conception, and other dogmas of the innumerable Christian denominations as the sole philosophy produced by the combined intellect of Europe and America.

It must be distinctly understood that Hindu philosophy is philosophy worth the name mainly because it has boldly examined every postulate of human life; i.e., mainly because it is fundamentally agnostic or rationalistic. The contributions of Hindu thought must not be regarded as lying wholly within the field of metaphysics, but have been as great in psychology as in methodology or logic. The Baconian Induction and John Stuart Mill's methods of truth-investigation have been the instruments of scientific and philosophical work among the ancient and mediaeval Hindus. The Hindu thinkers have not been mere empirics; their logic has had a long and continuous history. As for psychology, the progress of the Hindu thinkers in this field has been due to the fact that human physiology attained a high development in Hindustan. It is needless to observe that philosophical systems have been possible in India as in Europe simply because of systematic psychology and systematic logic. If the achievements of Hindu philosophy, i.e., of Hindu rationalism and positivism were historically studied, it would be found that philosophy is neither Occidental nor Oriental but that it is human.²⁾

The successful Occidental races of the nineteenth century used to characterize the life and thought of the Hindu thus: "The people of India are devoid of energy, indolent, and full of melodramatic enthusiasm. They have no practical common sense and are addicted to other-worldly sentiments. They are indifferent to the actualities of real life, and are governed by the pessimistic philosophy of despair." Such is India through the eyes of "colonialists" and "orientalists."

And yet from the age of Chandragupta Maurya (fourth century B. C.), the first Hindu emperor of a united India, down to the epoch of Baji Rao, the great Maratha statesman-general of the eighteenth century, the Hindus had exhibited their genius in industries and commerce, martial and naval exploits, construction and management of forts, maritime and colonizing enterprise, administration of civic and other public interests, as well as in the overthrow of the country's enemies.

The evidence of India's achievements in secular endeavor had been furnished by the Europeans themselves. Portuguese, French, Italian, and English tourists and traders came to India during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. What impressions did the country and its people have upon these visitors? They whole-

²⁾ Vide B. N. Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* (London 1915).

heartedly admired the municipal arrangements, the general health and economic prosperity of the people in town and country, as also the vast river-traffic and the excellent roads and canals. The city of Murshidabad was brighter and more sanitary than the London of those days according to Clive. Baltazar Solvyns, the French observer, wrote even so late as 1811 that the Indian sea-going vessels were more durable and elegant than those of the English and French.

It was these very Hindus who, on the other hand, wrote and annotated the *Upanishads*, *Gītā*, *Vedānta*, the *Bhakti* (devotion)-*śāstras*, and *Yoga* (meditation) philosophy. It was these very Hindus, masters of the material arts, who proclaimed the inferiority of a mere life in the flesh and of an existence contented with the here and the now.

The historical truth, therefore, is that the Hindus cast their eyes equally on both wings of human life,—they approached the problem of the universe with the same sympathy from both angles of vision. Hindu culture was as much the embodiment of the most intimate experience of the concrete, positive, life, as the expression also of a thorough hair-splitting analysis of the Beyond or the transcendental realities. It was in short a synthesis of the world's eternal polarities.

7. The India of Colonialists and Orientalists.

During the nineteenth century, however, the people of India were divorced perforce from the vitalizing interests and responsibilities in every field of work. They had necessarily to fall back upon the super-sensual, the non-material, "the spiritual." But what is the spiritual worth that is not grounded in the "physical basis of life," the economic and the political? It can be nothing better than a nerveless fancy, a backboneless mysticism, an imbecile subjectivism, or an idle speculation.

The Hindus of this period, therefore, entirely misunderstood the spirit of the *Upanishads*, *Gītā*, *Vedānta*, and other philosophical bequests of their forefathers. The Indians, emasculated and demoralized as they had to be by pressure of circumstances, popularized a false doctrine of *māyā* or "world as illusion" without understanding the sense or context of the original propounders. They thus helped transform the country into an asylum of incapables, a land of vegetating animalcules; or of mere stocks and stones. The wonder is that this absence of vertebral vigour was even regarded by them as a point of glory.

The Occidentals had become masters of "this world." So the Indians began to take pride in demonstrating their own superiority over the Westerners (at least in their own imagination) in some such terms as the following: "Well, the philosophy of Europe and America is rooted in the enjoyment of the senses. You Occidentals are wedded to the interests of this little thing men call earth. But Hindu philosophy is grounded in self-restraint and self-sacrifice. We cultivate other-regarding ideals, our goal is renunciation, and our interests are absorbed in the Infinite and the Hereafter." This is the psychology of the slave. It is in such speculations that a subject race is bound to seek condolence. Exactly similar conditions led Jesus to declare to his compatriots: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's," and "My kingdom is not of this world." Grapes are sour indeed. Here is the proverbial "virtue of a necessity."

Thus situated, the people of India became to the Eur-American observers the standing example of slothful passivity, pessimistic indifference, and submissionistic tendencies. Arguing the past from the degenerate present, the scholars of Europe and America began to interpret the whole previous history and literature of the Hindus as a record of inertia, inactivity, subjectivism, other-worldliness. This misinterpretation has been perpetuated for the world in the writings, however meritorious on other grounds, of Max Müller and the indologists who have followed in his wake. The mesmerized Hindus understood that probably the West was thus eulogizing the East. The scholars of India followed suit, and interpreted the achievements of their ancestors exclusively as marvellous exploits in pacifism, *ahimsa* i.e., non-killing and non-resistance, spirituality, and "self-realization!"

8. The Ideas of 1905.

Fortunately, new conditions have of late exorcised this hypnotism and nightmare of mental thralldom. The Young India of the twentieth century does not pride in the imbecility forced into the intellectual consciousness of the last three generations by adverse circumstances. The philosophy of *Vedānta* is not now the gospel of dreamy inaction and invertebrate mysticism that it was alleged to be. The genuine idealism of the *Upanishads*, *Gītā*, *Vedānta*, etc., viz., transcendentalism based on (and in and through) the positive, i.e., energistic romanticism, has now been inspiring the life and activity of the Indians. The age of pseudo-Vedantism is gone; the spirit of the originators, creators, and pioneers of India's greatness has "come back." There has thus been initiated a *real* renaissance in modern India.

The Young India of today is, like its illustrious predecessors of mediaeval and ancient times, at once idealistic and practical. Indians are "romanticists" in so far as they have been cultivating a veneration for the past glory, proclaiming the visions of a mighty future, and instituting the Nature-cult of freedom and simplicity. *Pari passu*, they have been making the present, the here and the now, more lovely in a thousand and one ways. They have addressed themselves to the pressing problems of every day public life. Rural re-construction, elevation of the laboring classes, social service for the welfare of the masses, and spread of man-making education are some of the principal planks in Young India's nationalist propaganda.

On the one side, Young India is singing with Girish Chandra Ghosh:

"The stars of the sky beckon me,
The call from breeze is 'Come, O come!'
There's something in my heart methinks
That ever prompteth 'All is thine'."

or with Rabindranath Tagore:

"I would run from peak to peak
And roll from hill to hill,
Laughing, giggling, singing, prattling,
I would clap the hands to time.
I would flow in rivulet's self,
Would flow and flow onward,
And speak and speak heart's longing out,
And sing and sing my songs."

or with Dwijendralal Roy:

"Goddess mine! meditation's aim!
Country mine! O heaven on earth!";

or with Satyendranath Datta:

"What the past shadowed forth is bound to be;
Futureward we cast gleeful longing glance";

or with Kumudnath Lahiri:

"Why to manhood this insult, why?
Mind not the present source of grief;
Shatter to pieces the fetters of swoon
Bold with eyes on future far."

On the other side, the energists of Young India have been organizing the centres of creative work here and there and everywhere throughout the land. These institutions are the ganglionic cells of positivism which pervade the entire body politic. Various

movements have been thus set on foot to deal with the current concerns of life. These are not confined to any particular class of the people, but are manned by even the half-educated and the illiterate. All these—men, institutions, and movements—are embodiments of the Beyond-in-the-now, of idealism in the interest of the real.

Besides, instances of ancient Hindu achievements in secular civilization, of India's contributions to the "exact" sciences, of Indian successes in industry, politics, and warfare are being unearthed by archaeologists. During the nineteenth century the people of India used to read in their history only the record of "spiritual" advance. The Young India of the twentieth century finds in the same history the tradition of statesmanship, *Bushido*, humanism, materialism. The whole trend of national evolution is being presented in an altogether novel light. Indian culture is being scientifically rescued from the incubus of misrepresentation and misinterpretation.

The mentality and philosophical tendencies of this Young India, especially since the commencement of the struggle for independence in the *Swadeshi*, Boycott, "National Education" and *Swaraj* movement of 1905, are akin to what is being called "pragmatism" in the Western world. The methodology and message of the pragmatists suit very well the life and disposition of the Indians, eclectic as they are. It is according to pragmatic ideals that Young India has been moulding its future. It is alive as much to the German Eucken's *Life's Basis*, the French Bergson's *Intuition and élan vital*, or the platonism and neo-Hegelianism of the Oxford professors, as to the lines of thought initiated or popularized by the American philosophers William James and John Dewey.

Young India's attitude is practical and creative. It is utilizing the world-forces (*vishva-shakti*) and examining the results achieved. It does not believe in the leadership of any one individual in industry, politics, literature, or art. It does not tolerate the authority of any one institution, or the monopoly of any one movement, or the despotism of any one propaganda. It does not think of national energy in the singular number, but in terms of many leaders, diverse ideals, multiple organizations, and varied consummations.

The philosophy which interprets the world on the solid basis of actual results, which formulates truths and values according to the effects of ideas and institutions on life, which postulates the plurality and multiplicity of life's experience, which has its cornerstone in the dignity of vital function as such, and which announces

the supreme sacredness of individuals (whether as persons or as facts or events) is the only philosophy that can be consonant with the spirit of Young India.

9. Human Interests of Oriental Achievements.

The Orient can thus touch the mind of men and women in the Occident at various points and mould their lives from every conceivable angle of vision. Oriental culture has a human interest as much as the Occidental. The poetry, drama, music, painting, architecture, sculpture, industrial arts, physical sciences, philosophy, metaphysics, morals and rationalism of the Orient are rooted in the fundamental human passions and ideals which make the whole world kin. No interests that influence the spirit of man can be merely local. Every human impulse is essentially and in the long run universal. The methods and accomplishments of mankind in any age and clime in the building up of world's culture can not but have a significance to mankind in other ages and climes.

And is not one of the main criteria of liberal education the humanizing of men and women? But this humanizing and liberalizing can be hardly effected by the specialists of the Oriental departments. Educational authorities have to take note of these psycho-sociological facts and frame their programmes and schedules of studies accordingly.

The human aspect of the Oriental lore, the absolute as well as relative values of the theories and institutions developed among the Hindus, Islamites and Confucianists should be exhibited to growing minds through all the rungs of the educational ladder. Herein lies the responsibility of the teacher of history, the teacher of philosophy, the teacher of science and the teacher of literature, as well as of the writers of text-books for schools and colleges. The university faculties and school authorities have to understand that Oriental topics can be profitably broached along with Occidental whether recent or past, through the departments of philosophy, science, history and arts.

No student of anatomy and physiology can, under the pedagogic scheme suggested here, remain ignorant of the Hindu researches in medical science from the earliest times down to the eighteenth century. The facts that the exact anatomy of the human body was known to the Hindus so far back as the sixth century B.C., that surgery was an applied science in India during the early centuries of the Christian era, that the first hospitals of the world were built by the Hindu scientists and philanthropists, that the application of

minerals in therapeutics is very old among the Hindu medical practitioners, that zinc was discovered in India before the time of Paracelsus, and that circulation of blood was guessed before Harvey, would, under the new conditions, be matters of as common knowledge in Europe and America as the principle of Archimedes and Newton's Laws of Motion.

Students of world's history would then know that the Hindus also had developed republican city-states of the Hellenic type and clan-commonwealths and village-institutions of the folk-moot type that the first most extensive and centralized empire of the world was the Hindu empire of the Mauryas (fourth to third century B.C.), that a census of the people according to social and economic status was actually undertaken in the fourth century B.C., that the Hindu generals could organize and manipulate a regular standing army of 600,000 infantry, besides a vast cavalry and an efficient camel-corps and elephant-corps, that the name of Hindu Charlemagnes, Fredericks and Napoleons is legion, that the Hindu navy commanded the Indian Ocean for centuries and facilitated the establishment of an empire of international commerce and culture, that down to the twelfth century A.C. the first-class powers of the world were the Hindus, Chinese and Saracens, that the "superior races" of the world both in arms and arts during the Dark Ages of Europe were the followers of Islam and the Buddhist Tartars or Mongols, and that there was practically nothing to choose between the educational condition, industrial processes, domestic institutions, constitutional and civic sense, international morality, and social ideals of the Europeans and those of the Asians during the age of Louis XIV., *le grand monarque*, Kanghi, the Manchu-Chinese "Son of Heaven," and Aurangzib, the great Moghul-Hindu.

Every student would then know that Kalidas, the Virgil of India, wrote epic, lyric and dramatic poetry in the fifth century A.C., which can feed modern mankind with the same humanism as Shakespeare's *King Lear* and Goethe's *Hermann und Dorothea*. The troubadours, minstrels, minnesingers, and "mystery"-playwrights of medieval Folk-India, the Hindu Dantes of the fourteenth to sixteenth century with their Beatrices, and the Schillers and Grillparzers of modern Bengali drama would also pass common in the intellectual currency of the world if once the Orient begin to be exhibited from other than the grammatical, paleontological and anthropological viewpoints. Similarly the Giotto's of Hindu art would be well-known "great masters" to the students of early

Renaissance painting, and the post-impressionists and futurists of Europe and America would be found to have as their comrades in new ventures and experiments the Indian painters of the modern nationalist school.

Readers of *Text-books in the History of Education* would then know that the Hindu University of Nalanda had a resident membership numbering 5000, that it provided free instruction, free board and room and free medical help to the whole body of alumni, and that it attracted scholars from every part of Asia during a period of seven hundred years (fifth to twelfth century A.C.). Besides, the philanthropic and social-service activities of Young India in modern times would no longer be the "single swallows which do not make a summer" in the consciousness of Eur-America's intelligent men and women, but would be taken as matters of course by the adolescents along with their lessons in civics and social welfare.

Further, the Indian Platos, Aristotles, Plotinuses, Machiavellis, Boehmes, etc., would swell the list of world's philosophers and thinkers, and have a natural place in every calendar of *Who's Who*. And the contributions of the Indians to inductive logic, methods of truth-investigation, and differential calculus would be facts of common knowledge to the school-going world.

10. Expansion of the Mind.

It would be clear to the most ordinary mind that the progress of the nineteenth century and the two decades of the twentieth in discoveries and inventions is a unique phenomenon in the history of six millenniums. But the West as well as the East had been equally primitive, or pre-"scientific" and pre-"industrial" down to nearly the end of the eighteenth century, if judged by the standard of to-day. The economic, political, military, social and domestic politics of the West prior to the industrial revolution did not differ, except superficially and in a few trifling incidents, from the contemporary institutions obtaining in Asia.

The time-sense and space-sense of the learners would thus be materially widened, and the whole intellectual horizon and mental outlook acquire an expansion, when the bounds of human knowledge are extended beyond its traditionally recognized limits, when "new men, strange faces, other minds" are treated as cooperators in the quest of truth and in the service of humanity. The liberalization produced thereby would be not only an important achievement in itself but have a far-reaching practical significance as well.

The "comparative method" in school and university instruction is sure to bring in its train a toleration of views, sanity of temperament, and a "transvaluation of values," leading necessarily to the overthrow of prejudices, superstitions and "idolas." The so-called "Oriental Question" would then appear to be, what it really is, a foster-child of ignorance and misunderstanding. If the solution of "race problems," of the complicated international questions affecting the relations between the East and the West, is ever to be effective at all, it can be achieved only by such a thorough-going liberalization of pedagogics as is being suggested here. For, taking human nature as it is, Occidental "sympathy" and charity, which occasionally embody themselves in the founding of schools, libraries and hospitals in the Orient, however well-meaning they be, can at best but add insult to injury, and remain a grievous wound in the heart of helpless but now self-conscious Young Asia.

The peculiar "logic" of the Occident with regard to the Orient, which has been engendered in the nineteenth century by the natural and pardonable vanity of success since the industrial revolution, has to be entirely changed. Eur-American mind must be trained to receive Oriental culture on the only terms which ensure the dignity of the Orientals as colleagues of the Occidentals in the past, and as collaborators with them in the future advancement of the human race. There is no greater and more serious problem than this to which the science of education has to address itself at the present day. The maintenance of world's peace will depend ultimately upon the schoolmaster and university professor.

11. A Call to Cosmopolitanism

It is this sentiment of Young Asia that the delegate from Japan voiced at the Congress of Versailles by categorically demanding the recognition of the principle of race-equality in international relations. Behind this claim of Japan's lies the moral support of the entire Orient from Tokio to Cairo. Indeed, Japanese statesmen have only brought to the forefront in political sphere what Young Asia claims in all spheres of human activity, cultural and social, as well as economic and political. Thus has formally been issued what is virtually Asia's challenge and ultimatum to the combined intelligence, diplomacy, and foresight of the western world for the next quarter of a century.

The New Asia wants the New Europe and the New America to admit, as principle, that their peoples must not by any means command greater privileges in the Orient than the oriental peoples

can possibly possess within the bounds of the Occident. In other words, Asians must by law be entitled to enjoy the same rights in Eur-America as Eur-Americans have been enjoying in Asia. This doctrine of international reciprocity is the first article of faith in the gospel of Young Asia. And it should not seem strange to Christendom, accustomed, as it professes to be, to the "golden rule" enunciated by St. Luke.

It is notorious, however, that during the nineteenth century and the past few years of the twentieth both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of Eur-America had been misguided by the overbearing logic of the "white man's burthen" as manifest in their treatment of the Orient. They had lorded it over on the false pretension that the occidental races are not only different from but superior to the oriental. Nay, they had proceeded so far on the ground of alleged unassimilability as to enact discriminative and humiliating legislation maliciously excluding Asians from Eur-American colonies and homelands. Too long has oriental humanity submitted to all this injustice perpetrated by the dominant "albinocracy." The world is in need of a revolution in morals, manners and sentiments, an ethical and psychological *risorgimento* that would purge the Occident of its superstition and race-prejudice. It is to supply this want of Europe and America that the militant nationalism of Young Asia has been evolving a new philosophy of world-culture and new *organon* of social science.

Young Asia wants Eur-America to remember the historical fact that the duration and extent of oriental aggressions into Europe have been greater than those of European into Asia.

Young Asia wants Eur-America to realize that democratic emotions and ideals are not the monopoly of occidental race-psychology. Mohammedans learn from their *Koran* that "the hand of God is with the multitude." Chinese have their Rousseau in Mencius who declared that "the most important element in the state is the people, next come the altars of the national gods, least in importance is the king." And the Hindu mind nurtured on the tradition of the *Mahābhārata*, the "Great Epic," is bent on active resistance to arbitrary rulers, not stopping short of the execution of the tyrant. It is well known, besides, that during the age of Periclean Athens there were no nationalities in Europe more democratic than the Sakiya Republic, the United States of the Vajjians, and several other republican communities organized by the people of India.

Young Asia wants Eur-America to ponder over the facts that

the sciences of arithmetic and algebra, without which no secondary education can be complete in the Occident are the finished products of the oriental brain and that the Orient was never more superstitious than Christendom with its alchemistic hocus-pocus, physiological humors, barber-surgeons, talismans, charms, prayers and fetishes that are said to counteract disease.

Young Asia wants Eur-America to understand, further, that today the "ideas of 1789" and 1848, the socialistic economics of Karl Marx and Louis Blanc, the philosophic radicalism of John Stuart Mill, the nationalistic idealism of Joseph Mazzini, nay, the Bolshevistic politics of Lenin and Trotzky are not more active in the West than in the East as liberalizing forces, and finally, that spiritual fathers of the New Orient like Saiyed Jamaluddin of Persia (the inspirer of Pan-Islam), Kang Yu-wei (the St. John the Baptist of Chinese constitutionalism), Prince Ito (the Bismarck of modern Japan,) and Mohandas Gandhi (the Napoleon of Revolutionary India) have achieved as great a result in making the world tend towards and aspire after political emancipation, economic freedom, and social justice as would be possible for the greatest and ablest Western agitator, propagandist, organizer, or statesman under the same *milieu* of alien rule or "sphere of influence" and foreign exploitation.

In approaching the problems, movements and methods of the East, therefore, the Western liberals and lovers of liberty, justice and truth should not feel as if they were going to tackle altogether, unknown phenomena, totally different from their own standpoints and attitudes, but proceed according to the dictum of Lowell's "true man." The soul-inspiring words of this Yankee prophet are well known. Here follows one verse:

"Where'er a human heart doth wear
 Joy's myrtle-wreath or sorrow's gyves,
 Where'er a human spirit strives
 After a life more true and fair,
 There is the true man's birthplace grand
 His is a world-wide fatherland!"

It is only when this spirit prevails that the chauvinistic *idolas* of "colonialism" will become things of the past.

12. The Message of Equality.

We are not going to claim for the Asians the credit for initiating all the factors of human progress, or the monopoly of all the great discoveries which have made civilization what it is. We do

not claim for the people of Asia, whether historically or psychologically, greater intellectuality or greater spirituality than for the rest of mankind.

Our claims are not so pretentious or absurd. The sole thesis is that the Orientals have served mankind with the same idealism, the same energy, the same practical good sense, and the same strenuousness, as have the Greeks, Romans and Eur-Americans, that the Orientals have been as optimistic, active and aggressive in promoting social well-being and advancing spiritual interests as have the other races, that the Orientals have developed ideas, ideals and institutions which are analogues, if not, in many cases, almost duplicates or replicas of the ideas, ideals, and institutions of the rest of humanity, and that superstitious ceremonies and observances have had the same pragmatic significance for the folks of the Christian Occident as of the "heathen" Orient. Asian culture, again, is not all original creation of indigenous Oriental intellect, but, to a great extent, the result also of conscious adaptation, imitation or assimilation from extra-Asian sources, like other culture-systems of the world. Lastly, the animality or materialism of the Asians has not been less in intensity or extensity than that of the Europeans and Americans.

In short, the Orientals are men, their successes and failures are the successes and failures of human beings. They should therefore be judged by the same standard by which the tribulations, lapses, weaknesses, falterings, and triumphs of Eur-American humanity are measured. That is, they are to be tried not by an impossible static standard of the ideal conditions in a utopia, but by the dynamic historical standard which suits the conditions of the ever-varying, ever-struggling, ever-failing, ever-succeeding, part-brute, part-god animal called Man. The culture-anthropologist must have to be honest enough to say with Walt Whitman:—

"In all people I see myself, none more and not one a barley-corn less,
And the good or bad I say, of myself I say of them."

III. Revolutions in China.

The Beginnings of the Republic in China.

1. The Revolutionist Manifesto.

In 1688 the English people drew up their "Declaration of Rights." In 1776 Jefferson framed for the American colonies the articles of their "Declaration of Independence." In 1789 the French National Assembly proclaimed the "Rights of Man." And on the 5th of January, 1912, Sun Yat-sen, as President of the provisional Republican Government of China, issued from Nanking the first manifesto of republicanism in modern Asia.

The declaration runs thus:

"To all friendly nations,—Greeting. Hitherto irremediable suppression of the individual qualities and the national aspirations of the people having arrested the intellectual, moral, and material development of China, the aid of revolution was invoked to extirpate the primary cause. We now proclaim the consequent overthrow of the despotic sway of the Manchu dynasty, and the establishment of a republic. The substitution of a republic for a monarchy is not the fruit of transient passion but the natural outcome of a long-cherished desire for freedom, contentment and advancement.

"We Chinese people, peaceful and law-abiding, have not waged war except in self-defence. We have borne our grievance for two hundred and sixty-seven years with patience and forbearance. We have endeavoured by peaceful means to redress our wrongs, secure liberty, and ensure progress; but we failed. Oppressed beyond human endurance, we deemed it our inalienable right, as well as a sacred duty, to appeal to arms to deliver ourselves and our posterity from the yoke to which we have for so long been subjected. For the first time in history an inglorious bondage is transformed into inspiring freedom. The policy of the Manchus has been one of unequivocal seclusion and unyielding tyranny. Beneath it we have bitterly suffered.

"Now we submit to the free peoples of the world the reasons justifying the revolution and the inauguration of the present govern-

ment. Prior to the usurpation of the throne by the Manchus, the land was open to foreign intercourse, and religious toleration existed, as is shown by the writings of Marco Polo and the inscription on the Nestorian tablet at Hsi-an-fu. Dominated by ignorance and selfishness, the Manchus closed the land to the outer world, and plunged the Chinese into a state of benighted mentality calculated to operate inversely to their natural talents; thus committing a crime against humanity and the civilized nations which it is almost impossible to expiate.

"Actuated by a desire for the perpetual subjugation of the Chinese, and a vicious craving for aggrandisement and wealth, the Manchus have governed the country to the lasting injury and detriment of the people, creating privileges and monopolies, erecting about themselves barriers of exclusion, national custom, and personal conduct, which have been rigorously maintained for centuries. They have levied irregular and hurtful taxes without the consent of the people, and have restricted foreign trade to treaty ports. They have placed the *likin* embargo on merchandise; obstructed internal commerce, retarded the creation of national enterprises, rendered impossible the development of natural resources, denied a regular system of impartial administration of justice, and inflicted cruel punishment on persons charged with offences, whether innocent or guilty. They have connived at official corruptions, sold offices to the highest bidder, subordinated merit to influence, rejected the most reasonable demands for better government, and reluctantly conceded so-called reforms under the most urgent pressure, promising without any intention of fulfilling. They have failed to appreciate the anguish-causing lessons taught them by foreign Powers, and in process of years have brought themselves and our people beneath the contempt of the world. A remedy of these evils will render possible the entrance of China into the family of nations.

"We have fought and formed a government. Lest our good intentions should be misunderstood, we publicly and unreservedly declare the following to be our promises:—

"The treaties entered into by the Manchus before the date of the revolution will be continually effective to the time of their termination. Any and all the treaties entered into after the commencement of the revolution will be repudiated. Foreign loans and indemnities incurred by the Manchus before the revolution will be acknowledged. Payments made by loans incurred by the Manchus after its commencement will be repudiated. Concessions granted to nations and their nationals before the revolution will be respected.

Any and all granted after it will be repudiated. The persons and property of foreign nationals within the jurisdiction of the republic will be respected and protected.

"It will be our constant aim and firm endeavour to build on stable and enduring foundations a national structure compatible with the potentialities of our long neglected country. We shall strive to elevate the people to secure peace, and to legislate for prosperity. Manchus who abide peacefully in the limits of our jurisdiction will be accorded equality and given protection.

"We will remodel the laws, revise the civil, criminal, commercial and mining codes, reform the finances, abolish restrictions on trade and commerce and ensure religious toleration and the cultivation of better relations with foreign peoples and governments than have ever been maintained before.

"It is our earnest hope that those foreign nations who have been steadfast in their sympathy will bind more firmly the bonds of friendship between us and will bear in patience with us the period of trial confronting us and our reconstruction works, and will aid the consummation of the far-reaching plans, which we are about to undertake, and which they have long vainly been urging upon our people and our country.

"With this message of peace and good will the republic cherishes the hope of being admitted into the family of nations, not merely to share its rights and privileges, but to cooperate in the great and noble task of building up the civilization of the world."

Revolutionary manifestoes are, from their very nature, first, apologies for the revolution, i.e., statements of the crimes of the preceding regime, and secondly, promises and assurances from the new order, i.e., declarations of future policy. But these paper documents, howsoever true and just in their claims, are the least part in the making of a revolution.

Revolutions draw their sustenance from discontent with the existing state of things and with the powers that be. This discontent need not necessarily be all founded on wrongs perpetrated by the *status quo* and on grievances actually suffered by the people. It can be effective as fuel to the revolutionary fire even though it should happen to be chiefly sentimental and fanciful. The "natural leaders" have only to nurse it and engineer it in such a manner that the active support or passive cooperation of the masses, nay, of a fraction of the people may be enlisted on its behalf. It is the strength and competence of the *personnel* in the propaganda,

i.e., the organizing capacity of the intellectuals, that constitutes the real soul and apology of revolutions.

The world has never recognized an insurrection as *fait accompli* simply because the charges drawn up against the preceding government are just, unless indeed it pays the interested Powers to intervene of their own accord, as the United States did in Colombia-Panama disputes (Dec. 1903), and the allies in the secessionist activity of the Tchech nationalists of Bohemia (August-September 1918). Right or wrong in their pretensions, revolutionists have had to establish the legitimacy of their cause by the sheer fact of success. Only then has the movement been accepted by mankind as almost a "historical necessity"—one of those "far-off Divine events toward which the whole creation moves."

The wording of a revolutionary instrument indicates, of course, the trend of political philosophy that nourished its being. At any rate it reveals the pious wishes of those who are responsible for it. But how far it is an accurate picture of the order subverted is none the less a matter for sceptical investigation on the part of scientific history.

It is well known that the English Civil War, Restoration, and Revolution have a Tory and a Whig version. And the leaders of the American revolution are thus appraised by Lord Acton:

"Not only was their grievance difficult to substantiate at law but it was trivial in extent. The claim of England was not evidently disproved, and even if it was unjust, the injustice practically was not hard to bear. The suffering that would be caused by submission was immeasurably less than the suffering that must follow resistance, and it was more uncertain and remote."

Even the plea for the French Revolution has not passed unchallenged by the critical students of the *ancien régime*. Tocqueville, Jefferson, and Arthur Young gave contemporary evidences of the silver lining that edged the economic cloud of Bourbon France. The condition of the masses in contemporary Spain, Italy and the German-speaking territories was far worse than that of the French peasants.

Indeed, "the ideas of 1789" are neither what one reads in the "Rights of Man" enunciated by the National Assembly (August 26, 1789) nor in the draft of the new constitution under which the Legislative Assembly held its first meeting (October, 1791). The real document of the revolutionists in France, as it turned out, was the inspiring personality of the young lieutenant from Corsica. Napoleon was the living embodiment of all the floating ideas of the

age, the rationalistic enlightenment of Voltaire, the anti-statal Nature-cult of Rousseau, as well as of the mobocratic radicalism of Danton and the utopian idealism of Robespierre. It was the military hypnotism exercised by Napoleon over twentyfive million men and women that enabled them to feel the justification of their principles as a matter of course. It was the spiritualizing leadership of a dynamic soul that heartened the army of raw recruits and lay generals to venture on defying the aggressive Concert of Europe in its attempt to nip the revolution in the bud. Down to 1815 the French people did not once care to exhibit or even remember the paper manifesto of their "principles", but the fall of Napoleon proved to be similar to the fall of Epaminondas in ancient Thebes. As long as another Napoleon was not forthcoming, thousand such documents were of no avail.

A revolution is justified only by its success. The justification of the Chinese revolution does not consist in the evils of the Manchu administration, howsoever atrocious they may have been in reality. It would have to be sought in the achievements of the "futurist" patriots of young China. In the meantime the Nanking document of 1912 may be examined as a record of political literature.

2. Despotism and Mal-administration.

This document of an Asian revolution contains the familiar phrases, "inalienable right," "consent of the people," "irregular and hurtful taxes," etc. But evidently it does not attempt to exhibit a philosophic grasp of life's fundamentals. Nor does it display sweeping generalizations of an absolute character, whether social or economic. The instrument is not marked either by any characteristic theory of popular sovereignty or by any epoch-making political *Weltanschauung*. But one finds in the general tone of this Chinese manifesto a distant family likeness of the Bill of Rights. There can be detected in it a faint echo of John Adam's eloquence on the 4th of July. It bears probably also a weak reminiscence of the heated pamphleteering of the mob-leaders in France such as were noticed by Arthur Young in the course of his travels.

More or less the same language was used in Mexico by the partisans of Carranza against the dictatorship of President Diaz. The wordy side of the pre-Bolshevik revolution in Russia has not been far removed from this argument. And this would be manifest also as much in the revolutions of any of the lesser republics in Latin America as among any of the peoples in Asia or Africa, should they ever rise to overthrow the dominant races.

Like the steam-engine and the U-boat, revolutionary ideals and democratic platitudes, songs of freedom and humanitarian cant are the universal or cosmopolitan goods of the modern world. They are not the "patent" of the individuals or races in and through whom they were born. These shibboleths are at the service of anybody that can command them. Probably it is well-nigh impossible for a people to be essentially original in the manufacture of a revolution. For this we should perhaps have to wait for the epoch of socialism triumphant. That is likely to usher in a radically new psychology with its ethics of the "rights of human *personality*" as distinct from the conventional "rights of man" and "rights of woman." The plutocracies masquerading today under the guise of constitutional monarchies and even republics would then automatically be subverted. Eventually a new phraseology and idiom of revolution may thus grow up for the future pioneers of civilization and the apostles of new types of democracy.

If the political philosophy of the Chinese revolution is anything but extraordinary, the demands of its leaders do not rise above anything but the stereotyped. The case made by them against the Manchus does not exhibit a picture of the atrocities of Spanish rule in the Netherlands and Peru or the horrors of the Siberian dungeons under the Romanoffs. It is not a record of the age-long social and political persecution of Jews in every Christian land.

The definite references to the iniquities of the Manchu administration are vague indeed, but they would be equally applicable to the declining periods of the indigenous Chinese dynasties. Sun Yat-sen's account of the Manchus is the same as Emperor Shün-chi the Manchu's account of the last Mings and the historian Sze Ma-chien's account of the last Hans.

Besides, the grievances enumerated in this republican manifesto of the modern Orient were the grievances of every European people in the eighteenth century. Which Occidental nation was then free from one or other or all of the following features of socio-political life: serfdom, intolerance, persecution, oligarchy, arbitrary taxation? These were practically the "inseparable accidents" of every "enlightened despotism," e.g., that of Frederick of Prussia, Joseph of Austria, and Catherine of Russia. It is notorious also that in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century Guizot, the French minister, out-Walpoled the English premier Walpole in the use of bribery, corruption, sale of offices, and nepotism as political methods.

Corruption¹⁾ in the earliest American democracy (c. 1776) is thus commented on by a writer cited in Weyl's *New Democracy*:

"In filibustering and gerrymandering, in stealing governorships and legislatures, in using force at the polls, in colonizing and distributing patronage to whom patronage is due, in all the frauds and tricks that go to make up the worst form of practical politics, the men who founded our state and national governments were always our equals and often our masters."

The degeneracy of pre-Revolution France is described by Gustav Bang, the Danish socialist, in the following terms:

"The Court and the two upper estates represented an exploitation which became more and more flagrant and which more and more was felt to be destructive of civil activity. The burden of taxation kept the urban as well as rural population down. . . . An indescribable demoralization was spreading throughout the ruling classes; . . . bribery and sales of offices flourished; administration of justice became a mockery. . . . It was a condition which in many respects resembled that of modern Russia. And as in Russia, so also in France under the old regime, it was felt that a catastrophe was impending."

This is a recent "Labour" view of Bourbon France. The "anarchist" Kropotkin in his "popular" history of the French revolution draws, of course, the same picture. And these are not mere extremist standpoints. The facts are too well known. Even under the mighty Louis XIV the laws of France were not uniform in all the provinces. The country, though but one-seventh of China Proper in area, was not a single unit. It was divided by custom lines into numerous almost independent states. Under his successors, as before, the royal household was extravagantly managed, the third estate did not exist, and freedom of thought was a taboo. The person and property of the people were at the mercy of the ruler who was the state by Divine right.

The defects of the Manchu regime will thus be found to have been neither essentially Manchu nor exclusively Oriental. Some of them are the inevitable attributes of despotism or *tyrannos*, i.e., one-man-rule, as such, even though it be benevolent, paternal or enlightened. Others are the results of mal-administration and non-administration to which every government is liable during its degeneracy, such, for instance, as Bryce has to complain against in *Modern*

¹⁾ Cf. Bryce: *Modern Democracies*, Vol. II, pp. 497—505.

Democracies (1921). There is nothing climatologically or ethnologically Asian in the decline and fall of the Manchu empire.

Montesquieu wanted to reform the French monarchy on the model of the English state. This was before 1789. The Chinese also under the guidance of Kang Yu-wei had for some time (c. 1897) tried to rejuvenate the Manchu dynasty. The programme was that of European constitutionalism. That effort having failed, the reform movement has taken shape, however amorphous for the time being, in General Li Yuan-hung and Sun Yat-sen's republic. The Chinese revolution is thus, no less than its younger sister in Russia with its distinctive social philosophy, a move in the direction of humanity's natural evolution indicated by the march of history.

3. East and West.

The leaders of the revolution have blindly accepted the conventional verdict of Eur-American scholars as to the non-militaristic character of the Chinese people. They have made it a point to assure the world that Chinese are a mild and peace-loving race.

But this is a fallacy totally unfounded in history. This is one of the many superficial generalizations which the successful Occident of the nineteenth century has been pleased to propagate about its victim, the fallen and down-trodden Orient. The logic of the "superior races" in modern Eur-America has superstitiously allowed the characterization of the entire East for all the ages as "unchanging", "mystical", "quietistic" and so forth. It is the triumph of the Asian over the white at Port Arthur in 1905 that has recently led to a slight exorcizing of this *idola* out of the Occidental mind. But the fallacy virtually retains its undisputed sway.

To treat the Chinese as a pacifist race is the greatest piece of practical joke, to say the least, in historical literature. The truth is the exact opposite of the current idea. If the Chinese have not been an aggressive people, one would have to define afresh as to what aggressiveness means. The people and the rulers of China have exhibited warlike and vindictive habits in every generation. Even the Buddhist monks used to form themselves into military bands whenever the need arose. The martial characteristics of Chinese have really been as conspicuous as those of the proverbial fighting races of India. The war-spirit has not been less active in China than among the over-dreaded Bushidoists of New Japan or the "modern Huns" of Europe.

In China today there is a lack of literacy among the lower orders. The army, as all other departments, is not backed by sound

finance. The military and naval equipment is not scientific and efficient enough. Adequate discipline of the modern standard is therefore wanting on all sides. The present defects in China's fighting material and administration may easily mislead one as to the capacity of the race for future developments. But the present conditions and misgivings as to the future must not eclipse the actual facts of the past from our view. Chinese history has throughout been the record of unrest, warfare, secret societies, rebellions, and adventurous raids.

Indeed, the proper question that sociologists should have to answer is, "Has there been on earth a race more aggressive than the Chinese?" Chinese culture came into existence in one of the lesser states of the north-west. This was probably about B. C. 3000. The three ideal rulers, Yao, Shun, and Yu, whose names are household words even in modern China and are almost daily cited in the forward journals of the Chinese republic, flourished between B. C. 2897 and 2356. Today at the end of five thousand years Chinese culture comprises within its fold a heterogeneous and mixed population as extensive as that of Europe, and governs an area which is seven times that of Germany. Besides, there is a Greater China, including the now lost Indo-China, Formosa, and Korea, as well as the seceding Mongolia, Turkestan, Tibet, and Manchuria. All this "expansion" had to be effected inch by inch. It was not the fiat of an individual will. A race, whose collective consciousness is persistent enough to demand and achieve a continuous overflowing and cumulative enlargement, is certainly not a conservative stay-at-home, and war-dreading people.

The truth, therefore, must unequivocally be admitted by students of comparative culture-history. Under favourable industrial and financial conditions a Gustavus Adolphus can yet drill the Celestial man-power into a real "Yellow Peril". And this may turn out to be even more momentous than the successful Pan-Islam from which the crusades had to defend, Southern Europe for the Europeans or the avalanche of the Tartar hordes in Eastern Europe during the Middle Ages.

Another feature of the revolutionist manifesto requires special notice. There is manifest in it a too palpable desire to placate the Christian Powers. But, unfortunately, the references to foreigners form the least satisfactory part of the document.

It was during the reign of Kubla Khan, the Mongol "barbarian", that Marco Polo was in China for twentyone years (1274-95). He occupied an important Government post for three years. The

reference to Marco Polo proves the reverse of what the revolutionists want to demonstrate. For, the Venetian's account of toleration in China indicates that the alleged foreign dynasty of the thirteenth century was not ignorant and boorish, after all. The Tangs had protected the Zoroastrians, Manichaeans, Nestorian Christians and Mohammedans together with the Confucians, Taoists and Buddhists. The Mongols also were liberal enough to maintain the same religious policy. Further, China was "open" even then to foreign intercourse and receptive of new ideas from strangers. Otherwise a European could not have been deemed fit to hold office in the Middle Kingdom.

The Nestorian tablet, discovered in 1625, proves indeed that during the seventh century when it was set up by Christians, China was not closed to foreigners. But does it prove that China had been closed since then? There is a good deal of false and erroneous ideas in the air regarding this closing and opening of China. It is thoughtlessly alleged by Eur-American politicians that Cathay has always vegetated in "splendid isolation." The Chinese framers of the manifesto should not have swallowed this monumental untruth.

The China of actual history was in touch with the "Roman Orient" during the Han period. The Hans, the lesser dynasties, and the Tangs had intimate relations with Hindu India during the first seven centuries of the Christian era. The Chinese of more primitive times had communication with the Babylonians. In later times, the Sungs promoted maritime trade with the Arabs. And not only the indigenous Mings, but the foreign Mongols, as we have seen, appreciated the services of Europeans. Even the much-condemned Manchus were long friendly to Christians. Shunchi, the first emperor, had the empire mapped out by Jesuits. The Manchus learnt from them the manufacture of new artillery. Kanghi the Great appointed German and French astronomers to reform the Chinese calendar. He was presented with a bronze azimuth and a celestial globe by Louis XIV. In 1692 he revoked the edict against Christian missionizing.

The history of Christian missions in China has passed through the same stages as in Japan. It was during the sixteenth century—the epoch of Ashikaga Shogunate and Ming dynasty—that the Jesuits first came to these countries. The chequered career of Christianity in the Far East since then was not due to the natural open-mindedness or conservatism of the Japanese and the Manchu-Chinese. Its vicissitudes depended, first, on the internal

dissensions among the various Christian sects themselves as to the articles of faith, and secondly on the character of the missionaries as political agents of their home governments.

Christians were at first welcomed as much by the Mings and Manchus of China and by the Ashikagas and their successors in Japan as by the Great Moghuls of India. But political intrigues of the missionaries compelled Iyeyasu, the first Tokugawa Shogun, while regent for his son, to issue an anti-Christian edict in 1614. That was the beginning of a persecution which lasted for about twenty years. By 1638 Christianity was all but extirpated in Japan for two centuries.

Missionizing was most prosperous in China during the first two decades of the eighteenth century. Here the persecution began a full century after that in Japan. The Chinese came to know of what had happened in the land of the rising sun. Iyeyasu's work was done by Kanghi in 1717. The sole object was to defend the country from the machinations of the "wolf in sheep's clothing." The same desire for self-preservation had prompted Jahangir, the Moghul emperor of India (1605—1627), to declare: "Let the English come no more."

Such was the "Monroe Doctrine" of Manchu China against Christendom. Measures of political defence are not to be interpreted as instances of Manchu exclusiveness, as the revolutionist manifesto seeks to point out. Nor are they to be treated as evidences of traditional Chinese isolation, as Western scholars are wont to understand.

The document does not touch China's relations with the Powers during the Manchu regime. This would have involved a delicate and dangerous ground. It is obvious that the real foreigners are not the Manchus but these Powers. The Manchu emperors, as Chinese patriots, did for their fatherland the only duty open to them. They closed the country to Eur-America. But one cannot honestly lay one's fingers on any peculiarly Manchu weakness with regard to the eventual failure of this step. It remains for social science to explain the crumbling down of *entire* Asia in modern times.

From the time that Albouquerque (1510—15), the Portuguese admiral, first conceived the plan of establishing a European empire in India, down to the bombardment of Shimonoseki in Japan by the British, Dutch, French and American ships in 1862, the story of the contact between the East and the West was throughout uniform in procedure and results. Is not this the nemesis

or reaction to the long history of aggressive Asia,—beginning with the Persian Wars of the fifth century B. C., carried forward by the Mohammedan Caliphates and Buddhist-Shamanist Tartars of the Middle Ages, and culminating in the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 and the Ottoman domination of Southern and Eastern Europe down to the peace of Carlowitz in 1699?

But whatever be the ultimate consequences of the contact between the East and the West—whether annihilation of Asia or her re-emergence as a system of *swarûjes*, i.e. sovereign powers, the ætiology of the revolution in China is to be sought in the fact that the last Manchus had proved to be too weak to cope with the cumulative foreign aggressions, and not in the fact that Manchus were foreigners. Young China feared the aliendom of Eur-America, i.e., the subjugation by an "albinocracy" more than they could have reasons to hate Manchu absolutism. Majlisist or parliamentary activities in Persia (1907) have had the same origin, viz., the long-standing incapacity of the ruling Shahs to counteract European expansion in the Middle East. Similarly it was the fear of foreign control in Turkish Macedonia owing to the weakness of the Sultan's government that hastened the party of "Union and Progress" to extort from the throne a constitution (1908) and finally to depose the monarch after an abortive counter-revolution (1909). Nor is it less well known that New Turkey embarked on the war of 1912 because the Balkan allies had raised the demand for European mediation in the administration of Macedonia.

The fundamental fact in the politics of Young Asia is thus the revolt of the East against the domination of the West,—no matter whether it manifests itself in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy or in the founding of a monarchless republic; no matter whether it consists in the expulsion of a ruler or in the subversion of a dynasty. In overthrowing the Manchus the Chinese *intelligentsia* has sought simply to rebel against Occidental exploitation and to emancipate Eastern Asia from Eur-American vassalage—political, economic and cultural. The significance of Chinese unrest can be grasped only by realizing that the expulsion of the West from the East furnishes the sole *élan de la vie* of China's statesmen and patriots.

Political Tendencies in Chinese Culture.

I. Revolutions in Chinese History.

The Chinese are ever proud of the Tangs (A.C. 618—905) and the Mings (1368—1628) among their indigenous dynasties. It was under the Tang emperors that the Chinese empire comprised for the first time all the outlying regions called Greater China (Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, Turkestan and Tibet). And the Ming dynasty is specially dear to the Chinese heart because its founder, a poor Buddhist monk, succeeded in overthrowing the "foreign" Mongols.

But, what is the political character of the Tang regime? Twenty-one emperors belonged to this dynasty. Of these, sixteen were nominal rulers. For two-thirds of the period of about three hundred years the country was disturbed by civil wars or revolts within and invasions from abroad. Rivalry between minister and minister, or general and general, and inter-provincial struggles constitute the history of these two hundred years. The emperors, those "sons of Heaven", had to live under the protection of king-makers, powerful potentates, or successful generals. Not more than one, Tai Tsung (627—50), had the Napoleonic might to hold together a consolidated empire.

The history of the Mings repeats the same tale. Tai Tsu (1368—99), the founder, proved to be a strong military man. He was real emperor of a United China, but of his sixteen successors none but Young-lo (1403—25) was powerful or lucky enough to maintain Tai Tsu's imperialistic tradition. Young-lo himself became emperor by leading a successful revolt against his own nephew. On the whole, the period was punctuated with Tartar invasions from the north and raids of Japanese pirates from the east. It ended with violent intrigues and seditious movements which ultimately led to Manchu conquest.

The revolutionary unrest that marked the Ming dynasty's administration may be gathered from the biography of the great "heretic" philosopher Wang Yang-ming (1472—1529). He had not been a favorite with the court because of his heresy. But in the posthumous defence of his character by the Imperial Director of Education we read of his "fourfold merit". It is interesting that all the items refer to disorder in the empire.

"First, Prince Ning was disorderly Within the Court the Wei Pin clique, favorites, and their associates were

perfidious. Outside, such guards as Pi Chen Liu and Lan were treacherous, and the Court officials throughout the country nearly all looked on. Had it not been that Shou-jen (Wang Yang-ming) was loyal . . . took upon himself the responsibility of punishing the rebel, it would be hard to tell whether the country would be now at peace or in danger."

Wang's second merit was described thus:

"The camps of Tamao, Cha-liao, Liton, and Tungkang represented the combined force of four provinces. Soldiers had collected there for a number of years. When Shou-jen reached the place as guard he subjugated them all."

The third merit was the quelling of a rebellion.

"At Tienchou and Ssuen confusion had reigned for years, so that quiet could not be restored, nor could the people be pacified. In consequence Shou-jen was sent there and caused Prince Lu's followers to bow their heads in submission."

The fourth merit was as follows:

"Originally the eight military posts were the disgrace of the interior of the two Kwangs (provinces of Kwangtung and Kwang-si). The Government soldiers co-operated with the rebels and there was no way of getting at them; . . . By a surprise attack he exterminated them as quickly and as easily as though they had been wood. It accrues to the merit of Shou-jen that he averted great calamity and was ready to work unto death."¹

The contemporary statement of the qualifications of a Ming celebrity thus opens up the normal disquiet to which China was a victim even under her indigenous rulers. Similarly under the Han dynasty (B. C. 202—A. C. 190) also, rendered illustrious through the powerful Wu-ti (B. C. 140—87), China never maintained her integrity for more than two successive generations. And the still earlier Chou period (B. C. 1122—255), during which flourished Laotsze (c. B. C. 604) and Confucius (B. C. 551—479), was the period of feudalistic disintegration, of innumerable regicides, of baronial wars, and raids of Huns, Scythians or Tartars and of the aboriginal hill tribes. It was the epoch of fifty, sixty, seventy-five, and even one hundred and twenty five lesser Chinas maintaining their sovereignty alongside of one another.

The unrest and turmoil of the sixth, seventh, and eighth centuries B. C., found adequate expression in the verses of the period. Some of these were collected by Confucius in his *Shi-king* (The Book of Poetry).

¹) Henke: *The Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming*.

In Part I, Book X, Ode VIII,²⁾ the soldiers are describing the sufferings of the parents as they are called to the front and are eager to return to peaceful agriculture. We read:—

"Suh-suh go the feathers of the wild geese,
As they settle on the bushy oaks.
The king's affairs must not be slackly discharged,
And so we cannot plant our sacrificial millet and millet.
What will our parents have to rely on?
O thou distant and azure Heaven!
When shall we be in our place again?
When shall (our service) have an end?"

In Part II, Book VIII, Ode X, the soldiers are complaining that the kingdom is seared and scorched like the vegetable world, burnt yellow and then nearly black, thus:—

"Every plant is yellow;
Every day we march.
Every man is moving about,
Doing service in some quarter of the kingdom.
Every plant is purple;
Every man is torn from his wife.
Alas for us employed on these expeditions!
How are we alone dealt with as if we were not men?
We are not rhinoceros, we are not tigers
To be kept in these desolate wilds.
Alas for us employed on these expeditions!
Morning and night we have no leisure."

This is the story of China under the Chinese. China came under an alleged foreign rule during two periods of her history: (1) the Mongol (1260—1368) and (2) the Manchu (1644—1911). Both these periods were, as usual, marked by intrigues, conspiracies, civil wars and revolutions. Some of these were led by secret societies, a few by individual generals and governors, and others by Mohammedans.

2. The Logic of the Fish.

Disruption is then the norm in the history of Chinese politics. As with the Holy Roman Empire in Europe and the Moghul Empire in India, in China also the *de facto* independence of the Provinces and the formal vassals was never regarded as inconsistent with the *de jure imperium* of the *hwangti*, *sārva-bhauṃa* or "world-

²⁾ Legge's translation.

sovereign". Besides, anarchic periods of complete disintegration extending sometimes over centuries, during which no one dynasty enjoyed even nominal hegemony over the rest, intervened between the fall of one and the rise of another mighty Power.

China, like India, is, in *Realpolitik*, a geographical expression. It is a "pluralistic universe," in spite of the "fundamental unity" of cultural "ideals" pervading the entire area. China is one country only in the sense in which Europe is one. But neither in ancient and mediaeval ages nor in modern times has it been possible to postulate the "unity of Europe" for purposes of international politics. The "unity of China" and the "unity of India" are equally unreal terms in the diplomatic history of Asia. There have been many Chinas and many Indias at the same time during almost every century.

Disruptive tendencies are not, however, specifically oriental characteristics. The "confusions and revolutions of governments" described by Anthony Ascham of the English Civil War period have not been less marked features of the Occident than of the Orient.

The Imperial dynasties of China, whether indigenous or foreign, have not indeed been long-lived. But where on earth have the ruling houses had greater longevity than in China? The boundaries of the Chinese empire as well as the territorial limits of the lesser Chinas have changed every now and then. But have not the extent and area of kingdoms, city-states, duchies, and markgrafates of Europe exhibited the same kaleidoscopic character? There have been anarchies, conspiracies, intrigues, and regicides in China; but where has mankind known continuous peace for any length of time?

The following picture of the Roman empire is furnished by an anti-monarchist in Engelbert's *De Ortu et Fine Romani Imperii* (c. 1325):

"The Roman empire was and is always troubled by wars and rebellions; hardly ever were the gates of the temple of Janus shut: the greater number of Roman emperors have died violent deaths: and the Roman empire has been the cause rather of disorder than of peace."³⁾

This is an accurate picture of every period of European history. It is true as much of Machiavellian Italy as of Germany during the Thirty Years' War. It describes the Napoleonic era as exactly as the great armageddon initiated by Kaiser William II.

³⁾ Woolf: *Bartolus*.

China is thus not the only country or continent where revolutions and changes of rulers have been plentiful in all ages. The phenomenon of stable equilibrium has never been experienced by man either in the East or in the West. The political centre of gravity has been always on the move from organism to organism, from class to class, leading to the subversion of the old and the ringing in of the new.

Revolutions constitute the assertion of new stronger forces, and all history is the document of these assertions. The record of human achievements in the political sphere is the illustration of but one logic. This is what in Hindu political philosophy is called *mātsya-nyāya* or the "logic of the fish." Larger fishes swallow up the smaller, the stronger overpower the weaker. This "struggle for existence" is the law of the "state of nature" as described by Spinoza and Hobbes, or *Naturprozess* as Gumplowicz calls it in *Der Rassenkampf*.

The operation of the logic of the fish is "the golden rule," "the simple plan," observable in all organic relations. China has been no exception to the universal sway of the cosmic doctrine of might and the survival of the fittest.

3. Achievements and Failures of the Manchus

In Young China's terminology the anti-Manchu revolution of September 1911, has been characterised as anti-foreign. But, were the Chinese really a subject race under the Manchus? To be more general, we may even ask the question: "Were the Mongols and Manchus foreigners in China?"

If the Mongols and the Manchus are to be treated as aliens and foreign usurpers, every other Imperial dynasty would have to be called almost equally foreign. Ethnologically speaking, nearly every "national" dynasty of China had more or less an intermixture of non-Chinese blood. The old civilization of the Chinese was built up by people who had come from outside, viz., from the north-west, and were thus aliens in China. The influx of new-comers, generically known as Tartars (of various denominations), from the north and north-west, and the assimilation of aborigines and hill tribes, especially in the south and south-west, have never ceased in Chinese history. The continent of China is a genuine museum of humanity, and has been a real melting-pot of races. "Foreign" influence has thus to be detected in every epoch of Chinese culture.

Where indeed on earth is to be found an alleged pure race with its institutions and ideals untouched by extraneous races? In

this respect China does not differ at all from England, France, Germany, India, the United States or any other country of the ancient and modern world. If foreign influence in blood, language, or ideas of life is to be regarded as an instance of foreign subjection, no race of men has ever been really free. The diversity of races in China has undoubtedly led to the transfer of political hegemony from house to house and province to province. But this is exactly what has happened, for instance, in Germany, the land of heterogeneous peoples. And yet in Germany, as Bryce remarks in *The Holy Roman Empire*, the diversity was "not greater than in France, where intruding Franks, Goths, Burgundians, and Northmen are mingled with primitive Kelts and Basques, nor so great as in Spain or Italy or Britain."

It is true that the Mongols and the Manchus came into China from outside. But it is also true that they never left China again "homeward bound." They did not enter China to exploit it in the economic or cultural interests of another land, an alien mother-country. They did not regard China as their "colony", but made it their *patrie*, or *Vaterland*, the centre of all their affections and dreams, their own, their "native land". They lived and worked only to make China the real "middle kingdom" of the world. Their sole ambition consisted in carving out for China "a place in the Sun".

The Mongols and the Manchus did not come to impose any foreign customs and laws upon the "natives" but became part and parcel of the indigenous social life. They assimilated themselves in every possible way to the manners, superstitions, prejudices, and sentiments that already existed among the people. Here, as in many other instances in world-history, "captive Greece captured Rome."

We do not, therefore, hear of a so-called Mongol or Manchu culture in China. The Mongol and the Manchu periods have been, like other periods, but two links in a growing chain of the same Chinese civilization. In language, literature, the fine arts, philosophy, or religion, these periods do not represent any hiatus between the preceding and the succeeding ages, except what is inevitable in a continuous evolution. The same Lao-tsze, the same Confucius, the same Buddha, that had governed Chinese life under the mighty Tangs and the brilliant Sungs, governed Chinese life under the Mongols and the Manchus also.

Did the Chinese under the so-called foreign rulers suffer anything like the Spanish inquisitions, or the anti-Jewish "pogroms" associated with such Russian cities as Kishineff, Kovno, Vilna, or

Kiev? Could any Chinese justly cry to his comrade as the Russian Jew could lament to his, in the language of Max Weber?—"Is it not in Egypt still and under Pharaoh's hand that we live?" Or, could a picture like the following in regard to the Romanoff regime be called up about the Mongol and the Manchu administrations?—

"Egypt only a myth, and Russia real,

Egypt a legend, Russia tyrant to-day."

Were the autochthonous men and women of China treated by the Mongol and the Manchu rulers as mere hewers of wood and drawers of water? Were they appointed only to the subordinate posts and clerical offices as but second fiddles to the "superiors" imported from the ruling races? The questions must be answered in the emphatic negative.

The history of the Chinese administrative system does not, as a rule, furnish instances of the "colour-bar" in public offices, whether in the village service or in Council work. Appointments to government posts in Imperial China had been made on the results of public examinations since Han times (B. C. 29). These service regulations were generally kept up by the Mongols, though put in abeyance for a short time by some of the degenerates. The system was maintained throughout by the Manchus. Impartiality and fair play were thus ensured. The highest officials in the army, the ministry, the education department, and provincial civil service came in this way as much from the children of the soil as from the naturalized new-comers. Examination sifted the fit from the unfit without race-prejudice. Besides, the five honorific titles of nobility, viz., duke, count, viscount, baron, and baronet, were conferred without distinction on the Manchus, Mongols and the Chinese. What greater facilities for self-development or opportunities to nurture their genius along lines of advance had the Chinese obtained, say, during the golden age of the Hans or of the Tangs?

Of course, as the Mongols and the Manchus settled down in China, the Chinese found in them fresh competitors for the loaves and fishes. Their field of ambition was circumscribed to that extent. But these competitors were then no longer Mongols or Manchus but as good Chinese as the original inhabitants could possibly be.

Signs of foreign subjection are not wanting, however, to indicate that China was a conquered country during the two periods.

In 1289 Kubla Khan, the great Mongol, issued an ordinance to disarm the entire Chinese population. The measure must have been a temporary political necessity, but it did not succeed. And in

view of the fact that the Mongols were making themselves Chinese in all respects, the regulation cannot be taken exclusively as the mark of "alien" domination. It was more the tyranny of an oligarchy than coercion by a foreigner.

The Manchu emperors stationed garrisons of Manchu soldiers at Peking and at seven or eight other important cities of the empire. These Manchu "colonies", howsoever small they might be in size, were always detested by the Chinese. But to a certain extent they should be regarded rather as the "praetorian guards" of all despots than specifically as the visible embodiments of a foreign rule. Taking all other circumstances into consideration, the Manchu garrisons must be treated as essentially distinct in character from the French army and navy in Indo-China since 1885 and the Japanese army and navy in Korea since 1910.

Another fact of Chinese subjection to the Manchus is universally known. It is the queue or "pig-tail" at the back of the head with the front clean shaved. The Chinese never tolerated it and always smarted under the compulsion to keep it. It was however really a "fashion" with the men of light and leading among the Manchus themselves. But as it was abhorrent to the taste and sentiment of the Chinese, the imposition of the Manchu style must be regarded as sheer despotism. But, here, again, should it be called the tyranny of a foreigner, or rather the bigotry and arbitrary rule of an English Charles II in England or a French Louis XIV in France or the Russian Czars in Russia?

An interesting parallel to the Mongol and Manchu periods can be furnished from the history of India. The Mohammedan (the so-called Pathan, 1206—1526; and Moghul, 1526—1764) regime in India is similar to that of the Mongols and Manchus in China, because the first Mohammedans came into India as conquerors. But though they have maintained their religious antithesis practically intact, there has been ultimately a great *rapprochement* between the Hindus and the Mohammedans in language, music, painting, architecture, folk customs, etiquette, and phases of social life.

In political and military affairs the distinction between the original inhabitants of India and the new-comers (and the converts to the new faith) was all but obliterated. Hindu finance ministers were at the head of the Imperial treasury of the Great Moghul. The land revenue of the Mohammedan empire was organized by Hindu statesmen. Hindus were appointed equally with Mohammedans as governors of the provinces. The highest

commissions in the army also were conferred on Hindus. Hindu commanders were trusted with Mohammedan troops against Mohammedan princes and governors. Expert Hindu chiefs were despatched to put down the revolts of Mohammedan generals and viceroys.

The "Pathan" (Mohammedan) provinces of Bengal in the east and the Deccan in the south were annexed to the Moghul (Mohammedan) territory with the help of Hindu soldiers and generals. The emperor Jahangir (1605—27) sent the Hindus, Rao Ratan and Raj Singh, even against his own son Shah Jahan when he was a rebel (1623—25). Similarly the Hindu commanders Pahar Singh, Badal Singh and others were appointed by the emperor Shah Jahan (1628—58) along with Prince Aurangzib to take charge of the expeditionary force against Balkh and Badaksan (in Central Asia). Hindus thus co-operated with Mohammedans in the Imperial attempt (1646—47) to found a Greater India. In the wars against the Persian Mohammedans, also, in Afghanistan, the buffer between India and Persia, the Moghuls and the Hindus fought shoulder to shoulder (1648—53) for the expansion of their common Motherland.

The wars of mediaeval India were thus neither racial nor religious, but fundamentally territorial or provincial. Hindus and Mohammedans on one side could thus be arrayed against Hindus and Mohammedans on the other. There was genuine identity of political and economic interests, so far as the "local" units were concerned.

Mohammedan rule in India was in no respects the "government of one people by another". It was not an alien rule like that of the Hohenstaufens, and later of the Habsburgs, in Italy, or of the French in Indo-China, or of the Americans in the Philippines. The rule of the Mongols and the Manchus in China was likewise not a foreign rule.

Besides, from the standpoint of national glory, the Mongol and the Manchu regimes were not behind the Han, the Tang, and the Ming. The Chinese can be as proud of their country's achievements during these periods of alleged "foreign" rule as during the others.

Kubla, the Grand Mongol, developed the material resources of China, deepened the Great Canal, patronized letters and faiths, and was in every way one of the best "enlightened despots" of the eighteenth century European type. Further, it was under him that in 1281 a Chinese "armada" was on the point of making Japan an island-province of Greater China. It was, again, through him and his feudatories in Central Asia and Russia that the Chinese had the credit of extending the western frontiers of Asia into the very heart of Europe, as far as the Carpathian Mountains. This Mongol-

Chinese empire was the medium through which Europeans got gun-powder, the mariner's compass and the art of printing.

And the latter-day degeneracy of the Manchus must not blind one to the fact that during at least the first century and a half of their rule down to Kien-lung (1735—96) their records both in war and peace could vie with those of the "Augustan age" of Chinese culture represented by the Tangs and the Sungs. Kanghi (1661—1722), the second emperor of this House, suppressed rebellions, annexed Turkestan and Tibet to the empire, introduced social reforms, and promoted sciences and arts. It was his humanitarian legislation that put a stop to the traditional "sacrifice" of women in the tombs of the aristocrats. He also attempted, with partial success, the suppression of "foot-binding" among Chinese women. The monumental *Dictionary* of the Chinese language and *Encyclopaedia* of Chinese culture owe their origin to his patronage.

Kanghi was altogether the peer of China's greatest and the world's most distinguished sovereigns. In intrinsic merit he was greater than any of the Mings. And the China of his days could, like India under his contemporary Aurangzib the Great Moghul (1658—1707) as described by Bernier, the French traveller, stand honorable comparison with the Europe dominated by Louis XIV (1661—1715), *le grand monarque*, of France.

To understand the Asia of the seventeenth century in the background of contemporary Europe it is necessary to forget the nineteenth century and recent developments in governmental theories and institutions as well as in material science and general culture. The public and private morals of the English people during the age of Kanghi are thus described by Macaulay: "Then came those days never to be recalled without a blush, the days of servitude without loyalty and sensuality without love, of dwarfish talents and gigantic vices, the paradise of cold hearts and narrow minds, the golden age of the coward, the bigot and the slave. The king cringed to his rival that he might trample on his people, sank into a viceroy of France, and pocketed, with complacent infamy, her degrading insult and her more degrading gold. The caresses of harlots and the jests of buffoons regulated the policy of the state. The Government had just ability enough to deceive and just religion enough to persecute."

And in France Louis XIV's dictum was: "I am the State". He carried this absolutism to its furthest logical consequence both in home and foreign policies. He led aggressive wars against the Netherlands and the German states, and brought about the War of

the Spanish Succession. His taxation was arbitrary. He suppressed the Huguenots. Nationality, rights of the people, freedom of conscience were things unknown in Europe.

It is in the light of these facts of Occidental history that modern students of political science ought to read the Asian achievements of the time. Internecine warfare, raids of military adventurers, and religious persecution were not more rampant in China or in India than in Europe. The conception of civil and religious liberty was not more highly developed among the subjects of the Habsburg emperors than among the peoples of Asia. The Manchu regime can thus easily bear the critical examination of Comparative History.

Moreover, the decay of the later Manchus is not a phenomenon special to this House. The mighty Tangs had not been mighty for long, nor had the "nationalist" Mings been wielders of strength for any length of time. Similarly the Manchus failed but to produce a legion of Kanghi the Greats. In Europe also not every monarch has been a Caesar or a Charlemagne.

4. The Chinese Herodotus on the Law of Revolutions.

To what, then, is the passing of the Manchus due? We have to detect here the same causes as led to the decline and fall of the "national" Houses of China. The revolution of 1911 does not differ from those of the previous ages in any significant sense except that this was initiated, if not conducted, by intellectuals like Kang Yu-wei, Sun Yat-sen, and Liang Chi-chao.

The fundamental reason of revolutions in China, the land of perpetual insurrections and civil wars, is not far to seek. It is as universal as humanity itself. It is akin in character to the forces that down to the epoch of the French revolution kept Europe in eternal strife whether through dynastic ambitions or corrupt administrations. It is essentially what Polybius traces in the links or transitions between the "normal" and the "abnormal" in his "cycle of the forms of government."

The same Polybian dictum is stated by Sze Ma-chien (B.C. 90), the Herodotus of China, in his chapter on the closing period of the Han dynasty. "At length under lax laws," as the historian goes on, "the wealthy began to use their riches for evil purposes of pride and self-aggrandisement and oppression of the weak. Members of the Imperial family received grants of land, while from the highest to the lowest, every one vied with his neighbour in lavishing money on houses, and appointments, and apparel, although beyond the

limit of his means. Such is the everlasting law of the sequence of prosperity and decay."

The founder of the Manchu dynasty, also, in his inaugural proclamation (1644) bore testimony to the real causes of Chinese revolutions. Said he:

"The Mings having become corrupt, rebels rose everywhere and oppressed the people. China being without government, I, faithful to the beneficent traditions of my family, have destroyed its oppressors, saved its people, after which, yielding to the universal request, I have fixed the seat of the empire at Peking. Crowned with the blessings of Heaven, I announce that I have ascended the throne I beg respectfully that Heaven and Earth may aid me to remove the misfortunes of my country."

The Manchus conquered China at the invitation of the Chinese general Wu Sankwei. The complete subjugation was effected with Manchu armies but under Chinese generals. The Manchu conquest was thus almost a "national" undertaking. The founder of the Manchus was, like the Buddhist beggar who had overthrown the last Mongol, a real *Yugavatâra*, "deliverer" or political Messiah. He began by calling China "my country". He came to remove its "misfortunes", and could thus sincerely issue the proclamation as a genuine "Chinese" patriot.

The Manchu dynasty was, therefore, as "legitimate" in origin as the Ming. Nor had the Han dynasty any more valid claims. Its founder is described by Du Halde as "a private soldier who became a freebooter and captain of a troop of vagabonds."

Like the founder of all other Imperial dynasties, Shunchi (1644—61) was in reality putting an end to the "state of nature", which, according to the great Chinese philosopher Moh Ti (B. C. (500—420?), is, as Su Hu points out in the *Development of Logical Method in Ancient China*, an "anarchy of birds and beasts." He suppressed the operation of *mât-sya-nyû-ya* or the "logic of the fish", and "unified the people's diversified notions of what is right."

Young China's Experiments in Education and *Swarāj*.

The easiest, and to some minds the strongest, criticism that may be hurled against Young China is that it has presumed to found a *Min Kuo* i.e. government "by the people" before the people have learnt to read and write. For, today "no education, no republic" is a truism of human thought. In the twentieth century in every civilized and independent country education is free as the air. It is naturally inconceivable that there can be a republic in a society which does not enjoy universal education.

I. *Swarāj* before Education.

And yet all the republics that we know of had been instituted long before the idea of "compulsory" education, or "free elementary education", or "public school" system was conceived. The socio-political reforms and revolutions which have enlarged mankind's visions and powers were effected by communities the general masses of which were as low in intellectual status as are the lower strata of the Chinese society today.

Arthur Young, the English economist, in the report of his travels in France during 1787—89, "takes note of every object that meets his eye" but never mentions a village school. "Had such schools existed we may be sure that he would have visited them. . . . The education of the people was a dead letter in France at the time he wrote. Here and there the cure or freres Ignorantius would get the children together and teach them to recite the catechism or spell a credo and paternoster. Writing, arithmetic, much less the teaching of French were deemed unnecessary. The Convention during its short regime (1792—96) decreed a comprehensive scheme of primary instruction, lay, gratuitous and obligatory, but the initiative was not followed up, and the first law on the subject carried into effect was that of 1833. How slowly matters advanced in Brittany may be gathered from an isolated fact. Even so late as 1872 two thirds of the inhabitants of the Ile and Vilaine could neither read nor write. It remained for the Third Republic to remove this stigma"! ¹⁾

It is clear that at the time of the Revolution the people of France were not "fit" for self-government, democracy, responsibilities for popular sovereignty and so forth. In 1833 Guizot, as minister

¹⁾ Young's *Travels in France* with introduction by Miss Bethan-Edwards.

of public instruction, ordered an inquiry into the educational condition of France. The *Exhibit of Primary Instruction in France* was published in 1837. "All the teachers", as we read in it, "did not know how to write. . . . The ignorance was general. . . . The teacher practised all the trades; he was day labourer, shoemaker, inn-keeper. He had his wife supply his place while he went hunting in the fields."²)

Take, again, the history of education in England. "The passage of the Reform Bill of 1832, which greatly extended the franchise in England, awakened a new sense of peril from the ignorance of the masses, and in the following year the first parliamentary grant was made for elementary education."³)

The actual educational condition of the English people in 1870 was described by Forster in the speech presenting his celebrated Education Bill. He said that the state-aided system was educating at the time "more or less imperfectly" 1,500,000 children. Many of these were mere infants; of the children between six and ten years of age it was estimated that 700,000 were in the aided schools, against 1,000,000 who were "neglected"; of those between ten and twelve, 250,000 were in the schools and 500,000 were not accounted.⁴)

The American republic also had been founded at least half a century before law recognized education as the birth right of human beings.

"The War of the Revolution had left the three millions of people impoverished; and difficulties with Great Britain, which continued up to the close of the war of 1812, made them uncertain even of the future. . . . During all this time schools . . . were running down. . . . It is true that colleges were springing up, and that academies were in the most prosperous condition, but neither of these institutions was for the people. Most of the latter (good schools) were within the private rather than the public system, and touched but a comparatively small proportion of the people. . . . There was absolutely no such thing as the pedagogical supervision of the schools, and not a public institution for the training of teachers in the country."⁵)

Such were the educational conditions in the most advanced areas in 1837 when Massachusetts first organized the State Board

²) Compayré: *History of Pedagogy*, Payne's translation.

³) Monroe: *Cyclopaedia of Education*.

⁴) *Ibid*

⁵) Dexter: *History of Education in the United States*.

of Education. This is fifty one years after the Declaration of Independence; and of course it was long before the level of literacy and elementary education could become uniform throughout the country.

None of these peoples waited to have their countries dotted over with schools and colleges before overhauling the political fabric. If they had thus waited they would have only committed the mistake of Plato as tutor to Dionysius II, king of Syracuse in Sicily (B. C. 367-357). It is well known how in Plato's ideal republic, as in the states devised by the ancient Chinese and Hindu political philosophers, the king as well as the ruling officers must have to be philosophers. When, therefore, he got a chance to carry out his ideal, Plato proceeded to build up his royal pupil according to his educational creed, "No philosopher, no king." Now, the basis of all philosophical investigations is science, and geometry, is the most fundamental of all sciences. Hence, argued Plato, in order to be a king or a "guardian", one must begin with geometry. Accordingly he set Dionysius and his court to mastering the properties of triangles and squares. It is not strange that the scholars were soon disgusted with this "thorough" pedagogy, and the whole experiment failed.

The maxim, "No education, no republic" or "no *shikshā*, no *swarāj*" may similarly be pushed to this ridiculous length. Statesmen should rather recognize that the very institution of the republic is itself a powerful educative agency, and that actual participation in the work of government is an integral schooling for democracy.

2. China's Educational Endeavours.

It must not be imagined, however, that republican China is depending exclusively or mainly on this "education through political activity" in order to make its citizens fit for the responsibilities of modern democracy. But like the revolutionists in France the Chinese republicans have drawn up a systematic scheme of educational institutions, primary, secondary, and collegiate. The goal, as everywhere else, is compulsory and universal literacy. Educational reform is really considered by Young China to be the very pivot around which all other reforms turn.

The traditional Confucian pedagogy aimed at *tao teh*, i.e. cultivation of moral or virtuous character. The republicans have applied the right of interpretation to this ideal of Confucius in order to adapt it to the modern needs. In 1912 Tsai Yuan Pei, the first minister of education under the new regime, defined the aim of

education to be to "instil into the minds of the people the right knowledge of liberty, equality, and fraternity.⁶⁾

Educational activity is indeed the most prominent feature of Chinese life today. For a short time, during the revolutionary period (1911—12), the modern educational programme first instituted in 1905 was disorganized. But "thanks to the enthusiasm with which educational affairs were taken up under the new regime, the "ground lost during the revolution was quickly recovered."⁷⁾

The following schedule indicates the work done by the Chinese republic in public education during the four years from 1912 to 1915. The figures for 1909-10 are given to show the point at which the revolution found the new Chinese education since its promulgation in 1905.

	1909—10	1915
Schools	57,267	86,799
Students	1,636,529	2,905,152
Teachers	89,362	127,706

Those who are aware of the financial difficulties of China will call this progress marvellous. In five years the schools have increased more than 50 per cent, the student body more than 75 per cent, and the teaching staff about 40 per cent. In 1919 the number of schools rose to 134,000, and of students to 4,500,000 in round figures.

Undoubtedly the figure 4,500,000 is but a drop in the ocean of China's population. It is certainly not yet time to calculate the percentage of literacy among the Chinese or compare it with that of Japan or of the Eur-American powers. In 1919, in every 400 men and women in China only 5 persons could read and write.

But the fact calls for notice that in about a decade and a half Young China may be said to have almost caught up to the educational activity in India, which has been under the control of a European nation, in parts, for over a century. In this the most advertized example of the alleged successful administration of the "white man's burden", the number of boys and girls at school in 1918—19 was only 7,936,577. out of a total population of 242,988,947. This was but a fifth of the children who have the right to free education in modern independent states.

People who are enthusiastic about the achievements of occidental governments in the Orient should therefore take a warning

⁶⁾ Kuo: *The Chinese System of Public Education*.

⁷⁾ *The China Year Book*, 1916.

from the role of England in India and hesitate to think of China being added to the list of their "burdens".

A few years ago newspapers were almost curios in China. At the end of 1917 there were at least 10,000 dailies, weeklies, or monthlies conducted by the Chinese. Practically the whole of this journalism is the product of the revolution and republican life. The daily vernacular papers in Peking were sixty in number, some of which had the circulation of 20,000 copies.

A noteworthy institution in the education department of the new administration is the "Bureau of social education". It has been playing a very useful part in promoting the general culture of the people, in a manner similar to that of the Public Lectures System maintained by American cities. A number of quasi-educational institutions has come into existence under its auspices. They diffuse education among the public by lectures, moving pictures, etc.

Besides clubs (literary, political, scientific, and pedagogic) have been becoming conspicuous items in the social life of Young China. All along the line there is a regular effort to raise the intellectual level of the citizens.

Among such "popular" institutions we note in 1919 the existence of 10 museums, 462 libraries, 197 travelling libraries, 2129 lecture halls, 1242 schools for poorer children, 37 open air schools, and 4593 ordinary schools. The figures speak for the social service and patriotic activities of China's leaders.

3. Embryology of Democracy.

But we must have to remember that, anthropologically and historically,⁸⁾ a republic is indeed an abstraction. Ordinary men and women, however, understand but the concrete signs of sovereignty, the tangible symbols of power, the material embodiments of law, and the living fountains of justice. Nay, it is the very visible human elements in the government, the personal prejudices and equations in the administration that appeal to the imagination of mankind. Monarchy with its divine halo and time-honoured paraphernalia is thus almost a "natural" institution, not only in "primitive" but also in "advanced" societies.

But under special circumstances the mentality of man may be modified and human nature "re-made" through deliberate experiments and the force of "creative" will. Thus on a thoroughly

⁸⁾ *Vide* "The Tenacity of Monarchy in the West" and "Republicanism in France" in Sarkar's *Political Institutions*.

virgin soil a community of kingless men and women may purposely settle down to constitute a state of its own. It would not be pressed heavy by the weight of its past except what it may care to select from the accumulated experience of ages as positively conducive to its interests. It would have absolute choice regarding the number, character, and qualifications of its population, the size and area of its settlements and cities, the tenure of agricultural holdings etc. Granted these conditions, a republic can be easily 'manufactured', if desirable (and, indeed, if it does not evolve spontaneously), according to some paper-constitution or "written laws" consciously resolved upon through the clubbing of fertile brains. The states of the New Hemisphere are instances of such republics "made to order" on a more or less cut and dried plan.

But the Old World is not a political or socio-economic *tabula rasa*. It has its fixed grooves, sanctified prejudices, historic vested interests, absolute landmarks, and permanent turn-pikes. Here, therefore, up till now there has been only republic of long standing; and this, again, among a people which has never had any king, and which succeeded in repelling all invasions by foreign kings. This is Switzerland. As for other countries where the very atmosphere is surcharged with the tradition of kings, queens, princes, and palaces, human energy has been rather barren in its results so far as the construction of pure republics is concerned. England could not stand a kingless polity; and the republic in France, formed in spite of her own sentiments, has throughout had a precarious career.

The testimony of history about the embryology and development of republics should however be interpreted as being open to two limitations.

First, a republic, wheresoever or howsoever born, may transform itself into one or other of the well-known forms of government, as it has often done, e.g., in England under Cromwell's army rule, in France and in Latin America.

In the second place, forms of government have been modified by free will in the past and would be more and more matters of choice in the future. The explanation is to be sought in the expansion of creative intelligence and in the daily increasing power of man over the world-forces.

4. "Absolute" Revolutions.

Since 1870 education has become universal all through the civilized world except only in dependencies, protectorates, and

spheres of influence. The universalization of education among the masses is soon going to be a fact everywhere on earth. As a result of this the revolutions of the twentieth century and after would have their *raison d'être* more specifically in abstract considerations of social justice, viz. the removal of obstacles to the growth of nationhood, international equity, the equalization of opportunities for the progress of the races, the highest development of men and women, in one word, the dignity of man as a human being, than in any violation, real or false, of original compacts, oaths, promises or treaties, and inhuman tyranny, bigotry, license, inquisition, "pogrom" etc. on the part of the powers that be.

The liberators of man in the twentieth century will not wait to count the barbarities inflicted on defenceless men and women by kings, capitalists, or landlords. The revolutionists of the future will not need a Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell* to electrify and spiritualize them against the tyrants, or "Satans" as they are called by Gandhi in India (1921). With the advance of rationalism the world will bring forth revolutions on *absolute* grounds; and even republics, abstract as they are, may become part of the very nature of mankind. Men and women will act more as the "moral agents" of Immanuel Kant and not as the mere creatures of environments and historic circumstances. The will is becoming more and more self-legislative and free; and revolutions will be welcomed as *Nishkāma Karma* (duty for its own sake) or "categorical imperatives" by the leaders of the human race. The ideal of *swarāj* as sovereignty and democracy will grow into a commonplace phenomenon in the normal psychology of individuals.

The first fruit of political thought and action under such *milieus* of creative intelligence cannot fail to be the emancipation of mankind from history. Politics will be regulated not so much by what tradition determines as by the conception of the ideally best form of government, whatever it may be considered to be for the time being.

Already the Russians have out-Frenched the French in their enunciation of the rights of man. Their program gives us a glimpse into the ideals and tendencies of political futurism. "The government very soon granted amnesty for political offenders, March 22, restored the constitution of Finland, March 21; promised Poland self-government and unity; conferred equal political, economic, educational, and military rights upon the Jews, March 26; abolished the death penalty, March 31; substituted the elected heads of the provincial zemstvos in places of the former appointed provincial

governors; and fixed prices at rates twenty to fifty percent lower than those current. . . . On June 9 elections for municipal and district councils were held, with universal suffrage for the first time in Russian history, and on June 22 universal (male and female) suffrage was extended to the zemstvo elections. Confiscatory taxes were laid on excessive war profits, and heavy burdens (sixty per cent) imposed on large incomes. . . . The trade unions, moreover, were permitted to exact from employers large wage increases and other concessions; in Petrograd 140 factories were placed on a six-hour-day basis, June 6."⁹)

It cannot be maintained that all these measures, not to speak of the Bolshevik cataclysms since November 1917, are the necessary and logical reactions to the tyranny and persecutions of the Romanoff regime as such. Nor is the "economic interpretation of history" adequate to explain this phenomenal revolution. The philosophical historian must see in a great part of it the presence of the "absolute", the "ideal", the "spiritual", which forms a most powerful ingredient in all *Zeitgeists*.

The republican movement in China is such an absolute movement. It is a complete breach with the past tradition in exactly the same sense and to the same extent as was the French event of 1792. Its real import can, therefore, be understood not from the platform of the history that was, but pragmatically, i.e., with reference to the result that is to be. It is an event in the liberalization of mankind, a process in the advancement of world culture. Here is an instance where political science has to admit the claims more of the visions of the idealists and the theories of the dreamers than of the over-wise conservatism of the hide-bound diplomats who fear every change in the *status quo* as a possible step in the destruction of their cherished preserves.

Nor, in fairness, can students of comparative history condemn the revolutions and counter-revolutions among the Chinese as evidences of political puerilism. The experience of America during the war of independence should be significant to the critics. The tribulations of the Americans are thus described by Guizot in his essay on Washington:

"Washington himself was not in safety; a conspiracy was formed to deliver him up to the English, and some members of his own guard were found to be engaged in it. . . .

⁹) *The Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1917.

"Arrests and banishments became frequent. The prisons were filled. Confiscations of property commenced. Local committees of public safety disposed of the liberty of their fellow citizens on the evidence of general notoriety. Popular violence in more than one instance was added to the arbitrary severities of the magistrates. . . . Notwithstanding the legitimate character of the cause, notwithstanding the virtuous wisdom of its leaders, the infant republic was experiencing the horrors of a civil war. . . .

"The colonies wanted confidence in each other. All of them were jealous of the power of the Congress, the new and untried rival of the local assemblies; they were still more jealous of the army."

If scientific judgment is to prevail, China's experiments in social reconstruction should have the same justification as those of the now successful America and France. In the meantime let Eur-American statesmen and sociologists swallow the ugly facts that in 1921 Constantine has been restored to kingship in Greece the cradle of Western democracy, that Karl the Habsburg has failed to get back the crown in Hungary only through a diplomatic bungling, that the Deutsch-National Party in the Imperial Republic of Germany is looking for the return of the Hohenzollerns, and that *L'Action Française* of Paris still enlightens the French royalists with the messages of coming golden age from their beloved *ex-roi* Philippe.

The Democratic Background of Chinese Culture.

In spite of the generally acknowledged importance of historic tradition as a pre-disposing force in the political development of a people, it may be safely asserted that the democratic ideals and republican institutions of Asia in ancient and medieval times, such as they were, can, for all practical purposes, exert no influence on her present-day experiments in nationalism and democracy. The political achievements of the Old Orient are, in fact, of no greater efficacy to the New Asia than the Periclean city-state of twenty thousand free men served by two hundred thousand slaves, the Roman *jus gentium*, the "law of nature" of the Stoics, the Patristic doctrine of spiritual equality, the Frankish *Champs de Mars*, the Visigothic *officium palatinum*, the *Vehmgerichte* of the Teutons, or the Council of Toledo can possibly be in helping modern Eur-America solve the problems of universal suffrage, the ethics of representation, referendum and recall, public ownership, and sovietic governments. But now that world-reconstruction is being consciously attempted on all hands, and old values are being revalued in every line of human endeavor, it is of the deepest import to practical statesmen and students of culture-history to recognize that the political psychology of the Orientals has been pragmatically uniform with that of the Occidentals both in its strength and limitations. In approaching the East, therefore, in the future the West should not attitudinize itself as to an antithesis, as it was the custom during the last few decades, but as to a "double" or replica and analogue.

1. Local and Gild Liberties.

The points of affinity between Asia and Eur-America do indeed lie on the surface. Let us confine ourselves to China for the present. On this sub-continent, a veritable museum of humanity, no traveller could have failed to notice, here and there and everywhere, the little nuclei of sturdy self-rule, the so-called village communities. The local authorities of these rural communes entirely administer the affairs of the village or township, metropolitan or provincial officers being conspicuous by their absence. The village council is composed of all the heads of families. Sometimes its constitution is based on the choice of elders by lot. These folk-moots often exercise the greatest influence in "national" politics. Thus when in 1857 the Imperial Government of China opened the port of Canton to the

British it had to encounter the utmost tooth-and-nail opposition of the city council to the measure.

The Chinese have been used to this system of local self-government since the earliest times. The elementary details of such municipal or rural institutions are given in the *Chouli*, the text-book of politics compiled from still older sources in the twelfth century B.C. All through the ages the elders of Chinese communes have been elected by local meetings and have held office during good behavior. Even to-day the salaries of these officials are fixed by their peers of the neighborhood, and they are removable whenever the principal persons of the community are displeased with their conduct.

The alderman of the townships has, generally speaking, twofold functions to discharge. First, he is the connecting link between the local people and the higher authorities in matters of administration. He supervises the police, is responsible for the common weal, and enforces the necessary regulations in regard to streets, tanks, markets, festivals, collection of taxes, etc. Secondly, he is a judicial officer, the lowest in the rung of the system for the whole country. The Manchu code provided that all persons having complaints must address themselves in the first instance to the lowest tribunals of justice in the district. The petty questions arising between the men of the locality are thus attended to by the headman, and he is authorized to mete out the proper punishments.

Not less remarkable as testifying to the age-long capacity of the Chinese for collective life in order to promote joint interests are the religious fraternities, secret revolutionary societies, industrial guilds, and trade corporations. The constitution of some of the modern guilds of China is democratic with vengeance. Thus, for instance, the tea-gild at Shanghai has at its head an annually elected committee of twelve. Each committeeman acts in rotation for one month as chairman or manager. No gild member may refuse to serve on this committee. Another gild, that of the millers at Wenchow, is composed of sixteen mill proprietors. A committee of four is selected by them in such a way as to bring each member in his turn on the committee. But the ruling price of the flour each month is settled by the entire craft in conference.

The guilds make their own rules and modify them whenever necessary. And since they are all voluntary associations owing their origin to no charter or governmental license, one can guess from the guild-rules to what a powerful extent the merchants of China are willing to be bound by the laws of their own making. One

of the rules of the tea-gild at Shanghai is thus worded: "Pending litigation with a foreign firm, members of the gild shall transact no business with the delinquent firm; relations are not to be resumed till the case is adjudicated." These ultrademocratic corporations do not in reality stop short of enforcing on their members the greatest possible solidarity of interest. "It is agreed," as we read among the rules, "that members having disputes about money matters shall submit their case to arbitration at a gild meeting, where every effort will be made to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the dispute. If it prove impossible to arrive at an understanding, appeal may be made to the authorities; but if the complainant resorts to the courts in the first instance he shall be publicly reprimanded, and in any future case he may bring before the gild he will not be entitled to the redress."¹)

The autonomies and immunities enjoyed in this way by the trade-gilds and rural communes of China in matters of legislation and adjudication would be easily recognized as some of the privileges and liberties of the craft gilds and *gemots* of medieval Europe. One must not suspect, however, that the political genius of the Chinese displayed itself solely in the administration of such parochial entities, the atomistic units of government. The *forte* of the people lay in centralization and unified control as well. In the study of Chinese polity we are familiar not only with the phenomena of feudalistic disintegration, provincial autonomy, *laissez faire*, and home rule, but also with pan-Chinese nationality, *fédération de l'empire*, and real *Weltherrschaft*.

2. Centralizing Agencies.

Solid political homogeneity was achieved on the Chinese continent on several occasions. The "Son of Heaven" did then become *de facto*, as he always was *de jure*, the *hwangti* or Bartolus's *dominus omnium*, of the whole empire. The supreme government of the Manchus, for example, consisted of two Imperial Councils of deliberative character and a dozen administrative boards. One of the councils, called the general council, organized first about 1730, was composed of any *grandees*, as princes of the blood, chancellors, presidents and vice-presidents of the boards, and chief officers of all the other metropolitan courts. The various branches of government were consolidated and their harmonious action facilitated by this agency. It served further to make up for the

¹) *Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*; 1896, New Series, Vol. XXI, pp. 133—192.

shortcomings of a degenerate ruler and act as a check on the arbitrary measures of a tyrant. The government and direction of the entire civil service of the Manchu empire were left to the care of one of the boards, called the Board of Civil Office. Similarly the other boards were entrusted with duties concerning all the people of the empire. All this contributed no doubt to administrative unification.

The eighteen provincial governments had, as Williams calculates in the *Middle Kingdom*, about 2,000 officers above the rank of the assistant district magistrate. Personal touch with the supreme governments was ensured by the rule that every high grade officer had to report himself in writing twice every month. Appeals from the lowest courts of the village elders to the higher tribunals of the provinces and the empire served also as strong centripetal influences. Besides, the system of literary examinations by which all officers were appointed to important posts was thoroughly imperialized. The hierarchy of teachers and examiners from Peking to the villages was complete. The "literary chancellors" of the provinces were, like the civil and military governors, appointed by the emperor himself. Altogether, we have here the picture of a France centralized under the Intendants of Richelieu for an area five or six times as large.

It must not be surmised, however, that the king's power in China was a pure despotism. The Chinese polity was never without a conciliar element, the acts of the king being always subject to the control of the chief ministers. No individual could be appointed to a high post by the emperor alone. The ministers had the right to recommend or present a fit person. The king might indeed reject him, but even this prerogative appears to have been controllable, as may be gathered from Werner's *Chinese Sociology* (p. 52), by the united voice of ministers.

The restraints on the power of the king and the value of the council of ministers in the constitution of the state are strongly borne out by Chinese tradition which can be traced back to hoary antiquity. Thus from the earliest times it has been taught, both by examples and precept, says Meadows in *The Chinese and their Rebellions*, that no man whatever had a hereditary divine right to the throne, nor even any son of its last occupant. The "five legendary rulers" (B. C. 2852—2255), whom Confucius has immortalized for his countrymen in the *Shuking* (Book of History), treated the kingdom as belonging to the nation. The doctrine of the state as public property was forcefully demonstrated, as is

known to every Chinese of all ages, when Yao (B. C. 2356—2255), one of the "model kings," selected the worthiest from among the people as his successor.

The political psychology of China is likewise nurtured on the democratic imagination fired by the exemplary conduct of Shun (B. C. 2255—2205), another of her model kings. He had a tablet placed outside his official residence whereon any one could criticize his administration. Public opinion was thus brought to bear upon his own work. He used also to put questions to the people in Ming Tang, a sort of national assembly, with special reference to the names of bad characters or undesirable citizens. Participation of the people in the function of government entailed necessarily a check on the royalty itself.

Further, as Simcox makes it clear in *Primitive Civilizations*,²⁾ it is treated almost as a constitutional principle that when the king of China misbehaves it is the duty of the most virtuous and powerful of the provincial princes to depose and succeed him. There is, for instance, on record the actual confinement of the sovereign Tai Chia by the minister I Yin in a palace at Tung near the ruins of the former king "until he gave proof of reformation." With reference to this incident Mencius (B. C. 373—289), the great Confucian sage, was asked whether worthies being ministers might banish their vicious sovereigns in this way. The reply was given to the effect that if they had the same purpose as I Yin, they might, otherwise it would be usurpation.³⁾

To an American whose mentality is normally as far removed from Dante's *De Monarchia* as the modern spectroscope is from Aristotle's optics or the Harveyan circulation of blood from the Galenian physiology, all this is but a poor preparation of Asia for the responsibilities of the modern democracy. True, but the fact remains that monarchy, absolute even when "enlightened" and benevolent, has been the most tenacious and persistent form of government in the occidental world also. Indeed, if Napoleon III. had not been defeated by the Prussians at Sedan, it is an open question if there would have been a republic in France to-day.

Institutionally speaking, then, the political experience of Asia has not been essentially distinct from that of Europe. What about political theorizing?⁴⁾ Here again we find the same parallelism and

²⁾ Vol. II, p. 18.

³⁾ *Mencius*, Book VII, Part I, XXXI.

⁴⁾ Vide "Thé Doctrine of Resistance in Hindu Thought" in the author's *Positive Background of Hindu Sociology*, Vol. II. Political (Allahabad, 1921).

identity between the East and the West. For instance, to take only China, no political thinker could be more radical than the "superior men" of the Confucian classics. It is often said that Chinese culture is but Confucius "writ large." We need not accept the statement as implying that one abstract word "Confucianism" sums up and explains the whole mentality of entire China. But it may still be maintained that like the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* of the Hellenes, the *Shuking* and the *Shiking* (Book of Odes) have furnished the *mores* of the Chinese people for over two thousand years. The *Divine Comedy* has not been the bible of Catholic Europe to a far greater extent than the Confucian texts and their commentaries to the upper ten thousands as well as the dumb millions in China.

3. Chinese Political Philosophy.

What, now, are the political tenets of the Chinese classics? The idea of the position of the people as supreme is the corner stone of the *Shuking* politics. We are told:

It was the lesson of our great ancestor:

The people should be cherished;

They should not be down-trodden;

The people are the root of a country;

The root firm, the country is tranquil.⁵⁾

Interests of the people are carefully safeguarded in another advice: "Do not oppose the people to follow your own desires."⁶⁾

Passages like these have been handed down from generation to generation, and to-day they are on the lips not only of intellectuals like General Li, Premier Tang and Foreign Minister Wu, but also of the rickshaw coolie and the junk sailors. They know also the maxim that "of all who are to be feared, are not the people the chief?"⁷⁾ This is the Chinese version of the saying: "The fear of the people is the wisdom of the lord."

What, again, could be more conducive to the "dignity" of the people than the oft-quoted proverb?—"The great God has conferred *even* on the inferior people a moral sense, compliance with which would show their nature invariably right."⁸⁾ The *Shuking* can be cited also in a campaign of popular sovereignty. As might be naturally expected, the newspaper men of recent

⁵⁾ Part III, Book III, Ch. II. 1.

⁶⁾ Part II, Book II, Ch. I, 6.

⁷⁾ Part II, Book II, Ch. II, 17.

⁸⁾ Part IV, Book III, Ch. II.

times have succeeded in bringing to the forefront the conduct of the king who followed the principle of limited monarchy when he admitted: "I consulted and deliberated with all my ministers and people and they are of one accord with me."⁹) There is thus no place for arbitrary rule in the political consciousness of China.

Indeed, *vox populi vox dei* is the first postulate of Chinese political philosophy. A popular maxim was given by Chang in his commentary on Confucius's *Great Learning*. It runs thus: "By gaining the people the kingdom is gained, and by losing the people the kingdom is lost" (Ch. X). The origin of this doctrine of the will of the people is to be traced, as was done by Mencius, to the ancient "Great Declaration," which says: "Heaven sees according as my people see; Heaven hears according as my people hear."¹⁰)

Mencius himself can be cited by advocates of active resistance. For he openly discussed the question, "What fault is it to restrain one's prince?" and his answer was clear: "He who restrains his prince loves his prince."¹¹)

Mencius is likewise an authority in a case for the deposition of a ruler. According to his advice, if the prince have great faults the relatives ought to remonstrate with him, and if he does not listen to them after they have done so again and again they ought to depose him.¹²)

Like Milton, Mencius is a defender of regicide too. The king asked: "May a minister then put his sovereign to death?" Mencius replied:

"He who outrages benevolence *proper to his nature* is called a robber; he who outrages righteousness is called a ruffian. The robber and the ruffian we call a mere fellow. I have heard of the cutting off of the fellow, Chow, but I have not heard of the putting a sovereign to death *in his case*."¹³)

The logic of Mencius here is similar to that of the most outspoken anti-imperialist of the eleventh century, Manegold of Lautenbach, who defended the expulsion of Tarquin from Rome on the ground that kingship ceases to be legitimate when it ceases to promote justice. In fact, the Mencian creed is Rousseauesque in its radicalism. "The most important element in the state," declares this protagonist of Chinese democracy, "is the people; next come

⁹) Part II, Book II, Ch. II, 18.

¹⁰) Mencius, Book V, Part I, Ch. V, 8.

¹¹) Book I, Part II, Ch. IV, 10.

¹²) Book V, Part II, Ch. IX, i.

¹³) Book I, Part II, Ch. VIII, 2, 3.

the altars of the national gods; least in importance is the king." Further, "By observing the nature of the people's aspirations we learn the will of heaven." In Chinese ethics the divine "sanction" is thus subordinate to the sanction of the demos.

A cynic may reasonably ask: "How much of this philosophical radicalism or intellectual bolshevism was embodied in actual institutions of the Chinese polity?" The answer would be furnished by a parallel situation in Europe. According to the theory of the lawyers, e.g., Ulpian (second century A. C.), the source of political authority was the people. But from Hadrian to Justinian (117--565) the emperor's will was law. And in the fourteenth century Bartolus (1314--57), the "prince of jurists," was but maintaining the trend of traditional jurisprudence when he affirmed that the Roman Emperor was "*Deus in terris*" and "*semperiternus*" and that to dispute him was sacrilege. Similarly the modern ideas of natural equality, freedom, justice, etc., can be carried, as has been done by Carlyle in *Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, back to Cicero (106--43 B. C.) through the Church Fathers and the Roman jurists. But, for two thousand years slavery was recognized as a lawful and legitimate institution, privileges and inequalities were the norm in socio-civic life, and the divine right of the king was an established fact. It was not until the French Revolution that a legalized constitutional measure was adopted to give effect to the doctrine of natural equality which was first promulgated by the Stoics in opposition to the theory of the Aristotelians. The discrepancy between theory and practice in the political sphere is thus not less occidental than oriental, after all.

The Fortunes of the Chinese Republic (1912-1919).

1. Revolutions and Reactions.

The Chinese Republic is now in the throes of another civil war. Just at present there are two governments in China. The one is the established Government at Peking in the North, the other the rebel Government at Canton in the South. The Northern Government is the one recognized by the Powers and has been an associate of the Allies in the war against Germany since August 14, 1917. It is this Government that is one of the fourteen states represented at the Congress of Versailles, and that has been a signatory to the draft of the constitution of the League of Nations announced by President Wilson on February 14, 1919. But the authority of the Peking Power is not acknowledged as legitimate by the constitutionalists of Young China.

Ever since the illegal dissolution of parliament to which President Li Yuan-hung was forced to assent under a *coup d'état* of General Chang Hsun on June 13, 1917, they have been in open revolt against it. The resistance of the constitutionalists at first took the form of representations to Peking to reconvoke the dissolved parliament. On the failure of the repeated representations to bring about a parliamentary regime, the five rich and populous provinces of the South, viz., Kwang-tung, Kwang-si, Yunnan, Kwei-chow and Sze-chuen declared their complete independence from the jurisdiction of the North. In seven other provinces, such as Hu-nan, Hu-peh, Fu-kien, Shan-tung, Ho-nan, Shen-si and Che-kiang, constitutionalist armies are masters of large portions of territory and have the moral support of numerous cities and districts. The most powerful portion of the Chinese navy also is on the side of the constitutionalists. It is on behalf of this recalcitrant Government with headquarters at Canton that Wu Ting-fang, Tang Shao-yi, Sun Yat-sen and five others have appealed to the Powers for recognition, in their capacity as Administrative Directors. The Government in Canton has convened a parliament which has been in session since August 6, 1918. The objective of the "Constitutionalist Provinces and Forces of China" is not a separation or secession but the establishment of a legally constituted parliamentary government for all China.

The present civil war is the sixth in the series of revolutions and reactions (or rather the seventh, if we count the puerile inter-

lude of the Manchu restoration of July 1—12, 1917, as a serious political event) that have marked the politics of Young China since the bomb explosion at Hankow on October 10, 1911, and the establishment of the republic with Sun Yat-sen as provisional president and General Li Yuan-hung as vice-president on December 30 of the same year. The first revolution (Oct. 10, 1911—March 10, 1912) may be taken to have been formally complete with the inauguration of Yuan Shih-kai as provisional president on March 10, 1912, the decision to maintain the capital at Peking and not to transfer it to Nanking, and the adoption of the provisional constitution drawn up by the provisional National Assembly (the "Advisory Assembly") at Nanking, generally known as the Nanking Constitution.

The second revolution (July—August 1913) was directed against Yuan Shih-kai's conclusion of the five-power-loan without the assent of the first Parliament that had been convened on April 7, 1913, and other arbitrary measures. It broke out at Hukow in Kiang-si Province, and at Nanking, Shanghai and Canton. The radicals organized in the Kuo-ming Tang party were responsible for the movement. It was speedily suppressed, however; and General Huang Hsing, Sun Yat-sen and other rebel leaders had to escape to Japan and America.

The first reaction, under the republican regime, had been in evidence in Yuan's attitude towards the Nanking Constitution, and subsequently towards the measures of the first Parliament. It took final form on November 4, 1913, when after his election on October 10 as full president for five years Yuan "purged" the parliament of the radical Kuo-mings (306 Representatives out of the total 596, and 132 Senators out of the total 274). The first Parliament was thus put "in commission" owing to the lack of quorums that needed the presence of half the members in each House, and finally abolished by the president on January 10, 1914, with the support of the "moderates".

The *coup d'état* of November 4, 1913, left Yuan the *de facto* dictator of China for two years and ultimately matured in the plan, secretly manoeuvred by himself, for the formal establishment of an imperial monarchy. Yuan officially accepted the throne on Dec. 11, 1915, under the title of *Hung Hsien* or "glorious constitutionalism." It was against this projected empire that the third revolution broke out on Xmas 1915 in Yun-nan and Kwei-chow under the leadership of moderates or conservative progressives of the Chinpu Tang party such as "Scholar" Liang Chi-chiao and General Tsai Ao. Yuan was

compelled to cancel the empire-decree on March 22, 1916; but the revolution continued to spread from province to province leading to the declaration of independence by each, and really came to an end only with the sudden death of Yuan on June 6, the election of Li Yuan-hung (the General of the first revolution) as president, and the convocation of the second Parliament, which was really the old Parliament of 1913, on August 1, 1916.

The second reaction began in May 1917, over the question of finally declaring war against Germany, diplomatic relations having been broken off on March 14, 1917. General Tuan Chi-jui, as Premier, attempted to coerce the parliament to vote in favour of war, and was therefore dismissed by the president for want of people's confidence in him. Once out of the Cabinet, however, Tuan secretly instigated the military governors of the provinces to declare their independence of the Peking Government. Furnished with this cue they forthwith demanded the reappointment of Tuan, and marched upon the capital in militant expedition. Practically a prisoner within the city, President Li was pressed by the militarists under General Chang Hsun to order, against the law as embodied in the Nanking Constitution, the dissolution of parliament on June 13, 1917.

The revolt of the provinces and the strangling of parliament were followed by another reaction consisting in Chang Hsun's restoration of the Manchu boy-emperor to the throne on July 1. But the monarchy was abolished in less than two weeks through the patriotic move, among others, of General Tuan who "could not bear to see the destruction of the republic without stretching out a helping hand," although after his dismissal he had "resolved," as he said, "not to participate in political affairs." The farce of the restoration made confusion only worse confounded. All authority came to be concentrated in the hands of Tuan, the hero of the hour. He managed to have himself reappointed premier, restored the militaristic regime that had led to his dismissal, and illegally declared war against Germany on August 14, 1917. It is to this unconstitutional rule of the Cabinet without a parliament that the Southern Government at Canton has been in armed opposition for about two years since the summer of 1917.

2. North and South in Chinese Politics.

The most characteristic feature of these civil wars or revolutions and counter-revolutions is that invariably they take the form of an *ultimatum* issued from the provinces upon the Central Government,

and this is followed immediately by declarations of their independence. This *modus operandi* is the procedure as much of the republicans and constitutionalists as of the reactionaries and militarists. Nothing could be a more natural method in China, as the provinces of today have but inherited the virtual home-rule of the old regime. In normal times these local governments were to all intents and purposes independent of one another without the links of co-operation. They had, besides, no real touch with the supreme authority except only in the payment of "tribute". The mountainous provinces like Yun-nan, Kwei-chow and Sze-chuen are, moreover, all but inaccessible. Further, they are inhabited by semi-savage tribes who were never fully conquered either by Chinese arms or by Chinese culture. Owing to this incomplete assimilation and ineffective "Sinification" these frontier provinces were perpetual storm-centres in pre-republican days. And these are the areas that were generally selected by ambitious viceroys or chieftains who wanted to measure their strength with the Sons of Heaven at Peking.

Altogether, then, the Chinese empires were, practically speaking, *Staatenbunden*, i.e., loose federations of free nationalities and autonomous states, except during short intervals under masterful organizers of the Kanghi the Manchu or Tai-tsung the Tang type. The self-sufficiency and decentralization of the provinces were not confined only to the administration of justice and collection of taxes. During the last days of the Manchus the provinces appear to have behaved even as separate military-naval units. Thus, for instance, in the Korean War (1894-95), the Nanking naval establishment acted almost as if it were indifferent to the fortunes of the northern fleet that was facing the Japanese navy. Automatically, therefore, the Chinese state tends to crumble down like a house of cards as soon as there is an acute misunderstanding between the local rulers and the central head.

This is an inherent constitutional weakness of China. It is due certainly to the vast size of its territory and the consequent distance of the local centres from the metropolis. The Central Government as a rule naturally finds it hard to cope with the disruptive centrifugal tendencies created by this physical reason. And the difficulty is further enhanced by the absence of funds or sinews of war. The deficit in the treasury has been a chronic disease with the authorities at Peking. Any military actions of a sustained and serious character have thus been rendered well nigh impossible on their side. These are the fundamental facts of Chinese polity that

explain the quick and spontaneous division of China into North and South with the slightest hitch in the course of affairs.

The strategic advantage in the position of recalcitrant provinces is therefore the first postulate of China's internal politics, and the success of malcontents and rebels an almost foregone conclusion. The general situation from the standpoint of the Supreme Government on all occasions of revolutionary outbreak can be gathered from two of the three abdication-edicts promulgated by the Empress Dowager on Feb. 12, 1912. One edict says that, separated as the North and South are by great distances, the unwillingness of either side to yield to the other can result only in the continued interruption of trade and the prolongation of hostilities. If, however, renewed warfare were to be indefinitely maintained, says the third edict, the general condition of the country might be irretrievably ruined, and there might follow mutual slaughter among the people. Here is a confession of incompetency on the part of the powers that be, the admission of military unpreparedness that dare not bring the unruly forces to bay. In the selfsame way has the *de facto* government in China had systematically to come down to compromise in the face of a tolerably strong opposition, just as in the industrial strikes of Europe and America the employers have invariably to acknowledge defeat and submit to the demands of the organized labor force.

Whenever, therefore, there is a denomination or class or party in China sufficiently powerful to challenge and defy the established government, it has only to seek its fulcrum at a place far from Peking, e.g., in the frontier provinces, be it in Sze-chuen or Yunnan or Shen-si or Shan-tung. Even before the event of Oct. 10, 1911, we find serious political disturbances breaking out in these out of the way regions. It is such areas that furnished the theater for the great Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), the Mohammedan revolts under Sulciman (1855-1878) and Yakub Beg (1866-77), and the Boxer upheaval of 1900.

The South may of course be presumed to be, as it indeed is, comparatively enlightened and progressive, as Macao the Portuguese port in Kwang-tung has been in touch with modern European commerce and culture for a longer period than the other ports opened since the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. It is also not an accident that Kang Yu-wei, the spiritual father of Young China, and Sun Yat-sen, the out-and-out radical, and several other constitutional agitators and anti-monarchist republicans have come from Canton and the South. But the leadership of the South in the events of the past seven years is not to be exclusively interpreted

as an expression and proof of its modernization as contrasted with the medievalic obscurantism of the North. It is, as has been indicated, the greatness and glory inevitably thrust upon it by physiography, ethnology, provincial separatism, *laissez faire* or imperial impotence, and financial bankruptcy of the central governments. It is not always safe or legitimate, therefore, as is usually done, to identify the South with liberalism, reform or republicanism, and the North with monarchism, Manchuism and militarism.

3. *Min Kuo* (Republic) Triumphant.

Among the kaleidoscopic changes in the political fortunes of Young China we have to count two attempts at monarchic regime. The first is that of Yuan Shih-kai who during the latter half of 1915 was systematically "manufacturing the will of the people" in favor of changing the republic into a monarchy. On November 11, 1915, the "administrative council" or "council of state" composed of his henchmen was in a position to announce that out of 2043 votes 1993 were for the immediate enthronement of Yuan. Accordingly, in "deference to the will of the people" the empire was sanctioned by the president or rather emperor-elect on December 11. The second monarchic counter-revolution is the farcical July restoration of 1917. It was the disorder and turmoil in the country owing to the revolt of the northern provinces under the inspiration of Tuan Chi-jui and the eventual abolition of the second Parliament that enabled General Chang Hsun to raise the Manchu boy to the throne.

Both these attempts failed ignominiously. Yuan was completely humiliated, crushed, and literally killed by the combined opposition of the nation. The "Yun-Kwei revolt" was indeed conducted by moderate leaders of the Chinpu Tang party like Liang Chi-chiao and General Tsai Ao, but it had the backing also of the Kuo-ming radicals like Sun Yat-sen and General Huang Hsing, who since the failure of 1913 had been political refugees in Japan and the United States, of General Li Yuan-hung the staunch republican, whom neither the threats nor the enticements of the monarchists could influence in favor of Yuan's contemplated dynasty, as well as of Kang Yu-wei, the veteran constitutionalist and "China's modern sage." Even the province of Sze-chuen which was under the rule of Yuan's most dependable friend joined the confederacy of the rebel provinces on May 6, 1916. This event is most significant as Yuan had already cancelled the empire-decree (March 22). The

triumph of the Chinese *Min Kuo* (republic) was decisive and thorough.

Similarly did Chang Hsün's *coup* of the Manchu restoration fall disastrously before the united front of the entire nation. Liang came forward once more as the Milton of the armed resistance against the nullification of the republic. And the trumpet-call of this scholar, "moderate" though he be, summoned on to a common platform all the factions that had been mutually opposed. The North advanced to co-operate with the South; even General Tuan, the militarist detested by liberals and legalists, came to the aid of the parliamentarians, because, as he said, "he has had a share, however insignificant, in the formation of the Chinese Republic." The restoration was treated as a national disaster. To a far greater extent than Yuan's dictatorship and projected empire-building, it brought to a head the nebulous and subconscious political tenets of all parties and individuals, whether liberals or conservatives, self-seekers or patriots, autocrats or those working for the inauguration of the reign of law.

Monarchy appears in this way to have been finally rung out from the political psychology of Young China. It is committed for good to the nurture and development of the republic. The vital urge of Chinese politics lies now, therefore, in the struggle over the constitution. Indeed, it is the constitutional issue that has been the real core of all dissensions and fights since the promulgation of abdication-edicts and the inauguration of Yuan as provisional president in 1912. Nay, this constitutional struggle, of which the most recent phase is embodied in the manifesto of Wu Tingfang (August 1918) is the result of an evolution the beginnings of which are to be seen in the decade or so preceding the revolution itself.

4. Constitutional Agitation under the Manchus.

The pre-revolutionary struggle was naturally focussed upon the establishment of parliamentary institutions such as might act as checks on the one-man-rule of the monarch. The St. John the Baptist of Chinese constitutionalism is Kang Yu-wei, the "modern Confucius", editor of *News for the Times*, and he succeeded in becoming for a few months the "guide, philosopher and friend" of Emperor Kwang Hsu (1875—1908). It is to Kang's studies in modern history and comparative politics, especially the British constitution and the *Meiji* (enlightenment) era of New Japan that the twenty-seven Imperial reform-edicts of July 1898 owed their inspiration. The reform movement succumbed, however, through the

comp of the Empress Dowager. Kang and his foremost disciple Liang Chi-chiao had to escape with a price on each head.

But the signs of the times were unmistakable after the failure of the Chinese Boxers in 1901 and the success of Japan in the Russian War. So in 1905 a commission was sent to Europe under the presidentship of Prince Tsai-tse (cf. Japanese Prince Ito in 1882) to study the conditions for a representative government suited to the problems of China. This commission was followed in 1908 by the Imperial promise of a parliament to be convoked in 1917. In 1909 were constituted the first Provincial Assemblies of China, and on October 3, 1910, the Imperial Assembly or Senate of two hundred members (one hundred being drawn from the Provincial Assemblies) also sat in Peking for the first time. The agitation of these two new bodies proved to be powerful enough to wrest from the Crown the promise that the first parliament would be called in 1913 and not so late as 1917.

It was at this stage of China's constitutional experience that the bomb explosion at Hankow on the Yang-tsze, which was to be the signal for the subversion of the monarchy, took place on Oct. 10, 1911. The monarch tried to save the situation for the Crown on Nov. 3, 1911, by issuing the "Nineteen Articles", which provided, among other items, the parliamentary control over the budget, the Cabinet's responsibility to parliament, and limitations on the power of the Emperor by the constitution. Had these articles been acceptable to the rebels, Chinese politics would have taken the same course as those of Young Persia since 1906 and of Turkey since 1908. But within a month of the rising in Wuchang zone fourteen provinces declared their independence. Their delegates met quickly at Nanking in convention and proclaimed China a republic on December 30. The officers and representatives of the monarchy had no mind or might to put up more than a feeble or sham resistance to what they accepted as a *fait accompli*.

It was therefore easy to force an edict from the Empress Dowager on February 12, 1912, to the effect that "the hearts of the majority of the people are in favour of a republican form of government." "From the preference of the people's hearts," the edict went on to say in conformity with the teachings of Mencius, "the will of heaven can be discerned. How could we then bear to oppose the will of the millions for the glory of one family! Therefore, observing the tendencies of the age on the one hand, and studying the opinions of the people on the other, We and His Majesty the Emperor hereby vest the sovereignty in the people

and decide in favor of a republican form of constitutional government." The first phase of the struggle over a constitution was thus brought to a successful end.

5. The Struggle over the Constitution in Republican China.

Constitutionally speaking, then, the revolution came only to give a fillip to the movement that had been set on foot in 1898 or rather in 1905. It did not take China by surprise. The Throne being abolished, the leaders of Young China have proceeded since then to the reorganization of a crownless state on a popular basis. The parliament that was to have been called in 1913 by the Crown happened to be anticipated by the Convention of Nanking (December 30, 1911), that gave way to the Advisory Assembly on January 28, 1912. This assembly prepared the provisional constitution at Nanking, inaugurated Yuan Shih-kai as provisional president (March 30) and later moved on to Peking (April 29). It was finally replaced by the First Parliament which sat on April 7, 1913.

The first constitutional struggle in republican China was waged over the group of unparliamentary politics that arose through the dictatorship of Yuan Shih-kai. As provisional president, he made the loan transaction with five powers (including Japan but excluding the United States) to the value of £ 25,000,000 without the sanction of the Parliament. As Yuan was backed by the Powers, the bankers did not hesitate to grant the loan though the Parliament protested against it as illegal and declared it null and void. Subsequently, as full president, Yuan dissolved the national parliament on January 10, 1914 as well as the provincial assemblies and local associations (March 1). Backed by the political wisdom of Dr. Goodnow, the American adviser, he created in their place a constitutional compact conference, and this recommended laws directly calculated to make the president a virtual despot and leave the legislature a mere automaton of non-entities.

It was through the substantial support of the Powers that Yuan Shih-kai's "tyranny" could get a firm footing. As they were interested solely in the security of the funds supplied by their nationals, their connivance at Yuan's unconstitutional measures was more than mere diplomatic non-intervention. It was tantamount to aiding and abetting their protégé and vassal in his own sweet will. Here was a repetition of the old story of the Stuarts trampling down the rights of the English people with the French despot Louis XIV's 'degrading insult and more degrading gold'. The European War also for a time contributed to the strengthening of Yuan's single-handed rule

by removing from it the public opinion of the world that was absorbed in more vital international issues. But as Japan's Twenty-one Demands (January 18—May 7, 1915) on China after the victory at Tsing-tao would have deprived the Europeans and Americans of their lion's share in the control of Far Eastern politics, they could not by any means remain long indifferent to Chinese affairs. They hastened to do all they could under the circumstances to pose as the friend of China and exploit her as a tool in their own anti-Japanese interests. Yuan's "patriotic" resistance to Japanese overtures received formidable support from the nations in whose eyes the success of Japan, the only free Asian state, means a loss to Eur-American world-domination. Especially interested were the diplomacies of Great Britain and the United States; and unluckily for Chinese democracy, they served to consolidate Yuan's grip over the people.

Exigencies of foreign politics having thus rendered his position impregnable from an unforeseen angle, Yuan ventured on playing the trump-card and risking a "world-dominion or downfall" on a single stake. He launched the monarchy propaganda in the summer of 1915 and was almost on the point of carrying it through when the opposition of the nation manifested itself in a revolution that swept away the whole system of arbitrary rule. In this instance, at least, Japan has stood for liberalism and constitution in China, for the anti-Yuan movement was hatched and matured by Young China's leaders as guests of the Japanese people.

The second group of unparliamentary politics in the Chinese republic consists in the problems that have arisen through the autocratic methods of the premier, General Tuan Chi-jui. It is the extremely idealistic advocacy of legal and constitutional procedure on the part of the Kuo-ming radicals that is responsible for the opposition to Tuan's regime which has forced China into the war against Germany. Evidently all the Kuo-mings are not opposed to the war itself like Kang Yu-wei, Sun Yat-sen and Tang Shao-yi. But though several of them are pro-war like the Chin-pu Tang moderates headed by Liang Chi-chiao, the extremists have dared risk a regular armed revolt with the only object of vindicating the constitution. "No pains have been spared time and again," as Wu Ting-fang's manifesto states, "to make clear that the sole aim of the constitutionalist movement is to uphold the law and constitution and the sole claim is the restoration of the dissolved parliament. If the order for reconvoation be issued today there will be peace tomorrow." This is an interesting phase in Young China's political

development. At Canton are united not only the liberal thinkers of the South but constitutionalists from every part of China. Similarly Peking is the headquarters of all reactionaries, Northern as well as Southern. The issue is not between province and province or North and South but constitution and arbitrary rule.

In the first place, China's declaration of war against Germany on August 14, 1917, is considered unconstitutional by the Canton Government as it was done without the sanction of a parliament rather after a parliament had been forcibly abolished. The "militarists" at Peking are being further charged by the seceding constitutionalists with the misuse of funds set free by the remission of Boxer Indemnity payments (a concession in return for China's joining the allies), the selling and mortgaging of the "richest mines, the stable revenues and the most profitable railways," the revival of the opium traffic, the negotiation of important conventions with foreign powers in which the nation is committed to grave undertakings of unknown extent without parliamentary sanction, and the absolute refusal to publish the contents of the conventions and allay the misgivings of the people in spite of the universal demand. But the position of the Peking Government is unassailable for the time being as it is in alliance with the Entente Powers and the United States in order to make the "world safe for democracy". From the standpoint of the Canton politicians, therefore, it is foreign influence, if not intervention, that has mainly contributed to the present constitutional interregnum in China.

Like the "eleven years' tyranny" of Charles I, both these instances of unconstitutional rule in republican China are marked by the negation and overthrow of parliament. The only period of smooth parliamentary government was that under President Li Yuan-hung from August 1, 1916 to June 13, 1917. By May it had finished drafting the permanent constitution that is to take the place of the provisional Nanking Constitution, but before it could be formally adopted, came the crisis. Curiously enough, in each instance, the reactionary elements, viz., Yuan and Tuan, have had the support of foreign powers, some of whom at least are democratic and liberal in their own home politics. The republicans of Young China have thus had before them the same double opposition, domestic and foreign, to contend with as the constitutionalists or Majlisists of Young Persia. Not less remarkable is the strange coincidence that like the liberals, reformers or democrats of the Near East and the Middle East looking up to autocratic Germany as the inspirer of their political programs, the republic

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The International Fetters of Young China.

1. Foreign Possessions in China.

Technically speaking, China is still a free country, as the number and extent of *de jure* foreign territories on Chinese soil are remarkably small. The story of these "possessions," euphemistically known as areas "leased" to the powers for a period of ninety-nine years, is easily told.

Hong-kong at the mouth of the Canton River, about 90 miles south of Canton, has been British since 1841. Its present population is about 500,000. Total area 391 square miles. Wei-hei-wei in the Shantung Province has been British since 1898. Area about 285 square miles. Population about 150,000.

France has been in possession of Kwang-chau-wan in Kwang-tung Province since 1898. Area about 190 square miles. Population 168,000.

In 1898 Germany obtained from China the port of Kiao-chao with exclusive railway and mining rights in Shantung Province. Area 200 square miles. Population 200,000. Since November 7, 1914, the Japanese have been in full possession of all authority in the port and in all former German concessions, viz., the mining privileges and the railway to Tsinan-fu, the capital of the Chinese territory. The Congress of Versailles (1919) has formally legalized Japan's stepping into Germany's shoes at every point.

Kwan-tung (with Port Arthur and Dalny or Dairen) in the Liao-tung Peninsula in Southern Manchuria belonged to Russia from 1898 to 1904. But it has been in Japanese hands since the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905). Area 1256 square miles. Population 525,000.

The mastery of Macao at the mouth of the Canton River belongs to Portugal. Population 75,000. The Portuguese have been enjoying authority since 1862.

It is evident that the actual jurisdiction of European and Japanese governments within the geographical boundaries of China is almost inappreciable whether as regards mileage or in terms of population. And yet the sovereignty of the Chinese republic *de facto* is, like the sovereignty of Persia, a thing that does not exist except in the imagination of China's patriots or in the hallucination of the world's political idealists who do not want their pious wishes to be disturbed by the dry light of *Realpolitik*.

or in the legalism of jurists who are professionally bound to make a distinction between the political authority of a foreign state and the economic interest, financial control, or moral influence, and educational guidance of foreign peoples.

2. China's Sovereignty in *Realpolitik*.

On November 2, 1917, the United States came to an understanding with Japan in regard to "open door" and "special interests" in China; but neither of them felt it at all necessary to consult the Chinese government in the matter. It is only on the postulate that the sovereignty of China is an international fiction not worth the serious attention of the Great Powers that the Ishii-Lansing pact could have been consummated. The Japanese American agreement has thus reproduced in the Far East the high-handedness of the notorious Anglo-Russian convention of August 1907, regarding the spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. It may indeed be regarded as a continuation in China of the policy which led to the delimitation of British and German spheres of interests in September, 1898, and of British and Russian in April, 1899, without seeking the sanction or approval of the Chinese Empire. In all these instances the sovereign rights of weaker states have been handled not on the principle of self-determination, but according to the interests, the geographical propinquity etc. of the powerful neighbors.

China's sovereignty is at best in its non-age. This was demonstrated in the summer of 1917 when the United States considered it part of its duty to administer a dose of political wisdom to the infant republic of Asia. After the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Germany (March 14) China's publicists and statesmen were divided into fiercely antagonistic camps over the question of finally declaring war. That constitutional crisis was availed of by America as an opportunity to play the boss. A note was accordingly sent to China on June 5 to the effect that the "entry of China into war with Germany or the continuance of the *status quo* of her relations with that government are matters of secondary importance and that the principal necessity for China is to resume and continue her political entity." Legitimately therefore was this paternal advice of the United States resented by Japan as an intervention in Chinese politics, at least an infringement of full self-determination.

These actions of the American government are merely "declaratory," i.e., they have only brought home to the world at large the fact that had been existing for a long time. The

negation of China's sovereignty was brought about by others, for instance, by the French Republic. Thus in April, 1917, American engineers and American capitalists were prevented by France from building a railway in Kwang-si Province. This region bordering, as it does, the French dependency of Indo-China was claimed as France's industrial preserve; for in 1914 the Chinese Republic had made a promise that in case "a railway construction or mining enterprise be undertaken in Kwang-si Province in the future, for which, foreign capital is required," France would first be consulted for a loan of the necessary capital. France has by this right been enabled to exclude a foreign enterprise from her sphere of influence. Nor is this all. She has been predatory enough to rob China of her own territory in broad daylight. In November, 1916, a plot of Chinese ground about 333 acres adjoining the French "Concession" in Tien-tsin was occupied by an armed French detachment, and nine uniformed Chinese sentries locked up as prisoners of war in French barracks. The reason is simple. The local Chinese authorities had failed to reply to the ultimatum of the French consul-general within twenty-four hours regarding the extension of the French concession over the land in dispute. This is the traditional French method of colonization. It was by landing marines from a cruiser that the French "settlement" at Shanghai had been extended in 1898.

Now, oriental Japan would not be accepted as an honorable first class power by European and American nationalities unless she were adept in the use of all the methods of political exploitation, and brigandage popularized by the Occident through the Opium War and the annexations of Siberia, Annam, Tongking, Burma and Sikim. Consequently the sovereignty of China must have to suffer at the hands of Japan also who could not foolishly wait to see the entire Chinese pie swallowed up by Russia, England, and France. In August, 1916, therefore the small Chinese town of Chang-chia-tun in southern Manchuria was besieged by Japanese cavalry and infantry. The tempest arose, as is usual in such cases, of course, in a tea-cup. A young assistant of a Japanese apothecary appears to have been beaten by some Chinese soldiers for roughly handling a Chinese boy who had refused to sell his fish to the Japanese at the price offered. The Japanese "police box" was at once notified. Then followed the dispatch of a Japanese armed detachment and the imprisonment of the Chinese magistrate in a Japanese barrack. Further in January, 1917, a representative had to be sent by the Chinese military governor of Mukden to Port Arthur in order to convey regret to the Japanese authorities.

From Manchuria let us turn to other "dependencies" of the Chinese Republic and size up the extent of China's sovereignty in "Greater China." Owing to China's refusal to accept the boundary between inner and autonomous outer Tibet decided on at the Simla Conference (October 13, 1913—April 27, 1914), England prevented China's communication with Tibet via India, and the Chinese government had for some time no official representative or agent in Tibet. But late in 1916 China encountered a fresh set of demands from the British regarding the final settlement of affairs. By these terms no Tibetan rights can be conceded to other countries, appointment of officials can be made only after mutual consultation, and England alone should be engaged to assist in the development of industries in Tibet. These demands are undoubtedly a corollary to the partition of Tibet that China had been forced to recognize at Simla, and after a period of impotent protests have at last (1919) been met by the Republic to the satisfaction of the British Empire. Likewise has China's sovereignty been ruled out of existence in Mongolia where Russian initiative and pressure compelled the Chinese Republic to acknowledge an autonomous outer Mongolia and to recognize it virtually as a Russian protectorate (November 5, 1913—June, 1915). These two parallel and simultaneous incidents are natural links in the chain of events since Mongolia's declaration of independence from China (December, 1911) and the quick negotiation of a treaty between Tibet and Mongolia on January 21, 1912, by which each country recognized the other as independent. The joint Russo-British advance underlying these secessionist movements in Greater China followed logically from the pooling of interests effected by the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907.

The procedure adopted in the present instance is identical with the policy of gradual "assimilation" that the French Republic had followed in Indo-China after the annexation of Cochin-China in 1858—1862. The process of Frenchification consisted in the acknowledgment of the independence of Annam (a sort of "outer" Indo-China, adjacent to French dependency) in 1874 and the establishment of a protectorate over the southern frontiers of China and Tongking (an "inner" Indo-China, to use the recent phraseology) in 1885.

In so far as they lead to the curtailment of China's sovereign rights it must be honestly recognized that the over-condemned demands of Japan (finally accepted by treaty on May 25, 1915) fall rather short of the Russian and British actions in Mongolia and Tibet. For, after all, the measures of Japan did not amount to more than a formal and definite acknowledgment of her sphere

of influence by the Chinese government in southern Manchuria and eastern inner Mongolia on the lines of German and British spheres in April, 1899. In demanding certain economic concessions, viz., that without the consent of the Japanese capitalists China would not convert the Han-yeh-ping (iron and steel) works, a Chinese concern with capital loaned by Japanese financiers, into a state enterprise nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese, Japan was only claiming the stereotyped minimum of a great power's "financial" control within a weak nation's jurisdiction. China has only to thank England, Russia, France and Germany for setting the precedent.

Rather it would not be unfair for Japan to argue that she has not by any means made the bargain that Russia secured through the Chinese Eastern Railway concession swindling China out of her sovereign rights in Manchuria (as the result of the Cassini-Li Hung-chang convention after the Korean War 1894—1895). And of course the British ultimatum of 1898 which wrung from China the concession of 2800 miles of railway extending over ten provinces has yet been too much for Japanese naval and military power to issue. In the recent engagement (May 25, 1915) China has no doubt conceded that she would not grant to any other Power the right to build any shipyard, coaling or naval station or any other military establishment on the coast of Fu-kien. The demand from Japan was not unnatural, if things are at all natural in China, since the Japanese island of Formosa faces the coast and might be threatened by a foreign power, e.g., America, with a base thereon. This is indeed a corollary to China's promise to Japan in 1898 that the Province of Fu-kien would not be alienated to any other Power. Such promises of non-alienation China had granted at the same time to England in regard to the vast and populous Yang-tsze Valley (February, 1898) and to France in regard to the provinces bordering on French Tongking and also in regard to the island of Hai-nan (April, 1898). England had also claimed and obtained in April, 1898, the concession as to the non-alienation of Yun-nan and Kwang-tung to other powers, e.g., to France, on the ground that the former province was adjacent to Burma and that British trade was preponderant in the latter. Altogether, then, Japan has been "more sinned against than sinning" in her Chinese policy; but of course, so far as the infringement of China's sovereignty and territorial rights by the non-alienation demands is concerned, it is useless to weigh the powers in the balance and find which is the greater sinner.

Last but not least in importance as an instance of the nulli-

fication of China's sovereignty during the republican régime is the violation of her neutrality by Great Britain and Japan during the war on German Shantung. In August, 1914, in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Japan blockaded the German port of Kiao-chao. But the Japanese and British invasion of the little territory ("leased" to Germany by China in 1898) was not accomplished only from the land side. It was effected also from the rear on Chinese soil, and the anti-German war was carried as far interior as Tsinan-fu, 256 miles from the sea, the terminus of the German Shantung Railway. The violation of China's sovereign jurisdiction by the belligerents can be accounted for only on the assumption that the entire territory on which Germany possessed mining and other concessions, whatever might be its theoretical, i.e., legal status, had been a *de facto* German "possession." And at least Great Britain was fully aware of this Germanization of Shantung, since she had realized in 1898 that an English railway line could not be constructed through the province without Germany's consent. This identification of a "sphere of influence" with a virtual dependency has been paralleled in the course of the Great War by England's and Russia's violation of the neutrality of Persia in order to attack Turkey from the east in the Mesopotamian zone.

3. Bolshevik Renunciations.

Such is the order of facts bearing on China's jurisdiction or absence of jurisdiction as an independent nation from Mongolia's declaration of independence in December, 1911, to the Ishii-Lansing pact of November, 1917. Since then, no doubt, the Chinese Republic has been represented by two members at the Congress of Versailles, and has also been accorded the right to sign the draft of the league of nations constitution (February, 1919). But what through Russian and British intrigues or British and French rivalry on the one hand and Japanese counter-movements to neutralize the European aggressions in Asia and preserve the balance of power on the other, what through the friendly guardianship of one power or the hostile annexations of territory by another, and what through the contemptuous treatment of neutral rights by belligerents or mutual agreements between two neighbouring Powers as to the policy of peace in the Far East, or the rigid exclusion of third parties from industrial and railway development in its sphere of influence by a "most favored nation," the republic of China has during its short term of life experienced the logical consequences of political annihilation both in China proper and in Greater China that was

imposed by the Powers on the Chinese Empire at the end of the Boxer revolt in 1901.

In the midst of this *status quo* of China's passive submission to everybody's demands there has suddenly been thrown a bombshell from Bolshevik Russia. This bolt from the blue is calculated not only to electrify Young China to a mood of active resistance, but also to cry halt to the traditional methods of the *concessionnaires* and empire-builders. For it consists in the announcement of nothing short of a policy of thorough-going renunciations and in the cancellation of all the "rights" of the imperial régime with the object of making it possible for the peoples of the East "to win back again their lost freedom." In regard to China, says Arsene Voznecieski (Chief of the Oriental Division of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs), the All-Russian Congress of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies on October 27, 1917 renounced the annexations of the Czar's régime in Manchuria and restored the sovereignty of China in those regions in which lies the Chinese Eastern Railway. The right of extra-territoriality of Russian citizens in China and Mongolia has also been renounced as well as all those contributions imposed upon the peoples of Mongolia and China under all sorts of pretexts by the old Russian government. It need be added that Soviet Russia has already recalled all consular guards which the Czar's government and the Kerensky government had sent to China.

This is an extraordinary and incredibly supermanic promulgation of a new international morality. Thus has been ushered into existence a new "categorical imperative," the *Giti* or the Bible of a veritable *Yugantara*, the cataclysmic upheaval of a new era. It is not clear as yet as to how far this "self-denying ordinance" theory and fact of renunciations in the midst of the *Kurukshetra* or armageddon of the twentieth century have influenced the political psychology of Chinese statesmen and leaders of thought. Of course Young China cannot easily forget that ever since Peter the Great bequeathed his will to the Muscovites, especially since the annexation of the Siberian Maritime Province in 1866 Russia had been one of the first to perpetrate unjust aggressions on the Chinese dominions. But the new gospel of the political emancipation and sovereignty of all peoples is so world-sweeping or universal in its scope and so radical or fundamental in its Messianic good-will that the Bolsheviks have already won the highest encomium in Chinese estimation by being characterized as *Huan-yi Tang* or the party of the most far-reaching humanism. It may be surmised therefore that Young China's voice

in the political conferences of nations would rise higher and higher as long as there is at least one nation on earth to preach and practise this creed of liberation of subject races from the domination by aliens;—and this independently of the consideration as to the amount of progress that the anti-propertyism of Bolshevik economics is likely to achieve among the masses and intelligentsia of Eastern Asia.

4. The Demands of Young China.

Be this as it may, the Bolshevik promises and actions in regard to the Far East have not come a moment too early. For, the right of China to live as an unfettered nation has been definitely demanding the attention of all her political leaders since at any rate the summer of 1917 (a few months previous to the Soviet announcements). Indeed the most important question discussed by the pro-war as well as anti-war party in China was the question as to the best means of fortifying her status as a sovereign state.

It is because Liang Chi-Chiao believed that active association with the allies in the war presented China with the "last opportunity to become a member of the family of nations" that he enthusiastically started the pro-war campaign. Nothing therefore could be more characteristic of his stand-point than the slogan, "Wanted—a Cavour."

Exactly opposite was the attitude of his political preceptor Kang Yu-wei, Sun Yat-sen, and Tang Shao-yi, who opposed the war by all means. They believed that China's participation in the war would not place her sovereignty on any more respectable basis than the maintenance of neutrality. For, cancellation of Boxer indemnities, abolition of extra-territoriality, retrocession of foreign concessions, and repeal or amendment of unjust treaties,—these constitute the irreducible minimum of Young China's demands as stated by Kang in his anti-war memorandum. "But none of these," said this veteran champion of China's rights, "have we demanded."

Since then, however, China's delegates to the Peace Conference have stated these claims in no unmistakable terms. But Young China at last understands with Kang that "it is absurd to expect our admission to the ranks of the first class powers simply by being allowed a seat at the Peace Conference and by taking a side with the Entente!"

The Chinese Republic does not have to repeat today the cessions of Hongkong, Eastern Siberia, Indo-China, Burma, Sikim, Formosa and Korea, or the "leases" of Kiao-chao, Wei-hei-wei, Port Arthur,

and Kwang-chau-wan that the old régime had to transact between 1842 and 1898. These are ancient stories and have at the worst left only painful memories. But the inheritance of the republic from the empire in the remaining portions of Greater China as well as within the bounds of China proper is full of knotty problems that are taxing the patience and diplomatic skill of its statesmen. It is nothing short of the Herculean might of a "Perseus the Deliverer" that can possibly rescue a nation out of the "Serbonian bog" of Chinese politics.

England is not satisfied, as we have seen, with the Chinese recognition of the autonomy of outer Tibet. She must have her own terms as to the boundary between inner and outer Tibet. Russia (of the old régime) was compelling autonomous outer Mongolia to cede territories to her, though the Republic claims that by the Kiakhta agreement of 1915 China still has "suzerainty" over Mongolia and is entitled to prevent any such cessions. Japan has been erecting "police boxes" here and there and everywhere in south Manchuria. But according to China this action is much more than what extra-territoriality implies. The Japanese government of Korea tries also to bring within its administrative jurisdiction all those Koreans by race who live in Yenchí, the borderland between Manchuria and Korea. The Republic claims that these Koreans are citizens of China and are by no means amenable to Japanese rule.

These are some of the outstanding problems arising in anomalous regions whose international status verges indefinitely between a "sphere of influence" or the more innocent "sphere of interest" and a protectorate or dependency.

The troubles of such international muddles were bequeathed by the Empire to the Republic within China proper also. Since the United States Secretary Hay's "open door policy" letter was issued to the powers in 1899 the "integrity" of China has surely been guaranteed by every power, who has proclaimed at the same time the policy of "open door" and "equal opportunity for all."¹) In a similar fashion had been guaranteed the integrity of Turkey in 1856 and of Morocco in 1880. But China as well as the rest of the world know how the "independence" of these states have been served by such scraps of paper. While theoretically speaking, therefore, legal sovereignty is in Chinese hands. Young China has by daily experience come to realize that the state of affairs requiring

¹) This has been done once again in November 1921 by the powers assembled for the so-called Disarmament Conference at Washington, D.C.

external guarantee of self-determination is not intrinsically different from the much-dreaded subjection to foreigners.

"To be weak is miserable, doing or suffering." And in international relations, not to have the sinews of war is tantamount to inviting thralldom and submitting to oppression. The foreign demands on China are indeed mostly non-political in nature. Mere "financial" control is generally what is stipulated by the foreign industrial and commercial syndicates. But the limitation of sovereignty and curtailment of political freedom follow as a matter of course—in fact, if not on paper.

5. The "Never-Ending Wrongs" of the Chinese People

I. Sphere of Influence.

Young China has to feel the fetters and shackles at every step. Not an inch of Chinese soil is without foreign control of some sort or other. Since 1897—1898 the whole of China proper has been divided up into spheres of interest. The "sphere of interest" is a term that, loosely used, as it generally is, implies also "sphere of influence." In such areas "special" privileges, principally and *legally* of an economic character, are enjoyed by one Power to the *exclusion of the rest*, and the favored Power commands the monopoly in the matter of all concessions regarding loans, railway construction, mining, and so forth. Such a sphere is in reality a euphemism for actual political dominion. In any case it is an "exclusive" preserve, and as such, is logically the total antithesis of integrity, "open door" and "equal opportunity" for all. To ear-mark somewhere in China a sphere of influence for a certain Power and then to guarantee in it an open door constitute a contradiction in terms. It is absurd therefore to speak of China's "integrity" in the same breath with exclusive privileges or special interests enjoyed by the different powers each in its own sphere. And after all this it is adding insult to injury to remark that China still possesses "independence."

The voluntary retirement of Bolshevik Russia from the battle for concessions and spheres leaves China open to the competition of only one unit less. By no means does it liberate the Chinese republic from the thralldom of aliens. Rather, from the standpoint of the foreign aggressors, viz., England, France and Japan, the fewer the rivals, the better the chances for a monopolistic control. Nor of much intrinsic advantage to China itself is the expulsion of Germany from the Shantung area. The elimination of two great powers from the politics of eastern Asia is full of dangerous consequences to Chinese independence. For one thing, China's

opportunities to play off the powers against one another are likely to come few and far between. And the problem is getting darker every day through the philistinism of the United States. Young China, especially that section of it which has not been demoralized by America's charity, knows quite well that the American people or government do not intend to be real friends of Chinese freedom. China's patriots may be excused for feeling that the statesmen, journalists and political agitators of the United States are much too obsessed by their own anti-Japanese interests and anti-Asian sentiments to understand rationally the exact situation in the Far East for which the ever-expanding British empire is primarily responsible.

II. Extra-territoriality.

Subservience is most keenly brought home to Young China whenever it comes in touch with a foreigner in business intercourse. The Chinese in their own land have to submit to foreign institutions in all transactions with outsiders.

Nationals of every foreign power enjoy extra-territoriality in Oriental countries. This alienism is exercised in the Turkish Empire by what is known as "capitulations." Throughout the length and breadth of China the foreigners have had their own laws and tribunals since the treaty of Tientsin (1858). The extra-territorial jurisdiction of the consular courts is extremely galling to the children of the soil. The Japanese also had to suffer from this for a long time and have succeeded in getting rid of it only so late as 1911. Imperial China resented it at the convention of 1869. How Young China feels about this can be best understood from what friendly foreigners now say about the past experience of Japan. According to Brinkley in his *History of the Japanese People* "the struggle that ensued between foreign distrust and Japanese aspirations often developed painful phases, and did much to intensify the feeling of antagonism which had existed between the Japanese and foreign residents at the outset and which even today has not wholly disappeared."

The grievance is not merely a sentimental one. In the first place, each of the foreign powers tries its own nationals in its own courts. In the second place, the cases between persons of different nationalities are adjudicated according to the treaties between the powers involved "without interference on the part of China." In civil cases it is the foreign consulates that are to be appealed to in the first instance, and in criminal cases Chinese are tried and

punished by Chinese authorities according to Chinese law and aliens by their own authorities and laws. In addition to these restrictions in regard to litigation affecting Chinese and aliens, China has to concede the total absence of jurisdiction over foreigners in other cases.

Besides, every foreign traveller in China is exempt from the territorial jurisdiction of the local authorities and has to be handed over to the nearest consuls of his own state in cases of delinquency. No Chinese authorities can search the house or boat or property of any foreigners on Chinese territory. Even independent post offices have been established by foreigners in twenty-five treaty ports, and Japanese have commenced starting police booths in Manchuria and Fukien. It is easy to conceive how under these circumstances the foreign commercial activities and social relations of the Chinese people are hampered to the detriment of their future development.

And of course the absence of judicial autonomy deprives China of a great part of sovereignty. Abolition of extra-territoriality looms large therefore in the demands of the Chinese republic. And the claim is being put forward by Young China on the ground that it has reformed the code of laws according to modern ideas, has instituted a new system of tribunals and has also promulgated the independence of the judiciary through the permanent constitution that is waiting to be accepted by parliament.

III. Treaty-ports.

Extra-territoriality is diffused in every part of the land. But it is in the "open" ports on the sea-coast, on the rivers or in the interior that it is concentrated. The first ports were opened to the British by the treaty of Nanking in 1842 at Amoy, Canton, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai. In 1858 the Treaty of Tientsin opened to the British the Yang-tze River as well as several ports. Down to 1909, in addition to forty-eight "treaty-ports" twenty-seven places were declared open to international trade. Besides, on the Yang-tze River today there are nine stages, and on the West River twenty-one stages described as ports of call. Each of these ports and stages, as extra-territoriality localized, is the embodiment of China's political humiliation and servitude.

Ten of these treaty ports have separate foreign "settlements." These have not indeed been leased out or sold to the powers; but the administrative management of these areas lies wholly in their hands. Practically, therefore, they do not belong to China and fall outside of her sovereign jurisdiction. The legal status

of Shanghai or Hankow is certainly different from that of Hongkong or Macao, but in foreign and Chinese eyes the former do not differ from the latter, so far as actual political authority is concerned.

Political refugees from China, for instance, enjoy in these "settlements" all the immunities of asylum that they can possibly expect in England, Japan or America. The foreign consular authorities would hardly entertain any demands of the Chinese government as to extradition of political criminals. This circumstance may have been of considerable help in Young China's liberal movements. But here is an acid test of sovereignty that proves none the less that Shanghai, Hankow and other ports like these are not parts of Chinese territory but have become foreign (slightly internationalized perhaps) "possessions" by prescription.

IV. Financial Vassalage.

The most important source of China's subjection to foreigners consists in her inability to bear the burden of a modern state and the legacies of unsuccessful wars, including the misfortunes of the Boxer tragedy. Hence her financial indebtedness. At present there are four classes of Chinese debts. First in time and importance are the indemnity and war loans. Secondly there are the loans contracted for the building of railways. Loans for the construction of telegraph lines, the improvement of currency and the introduction of reforms in the general administrative system constitute a heavy third item. Lastly there are the provincial and private loans.

It must be understood that there is nothing derogatory in foreign loans as such. In modern times investments are international, and capital tends to seek a world market. Even great powers have to float loans among foreign peoples. But China's borrowings do not belong to the same category. They give rise to a "problem," because enormous security is demanded by the foreign creditors.

Revenues of the maritime customs (after payment of amortization and interest of the previous loans pledged on these revenues), total revenue of the salt gabelle, revenues of railway, profits of and mortgage upon railways, opium taxes, first charge upon *likin* (tax imposed upon goods in inland transit) and internal revenues in certain provinces, sundry taxes, rice tax, certain telegraph receipts, tobacco, wine, production and consumption taxes in Manchurian provinces, and the new salt surtax of the whole of China, these are the more important classes of securities that the Chinese republic has to ear-mark against its loans. "Collaterals" such as these were demanded in the loans to Persia by Great Britain and Russia, but

were not necessary in America's private and government loans to France or Italy during the Great War.

China's finances indicate that every resource worth anything has been pledged and every inch of the soil mortgaged. The whole country may be said to have been auctioned off to foreigners. Besides, the terms of the loans give the creditors a legal (in addition to the moral) right to interfere in the administration of assets and the disbursements. Students of Turkish finance since 1881 are familiar with a similar but more effective European control of revenues in a degenerate state. America's refusal to participate in the Six-Power-Loan to Yuan Shih-kai in 1912 on the ground that it might lead to intervention in China's internal politics is the best commentary on the condition of China's sovereignty as affected by the financial situation. Today in China every important undertaking of the government, every work of public utility, the collection of revenue, the management of post offices, railways, or iron and steel factories is being bossed by foreign advisers and experts. The maritime customs, salt gabelle and some other departments in Chinese administration are almost as alien in personnel and inspiration or guidance as any government office in British India or Japanese Korea. This aspect of China's vassalage is likely to acquire notoriety in American public life in the coming years because by joining England, France and Japan in the New Loan Consortium (1920) on the usual terms the government of the United States and the American banking group have at last formally bidden adieu to the idealism of the last decade and submitted to the inevitable decree of historical determinism.

V. Tariff Restrictions and Boxer Indemnity.

China's financial vassalage and consequent curtailment of political independence are enhanced by two sets of unjust treaties with the powers that powerfully cripple her industry and commerce. The first are the tariff regulations agreed on between Great Britain and China by the treaty of Nanking in 1842 and the second is the Boxer treaty of 1901. In 1842 China bound herself not to levy a tariff exceeding 5 per cent *ad valorem* on imported and exported goods. In 1902 by the Mackay treaty with England China was granted the right to levy a surtax of 7 per cent on imported goods on certain conditions, and in 1917 the tariff was raised to an effective 5 per cent as a concession for China's joining the allies. By the "most favored nation" clause all treaty powers automatically enjoy the tariff privileges first extended to Great Britain.

The present uniform rate of 5 per cent *ad valorem* is too low to protect the infant industries of China and is at the same time quite inadequate as a fiscal resource. In 1914 only 9 per cent of China's total revenue was derived from customs, whereas import duties levied by Great Britain in spite of her "free trade" policy amounted to 22 per cent of her revenues. It is the meagreness of the customs receipts that has compelled China to retain the onerous medieval inland-transit duties called *likin* though they militate enormously against the domestic and foreign trade of the country. No wonder, then, that the restoration of tariff autonomy by revision of commercial treaties has been one of the most pressing demands of Young China both as an economic and as a political measure.

The inadequacy of China's revenues and the eternal necessity for foreign loans are further accounted for by the exorbitant indemnities imposed by the powers in 1901. Imperial China was saddled with a first charge of \$ 350,000,000 on her revenues to be paid to thirteen nations (Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan, United States, Italy, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Portugal, Holland and Norway-Sweden). The terms of compound interest were so inequitable that after annual payments for sixteen years the outstanding debt in 1917 was still \$ 560,000,000 (although by declaring war China's debts to Germany and Austria were cancelled by a stroke of pen)! Cancellation of the remaining indemnity (and not a mere postponement for five years as has been conceded by the allies in consideration of China's association with them against Germany) is therefore a cry that the Chinese delegates naturally raised before the Peace Conference (1919).

· VI. Industrial Tutelage.

Young China has to feel every moment that the entire country is honey-combed with the foreign centers of economic activity. The railway, industrial, and mining concessions granted to the commercial syndicates of foreign nations are inevitably due to China's lack of brain and bullion. One need not be blind to the "development" of the country thus effected by foreigners. But it is a curse in disguise so far as the people are concerned. On the one hand, the concession-seekers are used to bring pressure upon their home governments in order that they may stand by them with their army and navy and with the prestige of their flag in the fields of their exploitation. Every industrial venture in China becomes in this manner an affair of "foreign politics." On the other hand, the rivalry of the *concessionnaires* among themselves, first, for profiteering

and secondly, for the shibboleth of their nationalities intr. international complications into China's every day life

The Bagdad Railway is the classic example of the stupe international animosity created by a foreign commercial mov. in the territory of an undeveloped people. Bagdad railways in (are plentiful as blackberries. The net result is perpetual intr "management," corruption; and this affects also the spheres o. far removed from trade and industry. Even in the appointmen teachers for elementary or secondary schools, and in the selec of textbooks for boys and girls, the organizers of institutions hav. consider the ulterior and more remote consequences of displa sympathy with the countrymen of Washington, Nelson, Napole or Bismarck. The industrial and commercial competition of forei nations turns out thus to be the greatest single cause of demora zation in the public life of China. It has rendered any systemat policy or unified method of administration virtually impossible. Ti statesmen as well as the people of China are constantly swave by every random gust of wind.

VII. Servitude of the Mind

China has to submit to foreign intervention of a subtle and sinister character through the missionizing establishments of Christians and the philanthropic charity of America. It is recognized by all consular authorities that missionaries are great though non-official agents of their national industry and commerce. On the dominated peoples the evangelists exercise a tremendous influence, which in a few cases is purely cultural and moral, but in almost all instances, is due to their financial opulence and the name of the powers they represent. The influence extends from the saving of a life at court as amnesty to the removal of an officer from some high post.

The patriots of China are not blind to the fact that America's return (in 1908) of 40 per cent of the Boxer indemnity in order to be spent on education may have been dictated, in the first place, by the consideration that the indemnity was exorbitant, and secondly, by the consciousness, though belated, of her sins committed against Chinese immigrants from 1855 to 1904. But conceding that it was a disinterested transaction, students of international relations may legitimately feel that it is none the less an "intervention." because it does not happen to be the charity of individual citizens like that embodied in Rockefeller Foundations but the grant-in-aid from a sovereign state. Besides, it serves to demoralize Young China

through the unseen but effective control on Chinese mind exercised by American action in the politics of eastern Asia. China's liberal statesmen fear it therefore as the most powerful weapon for perpetuating a strong anti-Japanese movement in their country, and not only for preventing the growth of friendly relations between the yellow races but also for crushing the development of a sound Asian policy among the Chinese. The moral backbone of the Chinese youth is likely to be destroyed by what to all intents and purposes constitutes an international bribery unless some counteracting spiritual forces be forthcoming. Young China has felt the humiliation already and seems to be quite alive to the danger. Under the *nom de plume* of Chung-hwa Sing somebody writes in the *Chinese Student's Monthly* (November, 1915): "Many of us are indemnity scholars. Your being in this country (United States) is the very memory of our national disgrace in 1900." It is this spirit of resentment that is slowly preparing the Chinese *risorgimento* of the coming decades.

6. The Psychology of the Semi-Slave.

From the standpoint of the "superior races" a full-fledged dependency like India, Madagascar, Java, or Korea is a closed question unless, as during war times, its cause is espoused by the enemy of the alien ruler. Normally it has no troubles except what may be created by the disarmed militarism and impotent insurrections of the subject race. But the daily life of people in a "sphere of influence," a Morocco, Abyssinia, Persia, or China, is a perpetual menace to the peace between the powers. For it is subject to thousand and one restrictions, imposed without law and resented without vigor, all the more serious because of their extent being boundless and significance mysterious. Such spheres are necessarily the eternal storm-centers of the world.

These "half-way houses" to foreign rule, where the legally constituted authority dare not exercise its jurisdiction except in a halting fashion, where indeed sovereignty is by law vested in one hand but in actual practice in a neighbor that happens to possess military and economic might, are the surest hotbeds of wholesale mischief. They do not fail to corrupt the financiers, diplomatists, and *concessionnaires* at the same time that they vitiate and poison the mentality and outlook of the indigenous people. Thus they engender a social *milieu* in which normal humanity is kept in abeyance.

The subject races or slaves *de jure* can have a clear-cut and

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precise attitude to the foreign masters. The Polands of the East can "localize" the wrongs they suffer and concentrate their efforts as to the remedy, although the nature and extent of its remedy depends in the ultimate analysis on the international international competition to which the ruling race is exposed. Even when a race is morally incapable of noteworthy civic or public virtues and in a long-standing political subjection, these unfortunate specimens of the human race Adamic can still be vitalized by the galvanic spirit of nationalism and patriotism. Dynamic love of fatherland continues to survive as the last redeeming feature of dependent peoples. But the incursions of the women of buffer-states, spheres of influence, semi-free nations and protectorates, i.e. the slaves *de facto* but not *de jure* are a constant drain from pillar to post in the attempt to appease the myriads of foreign powers. And in the repercussion that ensues the national animus of vitality loses its intensity and impelling force. Human beings in these circumstances are the spiritual and moral *pariahs* of mankind, the only class of slaves that have no *locus standi* in the universe.

Such is the dehumanizing situation that the Chinese Republic has received as heirloom from the Imperial China of 1842—1911. The constitutional struggle of Young China is therefore of trifling importance compared with the international anomalies that are swaying its comatose existence between the actual atrophy of today and the possible extinction of tomorrow.

IV.

Tendencies in Hindu Culture.

Fallacies regarding India.

1. Injustice to the Orient.

In Europe even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the barbers were surgeons. Even in the eighteenth century the magic touch of the king's hand was believed by the English people to have marvellous therapeutic effects. Patients suffering from scrofula, and other diseases used to petition the Court in order to have the royal healing administered to them. Today in Europe and America millions of Christians still believe in immaculate conception and transubstantiation.

If a Hindu were to note down these and other facts of a like nature and exhibit them as specimens of modern Eur-America or mediaeval and ancient Europe would it be doing justice to the intellect of the Occidental world? But this is exactly what European and American scholars of the nineteenth century have done with regard to India and the Orient. The little that is known of the Orient in Europe and America today is, to say the least, based on a fundamentally wrong attitude of mind and an unscientific presentation of the subject-matter.

2. Secular Literature of the Hindus.

The most prevalent notion is that Hindu literature is at best the literature of topics dealing with the "other world," the soul, the Divinity,—the themes which constitute the stock-in-trade of pessimistic metaphysics. The historic truth, however, is that metaphysical subjectivism is the least part of Hindu thought, and pessimism the furthest removed from actual Indian life and institutions.

The Hindus have discussed every subject in the universe from the tamarind to the pole-star. Hindu literature and art are the literature and art of every human passion and activity from sex to salvation.

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The Hindus have written on "pure" mathematics; the arithmetic were in advance of those of the Greeks. They have in fact laid down the foundations of the mathematical known to the modern world. They anticipated Descartes (1596) in the principle of solid geometry and Newton (1642-72) of differential calculus. The solutions of Lagrange and (1707-83) in indeterminate equations of the second degree given by the Hindus more than one thousand years before them.

Hindu literature on anatomy and physiology as well as embryology has been voluminous. The Hindus knew the osteology of the human body two thousand years before Vesalius (c. 1543) and had some rough ideas of the circulation of blood long before Harvey (1628). Internal administration of mercury and other powerful metallic drugs was practised by the Hindu physicians at least one thousand years before Paracelsus (1540). They have written extensive treatises on these subjects.

The Hindus have written on government, municipal institutions, taxation, census, jurisprudence, warfare, and the laws of nations. Their investigations bear comparison with those of Aristotle, Machiavelli and Jean Bodin. The Hindus have written on painting, literary criticism, dramaturgy, dancing, gesture, music, irrigation, navigation, and town-planning.

In Europe the six notes of the gamut were invented by Guido of Arezzo in Tuscany (995-1050) and the seventh was added by Le Maire of Paris in the sixteenth century. But the Hindus wrote about the full musical scale at least as early as the fifth century and they devised also a sort of musical notation, signs and symbols, which may be regarded as the analogues of the mediaeval European *neumes*.

3. Humanity and Hindu Culture.

Hindu treatises on algebra, arithmetic, astronomy, pharmacy, chemistry, medicine, and surgery were not confined to India. They were translated into Chinese (and ultimately into Japanese) on the one side; and on the other, were translated into Arabic by the Moslems of Western Asia. In the Middle Ages the Moslems taught the Christians of Europe at Cordova in Spain, at Cairo in Egypt, at Damascus in Syria, and at Bagdad on the Tigris. The Europeans have thus learnt the Hindu decimal system of notation in mathematics, the use of some Hindu medicinal drugs, and Hindu metallurgy.

The musical theories of the Hindus were the same as those of the Europeans down to nearly the end of the Middle Ages, as both were based on melody. Harmony is a recent European growth (seventeenth century). Similarly the theories of painting also were the same both in India and Europe. Like the Hindus, the ancients and mediaevals in Europe did not have the "perspective" with which the modern world is familiar. Hindu books on painting have, besides, influenced the art and art-criticism of China during her "Augustan age". Europeans and Americans who are today admiring the Chinese masters are thereby indirectly paying homage to Hindu art-philosophy.

4. Greater India.

In a sense the geography of Hindu culture is as wide as Asia itself. Hindu thought is even now governing the Bushido morality of the Japanese soldiers. It is at the back of the philosophical writings of the neo-Confucianists (of the Sung age) and of the mystical Taoists in China, as well as of the energistic Nichirenism of the people in Japan. It runs through the Sufistic teachings of the Persian poets, is responsible for the Buddhism of Siam and Indo-China, and regulates the everyday life of the Central-Asian, Mongolian and Siberian rustics. And the islands of the South Seas and the Indian Ocean from the Philippines on the East to Madagascar on the African coast bear on them indelible marks of Hindu colonial expansion, in vocabulary, literary tradition, sculpture, and architecture.

All this is a fairy tale today. But it was brought about by the most natural circumstances. For about fifteen hundred years from the close of the fourth century B. C. the Hindus maintained a Greater India of international commerce and culture. India had thus become the heart and brain of Asia.

5. Epochs of Hindu Culture.

It is often supposed that Hindu greatness was that of a people who belonged to some ante-diluvian age. It is even held in some quarters that the epoch of Hindu glory was synchronous with the primitive Vedic age or that it was exhausted in the so-called Buddhist period. The facts of history are quite otherwise. The Vedic age is by no means the greatest age of the Hindus; nor is there, strictly speaking, a "Buddhist period" of Indian history.

It is true that the Hindu ships brought muslin and indigo to the builders of the pyramids in Egypt, and jewels to Syria for the

Tendencies in Hindu Culture.

breastplate of the Hebrew high priest. It is also true that traders had settlements in the international quarters of the city of Babylon, a New York of antiquity. But for all purposes the great achievements of the Hindus should be regarded as synchronous with those of the Greeks from Pythagoras (fifth century B. C.) to Aristotle (fourth century B. C.), of the Alexandrians, and of the Roman Empire (c. A. C. 100—600).

As for the subsequent ages, it need be remembered that the classical races of Europe were extinct and gave the torch of civilization to the "barbarian" Teutons; whereas the Hindus continued to live and expand maintaining and furthering their consciousness. Down to the Renaissance of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries represented by Descartes, Leibnitz and Newton the new European races could not distance the Hindus in any branch of science or art, theoretical or applied. And down to the industrial revolution, i.e. the application of steam to manufacture and communication in the early years of the nineteenth century the Hindu political, military, economic and social institutions were on a par with those in Europe.

Liberty of the people was not then greater in the Western world than in India, women's rights were then not known in any part of the globe, mankind did not know anywhere the blessings of universal education, industry was everywhere limited to the cottage and the domestic system, the family was tied to the village, the civilization was throughout mainly agricultural and rural, and the Hindu Louis's, Fredericks and Peters were as good or as bad "enlightened despots" as were those of Europe.

6. Hindu Institutional Life.

It is alleged that the Hindus have ever been defective in organizing ability and the capacity for administering public bodies. Epoch by epoch, however, India has given birth to as many heroes, both men and women, in public service, international commerce, military tactics, and government, as has any race in the Occidental world. Warfare was never monopolized by the so-called Kshatriya or warrior caste in India, but as in Europe, gave scope to every class or grade of men to display their ability.

Hindu history is the history of as many institutions, councils, conferences, academies and congresses, as that of the Western races. The Hindus organized municipal commissions for civic life and built hospitals for the sick and wounded at least three hundred years before the Christian era. The Hindus had *parishats*, i.e. academies or clubs for

philosophical and scientific investigation in every age of their history. They established universities for the advancement of learning and propagation of culture. And they instituted societies or associations for religious and moral purposes as well.

It is a vicious practice to try to understand Hindu characteristics or the "spirit" of Hindu civilization from the failures and demoralization of the Hindus in the nineteenth century. It is also unscientific to forget the superstitions of the European Middle Ages while making an estimate of independent Hindu culture down to the eighteenth century.

International India.

All through the ages the people of India have had active intercourse with the other peoples of the world. The Hindus have never lived in an alleged "splendid isolation." They have always had their mettle tested by the one world-standard of merit-measurement.

It is generally assumed that internationalism or cosmopolitanism is a very recent phenomenon in human affairs. As a matter of fact, however, culture has ever been international. Lendings and borrowings, imports and exports, colonizations and migrations characterize even the most primitive stages in the history of human evolution. Hindu culture, like every other culture, bears the stamp of the more universal world-forces; and not only Asia, but the Western world also exhibits features which have been directly or indirectly influenced by the Hindus. India has always been a necessary link in the chain of a growing series of human values.

1. Intercourse with the Egyptians.

The dawn of human civilization finds the Hindus (Dravidians and Aryans) captains of industry and *entrepreneurs* of commerce. They were in touch with the Pharaohs of Egypt. The mummies of the Egyptians were wrapped in muslin which was imported from India. Hindu trade gave to the land of the Nile ivory, gold, tamarind-wood, sandal-wood, monkeys, and other characteristic Indian plants and animals. It is also believed that the textile craftsmen of Egypt dyed their cloth with Hindu indigo. Hindu ships brought the Indian commodities to the Arabian ports, or to the land of Punt on the Egyptian side; and from there these were transported to Luxor, Karnak and Memphis.

2. With the Aegeans.

Recent excavations and discoveries in the Aegean islands, especially in Crete, have pushed backward the limits of Hellenic antiquity. Homer is to-day not so much the first of the Hellenes as the last of the Minoans, or Mykenaeans, or Aegeans. This Aegean civilization was the connecting link between Egypt and the isles of Greece. It is interesting to observe that the Hindus (Dravidians) were in touch, probably indirect, with this primitive culture also. Hellenic-European civilization and proto-Indian civilization thus came to have certain elements in common.

It is difficult to connect India with the Mediterranean area of culture by archaeological evidences. The intercourse is suggested by certain decorative *motifs* of folk-art common to the two regions, e.g., the deer with four bodies and a single head, two lions with one head, the lion with three bodies and one head, animal processions, animal combats, and so forth. These designs belong probably to a common "Early-Asian" tradition, which has influenced Aegean as well as Hindu culture-areas.

3. With the Semitic Empires of Mesopotamia.

Hindu commerce with the land of the Euphrates was more intimate and direct. As early as about 3000 B.C. Hindus supplied the Chaldaean city of Ur on the Euphrates with teakwood. The Assyrians also, like the Egyptians, got their muslin from India. In fact, vegetable-"wool," i.e., cotton, and wool-producing plants have been some of the earliest gifts of Hindu merchants to the world. From the tenth to the sixth century B.C. Assyro-Babylonian trade of the Hindus seems to have been very brisk. Hindus brought with them apes, elephants, cedar, teak, peacocks, rice, ivory, and other articles to Babylon, the Rome of Western Asia. It was through this Indo-Mesopotamian trade that the Athenians of the sixth century B.C. came to know of rice and peacocks.

This expansion of Hindu activity influenced the literature of the time, e.g., the *Vedas* and *Jātakas*. A cylinder seal of about 2000 B.C. bearing cuneiform inscriptions and images of Chaldaean deities has been recently unearthed in Central India. In Southern India has been found a Babylonian sarcophagus. The Hindus owe their script to this West-Asian intercourse. The present-day characters of the Indian alphabet are derived from Brāhmī and earlier Kharoshthī. Both of these are Semitic in origin. These the Hindus learnt from the Phoenicians about 1000—800 B.C. through the international settlements of the Mesopotamian cities. Babylon was like modern New York the melting-pot of races. Besides, some of the astronomical conceptions of the Hindus may have to be traced to the land of the Euphrates.

One of the eight dialects in which the famous inscriptions of Boghokoi are written is Indian. Hindu numerals like *eka*, *tri*, *panca*, *saṭa*, and *nava*, have been found in the same inscriptions of the Hittites in their exact Sanskrit form. The names of gods almost identical with those of the Hindus such as Mitrasil, Arunasil, Indara and Nasattijanna (twins) occur in the explorations from the Mitani kingdom which was situated between the Kur River and

the Caspian Sea. Sureja is likewise another god of the Kur Valley in which a Hindu replica may be suspected. India's intercourse with Kurdistan, and Asia Minor, or for that matter, with the geography of Hittite culture is more and more coming to be established as a fact of ancient Asian history.

4. With the Hebrews.

Hindu trade with the Hebrews also was considerable. Solomon (1015 B.C.), King of Judaea, was a great internationalist. In order to promote the trade of his land he set up a port at the head of the right arm of the Red Sea. He made his race the medium of intercourse between Phoenicians and Hindus. The port of Ophir (in Southern India or Arabia?) is famous in Hebrew literature for its trade in gold under Solomon. The Books of *Genesis*, *Kings*, and *Ezekiel* indicate the nature and amount of Hindu contact with Asia Minor. It is held by Biblical scholars that the stones in the breast plate of the high priest may have come from India. The Hindus supplied also the demand of Syria for ivory and ebony. The Hebrew word, *tuki* (peacock), is derived from Tamil (South Indian) *tokei*, and *ahalin* (aloe) from *aghil*.

This Hindu-Hebrew commerce was a principal channel through which the nations of the Mediterranean became connected with India and the Far East. Long before the Greeks had any direct communication with the Hindus, they thus came to know of the latter first through Babylon and secondly through Judaea.

5. With the Zoroastrians of Persia.

The Persians overthrew the Babylonian Empire in 540 B.C. Their territory extended into Thrace in Europe and into the Indian frontiers on the east. Northwestern India was for a time a satrapy of this Iranian (Persian) empire. The Persians got their gold from the Hindus who conducted extensive mining operations in the Punjab and elsewhere in India. Hindu soldiers joined the ranks of their Iranian fellow-subjects when Xerxes led the memorable expedition against Greece (480 B.C.), and the bones of many a Hindu must have been mixed with the dusts of Europe at Thermopylae. This was probably the first direct contact between the Hindu and the Greek.

During this period Persia was Zoroastrian in socio-religious life, and it may be that the teachings of the Prophet of Iran had some influence over the Vedists of India. There are stories in Persia which claim the conversion of a Hindu philosopher "Cangraghacah"

to the lore of the *Zend Avesta* after being defeated by Zoroaster himself in intellectual debate. On the other hand, Hindu influence on Iranians may also have been a fact. At any rate the Persians probably taught the Hindus the use of stone in architecture in the place of wood and brick. The "winged lions" as motives of Hindu art may also be traced to Iran.

6. With the Hellenistic Kingdoms.

Hindu genius for manufacture and commerce was thus of service to every race of antiquity that did anything for mankind. And when Alexander's deliberate internationalism (336—323 B. C.) ushered in the epoch of Eurasian culture-hybrids in Greece, Egypt, the overthrown Persian Empire, and the frontiers of India, the Hindus actively cooperated with the other races in bringing about the new conditions of the Hellenistic world.

Chandragupta Maurya (321—298 B. C.), the first Hindu Emperor of a United India, defeated the Hellenistic-Syrian invader, Seleukos, and compelled him to give him his daughter in marriage. Hindu-Greek marriages became common occurrences, Greek sculptors and merchants lived at Pataliputra (site of modern Patna), on the Ganges, in Eastern India, Greek ambassadors were taken care of by the Foreign Office of the Hindu State, and Greek professors were invited to the Hindu capital to lecture on Greek language.

In international politics the Maurya Emperors of India were the "allies" of the Hellenistic rulers of Western Asia, Europe, and Africa. To withstand the all-seizing ambition of the Roman conquerors the Greeks naturally sought the help of the Hindu rulers. Once or twice thus did the Hindus meet the Romans as foes (third century B. C.). Elephant-corps were despatched from India to help Pyrrhus of Epirus and Antiochus I of Syria against their enemies.

Hindu embassies visited the Hellenistic kings of Syria, Egypt, Macedonia, Epirus, and Kyrene on religious, cultural, and diplomatic missions. Sanskrit lore was taught at Antioch, Tarsus, and Alexandria. Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics exchanged notes with the Hindu logicians, philologists, Upanishadists, Buddhists, and Jainas. Hebrew, Hellenic, and Hindu factors combined to hold the Christ-cult in an eclectic metaphysico-theological solution.

7. With the Roman Empire.

During the first two centuries of the Christian era, the Kushans of Northern India promoted trade with the Roman empire by land,

and the Andhras of Southern India had touch with Rome by sea. Roman mercenaries were in the army of the Hindu monarchs, Roman citizens lived in India, Roman coins circulated in the Indian markets. Embassies from the Indian States went to congratulate Augustus, the first Roman Emperor, on his accession. Trajan also received a Hindu embassy (100 A.C.). Spices, perfumes, muslins, cosmetics, pearls, aromatics and other luxuries and novelties "made in India" commanded an extensive sale in the bazars of the Roman Empire. The balance of trade was in favour of the Hindus, leading to considerable "drain" of gold from Rome to India.

The Indo-Roman intercourse was deep and long enough to influence the general eclectic character of those times. Hindu philosophy was assimilated by the Greeks of Alexandria and became a formative agency in the development of Neo-platonism under Plotinus (third century A.C.). On the other hand, Ptolemaic astronomy may have been absorbed by the Hindus. The Kushan Emperor struck coins according to the Roman models. The vast extent of Hindu commerce was indicated by the international elements in the currency. The obverse had the Hindu Emperor in Tartar dress, a Persian fire-altar, and Greek inscription; the reverse had the Hindu god Shiva as well as Greek, Persian and Tartar deities. Hindu-Hellenistic or Graeco-Buddhist (Gandhara) sculptures of Northwestern India and Central Asia, also, were products of a cosmopolitan imagination fostered by the mingling of races. That art has been the parent of all sculptures in China, Korea and Japan.

8. With the Chinese.

The Kushans were Scythians or Tartars of Central Asia naturalized on Indian soil. Through them the northern frontiers of India were extended almost as far as Siberia. Along with this territorial expansion, Hindu missionizing activity was greatly enlarged owing to direct political sovereignty or spheres of influence. Central Asia was dotted over with Hindu temples, monasteries, hospitals, schools, museums and libraries.

It was through this "Greater India" on the land side that China, the land of Confucius and Laotsze, came within the sphere of influence of Hindu culture. The Indo-Chinese intercourse, begun through the Tartar intermediaries, continued for about one thousand years. Hindu activity in China was promoted by sea also through Indian navigators, colonizers, and merchant marine. This maritime enterprise gave to India the cultural hegemony ultimately over Burma, Java, Siam, Annam, and Japan.

China received Mahâyânic Buddhism and Sanskrit texts from the Central-Asian provinces of India in 67 A.C. Since then China became Hinduized not only in theology and metaphysics, but in every department of thought and activity. Thousands of Hindus lived in Chinese cities, e.g., at Changan in the N. W. and at Canton on the sea, as priests, teachers, merchants, physicians, sculptors and "interpreters." The name of Chinese tourists, students, philosophers, and translators, also, in India is legion. The Chinese founded their drama on Hindu precedents, imported musical instruments (stringed) from India, and introduced even some of the acrobatic feats, dances and sports prevalent among the Hindus.

During his Indian tour the great Itsing (634—712) mastered Hindu medicine at the University of Nalanda. Hindu mathematics and logic were cultivated among the intellectuals of China; Sanskrit treatises on painting and art criticism, e.g., *Shadanga* (six limbs of painting) in Bâtsâyana's *Kâmasutra* (erotics), *Chitra-lakshana* (marks of painting), etc., furnished the canons of Chinese art during its greatest epoch (Tang and Sung Dynasties, 600—1250); and the traditional Confucianism had to be re-interpreted, e.g., by Chu Hsi (1130—1200), in the light of the imported Hindu philosophy. China became a part of "Greater India" in poetry, aesthetics, folk-festivals, morals, manners and sentiments. The "Augustan Age" of Chinese culture, the age of the mighty Tangs and brilliant Sung, was the direct outcome of the "holy alliance" for centuries between India and China.

Nobody can understand and appreciate China's paintings, literature, and achievements in humanism without feeling at the same time what humanity owes to Hindu culture. And as for Japan, she has always been an appendix to Indo-Chinese civilization. From chop-sticks and *No*-dance to Nichirenism, *Zen*-(Meditation)-philosophy, *Bushido* (militarism), Sesshiu's landscapes, and Basho's *hokku*-versicles, the Japanese have derived almost every bit of their life and institutions from India or China or from Hindu centres in China.

9. With the Saracens.

India was the heart and brain of Asia during the Middle Ages. While the Far East was being Hinduized, the age-long intercourse with the peoples of Western Asia and beyond was not neglected by the Hindus. The epoch of Roman Imperialism and Graeco-Roman culture had passed away. But the Gupta-Vikramâdityan Napoleons of India in the fifth century welcomed the Chinese scholar-tourists with one hand and the Egyptian (Alexandrian) and

Arabian traders with the other. One Sassanian Emperor deputed his physician to India to translate Hindu folk-tales into Persian. Every school-child in Europe and America knows them to-day as the so-called *Aesop's Fables*. Another Persian monarch sent an embassy to the court of the South-Indian Emperor in the middle of the seventh century. The game of chess so popular in the western world to-day came from the Hindus through the Sassanians.

Then came the days of Mohammed's converts, the Saracens, and the Caliphates, which Islamized the world, deeply or superficially, from Canton in China to Cordova in Spain. About 800,

"By Bagdat's shrines of fretted gold,
High-walled gardens green and old;

* * *

By garden porches on the brim,
The costly doors flung open wide,
Gold glittering through lamplight dim,
And broider'd sofas on each side;
In sooth it was a goodly time,
For it was in the golden prime
Of good Haroun Alraschid."

On the one hand, the Saracens kept alive the intellectual tradition of Hellenic antiquity in the Dark Ages of Europe, and, on the other, they became the connecting link between the East and the West. The thirteenth century Renaissance of Europe, represented by Roger Bacon, was an offshoot of the Saracen contributions. On this Saracen culture Hindu influence was almost as great as on the Chinese.

Hindu professors of algebra, medicine, alchemy, logic, and folk-lore taught the Moslems of the educational institutions at Bagdad. Hindu physicians practised at the capital of the Caliphate, and were in charge of the Imperial Hospital. Mansur (753—74) sent a deputation to Sindh (in Western India), which had come under his political influence, for Hindu astronomical tables. Harun al Rashid (786—808) and Mamun (813—33), the Charlemagnes of the Abbasside Saracens, encouraged by all means the propagation of Hindu culture among their people. Sanskrit texts were translated into Arabic under the auspices of the State. The pre-Moslem Persian versions of Hindu literature were also used. Besides, advanced scholars came to India to study the Hindu sciences at first hand.

The great Harun was cured of a severe illness by Mankh, a Hindu physician. This fact gave a great fillip to the cultivation of Hindu medical science throughout the Saracen Empire. Mankh

translated into Arabic a Sanskrit work on medicinal plants. Sanak, another Hindu scientist, wrote in Arabic a book on poisons according to the Indian toxicologists. Many drugs were imported into Persia from India, e.g., pepper, lac, nard, myrrh, red sandal, cinnamon, calotropis, myrobalan, *occimum sanctum* and others.

The Moslems read with their Hindu teachers the standard medical literature in Sanskrit, e.g., *Charaka*, *Sushruta*, and *Vāgbhata*, the treatises on leeches and on poisons, and studied also the diseases of women. They are specially indebted to the Hindus for a knowledge of the internal administration of iron, oxides of arsenic, mercury, and other metals. From the Saracens the Christian nations assimilated these Hindu discoveries. The later Greek physicians became acquainted with the Hindu system and availed themselves of the Indian medicaments. Not before Paracelsus (1493—1541), however, and then in the teeth of great opposition from reactionaries, did these bold and dangerous Hindu practices become common in Europe.

The Saracens learnt the decimal system of notation from the Hindus and passed it ultimately to the Europeans. They learnt also the Hindu science which has since been wrongly called algebra after them. They learnt similarly their *Manzil* or division of the sky into twenty-eight lunar asterisms from the same source. They enriched themselves with Hindu geometry also. Thus they learnt the correct value of the π , and also how to find the area of the circle.

To understand the contributions of the Saracens to Europe, e.g., of Musa in mathematics, and of Rases and Avicenna in medicine, alchemy and physiology, one need consider the part played by the Hindu brain in mediaeval science. The founders of the first Universities of Europe got their inspiration from the centres of Moslem learning, e.g., at Cordova and Bagdad. These had in their turn been to a considerable extent nurtured on Hindu culture.

10. With Europe during the Later-Middle Ages.

We watched the Hindu navigators of hoary antiquity conveying their merchandise to minister to the wants of the builders of the Pyramids. We have now come down to the era of the Crusades (11th—13th century). The forefathers of the modern Christian nations were then busy withstanding the expansion of Asia in Europe. They were at the same time picking up a knowledge of the superior arts and sciences of the Asians. All these five millenniums the Hindus had maintained a cosmopolitan outlook in commerce and culture.

Thus early in the Christian era a Hindu scientist honestly admitted India's indebtedness to the Greeks in astronomy in the following words:

"The Yavanas (Ionians, i.e., Greeks) are indeed *mlechchhas*, i.e., barbarians, but amongst them this science of astronomy is firmly established; hence they are honoured as though they were *Rishis*, i.e., holy sages." This has been the historic attitude of the Hindu mind with regard to the world. Hindu culture has influenced and been influenced by all the culture-systems of mankind.

Since the thirteenth century India has been as much Mohammedan as Hindu. During the later Middle Ages it was, first, through the Arabs that the Indians were in touch with the mercantile commonwealths of Venice, Florence, and other Italian cities, as well as with the Hanseatic League of Northern Germany. Secondly, the Buddhist Tartars of China overran the whole of Russia and carried the western frontiers of Asia almost to the Carpathian mountains. They introduced the Europeans to the Chinese discoveries, e.g., printing, gunpowder, mariner's compass, etc., and also to the heritage of Hindu thought in Central Asia and China. Further orientalizing of the Occident was promoted by the establishment of Turkey as a first class power in the Southeast of Europe during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The more momentous consequences of this event have been the Renaissance, the discoveries, the expansion of Europe, and the birth of America.

ii. With Europe since the Renaissance.

The Hindus and Moslems of India under the Great Moguls during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were in intimate touch with Persia and Western Asia. India was enriched by the naturalization of new fruit-bearing plants from abroad. Some of the best treasures of Persian literature were made available to the people in translations. A new language, the Indo-Persian Urdu, was improvised to be the medium of the new joint aspirations of the original inhabitants and Indianized new-comers. Poets, scholars, architects, painters and musicians were invited from Western Asia to settle in India.

On the whole, Persia has left an indelible impression on Hindu culture. For the past three hundred years the social etiquette and fine arts of India, poetry, painting, architecture, and music, both Hindu and Moslem, have been consciously or unconsciously influenced by the canons of Persian masters. On the other hand, Sanskrit literature and philosophy were rendered

into Persian. It need be remarked that the Latin versions of the Persian translations of Sanskrit originals have had some influence on European minds also, e.g., on Herder and Schopenhauer.

It was during this period of Indo-Persian or Hindu-Islamic Renaissance that the European merchants came into direct contact with India. The merchants and sea-going vessels of India were then continuing the tradition of their best periods. The Indian mercantile craft was larger, more durable and more elegant than the Portuguese, French, and English ships, according to the estimation of the European experts. India was an "industrial power" still, and her market was Europe.

The year of the first French Revolution (1789) was also the year of the presentation of the first Sanskrit work, *Shakuntalā*, a drama by Kalidas, the Hindu Shakespeare (fifth cent. A.C.), in a modern European language. Goethe's raptures over it are well known. And as "imitation is sincerest flattery," he took a hint from the Hindu dramatist.¹⁾

12. The only "Dark Age" of India.

India's contribution to the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century has been, first, a vast market for the industrial powers of the western world, and secondly, a land of raw materials. She has thus been in touch with the modern world-forces, viz., steam and democracy, though mainly as a passive agent.

This is the only century during six thousand years in which the Hindus have failed to actively develop the progress of humanity. This is the first time in the history of India in which she has failed to contribute to the world as many first class men and women of international reputation in science, commerce, industry and art, as the world has a right to expect from her three hundred and fifty million people. This is the only period during which Indians have been false to their historic role in the promotion of the world's civilization—false to their traditional genius in fostering national industries and international commerce—false to their age-long natural capacity for cooperating with other races in the building up of the world's sciences, arts, and philosophies. The brightest period of world-history has thus been the darkest period in the Indian. Thanks to the ideas of 1905 India has now fairly entered upon a creative epoch, an epoch, that is, of revolt and reconstruction.

¹⁾ *Supra* p. 148.

Humanism in Hindu Poetry.

"Mighty am I, Superior by name, upon the earth, conquering am I, all-conquering, completely conquering every region." This is the emphatic proclamation of Man to the Earth in a section of the earliest Hindu literature. Thus sang the poets of the *Atharva Veda*.¹⁾

1. The Here and the Now.

The all-round desire for conquest manifested itself with equal force in the avocations of daily life. "In the villages and in the wilderness, in the assembly halls that are upon the earth, in the gatherings and in the meetings" the people of Vedic India were eager to "hold forth." This wish to shine and flourish is the perpetual burden of the songs in *Vedas*.

The composers of Vedic poetry took part in the "election" of the king in the communal *agora*. The following is a bit of the political folk-songs associated with such functions: "Thee let the people choose unto kingship, thee these five divine directions."²⁾

It was an age of government by discussion. Vedic poetry reflects the democratic harangues of the public speakers. An orator addressed the audience thus: "Be your design the same, your hearts the same, your mind the same that it may be well for you together."³⁾

Vitalism, i.e., the philosophy of a life in the here and the now, is the clear message of the *Vedas*. The best method of *misunderstanding* the authors of the Vedic cycle is to approach them from the angle of theology and god-lore. The main body of this literature consists indeed of hymns, prayers and sermons. But its essential *motif* is secular, the distinctive feature is its pre-eminently martial character.

The *Vedas* held the mirror up to the social life of the time. And what was it but the life of fighters and colonizers, of the Cuchulains and Volsungs and Theseuses? The Rishis who pioneered the settlements were not laying out cities and states in the "other world". Their vision was concentrated in this earth. They knew that their mission was to enrich it with the Promethean fire.

¹⁾ XII, 1, 54, Bloomfield's version.

²⁾ *Atharva* III, 4, Whitney's version.

³⁾ *Atharva* VI, 64, Whitney.

2. Yearning after Fire.

The poetry of the *Rig Veda* would be meaningless unless we take it as a grand saga of the Quest of Fire. It was not without struggle that fire was annexed to civilization. The Vedic poets are aware of this struggle and have sung of its various stages until the final victory of man.

Fire hid itself "in secret like a thief with an animal which he had stolen."⁴) A vigorous search had to be instituted to take possession of it. "Having taken in his hand all manly powers, he has made the gods fear, when sitting down in his hiding place. There the thoughtful men find him."⁵) It was "looked and longed for in heaven" and "looked and longed for on earth."⁶)

When once the Energy has been harnessed to human needs, what do the Vedic poets want it to do? The following is a typical ode to fire:

"Burn, O Agni, the nearer enemies, burn the curse of the distant evil-doer. Burn the unseen ones. May thy never-ageing, never-tiring flames spread out.

"Bestow mighty vigour on those who toil for thee, bright luck and welfare, O Agni, on the Vishwāmitras."⁷)

A prosperous territory and a happy home, success over the enemy and expansion of dominions—this is what the Hindus wanted in the Vedic age. Their literature portrays, therefore, the worldly interests of men and women. We read in it songs in praise of cattle, grain, and *soma* drink; it is pervaded by the spirit of carnivals, merrymakings, and Theocritean pastorals; it is the poetry of hearty send-offs to the soldiers going to the front, or of war-chants in honour of triumphant generals "at home." We read in it, further, of the romantic love between the damsel Urvashi and Pururavas.⁸) Centuries later this would furnish the plot of Kalidasa's drama. The Vedic woman is made of the same flesh and blood as the modern woman. And we see her shifts to win and fix a man's love against a rival.⁹)

3. Idealism.

Man does not live by bread alone. So we have the *Upanishads* singing of the soul and the Infinite. Here is a specimen:

⁴) *Rig Veda*, I, 65, Oldenberg's version.

⁵) *Rig* I, 67.

⁶) *Rig* I, 98.

⁷) *Rig* III, 18, 2, 4.

⁸) *Rig* X.

⁹) *A. V.* VII, 38, 113.

"From the non-existent (i.e., transitory, unreal)
 me to the ever-existent (i.e., permanent, truth, reality) lead;
 From darkness (i.e., ignorance)
 me to light (i.e., knowledge) lead;
 From death me to immortality lead."

It does not require a specially Oriental mind to appreciate this desire for "more light" of the ancient Hindu poets.

Self-control, restraint of passions, contemplation, etc., etc. . . . the theme of a portion of Hindu literature. The authors who followed the lectures of Shâkya the Buddha and other moralists were specialists in this branch. But the poetry of *Dharmapada* which contains the sayings of Buddha seeks mainly to rouse the *élan vital*, the creative will and intelligence of human beings. It harps on *appamâda* i.e., a life of vigilance, strenuousness, and activity. Buddhism is essentially dynamic. The Buddhist is a proselyte by nature; his cult is social service and alleviation of the sufferings of men and animals.

Dhyâna, *Yoga*, meditation, and silent "communion," are some of the topics of Hindu authors. They have preached sometimes a keen solicitude for the "higher self" and an indifference to the mundane affairs. Such non-secularism is the characteristic of a type of mentality all over the world. In the *Old Testament* this indifference is represented by Ezekiel. According to him there are aspects of life which are higher than the ordinary political interests. Emphasis on lonesome meditation and a life of seclusion from publicity is a prominent feature of the teachings of Zeno and his school. The "wise man" of Seneca¹⁰) does not differ from the Rishis, Buddhas, Bhikshus, and Yogis of India. And the *New Testament* with its contempt of "the world and the flesh" is the gospel of non-political other-worldlyism.

The poets of India have always emphasized the conception of progress of the world through revolutions. The Hindu masses are thus ever expectant for a change in the *status quo*. Herein lies the bed-rock of their never-failing optimism. The greatest Bible of hope in India is the *Gîtâ* (c. sixth-second cent. B. C.), a section of the Great Epic, the *Mahâbhârata*. The declarations of Lord Krishna to the warrior Arjuna teach the peasant and the prince to prepare the way for a Messiah in every age.

¹⁰) *De Otio* III, IV, *Ad Serenum* VIII, etc.

4. Love and War.

Two master-passions have made man here and there and everywhere—both in the East and the West. These are, first, love, and second, war, or first, war, and second, love. The literature of the Hindus from the age of the Maurya emperors (third and fourth centuries B. C.) to the age of the Gupta Napoleons (fourth and fifth centuries A. C.) is the literature of war and love.

Bhāsa, the dramatist of the second century A. C. (?) writes:

"How different, in operation, from other nooses, is the noose of a sweetheart's arms! Fastened about the neck, it imparts life; loosened, it produces death."¹¹)

The *Purāṇas*, embodying as they do older tradition, acquired their final form during the period from the second to the fifth century A. C. Their principal theme is the titanic conflict between the gods and the Asuras; the scene that appeals most powerfully to the folk-imagination is the cataclysmal Churning of the Ocean; and the most popular hero is Vishwāmitra, the embodiment of Satanic pride and energy, who would create other worlds and have a place in the sun.

Kalidās (fifth century A. C.), the Hindu Virgil, describes the fully developed personality of his countrymen thus:

"Lords of the lithosphere from sea to sea,
Commanding the skies by air chariots,
Who adopted the life of the silent sage when old,
And passed away at last through Yoga's aid."

Take a bit of natural sentiment from *Kūdambārī*, a Sanskrit novel in prose, of the seventh century:

"Next day the two Gandharva kings came with their queens, and the festivities were increased a thousandfold. Chitraratha, however, said: 'Why, when we have palaces of our own, do we feast in the forest? Moreover, though marriage resting only on mutual love is lawful amongst us, yet let us follow the custom of the world.' 'Nay,' replied Tarapida. 'Where a man hath known the greatest happiness there is his home, even if it be the forest. And where also have I known such joy as here?'"¹²)

The following "thanks to the human heart by which we live" is from *Karpura-manjari*, a drama in Prakrit language (A. C. 900) by Rāja-shekhara: "What need of the performance of song and dance? and what need of strong drink? what need of incense and

¹¹) Hall's trans.

¹²) Ridding's version.

aloes? and what need of saffron? On all the earth in daintines naught can equal man's tender passion."

And again, "The consort of an emperor and the wife of common man—in the matter of love there is not even a grain of distinction between them to be found, methinks, even if a certain difference in outward splendor is effected by rubies and decorations and garments and saffron."¹³)

It is but this Hindu conception of love's omnipotence even though unadorned that finds expression in the following lines of Rossetti's *House of Life*:

"Some ladies love the jewels in Love's zone

And some that listen to his lute's soft tone;

Some prize his blindfold sight; . . .

My lady only loves the heart of Love:

Therefore Love's heart, my lady, hath for thee

His bower of unimagined flower and tree."

5. Bhartrihari's Synthesis.

It should be observed, *en passant*, that Bhartrihari (c 800), a poet, who like all other Indian authors is apt to be misunderstood, was quite comprehensive in his treatment of the *rasas* (emotions). In his synthetic imagination there was a place not only for a century of verses on renunciation, but also for another two centuries, one of which was given over to love and the second to morals. Besides, even in the treatment of sex in the *Shringāra-shataka* (stanzas 51—52, 99—100), the poet did not forget the duality or polarism of human personality. He was conscious as much of the spiritual in man as of the sexual. His "whole duty, of man" was oriented not only to the sensuous elements in life but also to the moral or social obligations as well as to the super-sensual.¹⁴)

The same all-round view of the aesthetic *psyche* is accordingly mirrored forth in Indian treatises on poetics. In *Dasha-rupa*, a treatise of the sixth century on ten forms of drama, it is expressly stated that the themes of art are almost unnumbered, because *rasa* or sentiment can be conveyed among mankind by almost any and every treatment (IV. 90). It is implied that dramatists do not have to observe any taboo in the treatment of manners and emotions.¹⁵)

¹³) Lanman's version.

¹⁴) Kennedy: *Bhartrihari's Shatakas*, Boston, 1913.

¹⁵) Haas: *Dasharupa*, New York, 1912.

6. Mother-Cult.

A mediaeval invocation for strength to the Deity as Female Principle is given below. Mother-cult is in Hindu poetry a euphemism for energism.

"May Thy sword glittering in Thy hands,
Besmear'd with the blood and fat of Asuras (Titans) as with mire,
Be for us welfare:

Oh, Chandikâ! to thee we bow.

Oh, Mother, who hast shown Thyself in many forms,

Who else than Thee is able to achieve

That destruction of the great Asuras,

Enemies of righteousness,

Which Thou hast wrought today?

Queen of the universe art Thou and its guardian;

In the form of the universe art Thou its maintainer;

By the Lords of the universe art Thou worshipped,

They its supporters have great devotion to Thee.

Oh, Devil be gracious;

Ever protect us from the fear of enemies,

As Thou hast just now saved us by the slaughter of the Asuras.

Make cease at once the sins of the whole world

And the great dangers which come of all portents."¹⁶⁾

Pragmatically considered, the daily thoughts, wishes, and prayers of the Christian nations, who quite recently were measuring their strength with one another on the battlefields of Europe did not differ from the daily wishes of the Hindu Tantrists even in peace time. Verily, life is a grand war in Indian estimation. And yet this conception of the "Armageddon" of life is not a Hindu patent. "Thus we half-men struggle," says Browning. And the Siegfrieds of the *Nibelungenlied* e.g., of Hebbel's plays and Wagner's operas, are Browningite in their obstinately aggressive individuality. Whitman also sings:

"Know'st thou not there is but one theme for ever-enduring bards,

And that is the theme of war, the fortune of battles,

The making of perfect soldiers?"

7. Vishvanâtha, the Critic.

Nor in mediaeval Hindu works of literary criticism, e.g., in Vishvanâtha's *Sâhitya Darpana* (Mirror of Literature) will the reader

¹⁶⁾ Avalon's version.

of Clark's *European Theories of the Drama* find something characteristically Oriental. The definitions of poetry, for instance, discussed by the Indian rhetorician will appear to be but chips from the same block quite assimilable to those with which the West was familiar from Plato to Sidney. The doctrine that in poetry pain is transmuted into pleasure, as for instance in the "tragedy" of *Rāmāyana*, indicates at least that in the analysis of *rasas* the Hindu psychologists were not following a scientific willow-the-wisp.¹⁷⁾

Altogether, in these *motifs* and ideals of the Hindus what else do we see except the "phrases" in a continuous "thematic" development, to use an expression from modern music, of the yearning after fire, energy, life? And is this fire-hunger, energy-hunger, life-hunger exclusively Hindu? This is "human, all-too human."

¹⁷⁾ Mitra: *Sāhitya Darpana*, pp. 43—44.

The Joy of Life in Hindu Social Philosophy.

A great impetus was imparted to social studies by the publication of the *Sacred Books of the East*. It has rendered inestimable service to the sciences of mythology and philology. But, on the other hand, it is this series of books that has up till now offered the greatest impediments to the growth of a scientific comparative sociology. For it has diverted the attention of scholars from the achievements of Oriental races in exact science, mathematico-physical and physiologico-medical. It has also militated against the recognition by the Occident of the Oriental endeavours in civic administration, social service, conciliar enterprise, industrial activity, and institutional life. Today Eur-America is obsessed by the notion that Asia has stood for non-secular religiosity all through the ages.

Max Müller, the editor of the Series, is personally responsible for a great part of this modern superstition. His *India: what can it teach us?* was published about the middle of the nineteenth century. In this book he categorically declared that the sole message of India was the "sublime" philosophy of other-worldlyism, quietism, despair! This sweeping generalization is also summed up in a sentence of his *Chips from a German Workshop*. "The sense that life is a dream or a burden is," says he, "a notion which the Buddha shares with every Hindu philosopher." And Schopenhauer, the father of "modern pessimism," seems to have believed that he found allies in ancient Hindu thinkers. He therefore unequivocally stated that "the fundamental characteristics of Brahmanism and Buddhism are idealism and pessimism, which look upon life as the result of our sins and upon the existence of the world as in the nature of a dream."

Since then India has been treated in Eur-America as a synonym for mysticism or pessimism or both. Now, to the outside world, India happens to be known by a single personality, Buddha. And Buddha commands also the devotion of millions in China and Japan. He is, therefore, taken to be the "light of Asia." To the laymen as well as scholars of the West there is thus but one shibboleth which explains the entire East. It is Buddhism, and Buddhism = mysticism and pessimism.

I. Occidental Pessimism.

Psychologically or statistically, however, it is impossible to make out a distinction between the East and the West on the score

of mysticism or pessimism. Has not mysticism of diverse nominations flourished luxuriantly on the Occidental soil? The cult of the Infinite, the absolute and the eternal, has indeed formidable tradition in the Eur-American world. It counts in its calendar such stalwarts as Pythagoras and Plato among the Greeks, St. Paul the apostle and Plotinus the neo-platonist, St. Francis and Jacopone da Todi among the Italians, Ruysbroek the Flemish and Boehme the German, Pascal and Madame Guyon of France, Bunyan and Blake among Englishmen, and the New England transcendentalists, not to mention the latter-day rosicrucians and spiritualitarians.

Not less is pessimism an historic trait of the Occidental mind. The Books of Job and Ecclesiastes in the *Old Testament* are saturated with it. It was a leading *motif* of Greek tragedies. Theognis, nicknamed the "snow" (i.e., inanimated) has the following lines: "Best of all for all things upon earth is it not to be born nor to behold the splendour of the sun; next best to traverse as soon as possible the gates of Hades." Euripides is equally lachrymose. Socrates also is reported by Plato to have said: "Death even if it should rob us of all consciousness would still be a wonderful gain, in as much as deep dreamless sleep is by far to be preferred to every day even of the happiest life."

Jesus' message was the very cream of pessimism. "He that loveth father or mother more than Me," announced this Savior of Christendom, "is not worthy of Me"; "If any man cometh unto Me and leaveth not his father and mother and wife and children, he can not be My disciple." The *New Testament* with its emphasis on the "sins" of the "world" and the "flesh" is the most dismal literature conceivable even without a Nietzsche's help. The regime of the Church Fathers, celibacy, monasticism, and nunnery is of course the very reverse of optimism and of the sense of joy in life.

Pessimism has also attacked the general literature and poetry of the Western world. Byronic despair is proverbial. Here is a chip:

"Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
Count o'er thy days from anguish free,
And know, whatever thou hast been,
'Tis something better not to be."

Heine's *Weltschmerz* is a vein in the same quarry. Lamartine's *Le Désespoir* likewise has the Shelleyan burden: "Our sincerest laughter with some pain is ever fraught." De Musset belongs to the same class.

Hartmann, the philosopher of the *Unconscious*, is an inveterate woman-hater and a confirmed pessimist. His pupil, Mainländer, in

the *Philosophy of Redemption*, has outdone the master. According to him the movement of all being is not the will to live but "the will to die." The guide of them both, Schopenhauer, had propounded "the denial of the will to live."

How is it possible to maintain, in the face of these facts, that pessimistic philosophy is the product exclusively or distinctively of the Orient?

2. Hindu Militarism.

For one thing, it must be clearly understood that in India the state was never theocratic. No religion dominated the policy of governments. The statecraft was not regulated by the personal faith of the rulers. Hindu politics was, as a rule, thoroughly secular, i. e., Lutheran and Machiavellian.

Neither the vegetarianism of a sect nor the *ahimsā* (non-killing) of a cult could successfully counteract the military ambitions of the people. The national or racial desire for a "place in the sun" was never held inconsistent with even the most other-worldly and Godward tendencies in certain schools of thought.

The real Bible of the Hindu state was not to be found in any theological "ism" but in *nīti-shāstra* or political science. It laid down the ideals of man as a "political animal" in the comprehensive Aristotelian sense. On the one hand, it pointed out the duties of rulers to the people, and on the other, it taught the people how to resist the tyranny of the ruler and expel or execute him for "misconduct." It placed a high premium on the fighting capacity of human beings. It was the perennial fountain of inspiration to soldiers.

Shākya the Buddha's monasticism did not enervate the people of his time. His contemporaries as well as the generations that followed him kept on the even tenor of their militarism. The political history of India does not appear to have ever been modified by his or any other preacher's Quakerish pacifism. Within about a century after Shākya's death Chandragupta Maurya founded the most extensive of all the empires realized in India up till now. The Bismarck of this nation-builder was Kautilya, the finance minister. There is absolutely no trace of Shākyan teachings in his *Artha-shāstra*, the code according to which the empire was conceived and consolidated. It is as un-Shākyan or un-Buddhist as Machiavelli's *Prince* or Treitschke's *Politics* is un-Christian.

A glimpse into the military India of the third and fourth centuries B. C. would indicate that there was a direct cooperation of the

sexes in militarism such as has been conceived only yesterday by the war-lords of present-day Eur-America and that Hindu wars were no mere skirmishes of savages.¹⁾

Western scholars have stated that the Hindus were weak - a nation of fighters because of their caste system. It is alleged that the Hindus delegated the entire war-work to the Kshatriya (warrior) caste on the principle of "division of labour," and that they did not not learn how to utilize the total man-power of the country.

This is a fallacy like other fallacies about India started during the nineteenth century. It has no foundation in facts, it is utterly unhistorical. Even so late as the seventeenth century Shivaji the Great, the Frederick the Great of India, electrified the non-Kshatriya low-class Mawalis into the "Maratha Peril" of the Great Moghul.

Besides, the very opposite is the idea inculcated in all Hindu political and military text-books. "My teacher says," as we read in the *Artha-shāstra*, that "of the armies composed of Brāhmanas (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (merchants), or Shudras (lower orders), that which is mentioned first on account of bravery is better to be enlisted than the one subsequently mentioned. 'No,' says Kautilya, "the enemy may win over to himself the army of Brāhmanas by means of prostration. Hence the army of Kshatriyas trained in the art of wielding weapons is better; or the army of Vaishyas or Shudras having greater numerical strength."²⁾

The discussion indicates that army service was not the "preserve" of a special caste. There was nothing against the Brāhmana class as such being drafted for the regiments. The whole nation could be drilled at need.

Shukra-nīti is a later work than *Artha-shāstra*. And what are its teachings? "Even Brāhmanas should fight if there have been aggressions on women or if there has been a killing of cows (held inviolable according to Hindu religion) by the enemy. The life of even the Brāhmana who fights when attacked is praised by the people."³⁾

The general *Bushidō* morality of the Hindus is reflected in the following lines of the same work:

"People should not regret the death of the brave man who is killed in battles. The man is purged and delivered of all sins and attains heaven.

¹⁾ *Artha*, Book X, ch. III. *Vide Supra* p. 8.

²⁾ Book IX, ch. II.

³⁾ Ch. IV, sec. vii, lines 599 etc.

"The fairies of the other world vie with one other in reaching the warrior who is killed at the front in the hope that he be their husband.

"The great position that is attained by the sages after long and tedious penances is immediately reached by warriors who meet death in warfare.

"Two classes of men can go beyond the solar spheres, i. e., into heaven: the austere missionary and the man who is killed at the front in a fight."⁴)

The cult that has actually obtained in the land of Shâkya the Buddha is thus the exact antipodes of quietism and pacifism. The alleged pessimism of the Hindus is an *idola* of modern Eur-America. The Occident has by holding to this attitude been guilty of the greatest injustice to the Oriental genius. The removal of this injustice is the most fundamental of all the demands of Young Asia. Not until this *idola* has been overthrown can there be a reformation and rebirth of social science.

3. Buddhism in Hindu Culture.

Probably Buddhism is the theme on which, among all Asian topics, the greatest amount of scholarship has been bestowed. But its place in the scheme of Oriental life and thought remains yet to be understood. In fact, it is the most misinterpreted of all phenomena in the East. Let us try to understand Buddhism in actual history.

In the first place, Buddhism as a cult, of which Buddha is the God, is not the religion or morality founded by the monk Shâkya, called the Buddha, i. e., the "awakened" or enlightened (B. C. 563—483). The distinction between Shâkyaism and Buddhism is the same as that between the teachings of Jesus the Jew and the teachings of St. Paul about Jesus the Christ, who is a god.

The Budha-cult was formulated by Ashwaghosha and came into existence as a distinct faith about the first century A. C. during the reign of the Indo-Tartar emperor Kanishka. This religion, also called Mahâyânism (the Greater Vehicle) was theologically much allied to, and did not really differ in ritual and mythology from, the contemporary Jaina and the Puranic-Hindu "isms". It is difficult to distinguish the image of an Avalokiteshwara of this Buddhist pantheon from that of a Jaina Tirthamkara or a Hindu Vishnu. The Buddhism that is professed in China and Japan is this latter-day creed of gods and goddesses.

⁴) Ch. IV, sec. vii, lines 620 etc.

What now about the teachings of the man Shākya himself. Even granting for the moment that these were pessimistic, need be realized that they were not the sole source of lig in the India of the fifth and sixth centuries B. C. Shākya lived an age when the "stormers and stressers" were legion. There were eminent physicians, surgeons, grammarians, logicians, pedagogues and psychologists; and there were systems and systems of each of these classes of intellectuals. Shākya had no monopoly as a theologian or moralist or spiritual doctor in that "pluralistic universe."

Of course, Shākya, the son of the president or archon (*rājan*) of the Sakiya republic, had become an ascetic. He fled the world indeed, but did he ever become a recluse? No, he remained a propagandist all his life. He founded, no doubt, an order (*Samgha*) of monks, but he taught also the world of husbands and wives, of diplomats, consuls, merchants and governors. The Confederacy of the Vajjians in Eastern India looked up to him as adviser on critical occasions in national politics.

Nor were the followers of Shākya mere meditators. They were, as a rule, energists. Quietism or non-action is not the principle on which his *Samgha* was organized. The first hospitals of the world were built by his disciples, at least as early as the third century B. C. Schools, academies and rest-houses were the handiwork of the Shākyan monks.

It is the custom to mention Emperor Asoka the Great (B. C. 270—230) as the most distinguished follower of Shākya. He is generally known as the "Constantine of Buddhism." But, strictly speaking, as has been noted above, there was no "Buddhism" in the third century B. C. Besides, in what sense can it be said that Shākyaism was a "state religion" in Asoka's time? The citizens of India under his administration were not all followers of Shākya. No article of faith was imposed upon the officers. Toleration was as a rule the declared policy in matters of conscience, although not in ritual. Nor can the famous edicts of the emperor be regarded as manifestos in favor Shākyaism. His own cult, of of *Dhamma* or Duty again was distinct from, though based on, Shākya's tenets.

His time to time announcements to the people were really the ordinances of an "enlightened," benevolent despot. The paternal solicitation and moralizing of the monarch are manifest in the Kalinga edict. "All men," as we read, "are my children, and just as for my children I desire they should enjoy all happiness and prosperity, both in this world, and in the next, so for all men I desire the like happiness and prosperity."

Asoka's cares and efforts were thoroughly humanistic. He did not play the quietist, seeking a "denial of the will to live." He did not regard the sweets of life as curses to be shunned. He was the keenest of internationalists. He sent his own son to proselytize Ceylon. It was his embassies that brought Western Asia, Egypt, Greece, Macedon, Epirus, and Kyrene within the sphere of Hindu influence. His secular activity in civic life was the most pronounced. Altogether he is one of the greatest Caesars of all ages.

And as for the regular monks and ascetics of the Buddhist organizations, they also did not keep wholly aloof from politics. They knew how to take part in intrigues and promote revolutions. They were tried as seditionists by some rulers and worshipped as "king-makers" by others. They would band themselves into military orders in order to be qualified as partisans in civil wars. They were adepts in Jesuitical casuistry, too. During the seventh and eighth centuries. e. g., under Harsha-vardhana, Shashâmkâ, Dharmapâla, and others the political interferences of monk-generals were constantly in evidence. The mediaeval history of China and Japan also affords instances of warfare conducted by Buddhist monks as politico-military divines.

After all, it must be admitted, however, that Shâkya's *Weltanschauung* or view of life was certainly "not of this world." But his *Nirvânism*, i. e., doctrine of annihilation did not imply the "denial of the will to live." It tended rather to emphasize the annihilation of evil and the removal of misery and pain. Its trend was systematically "melioristic." Activism was thus the very keynote of his propaganda.

The idea of *Appamâda* (i.e., vigilance, earnestness, strenuousness) or energism was the cardinal element in Shâkya's pedagogy of the moral self.

His educational creed may be gathered from some of his sayings in the *Dhammapada*. Thus we read:—

"By rousing himself, by earnestness, by restraint and control, the wise man may make for himself an island that no flood can overwhelm.

"Earnest among the thoughtless, awake among the sleepers, the wise man advances like a racer leaving behind the hack.

"By earnestness (energizing) did Indra rise to lordship of the gods. People praise earnestness; thoughtlessness is blamed.

"A mendicant who delights in earnestness and looks with fear on thoughtlessness, moves about like fire, burning all his fetters, small or large.

"He who does not rouse himself when it is time to rise, who though young and strong, is full of sloth, whose will and thoughts are weak, that lazy and idle man will never find the way to knowledge."

According to Shâkya the wise man is thus an energist, a moral and intellectual gymnast, a fighter. There is no place for non action, passivity or cowardly retreat in the Shâkyan system of self-discipline. The follower of the Buddha must "advance like a racer" and "move about like fire."

The same energism was strongly inculcated by Asoka also. We read in his Minor Rock Edicts (No. 1):

"Even the small man can, if he choose, by exertion, win for himself much heavenly bliss.

"For this purpose has been proclaimed this precept; viz., 'Let small and great exert themselves to this end.'

"My neighbors, too, should learn this lesson, and may such exertion long endure."

Is all this the metaphysics of *Weltschmerz* and *désespoir*, or the ethics of the "perfection of character by effort"? Whatever be the superstition of Eur-American scholars regarding Asia, Shâkya, the republican, and Asoka, the emperor, are two of the most successful apostles of secular endeavor and humanistic energizing in Hindu estimation.

4. Western Mysticism.

And yet it has often been said that Europeans and Americans cannot understand the Hindu or the Asian mind. Oriental view-points and ideals are supposed to be fundamentally different from Occidental!

But what is the characteristic Oriental way of looking at things? Is it mysticism or the cult of the Eternal and Hereafter? There have been in Europe also mystics or "seers" of the Infinite, as many and as great as in Asia, from the earliest times till to-day. The very first speculations of Hellas were embodied in the teachings of Pythagoras. He believed in the transmigration of the soul and preached the esoteric doctrine of numbers. He was a vegetarian and believed in general abstinence and ascetic mortification of the flesh. Plato's "idealism" also was mystical as much as was the monism of the contemporary *Upanishadists* of India and Taoists of China.

Who has been greater occultist than Jesus? His message was: "My kingdom is not of this world." His other-worldliness and pessimism are undeniable. Indeed, the greatest passivist and sub-

missionist among the world's teachers has been this Syrian Saviour of Europe and America. His political slogan was: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's." Such extreme "non-resistance" was probably never preached in India.

Plotinus (third century A. C.), the greatest neo-Platonist, was a mystical pantheist. He actually practised Yogic exercises by which he hoped to attain union with the "ultimate principle," the highest God of all. The monasticism, celibacy, nunnery, and notions about "the world, the flesh, and the devil," the "seven deadly sins," etc., of Christianity have been practically universal in the western world. They have had too long a sway to be explained away as accidental, or adventitious, or imported, or unassimilated overgrowths. Spiritualistic "self-realization" was the creed of many a transcendentalist denomination in Europe during the Middle Ages. To the English Puritans, even music and sports were taboo. The painters of the romantic movement in Germany, e.g., Cornelius, Overbeck and others fought shy of women and preached that all artists should be monks. The race of Jacopone da Todis, Rosicrucians, Ruysbroecks, and Boehmes is not yet a thing of the past in Eur-America. And now that the philosopher of the *élan vital* has enunciated his doctrine of "intuition," mysticism is going to have a fresh lease of life.

Thus the psychology of the "soul" and the metaphysics of the infinite life and permanent verities, are as good orthodox Occidental commodities as Oriental. Even in the conception of the universe as a living being the tradition of the Occident has been as long as that of India.

According to Plato in his *Phædo* this universe is a living creature in very truth, possessing soul and reason by the providence of God. Virgil in his *Æneid* (Book VI, 96ff) writes:

"First, Heaven and Earth and Ocean's liquid plains,
The Moon's bright globe and planets of the pole,
One mind, infused through every part sustains;
One universal animating soul
Quickens, unites, and mingles with the whole.
Hence man proceeds, and beasts and birds of air,
And monsters that in marble ocean roll;
And fiery energy divine they share."

—Taylor's trans.

Similarly the Earth-Spirit conceived by Goethe is a personification of the active, vital forces of nature, the principle of change and growth within the universe.

This doctrine makes Plato, Virgil, and Goethe virtually Hindu Vedantists. How, then, does European mentality differ from Hindu? According to the Vedantists, the world originates out of Brahma (Self), the absolute Reality, the absolute Intelligence, the absolute Bliss.

To the same group belongs also Browning with his message of immortality of soul or continuity of life-energy, thus:

"Fool! all that is, at all,

Lasts ever, past recall;

Earth changes, but thy soul and God stand sure:

What entered into thee

That was, is, and shall be:

Time's wheel runs back or stops: Potter and clay endure."

The whole stanza can be bodily transferred into a section of the Hindu *Gītā*. The Emersons of America also disprove the notion that "transcendentalism" is an Oriental monopoly.

5. Hindu Materialism

Let us take the other side of the shield. What is alleged to be the characteristic standpoint or philosophy of Eur-America? Is it secularism, optimism, or, to be more definite, militarism? But, this has not been the monopoly of the Western world. Hindu culture has always been an expression of humanism, positivism and other "isms" following from it as much as Hellenic, European and American culture.

Take militarism.⁵⁾ Hindustan started the cult of Kshatriyaism, which in Japan is called *Bushido* ("The Way of the Warrior"). The first Hindu Napoleon, Chandragupta Maurya (fourth century B. C.) had a regular standing army of 600,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, 9000 elephants, and a multitude of chariots. Excluding followers and attendants, but including the archers, three on each elephant, and two fighting men on each chariot, the whole army consisted of 690,000 men. A race which can organize such a vast fighting machine and wield it for offensive and defensive purposes is certainly not over-religious or unpractical or other-worldly.

Such vast armies have not been exceptional in Indian history. According to a Portuguese observer, Krishna of Vijayanagara (1509—30) in South India commanded an army of 703,000 foot, 32,600 horse, and 551 elephants, besides camp-followers. One of the smallest armies of the Hindus has been that of the Andhras in the

⁵⁾ See the chapter on "The War-office" in the present author's *Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus* (1922).

Deccan. It had only 100,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 100 elephants.

Hindu *Bushido* had a spiritual "sanction" too. It was backed up by a theory which found its place in all Sanskrit treatises on warfare and political science.⁶⁾

Ahimsa, i.e., non-killing or non-resistance, has neither been a fact of India's politico-military history, nor a dominant trait of Hindu national thought and character. Kalidasa (c. 420 A. C.), the Hindu Virgil, enunciated as we have seen the energetic ideal of his countrymen.⁷⁾

Wherein do Hindu ideals then differ from Eur-American?

We shall now analyze Hindu secularism or positivism a little more deeply. Desire for the good things of this earth, life, strength, and general well-being, is not a feature exclusively of the Occidental mind. If this be called optimism or materialism, the Hindus also have been profoundly optimistic and materialistic since the days of their commerce with Egypt during the Theban period. In fact, all through the ages the Hindus have been famous to foreign nations principally as materialists.

It is a glib talk among economists to-day that India is an essentially agricultural country, and that the Hindus are a thoroughly non-industrial race. But were the Christian nations down to the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century less agricultural than the Hindus? Were they more "essentially" industrial? Historically speaking, Hindu materialism has manifested itself as much in commerce and industry as in agriculture.

The long-continued international trade of the Hindus points to their thoroughly commercial genius. Egypt, Mesopotamia, Syria, Persia, the Roman Empire, China, they all have profited by the commerce of the Hindus. This was possible because of the adventurous seafaring character of the people of India. It inspired them in their colonizing exploits in the islands of the Indian Ocean, and enabled them to establish a sphere of influence comprising Japan on the east and Madagascar on the African coast. Besides, they were past masters in the art of ship-building and naval architecture. They constructed seagoing vessels of considerable size, and effected gradual improvements in shipping industry. Some of the ancient Hindu ships could accommodate 300, 500, 700, 800, and even 1500 passengers.⁸⁾

⁶⁾ *Supra* p. 273.

⁷⁾ *Supra* pp. 105, 266.

⁸⁾ Mookerji: *History of Indian Shipping* (London 1910).

In the fifteenth century, according to Nicolo Conti, the Hindus could build ships larger than the Europeans, capable of containing 2000 butts and with five sails and as many masts. One of the Hindu ships on its way to the Red Sea, in 1612, was 153 ft. long, 42 ft. beam, 31 ft. deep, and was of 1500 tons burden. The English ships of that date were 300 or 500 tons at most.

The art of navigation was part of the education of Hindu princes. There were Sanskrit treatises on this and allied subjects. Light-houses were constructed on the seacoast in Southern India. The marine interests were looked after by a special department of State. Marine affairs were important enough to call forth Asoka the Great's attention to them in his celebrated "Edicts" (third century B. C.). Something like marine insurance even occurs in Hindu legal literature.

A few shipping regulations are here reproduced from the *Institutes of Manu* (not later than the fourth century A. C., but embodying the oldest tradition):

"For a long passage the boat-hire must be proportioned to the places and times. Know that this [rule refers] to passages along the banks of rivers; at sea there is no settled [freight].

"Whatever may be damaged in a boat by the fault of the boatmen that shall be made good by the boatmen collectively [each paying] his share.

"This decision on suits [brought by passengers holds good only] in case the boatmen are culpably negligent on the water; in the case of accident caused by [the will of] gods, no fine can be [inflicted on them]."

Surely the Hindus knew how to appreciate and manage the earthly interests of men and women.

During the nineteenth century India has been converted into a mere market for the Western manufactures. Her role at present is only to produce raw materials at the dictate of modern industrial powers. This is the exact antipodes of the part she has ever played in the economic history of the world. All through the ages it was the manufactures of the Hindus which had sought markets and created demands in foreign countries.

Varāhamihira's *Brīhat Samhitā* (sixth century A. C.) is among other things a record of the achievements of Hindu industrialism.⁹⁾ Cements and powders were made "strong as the thunderbolt."

⁹⁾ Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* (1915), Sarkar's *Hindu Achievements in Exact Science* (1918).

There were "experts in machinery." Experts in applied chemistry specialized in dyes, cosmetics, and even artificial imitation of natural flower-scents. Fast dyes were made for textile fabrics by the treatment of vegetable dyes with alum and other chemicals. The principle of indigotin was extracted from the indigo plant by an almost modern chemical process. Metallurgists were expert in the tempering of steel and could manufacture the so-called "Damascus swords." Pliny, the Roman of the first century A. C., admired the Hindu industrial attainments; Tavernier, the Frenchman of the seventeenth century, did likewise.

If Hindu civilization has not been materialistic, one wonders as to what is materialism. In what particulars did the "Greek view of life" differ from the Hindu? Let the Dickinsons and Huntingtons answer.

6. Hindu Achievements in Organization.¹⁰⁾

We have spoken of the genius of the Hindus for martial exploits, naval organization, and colonizing adventure. We have noticed also their capacity for capturing the markets of the world by the promotion of industry and commerce. All these activities bespeak a richly diversified institutional life, and indicate their ability to organize men and things, as well as administer public interests.

In a political work of the fourth century B. C., the *Arthashastra*, eighteen departments of State are mentioned. The war office of the first Hindu emperor was a highly organized and efficient public body. It consisted of thirty members, who formed themselves into six boards: (1) admiralty, (2) transport, commissariat, and army service, (3) infantry, (4) cavalry, (5) war-chariots, and (6) elephants. The heads of some of the other departments discharged the functions of the superintendent of manufactures, accountant-general, collector-general, and so forth.

Pataliputra (site of modern Bankipore, on the Ganges, in Bihar, Eastern India), the Rome of the Hindus, was nine miles in length and one and one-half miles in breadth. The rectangular wall around it was pierced by sixty-four gates crowned by five hundred and seventy towers. The thirty city-fathers of this capital constituted a municipal commission, which managed the affairs through six boards. These boards (1) superintended the industrial arts of the people, (2) looked to the needs of foreigners visiting the country, and managed their estates as trustees, if required,

¹⁰⁾ See *Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*.

Tendencies in Hindu Culture.

(3) collected the vital statistics by registering births and deaths revenue and other purposes, (4) regulated trade, commerce, weights and measures, (5) supervised manufactures, and (6) collected taxes on sales of commodities.

In subsequent ages Portuguese, French, and English visitors were struck by the volume of traffic in Indian cities, the well-ordered administration of civic life, and the sanitation and economic prosperity of the crowded urban areas. Tavernier found, for example travelling conveyances more commodious in India than anything that had been "invented for ease in France or Italy."

The Hindus have exhibited their capacity for administration of public bodies to promote general well-being in other spheres well. Fa-hien, the Chinese scholar-saint, visited India early in the fifth century A. C. He has given an account of the charitable institutions, colleges, monasteries, rest-houses and free hospitals, endowed by the enlightened Hindu philanthropists of those days. His description of the free metropolitan hospital at Pataliputra says (Giles's translation):

"Hither come all poor or helpless patients suffering from all kinds of infirmities. They are well taken care of, and a doctor attends them; food and medicine being supplied according to their wants. Thus they are quite comfortable."

The Hindus were the first in the world to build hospitals and have anticipated the activity of modern "Christian charity." The first Christian establishment for relief of the sick was founded in the fourth century A. C. during the reign of Constantine. But in India hospitals both for men and animals are at least as old as the time of Asoka (third century B. C.).

The same genius for organization and administration has been displayed by the Hindus in the management of their great universities, to which scholars flocked from all parts of Asia. The university of Nalanda in Bihar (Eastern India) was run for at least seven hundred years, from the fifth to the twelfth century A. C. was a residential-teaching university and gave instruction, room, board, and medicine free of any cost whatsoever.

Eur-American scholars are wont to think that Amphictyonic Leagues and Olympic institutions, Councils of Trent and Conferences of Westphalia, congresses of scientists and academies of learned men are Hellenic, Greco-Roman, Christian, or Occidental patents. These have, however, been plentiful in the history of Hindu civilization.

Parishats or academies, whether permanent or peripatetic, have existed in India since time immemorial. Medicine, grammar, logic, chemistry, mathematics, political science, jurisprudence, in short, almost every branch of learning has grown up in India through the clubbing of intellects.

It is this collective or *parishatic* origin which explains why the treatises on arts and sciences in Sanskrit literature have in general the title of *Samhitā*, i.e., compilation. Mostly encyclopedic works, they bear internal evidence of the collaboration and cumulative experience of many minds.

Individualistic ideals and ends are as a rule associated with moral, religious, and spiritual affairs in India. Yet even here the Hindu capacity for cooperation has been equally evident as in other spheres. Every twelve years the Hindus have had a Council of Trent, so to speak, since the earliest times. These congresses of spiritual leaders are called *Kumbha-Mela*, after the planetary conjunction (of *Kumbha*) which recurs periodically. These are tremendously vitalizing forces; their delegates number about 75,000, and the visitors millions. The name of other moral and religious associations is legion.

Like the Greeks and the medieval Italians and Hansards, the Hindus also developed republican city-states, corporations and guilds. The folknotes of European politics were represented in India by the village communities. And as for the vices of political life, they have not been confined to the East. Internecine warfare, feudalistic disintegration, absence of national unity, arbitrary taxation and legislation, territorial aggrandizement, and what not, have flourished as rank and luxuriant on European soil as on Asian.

In the thirteenth century Dante¹¹⁾ complained of the disunion and political corruption in Italy. This was the complaint of Machiavelli also in the sixteenth century. This picture of Italy has really been the norm of political and international life in the Occident.

In what respects, then, are the civic sense and political genius of the Western races superior to those of the Hindus, Chinese, and Mohammedans?

¹¹⁾ *Supra* p. 106.

An English History of India.¹⁾

Vincent A. Smith's latest book on India is a work of more than 530,000 words, relating the history of a sub-continent from prehistoric times to the end of 1911. A great portion of it is a summary of the author's four previous books on India, *Asoka*, *The Early History of India*, *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon* and *Akbar the Great Mogul*, each of which was the result of first-hand investigation conducted through a whole generation.

1. Comparative History.

In the *Oxford History of India* the reader must not expect, however, to find the simplicity and unity that characterize the dynastic histories of China and Japan. The picture is as bewilderingly varied and diversified as that of Europe from the wars of the *Iliad* to the war against Germany. It is true, as the book before us reveals, that on various occasions *pax sârva-bhaumica* (peace of the world-empire), the Indian analogue of *pax Romana*, was achieved within the boundaries of India. In fact, only once did Europe witness the formation of a unitary state with the size and area (page 105) of the Maurya Empire (B. C. 322—185). This was the Roman Empire at its zenith, during the second and third centuries A. C. Neither the heterogeneous European possessions of Charles V nor the ephemeral conquests of Napoleon acquired the dimensions of the Tughlak Empire of the fourteenth century (page 242) or of the Moghul Empire of the seventeenth (pages 365, 443) or of the Maratha Empire of the eighteenth (pages 460, 461). In terms of population and area, even the less extensive Gupta Empire of the fifth century (page 150), the Vardhana Empire of the seventh (page 166) and the Chola Empire of the eleventh (pages 211—212) were barely approached by the Empire of Charlemagne.

Still it must be admitted, though not with the strictures passed by the author in his *Early History of India* (edition of 1914, pages 356—357), that the political unity of India even in British times is as great a myth as the political unity of Europe. It is a veritable "pluralistic universe" that the student has to contemplate at the threshold of Indian history in spite of the fundamental uniformity of the people's cultural "ideals". In trudging through Smith's

¹⁾ The *Oxford History of India*. By Vincent A. Smith. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1919.—xxiv, 816 pp.

jungle of facts, one needs, therefore, the patience and discrimination that are necessary for mastering the kaleidoscopic changes set forth in Freeman's *Historical Geography of Europe*. The Indian continent exhibits the same development, the same *Naturprozess* of Gumplovicz's *Der Rassenkampf* as the western half of Eur-Asia. It furnishes but another illustration of the universal sway of the Hobbesian "state of nature", the *mātsya-nyāya* (or "logic of the fish"), as Hindu political philosophy calls it.

The worst that can be said about the conflicting nationalities of India is not worse than the description which Depping gives in his *Histoire du commerce entre le Levant et l'Europe* (vol. II, pages 207—214) of the relations between the Christians of Greece, Italy and Spain in the face of the Ottoman invasions. And this statement of a medieval anti-monarchist, cited in Engelbert's *De Ortu et Fine Romani Imperii*, should give pause to an occidental student inclined to view the political mentality of the old Orient as something essentially distinctive: "The Roman Empire was and is always troubled by wars and rebellions; hardly ever were the gates of the temple of Janus shut; the greater number of Roman emperors have died violent deaths; and the Roman Empire has been the cause rather of disorder than of peace".

2. Smith's Fallacies.

But his sense of historical perspective is as a rule lacking in Smith's writings. Once in a while he admits, as in his *Akbar the Great Mogul* (pp. 342—355), that the Indian monarch's policy was not more tortuous than that of the European potentates of the sixteenth century, or that some of his institutions still survive as the basis of the modern British administration. But, on the whole, students of political science will find the *Oxford History* vitiated by several fundamental fallacies.

In the present volume he has been led, in spite of himself (page XXIII), to interpret his entire story with an eye to the event of 1757, as if the three or four thousand years of Hindu political life and Indo-Saracenic evolution were merely preliminary to Plassey! In this book (pages 67, 74, 332), as in the *Early History of India* (pages 112, 113, 119, 199), the author cannot think of Alexander's failure in India and the expulsion by the Hindus of Seleukos (B. C. 303) and Menander (B. C. 153) without a sigh, which, though subdued, is yet audible. Not until he reaches the capture of Goa by Albuquerque in 1510 does he seem to experience genuine relief. Let the occidental with a sense of humor imagine the naïve sen-

timents of an oriental historian, who, disappointed by the failure the Persians at Marathon and Salamis and apprehensive for the prospects of a Greater Asia, should hold his breath until Islam begins to flourish on European soil, until southeastern Europe is Mongolised to the Carpathian Mountains and the Turks are at the gates of Vienna. Smith's point of view is, however, one that naturally pervades the psychology of every European and American student of oriental culture and politics, sicklied o'er, as it is, with the dogma of the "superior race".

But there is another prejudice in the *Oxford History*, that is born of the political propaganda on behalf of the vested interests and the powers that be, to which Smith's scholarship happens to be harnessed. The volume is to be memorized as a text-book by the undergraduates of British-Indian colleges, and the facts, therefore, have to be so manipulated that even he who runs may be convinced of the logic of the "white man's burden", and more specifically, of the righteousness of British imperialism in India. The author's treatment of the Mogul monarchy (pages 416—418) is an eminent execution in Rembrandtesque style, calculated to serve as a dismal background for the silver lining that occasionally sets off what Indian nationalists call the permanent cloud of the British régime. The sweeping estimate of Shivaji the Great and the Marathas as shameless robbers, ruffians, tyrants etc. (pages 436, 637) is a disgrace to British militarism, which should be able, now that a century has rolled away, to be generous to the most formidable enemy it ever encountered in the East. Altogether, in this volume, intended to be a handbook of loyalty, the reader will find the philosophy of Indian history summed up thus: The Hindus are caste-ridden and therefore inefficient as a fighting force; and the Mohammedans are at their best mere fanatics and normally the most unspeakable pests of humanity. This is the twofold message of the book to western scholars. The author's chivalrous appreciation of almost all the female rulers of India, whether Hindu or Mohammedan, such as Raziya, Durgavati, Chand Bibi, Ahalya Bai, must not, however, be ignored (pages 226, 347, 363, 577).

There are certain other defects, which are to be attributed to the author's conception of sociology, historiography and comparative politics. He is evidently inclined to read much of the liberties and institutions of the nineteenth century into the *Weltanschauung* of Periclean Athens, Imperial Rome and Catholic and feudal Europe. And so far as the Orient is concerned, his viewpoint does not seem to have advanced beyond the generalizations of Buckle, Hegel, Maine and

Max Müller, in spite of his own objective discoveries in Indian archaeology and epigraphy (pages XI, XII; *Akbar*, page 385; *Early History*, pages 357, 477).

One would expect to learn from a general history dealing with all ages what influence the people of India have exerted on the civilization of mankind. But the author does not even hint at the possible or actual contact of India with Babylonian and Pharaonic cultures. Chinese intercourse with the Hindus is, indeed, alluded to, but we do not learn that India gave China and Japan not only religion and mythology but dramaturgy, folklore, painting, logic, algebra and alchemy as well. Students of Chinese culture are well aware that the neo-Confucianism of the Sung period (960—1278), which furnishes even today the spiritual food of China's masses, was a direct product of the *Vikramādityan* renaissance which Fa Hien, Hiuen Tshang, I-tsing and other Max Müllers of medieval China had imported from India into their native land. The influence of Hindu mathematics, medicine and chemistry on the Saracen capitals at Bagdad, Cairo and Cordova, and through them on the universities of medieval Europe, is a legitimate theme for the historian of India, but no aspect of the "expansion of India" finds a place in Smith's narrative.

He does, indeed, say that the influence of New India on "Europe and the United States of America is no longer negligible" (page 737), but the impact of Indian thought on the modern world, which is made manifest in such publications as Victor Cousin's *Histoire de la philosophie* and exhibited in the influence of Kālidāsa on Goethe and on early romanticists and of the *Gītā* on the transcendental movement in Eur-American poetry and fine arts deserves the special attention of the historian. Unfortunately, even the effects of the "discovery" of Sanskrit literature on the "comparative sciences" remain unnoticed in this comprehensive treatise.

Nobody will charge the author with extreme phil-Hellenism, but he is still too greatly obsessed by the idea of "Greek influence on India" to estimate properly the reverse current, except possibly in the case of Gnosticism and neo-Platonism (pages 67, 134, 138—143, 160, 162—163; *Early History*, pp. 237—241, 306—307). The authorities cited in the *Oxford History*, *Akbar* and the *Early History* are so many and up-to-date that one notes with regret that the significance of Seal's *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* (1915) and Mookerji's *History of Indian Shipping* (1910) in reestimating the influence of Indian culture has been overlooked by Smith.

Altogether, the weaknesses of the author's methodology as a historian, i.e., an "interpreter" of facts—this does not apply to his

work as an archaeologist or antiquarian—would be felt by anyb familiar with the work of western historians who have written any period of occidental civilization, e.g., Bury's *History of Gre* or Mahaffy's *Greek Life and Thought* or Bryce's *Holy Rom Empire*. It is not too much to say that an Indian scholar emplo the same data used by Smith would produce a wholly different st chapter by chapter.

3. Islam in India.

The least satisfying section of the book is that dealing with t Sultans of Delhi (1200—1526). The author has exhausted the dictio ary of abuse in vilifying the early Mohammedan rulers, who, as has rightly pointed out, should not be called Pathan or Afgh since they were all, with the exception of one House, Turks o various denominations. Students of medieval civilization know tha the crusading zeal of Islam was felt to their sorrow by the Christian powers of Europe not less than by the people of India, and that for centuries the Mediterranean Sea was no less a Saracen lake than was the so-called Arabian Sea. The fact that they were conquered by Moslems is not more disgraceful to Hindus as a race than to Europeans. If Smith expects to foster Hindu hostility to the Moslem by raking up stories of religious persecution and wanton slaughter, he will be disappointed, for the oriental student can easily cite plenty of instances of inquisition, torture and "pogroms" in the annals of Christendom.

The one effect that Books IV and V of the *Oxford History* are sure to have on the mind of Young India is to increase the general unrest which the British are trying to allay by a thousand and one means. If there is one Mohammedan youth still left in India who is not anti-British at heart, Smith's volume is well suited to range him on the side of militant Indian nationalism. Nobody in the Mohammedan world, from Canton to Morocco, is prepared to swallow the characterization of the pioneers of Indian Islam, page after page, as worse than "ferocious beasts." In the name of "truth" the historian has dipped his pen in vitriol.

4. Hindu Period.

Notwithstanding his *ifs* and *buts* and general tendency to discount all "oriental" achievements as such, the author is on the whole sympathetic in his treatment of the Hindu period (see e.g., *Early History*, pages 127, 298, 344). He is, in fact, its first and only historian and may even be accused by critics of partiality for

the subject of his discoveries. And yet it is only fair to add that in his discussion of the political institutions of the Hindus he has scarcely done them justice (pages XI, XII). It is not necessary to wax enthusiastic, as Havell has done in his recent *History of Aryan Rule in India* or Banerjea in his *Public Administration in Ancient India*, over the so-called "village communities" or to accept at its face-value every statement in the Sanskrit text-books that points toward a democratic polity. No one with a sense of humor would suggest that the British constitution was anticipated in the *mantri-parishat* (cabinet) of the Maurya monarchy or in the "five great assemblies" of the South Indian states, described in Pillai's *Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years Ago*. —

But on the strength of authentic inscriptions, like those of General Ushavadāta at Nasik, of Rudradāmana in Gujarat, of the Chola Emperors and the Ceylonese dynasties as well as the Maurya *Artha-shāstra* and edicts (see *Asoka*, chapters IV, V) and the reports of Megasthenes and Roman writers on Alexander, it is possible to claim that there is no European institution of any importance from Diocletian to Frederick the Great of which a counterpart is not to be found in India from B. C. 322 to A. C. 1300. The *Vehmgerichte* of the Teutons and Henry II's Assizes are anticipated in the *Ubbahika* of the Buddhist *Chullavagga* and the jury of Kautilyan land legislation. The *liber burgus* of the medieval towns in Europe were not more extensive or intensive than the liberties of the *shrenis* (gilds). The *Parlement of Paris* could be modeled on the organization of the highest court of judicature under the Mauryas; and *les nerfs de la république*, as Bodin defines the finances of a state, were not more centralized under *le grand monarque* with his philosophy of *l'état c'est moi* than under Rājārāja the Great.

It is high time to recognize the fact, as would be evident to persons utilizing the author's footnotes (pages XII, 68), that the Greek city republics which fell before the onslaughts of Macedonian gold and arms were not more "democratic" than were the *ganas* or republics that opposed Alexander in the Punjab or the commonwealths in Bihar, the president of one of which was the father of Shākya, the Buddha. Another fact that should also be known to every student of comparative politics is that neither in the theory of Hindu political philosophy nor in actual practice did the caste system affect the public services of India, civil or military, prior to the end of the thirteenth century.

The *Oxford History* is professedly a story of ruling houses, dynastic conflicts, but it is not exclusively a political and military history. There are occasional glimpses into economic conditions though these are designed mainly to throw light on the alleged misery and poverty of the people in pre-British times; every instance of famine, misrule and oppressive taxation under "native" rulers has been carefully noted. (By the bye, the author treats land revenue in Hindu and Mohammedan India as crown-rent without documentary evidence; Hopkins' analysis of land tenure in *India Old and New* is more accurate.) Standard books on the history of Sanskrit literature have been summarized to add to the readability of the narrative. The references to early Tamil, Hindi, Beng., Marathi and Urdu literature are also interesting and useful. As since Smith has to his credit a *History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, which will remain a supplementary classic to Fergusson's older work, the reader of the *Oxford History* will find more than scrappy descriptions of the arts and crafts, especially the architectural monuments, distributed throughout its chapters. But as the author has neither the enthusiasm of a Guizot nor the scholarly eloquence of a John Richard Green for the theme of his investigations, his style seldom rises above that of the gazetteer-writer.

5. Modern India.

Western scholars have often complained of the lack of a general history of India, even for the British period, especially one covering the recent era since the advent of the "industrial revolution" in Europe and America. The older authorities, like James Mill and Meadows Taylor, useful as far as they go, do not come near the present; and apart from the disconnected stories that can be pieced together from the volumes in the *Rulers of India Series* and the annual reports and gazetteers published by the Government of India, no student of modern civilization has been able to familiarize himself with the history of the Indian people under British rule during a period that has seen an Asian race, the Japanese, emerge as a first-class power and challenge in the Chinese "cockpit of nations" the domination of the East by the West. The last part of the present volume undertakes to supply this need. But the narrative unfortunately ceases to be the history of India and becomes instead the history of European rivalries and the survival of the fittest in the South Asian sub-continent.

The western student, however, will be disappointed with the

author's treatment, for he will not find here the philosophic view of England's expansion in India as a by-product of the whirlpool of world politics between 1688 and 1815 (including Great Britain's failure in the American colonies) which Seeley's lectures have made a matter of common knowledge for all modern history. The importance of India in its relation to British imperialism and the *status quo* in Asia, with which readers of Curzon's volumes on the Middle East and the Far East are familiar, has not left its stamp on the pages of the *Oxford History*. And, of course, the conditions since the Crimean War that eventually led to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the Anglo-French *Entente* and the Anglo-Russian Convention, with their momentous consequences for India, have not been analyzed by the author. The Egyptian and South African campaigns have been ignored, the Persian Gulf, Tibet and China touched upon only incidentally. To all intents and purposes, British India has been presented by the historian in a state of "splendid isolation". Even from the standpoint of the ruling race, the jewel of the Imperial crown is thus left an unintelligible phenomenon.

Under such circumstances it is too much to expect that the author should have watched the development of those intellectual and moral forces among the people of the country that make Young India a political "problem" of the British Empire as well as a sociological "study" in ethnic rejuvenation. The volume does not mention the activities of the National Congress and the Moslem League, two associations of Indian politicians who were eminently loyalist in their vision until the Amritsar massacre of 1919, not to speak of the "ideas of 1905", that body of philosophical radicalism which has inaugurated a new era in the history of India that cannot be interpreted by any of the shibboleths of the preceding half-century. In fact, all that makes modern history worth reading, whether as an embodiment of the triumph of positivism and humanism or from the narrower angle of the expansion of Europe and America and the distinctive glory of *pax Britannica*, is virtually ignored. An American student who wishes to understand how much of modernism, i.e., the spirit of science and democracy, has pervaded the life and thought of three hundred and fifty million souls will find in Smith's history only a chronological summary of the wars *minus* the intrigues) that governor after governor has embarked upon in quest of territorial aggrandizement and the principal statutes by which the administration of the country has been organized. He will learn nothing of the parliamentary legislation by which during two generations the indigenous industries of India were strangled

in order to convert the dependency into a monopoly market for British manufactures and a helpless land of raw materials, nor the manner in which treaties with the Indian States were made and unmade by Great Britain's Pro-Consuls.²⁾

Smith has not forgotten, however, to discuss the comparative merits of Hastings, Wellesley, Dalhousie and Curzon not to justify the conduct of every British exponent of *Machtspolitik*. Such phrase as "grave necessities of the situation", "urgent necessities of the time", a time when "everything was at stake", considerations of "high politics", "the agonies of millions of helpless peasants" (page 538, 539, 581, 608) are invoked to whitewash or even defend all the "forward" policies of annexationists. Wellesley's "Foreign Office point of view", which expressed itself in the dictum that the "extension of direct British rule was an unquestionable benefit to any region annexed", is a first postulate with the author (pages 588, 604). No language, therefore, is stern enough, in his estimation, to condemn the occasional "pusillanimous policy of non-interference" (pages 581, 608).³⁾

Smith finds fault with Elphinstone for relying too much on the exaggerated reports of the Moslem chroniclers in regard to the events of medieval India (page 223). But he is guilty of a similar error not only in his acceptance of Persian and European material, whenever it suits his purpose to prove his thesis of the innate baseness of the Mohammedans (page 237), but also in his endorsement of every Tom, Dick and Harry who had anything to do with the East India Company's affairs as "a gentleman well qualified for governing", "noble", "polished" etc. (pages 339, 340, 383).

While the efforts of the Indian rulers, the *souverains indigènes*: the "country powers", to establish suzerainty and *pax sirvabhautica* are reckoned as nothing better than levying blackmail (page 469), every instance of British intrigue with "forgotten potentates" is a "deed of heroism" (page 471)! Haidar Ali in the south and Ranjit Singh in the north are "fierce adventurers". Baji Rao II in the Deccan "a perjured vicious coward" (pages 544, 631). The author does not categorically uphold Clive's forgery and exactions (pages 492, 494), but, on the other hand, he seeks to explain away

²⁾ Maulavi Mohammed Musibuddin, Premier of Oudh, wrote an account of the British robbery perpetrated on the State which he had been serving. The English edition of the story has been suppressed. But a German version appeared at Leipzig (Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1864) under the title: *Wie England Verträge schließt und bricht* (von einem Indierfreund). See also *How England conquered India* (Stockholm 1920).

too easily the British failings of those "rough days" as inevitable because of the *milieu* of universal corruption among the Indians! The young men of India are invited to be loyal to the author's race by reading in his book that every Hindu and Mohammedan from 1757 to 1857 was an abominable wretch, a "scoundrel" and a "rascal" (pages 487—489, 497, 498, 506, 538—540, 545, 597, 637). In these intemperate expressions the writer has, however, only pandered to the doctrine that in politics he who fails is an unscrupulous knave and he who succeeds a daring genius. He has therefore failed to see in the so-called Sepoy War of 1857,³) though abortive, and in the unrest since 1905, howsoever futile in the opinion of the military world, an expression of that most elemental feeling, the love of national independence, which surges even in oriental breasts. Not the least noticeable feature of the book is the fact that the author has not considered it worth while to mention a single great man of India since 1818. Does he wish the world to understand that *pax Britannica* breeds only Royal Bengals—or rather mere tame cats? There could be no worse impeachment of British rule.

Unbiased scholars in France, Germany, Japan, America and even in Great Britain cannot but feel that Smith has tried too palpably to create the impression that the British Empire in India is the only empire in the world's history which is not stained with the blood of innocents, the "Portuguese atrocities", the wholesale assassinations by Cortes and Pizzaro. The scientific poise of the *Oxford History* would have been obvious to critics if the author had only attempted to indicate that the process of imperial annexation could not have been "roses, roses all the way", and that the English people are "not too bright or good for human nature's daily food."

None the less, the value of the book is great. For one thing, it presents for the first time a comprehensive history of India, more or less encyclopedic in character, based on the results of the latest explorations and excavations. European and American sociologists who used to think of Hindu attainments in terms of the *Manu Samhitā* and the alleged pessimism of Buddha and who know Mohammedan India only in the pages of Elphinstone have but to open Smith's volume to be struck by the enormous advance in indology that has been systematically effected by the painstaking researches of scholars of both hemispheres. The author himself

³) *Vide The War of Indian Independence* by an Indian Nationalist (Vinayak Savarkar), London, 1909.

(died 1920) was not only an honored collaborator and author among that band, but as the whirligig of fortune would have it he was a direct stimulating power among the antiquarians and other intellectuals of India. As such he happened to be, paradoxically enough, one of the unconscious spiritual fathers of that late wave of the "romantic movement" which has been manifesting itself as Indian nationalism in the world forces of to-day.

Young India (1905—1921).

The Methodology of Young India.

The most signal feature of the Indian intelligentsia today is the spirit of self-criticism and a sceptical questioning in regard to their own achievements. This intellectual discontent is manifest in Young India's valuation not only of the individual personalities but also of the organized institutions. Never more in India is anything likely to be accepted as a solution of the problems of science or of life without challenge. Revolt has come to stay with the Indians as a most effective method in cultural advance.

1. Pluralism in Politics.

It is too well known how since 1905 the spirit of revolt has continuously been in operation in Indian public life. This has been the prolific source of creative political differentiation. These seventeen years India has therefore witnessed the rise and fall of leaders and parties which may almost be described as kaleidoscopic. Neither the monistic control of a patriot-despot nor the monopoly influence exercised by any single nationalist association has been tolerated in the political pluralism of Young India. And Indians have been advancing all this time simply because the message of tomorrow has invariably replaced the platitude of today.

Right now, the shibboleths, whatever they be, propounded by champions of *Swarāj*, whoever they are, have no chance of being accepted at their face-value unless these articles of faith can satisfy the *quo warranto* of the hour, i.e., unless they can justify their promulgation in the eye of the leaders who are peeping out of the horizon of adolescence. At every moment in Young India's history the past has thus been challenged by the future. And what is known ostensibly to be the most important organ of public life has after all but bidden its time to be overthrown by more vitalizing agencies.

2. Protestants in Science.

The history of chemical research at Calcutta presents a parallel picture of pluralistic differentiation which is so obvious in the political sphere. The monistic despotism of investigations bearing on the compounds of mercury to which Prafulla Chandra Ray had been led by

his antiquarian researches in the Hindu chemistry of *rasa* (mercury) would have become identical with a systematic torture on Indian intellect had it not been attacked at an early date by the individuality of Biman Bihari De who started off tangentially in the direction of organic compounds and organic derivatives in colloidal chemistry. Individuation was initiated simultaneously by Rasik Chandra Datta who may be credited with having created in Bengal the atmosphere of industrial chemistry in lines untried hitherto in India by foreign or Indian enterprise. The success of these "protestants" has ensured the Indian intelligentsia against any particularistic obsession in chemical research. The readers of European and American chemical journals are aware of the diversity of problems which have been engaging the attention of Indian workers in the laboratories.

In the realm of physics also Indian atmosphere today is quite clean and free. The newly founded Bose Institute is not the only place of international importance where the manufacture of instruments and the interpretation of physical phenomena are carried on in India. The Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science (Calcutta), founded about 1885, has at last come to its own in recent years on account of the many investigations of first rate dealing with light and sound which have been conducted under its auspices by C.V. Raman and his associates. Almost as a protest against Bose's physico-physiological investigations these researches of Raman's as well as those by Phanindra Nath Ghosh in applied optics at the University College of Science (Calcutta) have served to enrich Young India's students of physics with a freedom of outlook and individuality of manipulation.

3. Revolt against Orientalists.

Equally if not more epoch-making is the revolt which has declared itself in the domain of historical scholarship. The traditional standpoint of "orientalists", both foreign and Indian, which used to pin the civilization of Asia in general and of India in particular down to an alleged pessimism, subjectivism and religiosity has been subverted once for all by a new school of antiquarians and interpreters. The findings of Indian researchers¹⁾ such as B. N. Seal, R. K. Mookerji, K. P. Jayaswal and others are objectively demonstrating the fundamental identity in the *psyche* and in institutional developments of the East and the West.

¹⁾ Vide Bibliography D, in *Pol. Inst. and Theor. of the Hind.*

Not the least characteristic contribution to the logic of Young India in historical scholarship is that furnished by Jadu Nath Sarkar's investigations in Moghul-Maratha India, which have throughout been a silent protest against the obsession of Indian intellect by the studies bearing on "ancient Hindu culture." The multiplicity of historical interests thus ushered in has in recent years grown by leaps and bounds, thanks partly to the idealism of Asutosh Mookerjee, head of the university at Calcutta. Indian history or sociology today is not the monopoly of the Sanskritists, Arabists, or of Pali and Persian scholars. Young India has learned to appreciate the labours of workers who are attacking the historical problems of India from the evidences of Marathi, Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Bengali and other living languages. We have come to realize that one can be respected as a great historian even if his entire work is based exclusively on certain vernacular manuscripts.

The liberalization of mind effected by this heterogeneity of historical scholarship is being pushed further by the demand which has been raised from time to time that some of India's best intellects should make it a point to specialize in the "ideas of 1905",—in the achievements and philosophy of contemporary India in the perspective of their international bearings. Nay, it is also coming to be recognized by educators and statesmen that the brain of India must not remain satisfied with Asia but proceed to grapple with the problems of Europe and America as well, in short, with the questions that affect the general civilization of all mankind.

Nobody should have failed to notice how the alleged nationalist school of "Indian art" has gradually been losing its unitary sway on the imagination and reason of Young India. Already several sculptors and painters of no mean importance have risen in view,—whose manipulations in volume and colour have by sheer emergence automatically served to challenge the conventions rightly or wrongly associated with the name of Abanindra Nath Tagore. A happy consummation all the more noteworthy,—because the revolt has come not with the flourish of theoretical manifestoes and lectures but pragmatically in the course of actual creations of beauty. In art as in other spheres there is today no one India, there are Indias.

4. Varieties of Intellectual Experience.

The more or less dead monotony of India's intellectual being, such as it existed, say, about a decade ago, has been broken by several other agencies. Among them we should note the curiosity

which has been awakened in the varied phenomena of experimental psychology, the world-wide subject matter of anthropology, and the epochal evolution of fine arts. Needless to remark that these novel intellectual experiences have not only enlarged the vision of Young India but have also generated an element of scientific enfranchizing idealism in the life's pursuits and careers of the educated classes.

The same emancipation of intellect from the thralldom of the conventional pursuits,—school-teaching, the bar, and the medical profession,—has likewise been effected by the inventions and manufactures to which the technical genius of Young India has given birth. These achievements, industrial and commercial, have succeeded in diverting the brains of educated and half-educated men from exclusively literary, speculative and theoretical avocations to fruitful, practical and creative channels. The cumulative protest of India, as registered in the daily history of the seventeen years of the *Swadeshi* Movement, against the over-scholastic and almost mediaeval system of training offered in the official institutions has already borne some fruit,—in so far as today the mind of the Indian intellectuals is very often bent on utilizing the material resources of the country for the production of national wealth. The revolution in ideas brought about by such successes as those of pottery works, glass factories, and so forth is of high spiritual value in the inventory of India's urges of life. And as such, the industrial and commercial pioneers of Young India have certainly contributed their quota to the methodology of revolt in our approach to the problems of truth.

5. The Novel Urges of Life.

No less has the logic of Indian life been transformed by the successful activities of Indians in foreign countries. At a time when the field of work before Young India was circumscribed within Indian boundaries and confined really to petty concerns, this opening up of new lands and discovery of larger problems for India's intellectuals has been tantamount to a veritable *yugantīra* in Indian social *milieu*. India's activity today is measured not only in terms of the achievements at home but also of the work accomplished abroad.

In the midst of all this expansion it would still have been extremely regrettable if scientific research or industrial and commercial enterprise had absorbed the principal part of Young India's energy. Luckily, therefore, a vigorous protest against the mania for

money-making as well as against the craze for "original" investigation in the arts or sciences has been furnished in the new springs of action which patriotism has been able to create during all these years. The standard of spiritual urge in India is being set today not only by the academicians, authors, scholars, inventors and business experts but also by such men and women as have taken to public life, social service, political propaganda, rural reconstruction, and last but not least, to proletarian upheaval.

It is but in keeping with the pluralistic trend of Young India's spirituality that of late there has appeared an incessant attack on the institutions of established reputation. It may be considered to be a fit theme for self-congratulation that Young India's mentality is not prepared to submit to the Periclean or Napoleonic dictatorship of its own "enlightened despots",—howsoever great and good the results already attained by it or howsoever necessary it may have turned out to be for historical and environmental reasons.

6. A New Creed.

Naturally the very creed of Young India has been transformed by the storm and stress of the *Swaraj* period. There was a time, previous to August 7, 1905, the birth-day of the *Swadeshi* Movement, when the most soul-stirring message for Young India used to be Vivekānanda's "*Ma! āmāy mānush kāro!*" "*He māi! mujhko ādmī bānāo!*" "*Mother! make me man!*" The experiences and self-realizations of the *swarajists* have enabled the Indian youth to outgrow that call.

To-day the faith of India's life is awakened by the slogan: "*Duniyā! āmār tāmbē esho*", "*Re prithvī! mere kabje me ā jāo!*" "*Re jāhān! mere gor par sojāo!*" "I command thee, O world! come and be prostrate at my feet!" For, Young India has already attained its manhood, aye, its men and women are heroes, martyrs, and conquerors.

Once more has India learned to proclaim in the spirit of Purusha (Man) in the *Alharva Veda* declaring himself to the Earth: "Mighty am I, Superior by name, upon the earth, conquering am I, completely conquering every region." And this proclamation of the creed of *digvijaya* (conquest of the quarters) the world has heard in the all-grasping, all-risking *sādhana* of Young India's energists.

7. The Doctrine of *Satyāgraha*.

If it were necessary to sum up in one word the logic of Young India's life,—such as it has been operating in the spirit of

protest, in the conception of the sacredness of individual personalia and in the consequent pluralism of mental and moral *shakti* (energies)—we should not have to wander far from our daily actions to seek the appropriate abstract term. For, is it not in the doctrine of *Satyāgraha*, of devotion to truth, backed as it is by the espousal of martyrdom, that the kernel of India's present individualism, of the glorification of our individual worth and manhood, to be found in its most generalized and philosophical form. *Satyāgraha*, as a tenet of non-conformism, of *swadharma nidhanam shreyah*, of the right to die in one's truth, in one's own duties, and in one's "station" in life, as Plato or the neo-Hegelians would put it, is the spiritual key to the methodology of our life and learning. And as such the logic of *satyāgraha* is a distinctive contribution to the social philosophy of contemporary mankind, the twentieth-century phase of Kant's "categorical imperative" or Martin Luther's "freedom of the Christian man."

8. The Gospel of *Shakti-Yoga*.

And here it were well to remember that Asia has never been reconciled to the defeat inflicted upon her by Europe. The events in India from 1757 to 1857 and the spoliation of China in 1842 and of Persia in 1853 have only served to convince leading Asians of the need for a more thorough preparedness in order to consummate the great retaliation. It is, therefore, as a period of long-drawn-out armistice that Asia has regarded the last three generations of her humiliation. Saiyad Jamaluddin of Persia, the organizer of Pan-Islam, and Kang Yu-wei, the John the Baptist of China's revolt against the West, are no greater embodiments of the militant reaction to European domination than are one and all of the great men who have furnished for a whole century the intellectual and moral backbone of the movement which has culminated in the Indian Swarajist Rebellion of 1921.

The spirit of modern India is the spirit of protest, resistance and challenge. Whether the story is told of Ram Mohan Roy (1772—1833) of Bengal, the first Prince Ito of New Asia, or of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi of Gujarat, in whose tactics of *satyāgraha* (devotion to truth) or passive resistance the labour-leaders of the world are discovering to-day the revolutionary methodology of all disarmed races and classes, or of Syed Ahmed Khan (1817—1893), of the United provinces, the energizer of Indian Islam, or of Dadabhai Naoroji (1821—1917), the Parsi, who rediscovered *sva-raj* (self-determination) from ancient Hindu polity as

the inspiring goal of modern India, or of Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856—1920) of the Deccan, who furnished Indian patriots with their war-philosophy in the message, "Close the Penal Code, Open thy *Gita* (the bible of mystical militarism), or of Lajpat Rai of the Punjab, who has sought in Urdu to assimilate for his countrymen all the radical elements in modern thought from Mazzini to Lenin, nay, of Surendra Nath Banerjea, the indefatigable agitator against the British Government's policy of "divide and rule," it is the story of invincible will, of a Satanic self-assertion and pride and a vindictive intelligence, such as are but naturally to be expected of persons nurtured in the traditions of Tipu Sultan, *le citoyen Tipou* (c 1798), the Moslem martyred monarch of Mysore, and Shivaji (c 1674), the Frederick the Great of the Hindus.

If some of modern India's great men have claims to be remembered more in the social and religious and literary fields than in the political, the spirit of resistance, challenge and revolt is none the less characteristic of their message and life-work. Consider, for example, Dayānanda (1824—1893) with his militant call to Vedic theology and his declaration of war against the missionaries of Christ, and Vivekānanda (1862—1902) with his gospel of Napoleonic energism and triumphant defiance of the West; consider, too, Kali Charan Banurji (1847—1907), the seer of an "Indian Christianity" emancipated from European ecclesiastical control. And is not Rabindranath Tagore also, notwithstanding his occasional neo-platonic public utterances, in the estimation of his followers but the singer of songs and writer of essays which are filled, like those of Whitman and Shelley, with the spirit of revolution?

In every department of life in India to-day, political or cultural, everybody who is anybody is a fighter, a fighter against some social obscurantism, whether Hindu or Moslem, some alien despotism, some vassalage in art or some industrial thralldom, or some subjection in scientific or philosophical theory. In such fights lies the emancipation of his soul. These subversions constitute his perpetual *sādhana*. Verily *Shakti*, energy or force, is the very deity of India's men and women.

And this energism (*Shakti-yoga*) is but normal with the genius of the people. For, what else is Indian culture but the successful consummation of the Promethean strife,—from epoch to epoch? And of this, as the folk-mind learns it from Bhartrihari's (c 800) *Niti-shataka* (Century of Verses on Morals, stanza 80), "the most typical landmark is bodied forth in the cosmic struggle of the gods for the acquisition of nectar, *amrita* (immortality or deathlessness).

World-Culture in Young India.

The Indian freedom movement has been condemned by some prejudiced Western observers as a movement to withdraw from all world-currents. It is alleged that Young India is seeking to isolate itself from the rest of the world.

This charge, false as it is, comes from such persons as have deliberately propagated to their own satisfaction still another lie which pervades the scientific circles in Eur-America, viz. that Indian civilization had always in the past pursued a separatist exclusive path. We have seen in a previous essay, that on International India, how utterly unfounded in history is this *idola* about India's alleged isolation. So far as Young India's *swaraj* activities are concerned, the fallacy of the calumniators is senseless and absurd.

Ram Mohan Roy, the father of New India, was also one of the founders of the comparative method in social science. He was thus a maker of the modern world. Since then every movement with which the Indian nation-builders have been associated has been broad-based on world-culture.

And Roy in inviting Western culture into Indian consciousness and according to it the rightful place it deserves in all human development was only continuing the historic tradition of India's old masters, e.g., of Varāhamihira. This astronomer of the sixth century had frankly admitted that although the Greeks were *mlechchhas* i.e., "unclean barbarians", they must have to be worshipped as *rishis* (sages) because the science of astronomy had made great progress among them. Openness of mind is not a new feature in Indian *Weltanschauung*.

Young India indeed wants separation from Great Britain, in simpler terms, non-cooperation with it, in as much as association with it implies only political, industrial and cultural slavery to the foreigners. Herein is to be read India's "Monroe Doctrine," the Indian aspect of "Asia for the Asians" programme. India's declaration of independence is however a prelude to the establishment of the equality of treatment in international relations such as can be assured only when the races are free from alien control in every form. The attempts at emancipating India from the British yoke or the rest of Asia from Western domination must not therefore be ridiculously interpreted as attempts at bringing about a "splendid isolation."

A veritable *Wanderlust* and desire to master the world-forces (*vishva-shakti*) such as is bodied forth in Hemchandra Banerji's

memorable verse¹⁾ has long seized the mentality of Young India. And the comparative method foreshadowed in the life's work of Roy is so ingrained in India's *psyche* that the principle of boycott which operates powerfully in the sphere of politics as a weapon for freedom and equality has hardly any application in the cultural enterprises of Indian men and women.

The number of Indians who visit Japan, America, England, France and Germany for industrial and economic investigations has been steadily on the increase. Engineers like Visvesvarayya of Mysore, directors of chemical and pharmaceutical works like Prafulla Chanda Ray of Bengal, and bankers like Fuzlbhoy Currimbhoy and Vithaldas Thackersey of Bombay and Rajendranath Mookerjee of Calcutta are in closest touch with the latest developments in Western industry.

India does not study the advance of modern capitalism alone. The other side of the shield, namely, socialism in all its wings, has been receiving equal attention among the Indian path-finders. Cham-anlal and Saklatwalla of the Punjab, B. P. Wadia and Trimul Acharya of Madras, N. M. Joshi of Bombay, and Manabendra Nath Roy and Khan Lohani of Bengal have been touring the world in order to understand the methods of labor revolt.

Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, the poet, and Mrs. Fyzee-Rahamin, the musician, have carried to India the message of the new woman from Sweden, Switzerland and England. Mrs. Lila Singh has studied the social and economic conditions of womanhood in the South American republics. And in the United States Mrs. Parvatibai Athavale has investigated the family life, domestic science and women's education with special reference to the problems obtaining in India.

Wanderlust has already had solid influence on thought. The methodology of Voltaire's *Lettres Philosophiques*, in which a foreign land is idealized as the depositary of all possible cultural and political bliss, has more or less been at work in the Indian journalism and travel literature such as comes from the pen of authors who have lived in Eur-America. Writers on Western institutions and life are quite popular.

The painters and sculptors of Bombay and Calcutta do not seek their technique exclusively from old-Buddhistic and medieval Indo-Persian sources. The great masters of Japan and China as well as of Europe have profoundly influenced the work of Abanindra Nath Tagore, Nanda Lal Bose, M. K. Mhatre and Phanindra Nath Bose.

¹⁾ *Infra* p. 311.

Shakespeare, Goethe, Victor Hugo, Walt Whitman and Ibsen call forth among Indians the same enthusiasm as among the Westerns. Helmholtz, Pasteur, John Stuart Mill and William James, they all have thousands of admirers and followers in India. The great philosophers of Germany from Kant and Fichte to Haeckel and Eucken are as popular in India as her own masters.

The translation of Mazzini's autobiography by Vinayak Savarkar has given the Italian idealist as great a place among the Marathas as that of Ramdas the spiritual adviser of Shivaji. The teachings of Mazzini can be read likewise in Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, indeed in almost every Indian language.

The monthly journals like *Vividha-jñāna-vistāra* of Poona, *Saraswati* of Allahabad and *Prabāsi* of Calcutta are each an organ of *vishva-shakti*. They seek to bring to their readers all currents in the contemporary world of culture. Readers of periodicals thus become familiar with the aesthetics of Croce, the social philosophy of Karl Marx and Sorel, as well as the psycho-analysis of Freud and Jung.

In Rabindra Nath Tagore's school at Bolpur lessons are given not only in French and German but even in old Greek and Latin. The poet himself is an admirer of the Austrian violinist Kreisler and is trying to introduce European music among Indian experts.

On the other hand, a young Indian, Sahid Suhrawardy, has for several years been régisseur of the Russian Art Theatre in Moscow. Evidently India has been able to assimilate occidental histrionic art.

Nor has India lagged behind in the effort to understand the radical political and economic philosophy of the West. In his Urdu writings Lajpat Rai has ever sought to communicate the message of the new Occident to his countrymen. In his English book entitled *National Education* (1921) he has, besides, made it clear that Young India does not seek to accentuate a patriotic chauvinism but to assimilate truth and life from every race, even from the English people. And yet Lajpat Rai, the politician, is an inveterate enemy of England,—and as such, has been suffering imprisonment for the second time (February 1922).

India's efforts to understand the world-forces and make the best use of *vishva-shakti* have resulted also in the establishment of political centres for Indian activity in foreign countries. The foreign politics of Young India constitute an important factor in its contemporary culture and have by all means served to expand the soul of its men and women.

India's kinship with Afghanistan, Persia and Central Asia has

been cemented by the pioneering enterprises of Ajit Singh, Obedulla, Zafar Ali Khan, Vasant Singh, Hormusji Kershap, Pramatha Datta, Chait Singh, Mahendra Pratap, Pandurang Khankhoje, Barakatulla, Hrishikesh Latta, Mirza Abbas and others. The Mohammedan world from Angora to Morocco is today part of India's daily consciousness, thanks to the labours of Hafiz, Mansur, Abdul Wahid, Ansari, Ali Brothers, Sattar Brothers and Syed Hussein.

Rash Behari Bose, Bhagwan Singh, Heramba Lal Gupta, Jodh Singh, Chanchayya, Dharendra Nath Sen and Hariharlal Thulal have succeeded in expanding India in the Far East by their strenuous exertions in Japan, China and Siam. It must not be forgotten that owing to the labours of M. K. Gandhi, Manilal, Mehta and Parmanand the Indian labourers and retail store-keepers settled in South Africa, Fiji, Mauritius and other British colonies have learned to be conscious of their rights as men.

The United States today,—not only the labouring classes and labour parties of all denominations but also the intellectuals and bourgeois press are taking up the cause of India's freedom as a plank in their own liberalism. And for this India has to thank the propaganda of Ram Chandra, Santokh Singh, Tarak Nath Das, Har Dayal, Lajpat Rai, Basanta Koomar Roy, Jagat Singh, Sailendra Nath Ghose, N. S. Hardiker, Surendra Nath Karr and others.

Finally, Europe's cooperation with Young India in its revolutionary movements is due to the patience and perseverance of Madam Cama and Messrs Krishnavarma, Virendra Nath Chattopadhyaya, Sardarsingji Rana, Hem Chandra Das, Madanlal Dhingra, the Savarkar Brothers, R. B. Subrahmahmaniya Aiyar, Madhava Row, Moreshwar Prabhakar, Chempakaram Pillai, Bhupendra Nath Datta and G. S. Dara.

India will thus be found to be in terms of intimate intercourse with every land, every race, and every field of thought and work. In other words, there exists to-day a "Greater India" as a power among the powers of the world. And this fact must have to be recognized by every nation that is interested in the political and cultural reconstruction of mankind. For, in every project that is likely to come up before the world Young India is either a potential friend or a potential enemy. Statesmen who are busying themselves with the problem of new alliances or *ententes* will certainly not overlook this great factor in *Realpolitik*.

In these international complications rest the chances for the freedom of India. The political emancipation of India will be achieved, as world-forces should lead one to believe, not so much

on the banks of the Ganges and the Godaveri as on the Atlantic and the Pacific, not so much in the Indus Valley or on the Deccan Plateau as in the Chinese plains, the Russian steppes or the Mississippi Valley. Young India can therefore hardly afford to remain indifferent to "entangling alliances" among the nations of the world,—but must have to be in evidence in every nook and corner of the globe. Kinship with world-culture is the only guarantee for India's self-preservation and self-assertion.

Currents in the Literature of Young India.

1. Recent Bengali Thought.

Consciously or unconsciously Maupassant has come to occupy a prominent place in Bengali thought. The most marked feature in the creative work of Bengal today is the predominance of short stories and romance. And in this branch of prose literature, again, women are taking a leading part.

Two sisters, Nirupama and Anupama, both widows, are recognized by everybody as artists of the first grade. The theme of their novels is Woman. They write without a didactic propaganda behind them; but all the same their emotional appeal commands a strong influence on social activities among the Hindus.

Another two sisters, Sita and Santa, both university graduates, are already known in England and America through the English translations of their stories. They also deal with the personality of woman and discuss the modern phases of female liberty in a style which is appreciated by the intellectuals.

The most famous novelist, however, is Sarat Chandra Chatterji, whose realistic creations depict the home and life in Indian cities and villages in all their complexity and tragic depths. In his dozens of publications the reader encounters heroes in every grade of social life.

Another great writer is Pramatha Chaudhuri, a lawyer who received his education in England. His stories are conceived from the standpoint of "art for art's sake." He deals with the problems of modern Indian life in so far as they are likely to be influenced by the impact of developments in the West.

All these writers embody in a subtle manner the discontent which prevails among the intelligentsia with the existing state of things. Each one is looking forward to a new social order, a new art-philosophy, a new *Weltanschauung*. But nobody writes in the style of a demagogue advocating a revolution.

The strength of contemporary Bengali thought is, as has been said, to be found in prose. In consequence, journalism has received a tremendous push in these years. The *Prabasi* devotes itself to every branch of life and art. In its political sentiments it preaches the gospel of *swaraj* (freedom) in open alliance with the radical leaders of Young India. The *Upasani* devotes itself rather to non-political nationalism and is especially interested in

modern Russian literature. It is indeed consecrated to a propagand in regard to the revival of medieval cottage industries, the reconstruction of rural life, the establishment of free night schools among the peasants and working classes, and so forth. The *Sabuj Pat* represents all those thinkers who stand aloof from current social or political movements but are advocates of freedom in thought in literary enterprise, and in artistic creations. The *Bhārata-varsh* is almost another *Prabāsi* minus its politics and social message.

All these are monthly reviews. In and through them the writers of short stories, philosophical essayists and art critics convey to the reading public not only the original contributions of their own minds but also the trends of thought in contemporary Europe from Sorel to Croce. Each of them is a *La Nouvelle Revue Française* and a *Deutsche Rundschau* in its scope and outlook.

Nationalism is being fed by historical and antiquarian researches. These have given rise to a vast amount of dissertation in folklore, anthropology, ancient paintings and sculptures, philology, and historical interpretation. Young India is almost repeating in this manner the "romantic movement" initiated by Herder and his associates in Germany about five generations ago. Some very creditable historical romance has also come out from the pen of erudite authors like Rakhal Das Banerji. And this possesses as powerful a nation-making force as had the dramas of Dwijendralal Roy, the Schiller of Bengal, about ten years ago.

Another noteworthy phase in the prose literature is the important contribution of Ramendra Sundar Trivedi to the analysis of the concepts and categories in the domain of exact science from physics to biology. One of his writings has appeared in the *Archiv für Systematische Philosophie* (1911) under the title of *Die Wahrheit*. In the same line works Jagadananda Roy, who interprets the discoveries of Jagadish Chunder Bose, the physiologist and plant-biologist of world-wide reputation, in a manner hardly less valuable than a prose-poem.

Indian creative imagination is today so very objective and concrete that in the realm of poetry also the most characteristic feature is the ascendancy of realism and a vigorous grasp of the actualities of the world. The pure idealistic self-expression of a Verlaine is almost a rarity. Curiously enough, in Bengal there is absolutely no follower of Tagore. Bengal has virtually ceased to sing.

Jogendra Nath Bose has written two epics, *Prithvirāj* and *Shivaji*. The protagonist of the former was a national hero of the

twelfth century, and that of the latter, of the seventeenth. But the compositions, although sometimes rising to poetic levels, are, like Voltaire's "national epic", *La Henriade*, nothing but versified history planned with the avowed object of teaching a political and social moral to Young India. Like that great Frenchman of the eighteenth century this Indian author has, besides, taken the pains to add "notes" to his own phrases!

The poets are, however, dealing not so much with the romantic past as with the living present. One noticeable trait of the current poetry is the importance given to the different cities and villages, landscapes and historic sites as themes for imaginative portraiture. Another striking feature is the sympathy of the writers with the life of the working classes, the cultivators, the backward races, and so forth.

The most prominent poet in this realistic movement is Satyendra Nath Datta. He writes on every "occasion" of national importance. From the incidents connected with the revolution of 1905 down to the latest agitation conducted by Gandhi to boycott the British administration, perhaps every landmark in the constructive patriotism of the Hindu and the Moslem has left its trace on Datta's poetry. He translates copiously from the literature of foreign countries and has thus enriched the thought of India with adaptations from Chinese, Japanese, Russian, English and French. His contributions to vocabulary and poetic diction are also extremely valuable. Besides, as a herald of democracy and socialism Datta is a kin of the American Untermyer if not of Carl Sandburg.

The greatest single event in the Bengali literature of recent years is the entry of a number of Mohammedan writers into the field. Their stamp is already noteworthy not only in journalism but in fiction and *belles lettres* as well. When Habildar Kazi Nazrul Islam has contributed to the monthly, *Moslem Bhārat* (1921), an ode entitled *Vidrohi* (The Rebel), ringing, as it does, with the refrain:

"Say, Hero!
Say! 'Erect is my head!
Seeing my head that Himalayan peak
Bends low in shame',"

one feels that Bengal is now on the eve of a great literary outburst, an abandon in self-expression and lyrical enthusiasm which we have sought in vain during the last decade. Perhaps it was left for the fallow brain of the Mohammedans, who have not as yet contributed

their part to their mother-tongue, to awaken the slumbering spirit of Bengal's Muse.

2. The Songs of Young Bengal.

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi is being appraised as the "greatest man in the world" according to some foreign observers as "the Tolstoy of Asia" according to others. Hindustan did not wait for this international evaluation in order to be inspired by this heroic personality. Over a decade ago India's poetic soul shrieked against the tortures perpetrated on her sons and daughter in South Africa. The national grief found expression in the following lines:

"Ah, there, the guileless children of Ind,
Lured by the immigration-agents' snares,
Deprived of home and of self-respect robbed,
Beyond the seas abide in foreign lands."

Thus in Bengali wrote Satyendra Nath Datta whose genius responds as much to the creations of other races and ages as to the stimuli nearer home. Datta's imagination was concrete enough to objectify the struggle and indicate its ways and means. With him Young Bengal sang of the Indian labourers in South Africa:

"Firm is their leader like the tree upright,
His soul flourishes by conquering grief;
On his own shoulders he bears the thunder,
Thus is their success guaranteed of course."

Such was Gandhi, the hero of Greater India in 1912.

This spiritual *shakti* of Gandhi's is not a new phenomenon. It was a leading current in Indian poetry of the nineteenth century.

A recipe of preparation for life has been prescribed by Hem Chandra Banerji (1885). His message runs thus:

"Take thee to the ocean's deeps,
And, crowns of mountains scramble bold;
Planets of the universe
Ransacked be merciless;
Tempests and meteors,
Flame of lightning fierce,—
Grasp, man, audacious-firm;
Venture, then, on life's work."

This creed of kinship with the world-forces will have a universal appeal. Thus, according to Browning, personality embodies

"A principle of restlessness

Which would be all, have, see, know, taste, feel all."

In the epics and lyrics of Banerji modern Bengal awoke for the first time to discover its mission in the world. Energist as he was, Banerji's appreciation of the American spirit was embodied in the following eulogistic verse:

"Lo, there's America newly arisen,
To swallow the universe she maketh attempt!
Restless has she grown through her innate might,
Her *hu-humkar* yells cause the earth to quake.
Disembowel she would the globe, as it were,
And reshape it fresh at her own sweet will."

The creative optimism of the people in the New World certainly found an able interpreter in the New India's poet of dare-devil ambitions. No doubt this Oriental writer caught the spirit of the times which Whitman had in mind when he wrote *Pioneers, O Pioneers!*

Rajani Kanta Sen has given a fresh lease of life to the traditional folk-melodies by exploiting them as medium for modern emotions. Once in a while the following lines by him will not however fail to touch the serener chords in the human personality:

"Oh for that day!
When all pleasures and pains
Of the world and the flesh
I'll cast away,
And start afresh
With Heaven's blessing kind!
Would that my feet tremble not afraid,
Nor the heart melt sad at mine eyes
Responsive to love's catching tears!"

In the same manner in some of our *unsocial* moods we may be prompted to the following challenge:

"O man, what avails thee to frighten me?
If it please thee to love me not,
I shall be glad to get away;
Thousand and one beings in this universe
Who would fain wipe off the tears of mine eyes!"

The author of these lines has contributed to India some of its most social poetry and humane message. The above is from Girish Chandra Ghosh, founder of the modern Bengali theatre and dramatic art, who was in every sense a representative poet of the last generation.

Each one of these authors has been in the fight of life. Nor has Rabindra Nath Tagore been a mere on-looker. In Eur-America

he has his clientele among the dealers in "universal love." He even famous for tirades against nationalism. But let the followi speak:

"O Thou, who charimest all mankind!
O Thou, whose lands are ever bright
With ray serene of pure sun-light!
Mother of fathers and mothers!

With the blue deep's waters thy feet ever washed,
Thy scarf of green ever waving in breeze,
Sky-kissed on high thine Himalayan brow,
Crowned white thy head with tiara of snows.

First in thy firmament appeared the dawn,
First rose *sâma*-chants in thy holy groves,
First were revealed in thy forest-abodes
Wisdom and virtue and poesy's self.

Ever beneficent! glory to Thee!
From Thee flows food to countries far and wide;
Jâhnavî and Jumma, streams of thy love;
Giver of sweet sacred milk, O Mother!"

In his speeches, satires, stories, novels, songs and plays Tagore has both positively and negatively sought only one thing, — viz to visualize India.

Dwijendra Lal Roy's dramas deal with ancient and mediaeval history. But his *Leitmotif* is one, — the struggle for independence. Each one of his heroes is a Wilhelm Tell. To him, besides, Bengal owes its *La Marseillaise*.

With this Schiller of the twentieth century Young India sings (1905): —

"Full of gems and grains and flowers
Is this world of ours;
In the midst of it is a land
O'er all lands supreme, —
Inspirer of visions is this land,
With memories encircled.
A country such as this
Nowhere else can you find!
Of all lands the Queen
Is the land of my birth,
That's my motherland, O,
My motherland is that."

A chauvinism such as this is as elemental as human blood.

An ideal for youth is furnished by Satis Chandra Roy who died in 1904 at the age of twenty one. The following is an extract from his *Message from the Sun*:

"You remember him, of course? That boy with large soul,
Surely a chip from Creation's magnanimous self!
Like banyan colossal grows his frame;
And round him Nature scattereth her smiles, —
The joy of unfurrow'd brow, fresh, sublime.

* * *

Whither haven't I been? — in quest of man, real man,
Whose spirit is free to receive world's all impress,
Light and deep, — who, feeling one with every atom,
Senseless, sentient, can rise up to an infinite All?

Powerful-armed like that fisher-boy
Into life's ocean he throws himself down
Abrupt, dives deep, and elbowing billows
Heaves most gleefully with laughter again;
Confident-smiling he casts the net of work,
And 'up the fish must' he muses, patient-brow'd.

No doubt he is in love with terror deep!
How else can he smile amidst troubles of the sea?
Here is life, my friend, life, the joyous life!"

It is in the school of terror and defiance that the world's youth loves to grow up. Roy's message will be appreciated by the younger representatives of all races and ages and will have a special significance to the leaders of the *Jugend-Bewegung* in present-day Germany.

3. Dutt and Sen.

The vigour of the Bengali language as a medium of expression is to be tasted in the epic of Madhu Sudan Dutt entitled *Meghanāda-Vadha* (The Slaying of Meghanada). Dutt was inspired as much by Virgil and Dante as by Milton in his ideology, verse-structure and poetic form. Out of the twice-told tales in the Ramayanic tradition the world has obtained in his synthetic reshaping of cultural forces a most powerful art-structure, which is at once national and universal, a harmonious composition in which are skilfully blended the ancient and the modern.

In this epic reconstruction was New India born, — the India of Hindu, Mohammedan and Christian folk-spirits, the Greater India of *rapprochement* between the East and the West. Dutt's work stands to the nineteenth century in the same relation as Kalidasa's

Raghuvamsha to Vikramadityan India of the fourth and fifth centuries. In his attitude of challenge and defiance Bengal has found, besides, its bible of nationalism, and its gospel of strenuous resistance against tyranny.

Dutt's fire and force pervade the lyrical ballads of Nabī Chandra Sen whose racy rhythm and diction, however, sharply mark him off from the former's stately gait and learned pose. In Sen's poetry the Krishna-legends of the *Mahabharata* fame have received the same eclectic representation as the Rama-stories in Dutt's. With Girish Chandra Ghosh, the dramatist, Dutt and Sen constitute the triumvirate who have rebuilt the literary art of old India for the Bengal of today. In these great masters of the last generation must be sought the springs of philosophical and social transformation which feed the stream of contemporary life.

Sen's work has been epoch-making in another line. Like Hem Chandra Banerji and Dinabandhu Mitra, whose creative fervour was stirred by the political and legal wrongs perpetrated on the people by the foreigners, Sen has contributed to Bengal one of its most inspiring anti-British productions in verse. This is *Palāshir Juddha* (The Battle of Plassey) whose title carries its own message, reminding one, as it does, of the national calamity of 1757. With Sen as with Banerji poetry was a spontaneous medium of emotion.

4. Romanticism in Fiction.

In Engel's novel *Stoertebecker* (1921) Germans are reviving the literary idealism such, for instance, as is associated with Goethe's *Goetz* and Schiller's *Räuber* dealing with the adventures of bandit chiefs. The identical romanticism in fiction has been furnished to Young India by Bankim Chandra Chatterji in *Ananda Matha* (1885). The song of the robbers in this Bengali story idealizing, as it did, the Rousseauesque "state of nature" has since passed into a war-chant of the entire nation. The burden is as follows:

"Hail! Motherland!

Vande Mātaram!

Thou art my muse, Thyself my creed;

In thee my heart and soul;

And in my limbs the spirit Thou!

In mine arm Thou art strength;

Thyself heart's devotion;

Thine the images bodied forth

In temples one and all, Mother!"

Thus sang Chatterji's *dacoits*, — thus sing the patriots, martyrs, *swarajists* of India.

Karan Ghelo is a historical novel in Gujarati by Navalram. It deals with the exploits of the last Rajput (Hindu) King, Karan, who challenged Alauddin, the Moslem. The motif and treatment make this Gujarati work essentially a kin to the numerous Marathi novels in which Hari Narayan Apte has brought before his compatriots the life and activities of Shivaji or to the novels in Bengali by Bankim Chandra Chatterji which have for their theme the political and military enterprises of energists in mediaeval India.

The romantic handling of the past with a leavening of nationalism, love of individuality, and the sturdy spirit of freedom which characterize the robber-stories of Goethe and Schiller and the romances of Scott has certainly been a common feature in India's modern fiction, saturated with idealism as it is. In this sense *Vande Mātaram* (Hail Motherland) is the message not only of Chatterji's *Ānanda Matha* but virtually of every literary work, novel or drama, conceived in the background of mediaeval history.

5. Gujarati Prose and Poetry.

On the other side, the spirit of Gustav Freytag, Victor Hugo or Dickens is represented by the author of *Saraswati-Chandra*, Govardhanram Madhavaram Tripathi, who is reputed to have contributed to the Gujarati people their "nineteenth *Purāṇa*." In this novel dealing, as it does, with the life of modern Gujarat we are presented with a realistic picture of men and manners such as the eighteen *Purāṇas* of old India have perpetuated for us in Sanskrit in regard to previous ages.

The *Gujarati Sahitya Parishat* (Academy of Gujarati Literature) owes its origin to Tripathi. Academies of literature together with *Sammelans* i.e. congresses (generally annual) of the men of letters are a regular feature in the cultural life of every language-zone in India. The institution is as popular among the Telugu-speaking Andhras of Madras as among the Oriyas of Orissa. The subjects discussed in these assemblies of authors and journalists are throughout uniform. They range from philological, anthropological and archeological investigations to dramatic criticism, the discussion of scientific and technical terminology as well as philosophical dissertations, oriental and occidental.

An author who like Tripathi has interested himself in the same problems of present-day life — but whose *modus operandi* is the instrument of satire is Ramanbhai Nilkanth. His *Bhadram Bhadra* is

enjoyed by the Gujaratis as an Indian *Don Quixote*. Nilkanth is, besides, a reformer not only in social organization — but also in linguistic taste. In the controversy between the erudite Sanskritized diction and popular vocabulary he has thrown in his lot with the masses.

The poet "Kalâpi" is well known for his translations from Wordsworth. But his place in Gujarati literature is assured by his *Kekârava* (The Peacock's Notes). The technique of Kalidasa's *Meghaduta* (Cloud-Messenger) has been brilliantly employed by the author, who, by the bye, is prince of Lathi in Kathiawar, with a most wonderful sense of rhythm.

To a "migrant bird" Kalâpi addresses the following song:

"To the land of Kashmir, of sweet springs and balmy breezes!
Dear traveller! linger there in a land that is dear to me —
In a land of uttermost delight and honey-flowing groves
Where shadows of clustered grapes are cast on crystal streams.

* * *

"At eventide the Himalayan peaks are dyed with the colour of roses
Then vale after vale, and countless fountains and lakes grow fairer yet,
And the trees in the mountains above the clouds converse with the
stars —

They are bathed in the light of heaven and smile in a happy trance.

* * *

"Bethink thee then of the love of thy Master and friend —
My child, my darling, alas! thy tears are falling still, my grief!
But perch in the crown of a mighty tree I have reared for thee.
And I shall recite to thee, my dear, this little song I have made."¹)

But the poet-patriot who has equipped Young Gujarat with its war-cry is Narmada-Shamkar Lal-Shamkar, in whose anti-British songs much of the spirit that is agitating India's mind to-day was anticipated. His refrain, *Jaya Jaya Garavi Gujarata!* (Victory to Great Gujarat), has earned for him a pan-Indian reputation. Among his scholarly works the *Dictionary of the Gujarati Language* is a solid testimony to his capacity for labour.

6. Songs of the Marathas.

The *swadeshi-svaraj* movement has automatically been associated among Marathas with the revival of Shivaji-cult both as cause and effect. Around this worship of the Frederick the Great of

¹) Transl. by A. Coomaraswamy and P. V. Vaishya for the *Modern Review* (Calcutta) for March 1920.

India the best brains of the Deccan have grouped themselves, as explorers and novelists, as historians and artists.

Vinayak Savarkar, whose activity has been epoch-making in various fields of Young India, is also one of the most signal contributors to the songs of latter-day Mahārāshtra. Shivaji is the hero of his historical lyrics. His *Sinha-gadchā Powādī* (The Ballad of Sinhagad) depicts one of the pioneering achievements of the Hindu nationalist of the seventeenth century. The ballad narrating the devotion of Baji Prabhu Deshpande to the duty set by his master is likewise a soul-inspiring execution in the Shivaji legend.

Besides these "national" lyrics which as in every other province of India are oriented to the present struggle against Great Britain, howsoever varied be the races and the epochs dealt with, modern Marathi possesses a host of songs, which the theatre has contributed to the man in the street and made part of the people's folk-literature. Just at present the melodies sung by "Bal-Gandharva" on the stage are setting the musical taste and standard of the Marathas. He plays invariably the female part, since in Bombay, perhaps in every cultural region outside of Bengal, actresses are yet unknown.

7. Marathi Drama.

The dramatist whom "Bal Gandharva" has thus succeeded in making a popular figure is Krishnaji Prabhakar Khadilkar. This play-wright made his *debut* with prose-dramas like *Kichaka-radha* (The Slaying of Kichaka), which although based on a legend in the *Mahabharata* was too suggestive and modern to be tolerated by British law and was therefore proscribed. Khadilkar has several other plays in prose of which the themes are derived from Maratha history of the eighteenth century. *Bhao Bandki* (Family Quarrel) deals with the murder of Narayan Rao through the machinations of his aunt Anandi Bai. *Kanchangadchi Mōhanā* (The Lady of Kanchan-gad) is another piece from the same quarry.

Khadilkar's genius is versatile. He has created several types of womanhood in some of his dramas in verse. He has laid under contribution the ancient story of Kacha coming to Shukra for education and wooing his daughter Devajani. The play is called *Vidyā-harana* (The Stealing of Learning) and will be found to be more complex in the treatment of the relations between the sexes than is Tagore's *Chitrā* which is equally based on ancient legends. In Khadilkar's two other woman-pieces, *Rukmini-swayamvara* (The Choosing of her husband by Rukmini) and *Draupadī*, Marathas

can see the female sex in its atmosphere of freedom, individualism and self-assertion.

Khadilkar has taken part in politics, — belonging to the extremist group of patriots. His newly founded daily, *Lokamānya* (Respected by the People), is the organ of the *swarajists*.

The founder of the Marathi theatre is Anna Kirloskar. His plays like *Shākuntala* and *Saubhadra* were adapted from the old Sanskrit treatises. Although he did not originate any theme he is the creator of the new drama of the Marathas. He was besides a genuine poet in whose songs the people find the flow of the soul which as a rule is not characteristic of Khadilkar's compositions.

In the work of adapting ancient classics for the modern stage Kirloskar found a colleague and follower in Deval. This latter's *Mrichchhakatika*, *Shāpa-sambhrama* (based on the *Kādambari* of old) and *Mukandya* have served to bring home to the present generation the literary and cultural tradition of the past on which the contemporary re-valuation is erected.

Altogether in these literary achievements of the Maratha playhouse Bengal will remember the work accomplished for it by Girish Chandra Ghosh, — and the Western students of drama will notice the counterpart of the movement by which the Greek and the Latin sources have been exploited for the modern stage in Europe.

A brilliant poet has been cut off in his prime at the age of 32. This was Ram Ganesh Gadkari. His poetry breathes the atmosphere of undiluted natural sentiment. The elegies composed by him touch the tenderest chord in the human heart. His poems on nature and love possess an originality in the handling of emotion. Gadkari was strongest in the treatment of pathos. Perhaps no composition in Marathi has excited so much universal pity among the people as this sad young author's *Ekach Pyālā* (Just One Glass) acted on the stage. This drama is a study in the drink-evil and domestic misery, — and can always be used in the propaganda for prohibitionism.

While Khadilkar because of his many-sided dramatic productions and feverish fecundity is almost a household word to the literary public, a play-wright of exceptional merit whose popularity is no less patent is Narsingh Chintamon Kelkar, the present editor of the *Kesari*, the Marathi weekly. His *Totayache Banda* (Revolt of the Pretender) has for its theme the problems of double personality akin to many of the theses in psychology and fiction which the

late war has contributed to literature through the unrecorded deaths of many soldiers.

In 1761 at the Battle of Panipat (near Delhi) Sadasiva Rao Bhão, the chief of the Marathas, was killed in action. But as no trace was found of his body, a pretender came back from the front and claimed to be the ruler of the territory as well as the husband of the widow.

While reading Kelkar's story based on this incident one is easily reminded somewhat of Madame Borel's novel, *Le Survivant* (The Survivor), in which is presented the study of a strange personality constituted of the physical body of one man and the soul of another who is dead. The Maratha author has tried moreover to visualize the folk-India of the latter half of the eighteenth century. His characterizations are lively and his treatment has the grace of natural humour.

8. Hari Narayan Apte.

In the field of romance Hari Narayan Apte was until his death (1920) the most prominent figure. As an exponent of social reform and social service and as director of the *Anandashrama* Publications of old Sanskrit texts he was also one of the most influential makers of modern Mahārāshtra.

As man of letters he has naturally been attracted by that rich mine of legends and hearsays, namely, Maratha history. And nobody has made use of this valuable source of fiction more artistically than Apte.

Among his historical novels the *Ushahkal* (Dawn) deals with the exploits of the early Marathas. *Gad Alā pan Sinha Gelā* (The Castle came, but the lion is gone) is based on the statement of Shivaji to his followers who had stormed the fort of Sinhagad to the effect that although they had achieved their aim their triumph was eclipsed by the death of their commander, "the lion" Tanaji.

Apte's description of the manner in which people of the lowest class were organized into a mighty army and bands of young patriots used to form themselves into secret associations for political purposes has become a classic among the Marathas. Although in his personal views Apte happened to be an associate of the "moderate" leaders of nationalist India his artistic creations have furnished Mahārāshtra with the tenets of radical politics.

Apte has selected his theme from Rajput annals also, — the source so popular in Bengali drama, poetry and fiction. His

Rupa-nagarchi Rājanyā (The Princess of Rupanagar) has curious enough the same plot as Bankim Chandra Chatterji's *Rājasinh*.

Apte's contemporary piece is *Pan lakshat kon ghetō?* (who cares for it?). In it the novelist holds the mirror up to modern Maratha society, — and has a chance to expose the current abuses in domestic and public life.

9. Bāl Gangādhār Tilak.

Khadilkar and Apte are unforgettable names in Marathi literature. Equally or rather more so is Bāl Gangādhār Tilak. His claims to mankind's recognition in other, non-literary lines are of course unparalleled.

For a whole generation Tilak was the "uncrowned king" of Mahārāshtra in the estimation alike of the intelligentsia as of the working men and women. His moral persuasion was eminently successful among the masses in combating alcoholism. Unnumbered families of mill-hands in Bombay and the Deccan loved and worshipped him as father, friend, benefactor.

Vedic scholarship counted Tilak among its veterans of the premier rank. He was one of the brilliant pioneers of modern education in his province, a cause to which he devoted himself at immense personal sacrifice. In his death the world of science has lost a keen seeker of truth, and humanity an indefatigable energist in the service of freedom and democracy.

Prince among journalists, Napoleon among fellowmen, propagandist among philosophers, mathematician, lawyer, orator, this apostle of liberty was the very sun of the social system among the Marathas, — the Goethe of Poona as much in the radiation of influences as in the bringing together of world-forces. A towering personality that he was both in thought and deed, in idealism, organizing capacity and constructive statesmanship, Tilak's life-long persistence in self-expression has rendered to Marathi language and literature a service which is monumental, which indeed very few men of letters individually have been able to accomplish in the world.

And yet authorship was hardly a vocation with Tilak. His books in English are entitled *The Arctic Home in the Vedas* and *Orion*. The only book which he has left for his readers in Marathi is the *Gītā Rahasya* (The Philosophy of the *Gītā*). This was written during his second imprisonment and published shortly before his death. It embodies the maturest experience of his full-lived life and reinterprets the traditional soul-metaphysics, optimistic

as it is, in the interest of a vigorous materialism. This Marathi introduction to the *Giti* will appear to students of comparative philosophy to be another Voltaire's *Essai sur les Mœurs* (Essay on Morals), the analogy being confined chiefly to logic and language.

But the entire Tilak-literature bearing as it does the stamp of a mighty intellect is to be found in the columns of the weekly *Kesari*, the journal which he founded and which has furnished the "whole duty of man" to thousands of its regular readers on every question of life, social, religious, moral, political, literary. The *Kesari* has long remained the real "national university" of the Marathas. To it the young man of letters looks for suggestions in diction, the historian for judgment and criticism, the scientist for the language of the laboratory, and the patriot for inspiration in martyrdom.

Tilak was not a poet, novelist or dramatist. His medium was the essay, conversation, lecture written or *ex tempore*. His writings are the compositions of a man of action, pithy, pointed, precise, popular, addressed to the man in the street, to the woman in the home. Supremely a journalist and a lecturer, first and last an essayist and a popularizer, Tilak has imparted to his mother-tongue a vocabulary, style and range for which a parallel is to be sought only in the epoch-making achievements of French prose in the eighteenth century through the writings of Montesquieu, the sociologist, and Diderot, the director of the *Encyclopédie*. Nay, if one should look ahead and try to envisage the future career of the new Maratha in its historical perspective one should have to appraise the literary output of Tilak the prophet, preacher, patriot as a tremendous dynamic force no less vitalizing and momentous for his race than was that of Voltaire for France during the last and the greatest period of his devotion to "reason" and "humanity" through journalistic pamphleteering manipulated from Ferney on the Swiss side of the Lake of Geneva.

10. Themes of Literature.

A Georg Brandes attempting to make a survey of the tendencies in the literature of Young India will have to begin with the statement that there is strictly speaking no "Indian literature" but that the literatures in India are as varied as those in Europe. The languages in which the mind of India speaks are as different from one another as is Portuguese from Russian or Tchech from Danish.

And yet it would not take long to touch the bottom and find that what the Indian mind speaks through all these diverse media,

Tamil, Telugu, Marathi or Hindi is invariably the same. The literature of Young India is intrinsically one.

When life is so complex and pluralistic as today it is difficult to classify the "themes" of art. But several leading sources of inspiration for creative literature may here be indicated.

The characters, situations, plots and motives in modern Indian prose and poetry have been profoundly influenced by the study of antiquities, translations from ancient Hindu and Mohammedan literature as well as general archaeological scholarship. A *real* Renaissance has thus set in in Indian thought, — i.e. a re-interpretation of the past in the light of modern viewpoint and technique. In this transvaluation of values there has been working the all-too familiar romantic spirit.

In the second place, the folk-movements in public life, the anthropological investigations of scholars and learned societies, the cult of social service which has become popular among the educated classes, the statistical studies in regard to peasants' and working men's budgets, the cry of rural reconstruction, these and allied activities have served to enrich the novels, songs and short stories not only with folk-lore material but also with the heroic and the tragic in the life and labour of the masses, the pariahs, the working men and the villagers. The democratic experience of Young India here has its literary counterpart.

Thirdly, as might naturally be expected, Western fiction and drama have furnished Indian authors with many new subjects for conscious imitation or adaptation. And of course the indirect suggestive value of these foreign creations in regard to the treatment of legend, the analysis of attitudes, and creation of types is immense. The sway of the world-spirit or the cosmopolitan element in Indian literature is hereby assured.

11. The Wealth of Urdu.

Pari passu with this creative urge in thought one will have to notice a current of literary activity in India which as in every other country of the world today is manifesting itself in the effort to assimilate the best literary treasures of foreign nations. And this is all the more to be observed in India because here as in Japan, China and Egypt virtually the entire literature on higher science and philosophy has to be borrowed wholesale from the standard classics in the Western languages.

Perhaps the most advanced of all Indian tongues in this direction is Urdu or Hindusthani (as distinguished from Hindi) whose wealth in original poetry and fiction must not however be underestimated.

Writing on the place of Urdu in the Indian vernaculars²) Abdul Majid makes out a short inventory of its borrowed wealth in the following manner:

"In poetry and drama, most of the world-classics have found their way into Urdu. Homer's *Iliad*, *The Mahabharata*, *The Ramayana* (Valmiki's as well as Tulsi Das's); Kalidas's *Sakuntala*, *Meghdut*, and other works; Milton's *Paradise Lost* and Tagore's *Gitanjali*, *Chitra*, and several other pieces are easily accessible to the Urdu-knowing public. Shakespeare is perhaps the most popular. Most of his plays have been translated and are being staged. *Othello*, *Hamlet*, *King Lear*, *The Tempest*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Cymbeline*, *The Merchant of Venice*, *Winter's Tale*, *Measure for Measure*, *The Comedy of Errors*, and *As You Like It*, have long been available in Urdu. Some of Sheridan's plays, like *Pizarro*, and selected poems of Sophocles and Sappho, Dante and Goethe, Longfellow and Southey, Shelley and Byron, Wordsworth and Tennyson have also been rendered into Urdu.

"In fiction, next to Reynolds, who it seems has a peculiar fascination for the Indian youth, Scott, Marie Corelie and Conan Doyle are the most favourite. Almost the complete works of Bankim-chandra and most of Tagore's tales have been rendered into Urdu. Latterly R. L. Stevenson, Rider Haggard, Oscar Wilde, Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells have begun to come in favour.

"Among general prose-writers the Urdu-speaking public have found their favourites in Macaulay and Carlyle, Smiles and Lubbock.

"In regions of philosophy and psychology, Urdu possesses several dialogues of Plato, selections from Aristotle, Chanakya's *Maxims*, Seneca's *Reflections*, Berkeley's *Principles and Dialogues*, Le Bon's *The Crowd*, *The Psychology of the Evolution of Peoples*, and *The Psychology of the Great War*; and portions of the works of Bacon, Hume, Kant, Mill, Spencer, James and Stout.

"In general history and biography, the names of Plutarch's *Lives of Eminent Greeks and Romans*, Rollin's *Greece*, Bury's *History of Greece*, Thacker and Schwill's *General History of Europe*, Dozy's *Islamic Spain*, Wallace's *Russia*, Abbott's *Napoleon*, Green's *History of the English People*, Vincent Smith's *Ancient India*, Elphinstone's *History of India*, Malcolm's *History of Persia*, and portions of Gibbon's *Roman Empire* may be mentioned as illustrative of many others of equal weight and authority.

"In the domain of politics and economics the following typical names would suffice:—Aristotle's *Politics*, Mill's *Liberty*, *Represen-*

²) *The Modern Review* (Calcutta), March 1921.

tative Government and Political Economy; Bell's *Laws of Wealth*; Morley's *Machiavelli and Reminiscences*; Curzon's *Persia*; Mazzini's *Duties of Man*; Schuster's *Strangling of Persia*; Blunt's *Future of Islam*; Vanbervy's *Future of Islam*; and portions of Seeley and Blunt's *History of Modern Europe*; Wilson and Pollock, Sidgwick and Jevons, Marshall and Morison.

"Allied to political science is the department of philosophy and history and in this department may be named the translations of Guizot's *History of Civilisation*; Buckle's *Civilisation in England*; I. Bon's *Civilisation of the Arabs*, and *Civilisation of Hindustan*; Lecky's *European Morals*; Draper's *Intellectual Development of Europe*; and Dutt's *Ancient Hindu Civilization*.

"In education, besides several manuals like Todd's, Urdu is no unfamiliar with the works of Spencer, Bain, Froebel, Pestalozzi, Herbart and Montessori.

"In science, in addition to numerous popular treatises of a general character like Draper's *Conflict between Religion and Science*, the Urdu-speaking public is fairly well acquainted with the works and researches of Darwin and Wallace, Haeckel and Huxley, Lyall and Geikie, Tyndal and Bose, Kelvin and Maxwell, Crookes and Lodge.

"To allude to the translations of standard works on law, jurisprudence and medicine is superfluous since quite a large number of them have as a matter of necessity found their way into Urdu.

"It should be noted that in the above lists slightest attempt has been made to be exhaustive. The names given are taken at random and only with a view to give the reader an idea of the kind of the foreign wealth that Urdu literature possesses. To prepare even a fairly complete list of such works would require hundreds of pages.

"Another important fact worthy of notice is that the above lists, sketchy as they are, are mainly confined to the literature of the West. Arabic and Persian stock of Muslim literature, almost entirely, and the sacred Sanskrit and Hindi literature of the Hindus, to a large extent, have been reproduced in Urdu. The *Koran*, the *Gita*, the *Puranas*, the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana* have each of them several translations in this language. The lives and teachings of the Prophet, of Jesus Christ, of Sri Krishna, of Sri Ram Chandra, of Gautama Buddha, of Guru Nanak and of Kabir, as also the works of Hindu Divines and Yogins, like Vashistha; of saints and mystical poets, like Maulana Rumi and Hafiz; of ethicists and theologians, like Sadi and Ghazali; of epic poets, like Firdausi; of philosophers, like Avicenna; of historians like Ibn Khaldun, Ibn Khallikan and Farishta, are some of the best gems in the treasury of Urdu literature."

12. "National" Education.

The attempt that is being made at the Osmania University of Hyderabad to impart highest education through the medium of Urdu may not therefore be considered to be too ambitious and unreasonable. It must be remembered, however, at the same time that Urdu is the only living language of India in which up till now such an experiment has been undertaken and deemed to be possible. All other Indian languages have still to play the "second fiddle" in India's educational systems,—even in those which are conducted independently of the alien government by "national councils" or "national universities" under the influence of the ideas of 1905.

But the desire to bring the mother-tongues up to the level of an adequate medium of higher education suited to the modern requirements of a progressive life furnishes the *elan* of *swarajist* activity in education. Translations, adaptations and compilations from foreign sources, whether by individual publishing houses or by collective efforts, are necessarily becoming prominent in the journalism and literary life of every important city.

The cry everywhere in India,—as was worded for Bengal by the present writer before the Literary Conferences³) at Maldā and Mymensingh (1910—1911)—has been raised to the following effect: "In what ways and in how many years can our literature occupy the position of French, German and English for the study of science, philosophy, history and other serious subjects in the highest classes of a university? The efforts and activities of our men of letters have to be regulated in such a manner as to focus our whole literary devotion on the realization of this single object."

In this as in other trends of literary growth Young India is exhibiting not only the nationalistic animus of the Poles, Tchechs, Serbs and Irish but also the Mazzinian romanticism for linguistic or cultural souls. And it is from such a platform of educational independence and not from the standpoint of a senseless antialienism that Gandhi's proclamation of war against the English language (1921) acquires a deep significance in the history of contemporary civilization. This is but another aspect of the movement by which mankind is constandy being made concious that India and world progress can go on without England, without the English people and without the British government.

³) *Vide* the essay on *Sāhitya-sevi* (Man of Letters) in the author's Bengali *Sādhana* (Calcutta 1912). The essay appeared also in Hindi, Marathi and English (*vide* the *Modern Review*, 1911).

Science and Learning in Young India.

European and American observers who are watching the barometer of the world's progress cannot fail to notice that in India to-day at least two branches of learning bid fair to achieve permanent conquests. Of these the more popular one seems to be archaeology or the study of antiquities¹⁾ generally. The next in chronological order but by no means second in importance is positive science. Not only mathematics, physics and chemistry, but biology and allied sciences also—all of the highest grade—have come to sta

1. Criterion of Intellectual Advance.

Let us explain this stock-taking in precise terms. It is merely that these two groups of science are being studied by the young men with keener and keener interest, nor even that the professors and publicists with cultural predilections are trying to keep in touch with the latest articles in the scientific journals of the world. The really note-worthy feature in the present state of Indian intellect is twofold.

First, Young India has begun consciously to contribute to the conquest of new realms in each of these sciences by original investigations of the first rate. Its claims as an active partner and helpful member of the republic of world-culture are thus being automatically established. Secondly, and what is possibly of greater significance so far as India's national evolution is concerned, these pioneering investigations are not confined to one or two giants or to a few high-brow demi-gods, as might have been the case, say, about a decade ago, but are broad-based on the independent and small but persistent activity of a daily increasing number of seekers of truth. It is this new democracy of Indian cooperative research that is arresting the special attention of the European and American learned societies as a potent young Asian force harnessed in the interest of science-progress.

Judged by this twofold test, our intellectual inventory would exhibit a lamentable poverty of contemporary India in the field of philosophy. No doubt there are quite a few translations and paraphrases, in English and in mother-tongues, of the *Upanishads*, the *Darshanas*, the *Gītā*, and so forth. But at best these commentarial

¹⁾ See Bibliography in *Pol. Inst. and Theor. of the Hindus*, for an account, in part, of the antiquarian literature.

²⁾ *Infra*, Appendix.

publications have chiefly an antiquarian or palaeontological importance. In regard to the most learned of these treatises the highest that might be said is, that dealing as they do with cultural fossils, they are of no more value in modern life than are the critical editions of, or scholarly writings on, European metaphysicians like Seneca, Plotinus or St. Augustine by the professors of Western universities. We could hardly mention one great Hindu or Mussalman name in the last three generations of scholarship that is associated *in a creative way* with any of the schools and problems of psychology, theory of knowledge, or methodology. It is not too much to say that today the entire Indian intellect is absolutely bankrupt in the world of higher philosophical speculation, although the exploitation of ancient mysticism for current politics is a palpably noticeable feature of the times.

In historical fields the brain of India is as barren as in the philosophical. The world has a right to demand that Indian scholars should be competent enough to attack the problems of Latin-American, Russian, Italian, or Japanese history with as great enthusiasm as Western students employ in the study of Oriental lore. Indians must get used to discussing Europe and America with as much confidence as Europeans and Americans in lecturing and writing on Asia. Not until such an all-grasping world-view, a bold man-to-man individualistic understanding of things, a self-conscious attitude in regard to the events of the human world, an humanistic approach to the problems of race-development is ingrained in the mentality can one expect to see a real historical school grow up in Young India's intellectual *milieu*.

Even in regard to the problems of indology it were good to admit frankly that although India is cooperating with the West in producing first class archaeology, of real history there is virtually nothing.

History begins where archaeology ends. The beginnings of a school of history were being laid in India by Madhava Govind Ranade in his *Rise of the Maratha Power* and by Romesh Chunder Dutt in his *Ancient Hindu Civilization*, inevitably defective though their attempts were owing to the wrong archaeology of their days. But the methodology of "nationalistic interpretation" initiated by them, which in the last analysis is the life-blood of every system of scientific history strictly so called, remains yet to be seriously taken up by Young India. Opportunities for historical studies were never more inviting than now, for we are at the present moment in a position to make use of a comparatively accurate archaeology and hence a more correct anatomy of Indian society through the ages.

It is only when Indian scholarship proceeds to galvanize the dry bones of excavated data with the vital physiology of philosophical "prejudices" (no matter of what sort) that compilers of *Cambrian Modern History* and their admirers in Europe and America will be moved to announce the historians of Asia as some of the first intellectuals of the world and shake hands with them on a basis of equality. It must never be forgotten that history is a science altogether different from archaeology. In order to be lifted up to the level of history archaeology must have to be impregnated with a bias, an interpretation, a standpoint, a philosophy, a "criticism of life."

The third science which does not appear to have made a permanent home in Indian brains is the science of constitutional and municipal government, legal categories, and international relations. In India as elsewhere there is a need for demagogic platitudes being scattered broadcast from the pulpit and the press, in one word, for "propaganda". No sane critic who looks forward to the nationalization of political ideals can challenge the utility of such harangues and popular expositions. But still one might expect that there should be in India at least a dozen thinkers and writers whose views on administration, justice or statesmanship might command the respect of European and American theorists. In India political science is yet to come.

But probably the weakest item in the present state of Indian intellect, especially of that of the Bengali *intelligentszia* is a weak-kneed cowardice before facts and figures of the economic world. One cannot deny that during the last decade a very high degree of differentiation and specialization has been attempted by the universities in the teaching of economics. The advanced students no longer have their horizon circumscribed by Adam Smith, Mill and Marshall. But the fact remains that currency, finance, railway, land-tenure, prices, and statistics are still unreal terms or abstract entities in the consciousness of Young India.

2. Extra-Indian Data.

Some of the weaknesses in politics and economics could be successfully combated if a batch of Indian publicists and professors got a chance to live in the different intellectual centres of the world with a view to carrying on researches in regard to the agricultural banks of Japan, the tariff problem of the United States, the French and Italian schemes of colonization, the international loans of Turkey and China, local government in England, the Hague tribunals, the foreign trade of Argentina, the war finance of the late German

Empire, the industries of the new Russia, and the economics of reparations and indemnities. Such investigations will have to be undertaken for a good few years by each student in collaboration with the prominent financiers, political philosophers, social democrats, statisticians, and international jurists of the various lands. Before acquiring proficiency in the handling of such non-Indian or extra-Indian questions it would be well nigh impossible for us to build up an authoritative body of economic and political doctrines in India.

Indeed for philosophy and history also the same steps should be recommended as for politics and economics. Indian scholars and authors have need to meet the leading savants of the world on terms of familiar intercourse in order that they may watch from month to month how and why a particular problem of epistemology or animal behaviour or soul-psychology acquires prominence in philosophical discussions, and observe how the interpretation of one's country's immediate past has been changing with decades according to the shibboleths of science, sect, or social denomination that happen to be in the ascendant for the time being. Only with such intimate experience of the inner workings of the philosophical and historical mind is it possible for Young India to be endowed with the *organon* that is needed for its cultural reconstruction.

For Indian intellectuals the urgent desideratum of the hour is a purely objective methodology. The instrument of a thoroughly realistic and unsentimental approach to the facts and phenomena of the psychical and social world has to be made quite popular in India. In order to achieve this viewpoint the preliminary procedure should be to acquire altogether new angles of vision, and this would be feasible only if a good few of the scholars got interested in studies and investigations that have absolutely no Indian bearing. In other words, we have to proceed to the historical, philosophical, economic and political studies exactly in the spirit in which the archaeologists or rather the students of positive science have been attacking their problems.

3. Three Sciences Demanding Cultivation.

It is well known, however, that as in Europe and America, in India also philosophy, history, politics and economics are four of the most popular subjects among university students. One must mention in this connection a new branch of studies that has of late been acquiring a slow but sure foothold on the Indian mind, viz. that relating to the fine arts, especially to paintings and

sculptures. The study, however, is still in its non-age; original investigations have not passed the antiquarian grade as yet. I also regrettable that the science of aesthetic studies has not advanced in India in the same proportion as the creative experiments of the art-world. But notwithstanding much dilettantism and superficial generalization in regard to western "ideals" of art, signs of genuine art-awakening are too patent to be overlooked, at any in Bengal.

It is appropriate to point out that philology, anthropology and sociology are the three sciences that have long been awaiting wide recognition among Indian scholars. It might almost be said that until a year or two ago these sciences were hardly even listed in the courses of instruction offered by the universities.

A few post-graduate students especially of Bombay have had some education in philology at Berlin and Paris. But in these instances the knowledge is confined to the Indo-Aryan languages. They have as a rule learned to compare the grammars of Greek, Latin, Sanskrit (and Persian), French and German. But the chief requisite for a science of language is the comparative study of several non-Aryan languages together with that of the Aryan groups. Two such languages are Chinese and Arabic.

A school of philology worth the name cannot evolve in India unless the Sanskritist (and Persianist) possesses command also over Arabic and Chinese, or the Arabist can handle with ease the Chinese and Sanskrit (and Persian) languages. Sanskrit, Arabic, and Chinese, this *trio* must have to be treated as an inseparable group by the rising linguists of India.

The social value of this scientific *trivium* can hardly be over-estimated. The Hindu-Moslem unity of which we hear so much these days can be founded only on such a synthetic ground-work of conscious cultural *rapprochement*. Sanskrit-knowing Hindus must now have to learn Arabic, and Arabic-knowing Mussalmans must have to be proficient in Sanskrit. And since Chinese is partly also the language of Islam in the Far East no proper appraisal of Moslem civilization is possible to a student who is unfamiliar with that language.

Why should not the Hindu University of Benares start this new movement in Indo-Islamic expansion? A faculty might be created there under distinguished Indian experts such as would devote themselves to the study of a subject like, say, "Moslem Achievements in Mediaeval Culture." No more secure basis for a new Islamic renaissance could be suggested. The investigation will

involve a knowledge as much of Greek and Latin as of the other three languages, and of course, of French and German for access to modern researches on the subject.

A solid nucleus for Indo-Islamic philology is likely to emerge if an initial investigation be carried on for a period of about five years by three Mussalman and three Hindu scholars under the leadership of a philologist, say, like A. Suhrawardy of Calcutta. The investigators should have to be provided with opportunities for travel in Northern Africa, Spain, Western Asia, and China. Educational benefactors might be interested in raising some three lacs of rupees which may be needed for maintaining the researchers in their studies, lectures, and travels.

Thanks to the activities of the folklorists and collectors of legends and mss. associated with the *Sāhitya Parishats* and *Sammelans* (literary academies and conferences) much useful work on anthropological topics has been done in India during the last quarter of a century. One or two publications by Indian ethnologists have also been able to draw the attention of western experts to the merits of their work. But on the whole the scientific study of anthropology cannot be said to have begun in India. Nay, this branch of learning was officially unrecognized by the universities until a year or two ago. But time has come when the undergraduates should be taught to regard the investigations into the life and institutions of the Africans, American-Indians and the aboriginal tribes of India, Australia and the Polynesian Islands as an integral part of "general culture." For, the impact of anthropological researches on the approach to the problems of the human *psyche*, morals, religion, criminology, social behaviour, and inter-racial justice, in one word, on the entire science of civilization has been nothing short of revolutionary.

Everybody is aware of the tremendous influence that the social forces of the last seventeen years have exerted on university curriculum and administration in India. But we have still to remark that sociology is a science that remains yet to take its place as an independent course of instruction along with the other arts and sciences. The very fact that in India today there are at least one hundred propagandas from the Andhra library movement and Malabar women's association to temperance-conference and depressed classes mission, each with its regular congresses, publicity journals and lecturers, should challenge the authorities of higher learning to create opportunities for the scientific study not only of Indian institutions and *mores* but of all facts and theories bearing on social progress, social inheritance, social control, and social service.

4. The Ideas of 1905.

At this stage of intellectual *risorgimento* the demand is urged, felt for demolishing once for all the popular fallacy of the nineteenth century which has been surviving too long into the twentieth regarding the alleged difference in the "ideals" of civilization of human life between the East and the West. So far, moreover as the pressing problems of contemporary life are concerned, a discussion is absolutely worthless, pedantic and reactionistic, because the peoples of Asia, backward and "inferior" as they happen to today, have no choice before them but accept all the new *vidyās* and *kalās*, sciences, arts, mechanisms and institutions of Eur-America from the steam-engine to radioactivity and from the *Wealth of Nations* to Bolshevism. Anything that has been found useful in the West for certain periods in recent times—notwithstanding its limitations and abuses inherent in everything mundane that could not possibly be foreseen by human intelligence—will be found to be equally helpful in the East. The only problem before the East, therefore, is to try by all means to catch up to the West, at the Japanese rate of advance, in every field of human endeavour and establish once more the foundations of equality and reciprocal respect which governed the relations between Asia and Europe in ancient and mediaeval times.

It is necessary also to sound a note of warning. Partly through the onrush of industrial enterprise (which however has not come a moment too early, nor has been manifesting itself in too large proportions), and partly through the well-advertised recognition of Indian achievements in one line or another (which, by the bye, has not by any means been showered upon too many of our intellectuals and publicists), a section of Young India is tending to count human values in terms of money and fame. Nothing is likely to affect India's cultural advance more perniciously than this tendency of the social mind, should it happen to be diffused wide or deep for any length of time. Let us, therefore, not misinterpret the meaning of our contemporary history. There can be no question that the little progress that Young India has attained thus far is at bottom wholly the outcome of the spirit of self-sacrifice and creative idealism associated with the "ideas of 1905". And it is only this spiritual *shakti* that can carry India forward to the consummation of that world-mission which modern mankind has long been demanding of her and which she has taken upon herself at last to fulfil.

A British History of Revolutionary India (1905—1919).¹

Those students of international politics who care for facts will find in the present volume a well-compiled digest from year to year of the military achievements of Young India in its steady war against Great Britain. The story has all the authority of a first-hand study, since the author was one of those English members of the Indian civil service who were engaged by the British government to prepare the official history of Indian sedition, conspiracy, and revolutionary propaganda, published in 1918. Another of his significant qualifications for the present task is his participation in the framing of the Rowlatt Act of 1919, the Nationalist reaction to which has served to add Amritsar and Ahmedabad to the list of the world's massacres.

To the author the "vital issue of the present" is: "Will the constitutional changes" effected by the new Government of India Bill "be such as adequately to maintain British supremacy" (page 254)? Notwithstanding his verbose solicitude for the well-being of India, he seems to share the opinion formerly expressed by Lord Crewe, whose words he quotes: "Is it conceivable that at any time an Indian Empire could exist, on the lines, say, of Australia and New Zealand, with no British officials and no tie of creed and blood, which takes the place of these material bonds? To me that is a world as imaginary as any Atlantis . . . that was ever thought of by the ingenious brain of any imaginary writer" (page 89). Such being his point of view, it is strange that the author should so often be surprised to find that "the preaching of racial hate" is a prominent feature of Indian nationalism.

The author, however, has no illusions. He knows that there is no difference in aims and ideals between the "Moderates" and the "Extremists", the Home Rulers and the Liberators, the two camps into which Indian political parties are conventionally grouped. In regard to the "Moderate leaders" we are told that "when the riots began [1919], they blamed the rioters, but devoted their main energies to censuring the measures of suppression adopted by the government" (page 220). Instead of siding with the government these so-called Home Rulers advocated the abrogation of martial

¹ *A History of the Indian Nationalist Movement.* By Sir Verney Lovett. New York, Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1920.—xiv, 285 pp. Cf. *Freiheitskampf der indischen Nationalisten* (Berlin, 1920).

law, the repeal of the Rowlatt Act and a policy of surrender to the people's will. Common sense is thus left to make no distinction between the two parties but rather to designate both as belonging to one and the same group of "patriots", who are to be distinguished from those who in common parlance are known as loyalists or traitors, depending upon the points of view. Indeed at the National Congress of 1916 "absolute political independence" had become the professed ideal of Moderate and Extremist politicians alike" (page 119).

The position of those who do not belong to the group of patriots is brought into relief by the picture given by the author of success in terrorism which revolutionary India has been able to establish (pages 94, 188, 190). "The fair trial of a person accused of revolutionary crime has been rendered practically impossible by the murders of approvers, witnesses, police officers and law-abiding citizens suspected by revolutionaries of having given information to, or otherwise assisted, the police in the detection of revolutionary crime". (pp 94, 188, 190). Evidently there is a moral tug-of-war between the party of freedom and the forces harnessed to subjection and slavery.

In the background of all this the reader has to visualize a thoroughly disarmed India. And since her patriots have accepted the challenge of the British Empire their methods of work are naturally twofold. In the first place, they try by hook or by crook to equip themselves with arms. Secondly, they seek to improvise ways and means of acquiring a training in military manoeuvres. For the purchase of firearms they loot the non-patriots and the government treasuries. These tactics are akin to the Bolshevik economics of expropriation. Military discipline is achieved not only in this very process of financing the movement, but also in organized attempts to kill off persons in the British service undesirable to them, as well as their secret agents (pages 105, 115). Militaristic enterprises occasionally assume the form of outbreaks and riots, which, whether political in origin or not, are exploited by the leaders of secret societies for the purpose of paralyzing the government and demonstrating to the masses that "British rule is gone" (pages 98, 150). For instance, it was found out in the Punjab "rebellion" of 1919 that there were "clever men behind the lawless deeds and they showed concerted actions" (page 216).

These attempts at military preparedness, however crude, have shown cumulative progress since the first bomb attack in Bengal (1907), which was an aftermath of the events of 1905 (pages 73,

85), in which Young India may be said to have been born. Its philosophy is traced by the author back to Tilak's message in the *Kesari*, a Marathi journal, in 1897 (page 51): "Do not circumscribe your vision like a frog in a well. Get out of the Penal Code, enter into the extremely high atmosphere of the *Bhagavat Gita* (The Bible of Mystical Militarism) and then consider the actions of great men." Nay, the beginnings of this militant attitude are to be read in the journalism of the 70's. According to the British officer in charge of the Act (1878) designed to gag the Indian press, the journalists of the time used to incite the people to "upset the British Raj by denunciations, sometimes open and sometimes covert, of the alleged weakness and timidity of the English and their inability to maintain their present position in India".

From a reading of the book one rises with the conviction that a state of war exists in India between the people who are its natural leaders, and the foreigners who have managed to get possession of the country. This belligerency, chronic and old as it is, is not recognized as such in international law, because the rebels have not yet been able to smuggle, purchase or steal enough arms and ammunition for one or two dramatic military demonstrations. But India's efforts to attain political emancipation in the teeth of the formidable opposition of the enemy are patent to all who study warfare and the "halfway houses" to war. The present book is a record of this struggle, especially of the crisis that is coming to a head, from the other side of the shield.

Viewpoints on Contemporary India (1918-1919).¹⁾

A great impetus has been given to the discussion of administrative reconstruction in India by the publication of the Montagu Chelmsford Report in 1918. The four books under review approach this subject from four different angles. The first presents the viewpoint of the Anglo-Indian civil service, the second expresses the sentiments of liberal-progressive British publicists, the third voice the opinion of such Indian radicals as are still loyalist enough to remain non-revolutionary, and the fourth is a more or less academic contribution to the study of modern nationalism.

1. An Antiquarian on Modern India.

Vincent Smith's qualifications for prescribing to the British people their duties with regard to the administration of India rest on the fact that he has devoted a lifetime to the study of Indian archaeology. His recommendations are as valuable as those of Professor Mahaffy would have been, if he had specified to Venizelos what policies Greece ought to pursue during the war against Germany, because, forsooth, he was a specialist in the Hellenistic culture of the Ptolemies. Smith's obscurantism, however, has had no influence even upon the cautious conservatives who are responsible for the new scheme for the government of India, which has recently gone into operation. His failure to be taken seriously is another object lesson to academicians who are much too absorbed in their antiquarian researches in "past politics" to be pervious to the influences of the new world-order,—not the least of which is the demand for a liberation of the human intellect from bondage to history, tradition and social inheritance.

2. A British Socialist on Young India.

But if Smith has failed to envisage the dynamic forces in political relations, Mr. Ramsay-Macdonald has tried to comprehend

¹⁾ *Indian Constitutional Reform*. By Vincent A. Smith, Oxford University Press, 1919.—118 pp.

The Government of India. By J. Ramsay Macdonald, London, The Swarthmore Press, Ltd., 1919.—ix, 291 pp.

The Political Future of India. By Lajpat Rai, New York, Huebsch, 1919.—xxviii, 237 pp.

Indian Nationality. By R. N. Gilchrist, London, Longmans, Green and Company, 1920.—xviii, 246 pp.

Sarkar, *The Futurism of Young Asia*.

them by analyzing the problems of India "as a going concern." He starts with the following propositions: (1) that to-day the "political philosophy and axioms of the West are an essential part of Indian life" (page 2); (2) that the "Indian movement is following the lines of our own (British) liberal, radical and labor evolution" (page 23); (3) that the Indian Government is "now faced with an Indian opinion;" and (4) that the change has been brought about by "the growth in Indian merit and self-confidence," for even "the villages are now being stirred by nationalist propaganda" (pages 19—20). Arguing from these psychological premises, he concludes that "a *par Britannica* is not the end; the end is Indian life, abundant, responsible, spontaneous" (page 112).

What Ramsay-Macdonald has written, however, is not a book of mere propaganda; it is the result of minute and critical investigation. No author, perhaps, has ever given such a realistic picture of the modifications in the social and economic life of India brought about by the present system of judicial administration as we find in this book. The first chapter presents a history of the Moslem movement, which unfortunately is ignored in all treatises on Indian politics. The author is not so captivated by enthusiasm for democracy as to minimize the difficulties of Indian representation (pages 73—77), and is therefore able to perceive that a representative system for India "cannot be created on any simple or consistent theory". The entire system of administration is presented in its historical development, the evolution of each part being described since its origins. Readers of Ilbert, Strachey and Chesney will obtain here a non-official view of the workings of Indian polity.

Ramsay-Macdonald's criticism of the existing system of government is for the most part that of the non-revolutionary nationalists. He does not, however, accept the nationalist opinion that "the land tax is the cause of the poverty of the Indian cultivator". Considerations of economic theory compel us to endorse his analysis of Indian taxation as generally sound and to agree with much of what he says about the oft-discussed "drain" of India's wealth to England. It is, indeed, only by recognizing a fundamental distinction between the economics of a subject race and the economics of imperialism that we can understand why some of the A, B, C's of economic thought are persistently ignored by Indian politicians and theorists in their discussion of foreign trade, land revenue, permanent assessment of rural areas, railway finance etc.

∴ *The Government of India* is not intended to mince facts. It is

an able account of some of the sacrifices and achievements that en Young India to recognition in the world's remaking, as well some of the creative forces among the common people which shaping the country's political geography. Ramsay-Macdonald off in the first place, a lucid history of the administrative system in secondly, a "nationalistic" criticism of the organs of government which seeks to locate the root of the present troubles, thirdly, programme of reform, which, as a member of the British Labor Party, the author considers to be necessary in order to save it for the Empire.

For, "whatever else Ramsay-Macdonald may be he is first and last an English patriot, i.e., an imperialist. His writing therefore, are of value as exhibiting the lines of *rapprochement* that the main body of British socialism seeks to establish between a subject race and its masters. For this reason, the author's *Awakening of India*, published in 1908, during the period of the birth throes of the Young India movement became an international text-book.

The attempt to reconcile the claims of Indian nationalism with the interests of an empire of alien rulers is, however, not the only consideration in Ramsay-Macdonald's present effort. The new volume has been produced in an international *milieu* which is characterized by at least two sets of conditions. The first are those generated by the talk of a League of Nations, and the second is the *fait accompli* of a socialist state in Bolshevik Russia. And it is because the author seeks to harmonize his theories with these novel phenomena that his book acquires an importance such as is hardly indicated by the limitations of its title.

3. India and the British Empire.

Ramsay-Macdonald suggests that India should be "tried" with the "responsibility of being tutor to some of the East African peoples under the care of the League of Nations."

"It would be a great experiment," he says. "If it failed, the failure would soon be detected and would produce no great harm; and if it succeeded, as I believe it would, it would stamp India with a dignity which would command for it a position of unquestioned equality amongst the federated nations of the Empire."

Evidently the author is far more liberal than Norman Angell who champions the league of nations not because it is likely to erect a platform of peace as between the East and the West but because a federation of European nations is indispensable, in his calculation, in order to defend the land of the whites against a possible com-

bination of "Japanese, Chinese, and other Asiatics" who might, as he fears, "seek to interpret our ideals of democracy as entitling them to a real equality of treatment."

But here Ramsay-Macdonald's logic, idealistic as it is, bids farewell to *Realpolitik*. Why should he be so anxious, a Frenchman might ask, for still another evidence of India's "dignity" and "unquestioned equality amongst the federated nations of the Empire"? As a student of colonial politics, Ramsay-Macdonald must be thoroughly familiar with the active part that India's men, money, and material resources have played during a whole century in the expansion of England. Was it not with Indian help that Napoleon's Oriental allies were subdued? Was it not with Indian contributions in brain, brawn and bullion that the Persian Gulf was converted into a British lake, and Russia and France obliged to set a limit to their ambitions in Asia and North Africa? India has been "tried" with plenty of such "experiments" from the days of the British conquests of Hongkong down to the pacification of South Africa and Egypt. And it may be asked whether she has ever been less responsive or less successful than in the recent war against Great Britain's German enemies ending in the occupation of Mesopotamia and Palestine.

Possibly Norman Angell is a more correct interpreter of the British psychology in so far as he shudders at the idea of a "real equality of treatment" being claimed by Asians.

4. The Proletariat and Nationalism.

But if Ramsay-Macdonald fails here to square theories to facts because of his idealism viz. because of an enthusiasm for the subject race, in his analysis of the relations between socialism and nationalism he fails no less, but for an opposite reason, viz. that he is not idealistic enough. For the time being, the methodology of subject races happens to lie beyond his ken. The author is aware that in India as elsewhere capitalistic tendencies are becoming rampant, and the interests of the masses, the proletariat, the *ryot*, and the working men are often overlooked in bourgeoisie mentality. *Ergo*, argues he, let the British rulers boss the Indian administration as *ma-bap* i.e. as protectors of the people. This is Leninism without the sincerity of a Lenin.

In so far as Ramsay-Macdonald is an imperialist, his views although those of a Laborite cannot fail to be distasteful to Young India. On the other hand, as a socialist he flies in the face of some of its postulates. Speaking of the tariff, he says that "whoever

has visited the working-class districts of Bombay with their squallid overcrowding, their filthy dens of disease, . . . will pause before welcoming any rapid strengthening of the economic influences which maintain them until a public opinion and body of legislation have been created to protect the people whose labors will be necessary for the new factories." The nationalist will probably rub his eyes after reading this and declare that amorganatic alliance between Indian nationalism and British labour is an unnatural union.

For, according to the orthodox philosophy of nationalism the adjustment of relations between labour and capital in each state is a domestic problem, and must not be used as a pretext for intervention on humanitarian grounds by a foreign power or for the prolongation of alien control over a subject country. But the overtures to Young India from Eur-American labour as organized in the Communist Third International of Moscow, the Syndicalists of Germany, the International Anti-Military Bureau of the Hague, or the *Clair* group of Paris are more consistent and bespeak a more honest attempt at world-reconstruction in so far as the purely theoretical issues are concerned.

Thanks to the war and the revolutionary activities of Indian patriots India is today a question of practical politics in mankind's public life, not less so than was Poland in Europe and in the United States until her re-emergence the other day as a sovereign unit in international affairs. Not only journalists and university-minded people but even congressmen in their senatorial capacity and labor unions as organized bodies have made notorious the facts that in the Imperial medical and bacteriological service of India the Blue Books mention 24 English officers as against 5 Indian names, in the educational service, of the 37 men 34 are English, and of the 38 in agricultural service only 5 are Indian, and so forth.

Even the most rabid advocate of the economic interpretation of history knows that there is a limit to his doctrine. Since the ages depicted in Hesiod's *Works and Days* the conflict between patricians and plebs has been an eternal question in race-development. But no amount of argument in the name of international humanitarianism could convince an American of the wisdom of placing the United States under, say, French domination, because, for sooth, the interests of the American masses would be better handled by the countrymen of St. Simon, Louis Blanc and Jaurès than they are by their present masters. Nor could the people of the Argentine be advised with any hope of success to submit to Russian control in order that the "class-struggle" arising among them from the labour-

unions of Italian immigrants, might have the benefit of political doctoring at the hands of the latest experts in communistic government. To be logical, Ramsay-Macdonald would have to believe, as an international socialist, that there is nothing to choose between a Britain under German rule and a Britain under British rule, so long as the ruling-class consists for the most part of profiteers and slum-proprietors and is identified in one way or another with the capitalists.

This is a fallacy which comes from a misunderstanding of recent events in Russia. It is, in fact, a variety of counterfeit Bolshevism, manufactured in England, "not for internal use," however, but "for external application." For if there is one fact clearly revealed by the new Russia it is the truism that democracy or no democracy, social equality or no social equality, political freedom, as the world is constituted to day, is the first vital *désideratum* in all those regions where one people is governed by another. The primary need to-day of every Asian people is an absolute and unconditioned *swaraj* (sovereignty) of the Japanese pattern. All questions as to the form of government, whether monarchical, republican or soviet, are of subsidiary importance at the present moment. In any case, these are problems of internal politics, and so too are such questions as the adjustment of the relations between capital and labour, the redistribution of lands, forests and mines, the repudiation of national debts, "progressive taxation," and the like. To ignore this fundamental consideration or in any way to belittle it, while analyzing the nationalistic ideals of Young India, is hardly to assist in the clearing-up of long-standing international muddles.

5. An Indian Interpreter.

Yet on the whole the transition from the position of British Labour to that of Mr. Lajpat Rai is not difficult; for after all, the demands of Indian constitutionalists dare not rise higher than, nor even differ materially from, the promises or "pious wishes" of their comrades overseas. The chief value of *The Political Future of India* lies in the publicity which the author has given to the party he condemns, the party of freedom, revolution and "direct action." This movement has had no historian and interpreter, but the account of all Indian attempts since 1905 to "make foreign government impossible" and of their ramifications in the public life of France, the United States, Germany and Japan has been carefully collected for the British Government by the Rowlatt Committee in their *Report on Revolutionary Conspiracies in India* (1918).

It is on this bulky official document that Rai's summary is based. His book, though it contains useful appendices, does not evidently aim at furnishing its readers with more than a veteran agitator's immediate reactions to the reform scheme proposed by Montagu and Chelmsford. As such it may be consulted as affording a glimpse into the mind of the Indian National Congress.

But the documents printed in the preface, bearing on the atrocities to which men, women and children in the Punjab were subjected in 1919 have a deep significance for social science in so far as they constitute an index of the nature and extent of the degrading plight which none but a race that is hastening towards annihilation can tolerate in shame and silence. Once again has it been made clear that British rule in India, as white rule or albinocracy everywhere in Asia and Africa, exists by virtue of the military impotency to which the peoples of the lands have been reduced by legislation and coercion. This aspect of the "white man's burden" has naturally been ignored by the League of Nations, bent as it is on keeping the enslaved territories down to their servile condition as long as possible and by those labour politicians who make a profession of displaying friendship for the dependencies and mandated areas of the earth's surface.

6. Map-Making as a Function of Revolutions.

Among the many circumstances which obscure the problem of India to students of international relations none is more pernicious than the systematic blindness to the simple truism that there is no such country as India. The weakest link in the chain of arguments advanced by Indian politicians is that bearing on the "Indian States" which, numbering over half a thousand, cover, in various degrees of subjection to Great Britain, over a third of the South Asian sub-continent and comprise about twenty-five per cent of its population. But even more serious than this breach in the alleged unity of India is the racial or linguistic disparity of the different provinces, a disparity which no honest application of Mazzini's nationality-principle or of the Bolshevik theory of self-determination could ever ignore.

As for the differences between Hindus and Mohammedans, and the caste divisions in social life of which even the tyro in Indian affairs glibly talks, they are quite insignificant when legal, political, or economic organization is considered. By no means are they more potent as hindrances to national self-realization than are the conditions of *Realpolitik* obtaining in the West today.

As in Europe, with its score of kingdoms and republics and its dozen of new "irredentas," in India the real and only legitimate basis of political differentiation is territorial, allowing of course for the complications that are inevitable everywhere because of the borderland Alsace-Lorraines, Tyrols, Silesias, and the question of minorities. Indeed, the house of cards called United India would have been a thing of the past had the fortunes of the last war been ever so different from what they happened to be; for the terms of a victorious Germany in regard to Asia and Africa would hardly have been less ruthless, humanly speaking, than were those of the Allies in regard to the national boundaries of Central Europe. The present map of India, hodge-podge as it is, is the greatest superstition of Indian patriots; the fallacy of their political writers consists in trying to envisage future state-making on the lines of the map that has been artificially created by the haphazard annexations of the British since 1757.

7. Two Indias.

These considerations will not trouble the reader of Lajpat Rai's book. The strength and weakness of Rai are the strength and weakness of his school, of the political party to which he belongs. Constructive statesmanship is not to be expected from persons who by the force of circumstances are habituated chiefly to ventilate opinions that have no chance of being done into life, opinions embodying cut and dried resistance to cut and dried resolutions made by the alien Foreign Office—persons who have neither the intellectual boldness to think in terms of India's freedom nor the moral sincerity to be champions of the British empire.

The world has to recognize once for all that there are two Indias so far as politics is concerned—one the India that is in evidence and the other the India that is underground. It is from the open or surface India that speakers and writers, men of the Indian National Congress or of the Moslem League (Mr. Rai, for instance), come. The India of subterranean energies chooses to maintain a solemn silence except only in armed upheavals whose history and philosophy have laboriously to be unearthed by officers of the criminal investigation department.

It is the militaristic activity of this silent and sullen India with its network of sympathizers and agents in France, America, Germany, Japan, and Russia that taxes the brains of the far-sighted statesmen of Great Britain, who can afford almost to ignore the India of speaking agitators as such. All the sops which those

statesmen have been offering since 1908 in order to "rally moderates to the Crown," as the phrase goes in Anglo-Ind vocabulary, are but prizes that non-radical or "Menshevik" India enjoys on the unseen shoulders of bomb-throwers and arms-smugglers whose idealism does not stop short of anything but sovereign independence of the Japanese type.

Even superficial observers could not have failed to notice during and since the war that the open demands of the Indian National Congress and of the Moslem League rise in geometrical progression according as the secret societies are felt mysteriously to be growing in numbers and extending their conquests from class to class. On view of this fact are Rai's essay and the latest speeches by political orators on fiscal autonomy, educational budget, army and navy expenses, and tariff reform of importance to international diplomats, they issue from the only channels through which the surface-ripples of contemporary India can be observed.

Hopelessly situated as patriotic India is from the standpoint of military-preparedness, the school of open politics can only exhibit to the world an M. K. Gandhi, with his banner of "devotion to truth" (*Satyāgraha*) and passive resistance (the only form of resistance, by the way, conceivable under the circumstances). And while Mohammed Ali, a Moslem leader, preaches the theocratic ideal of the kingdom of Allah (God), Rabindranath Tagore, the Hindu, invites his compatriots to offer a prayer to God to give "power to suffer." What else, then, can Mr. Rai do but seek good company by exhorting his emasculated countrymen to study virtue and morality? Verily, a subject race can have patriotism but no politics, unless it be the politics of echoing the sentiments of a half dozen personal friends in the master race, or of serving as contented second fiddles to the alien ruler in order to consolidate and fortify his empire against the eventualities of the "next war."

8. An Attempt at Theorizing.

Theoretical considerations which are as a rule ignored in the other publications form an important feature in Mr. R. N. Gilchrist's *Indian Nationality*. The essays arose in 1915-16 out of an attempt to explain the racial background of the Great War. Subsequently the author was led to discuss the question "whether there is or will be an Indian unity analogous to the unity of Canada, Australia or New Zealand." The volume is thus a contribution to the comparative study of contemporary nationalism.

Professor Gilchrist's philosophy of nationality is calculated to demonstrate, as a matter of course, that the "Allies were fighting for the good of humanity" and "not that war in itself is right but that Germany was in the wrong" (p. 41). The author takes no cognizance of the elementary fact of international politics that Poles, Tchechs, and other peoples have been enabled to form national states of their own, not because of their right to freedom, inherent as it should be considered to be in every race, but because in the conjuncture of diplomatic manoeuvres²) it had been decreed that the Teutonic empires should be crushed, and especially because there was a power strong enough, commercially, financially, and militarily or rather navally, to bring them to their knees.

Territory, race, language, etc., are discussed in a popular manner as elements of nationality, which is described as "essentially a spiritual thing" (page 15). But while Gilchrist rightly rejects a monistic basis for what may be called the nation-making power, he overlooks the fact that in national movements one of the greatest "spiritual" factors is the will of a people to emancipate itself from foreign domination. The omission of this consideration vitiates fundamentally his analysis of the diversities of Indian life, although much of it is accurate, up to date and often original (pages 48—153).

The author does not content himself with the statement that "in India there is a collection of nationalities without a single nationality for the whole." The various aspects of *rapprochement* between Hindus and Moslems (pages 102, 103), the evidences of the constant flexibility of caste (pages 121, 123, 170) and the elasticity of Hindu law (pages 132, 133), as well as the "democratic movements" and other "constructive possibilities" (pages 138—141) in the social life of India to-day, have not escaped his searching inquiry.

9. Why not a Pluralistic but Free India?

Nevertheless, Gilchrist's logic for Asia is different from his logic for Europe. He is solicitous enough that the few thousands or hundreds of thousands of Croats, Moravians, Letts and Slovenes should attain to the dignity of national statehood. But the twenty language groups of India, each numbering more than a million people, some more than twenty-five millions and one or two more than forty millions, should be satisfied with Lord Acton's denun-

²) *Vide* the present author's *Science of History and the Hope of Mankind* (London 1912) for a discussion of the importance of *vishva-shakti* (world-forces) in all nationality-movements.

ciation of nationalism! Indeed, in the "small nationalities" of India the author cannot detect any unities except the unity of permanent subjection to a foreign race. Their *intelligentsia* are condemned sicklied o'er with "national neurasthenia."

There is, it is true, as Strachey asserts, no India—but in exactly the same sense that there is no Europe. Orissa is at least as real as Belgium or Holland, the Punjab is no less a unit than Italy or the United Kingdom, and Bengal is more compact and homogeneous than France. Besides, India has her Denmark, Portugal, Greece and Finland. But Gilchrist fears that a province like Bengal, "with a dominant and strong vernacular," if left to itself, might easily claim the "complete vernacularization of education as a national right" (page 79). Why this apprehension? What would be the harm to democracy, civilization and humanity, even a champion of the League of Nations might be permitted to inquire, should the forty to fifty million people of a sovereign Republic of Bengal actually attempt such a thing and set up French, German or English as a compulsory second language, and Japanese, Russian or Spanish as an optional third?

10. Comparative Politics.

Whatever be the political future of India, the student of constitutions will in the meanwhile appreciate Gilchrist's description of Indian finance as "federal," of the Canadian type (page 238). The tendency toward the federalization of India is further evident, as he interprets it, in the provisions of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, which seeks by the institution of the Council of Princes to assimilate the 650 States to the imperial system (page 245).

The parallel between the Roman Empire and the British Empire has often been drawn to the satisfaction of the "superior races." One need not quarrel with this, but when Gilchrist suggests that English officers in the Indian services are not more objectionable than are European and American experts in the Japanese (page 221), one can not but feel that when an Englishman indulges in sympathy for a subject race he is likely to lose all sense of humor.

The weakest chapter in the book is that on Tagore's *Nationalism*. The poet-essayist's idea that India's contribution to the world is to be made in the moral and spiritual sphere, and that what India needs is not political freedom but social reform (pages 155—156, 168), should have been regarded by a student of economics as one-sided, to say the least. Moreover, the author fails to detect in Tagore's lectures an intense anti-British animus which disguises

itself under the mask of an all-round philippic against "the Nation" as Western "organized power."

Gilchrist does not seem to be acquainted with recent intensive researches in Indian history. In references to the polity of old India his ignorance is surpassed, however, by that of Professor Ramsay Muir, who contributes an introduction to the volume. The latter's sweeping generalizations in regard to Hindu legal, political and social institutions (pages XI—XIV) betray, in the first place, an inadequate comprehension of comparative history and, in the second place, an unquestioning reliance on the cheap indology popularized in the nineteenth century by Maine and Max Müller.

India's Struggle for Swarāj (1919--1921).

1. The Roll of Honour.

The present alien government has been declared by Mohanda Karamchand Gandhi¹⁾ of Gujarat in 1921 to be the rule of Satan. In his weekly, *Navajivan* (New Life), his daily prayer is thus worded: "May I be thrown into prison or shot dead or India win her freedom!"

Gandhi's attitude is clearly indicated in the following lines: "We are on a footing of war with the British government. We challenge this government because its methods are devilish. We are out to subvert it."

Mohammed Ali and Shaukat Ali, two brothers, are in prison because they had incited the Indian soldiers against serving in the British Army. The Alis are Mohammedans, and, as stout champions of Pan-Islam are well known in Greek, Italian and French politics.

Chitta Ranjan Das of Calcutta on the eve of his arrest and imprisonment has declared: "The war has just commenced." At the present instance he won fame as the chief organizer of the National Volunteer Corps in Bengal. As barrister at the High Court Das used to earn £ 40,000 a year. But in order to pioneer the boycott of British law-courts he had renounced his profession and taken to whole-time patriotic service.

On the 17th of November 1921 in every city of India, great and small, *hartal* was practised. That is, there was a complete strike of all sorts, — implying a thorough abstention from daily activity on the part of business men, workers, store-keepers and students. This universal death-sentence, so to speak, was passed by the people on themselves as a protest against the outrageous insult perpetrated on their homeland because on this day the Prince of Wales landed at Bombay.

The boycott of the British government's measures in reception of the Prince is but an aspect of the all-round "non-cooperation" which the Indian people have adopted in their relations with foreign rule. The boycott extends to disobeying in a civil manner every law and regulation which is inconsistent with India's freedom. And the boycotters are ready to suffer for their acts of commission or omission.

1) In 1922 Gandhi has been sentenced to imprisonment for six years.

In 1921 during five months there were 266 prosecutions in the United Provinces alone and 51 in Madras. In one district in Bihar, viz. in Muzaffarpur, over 100 cases of martyrdom are reported from the nationalist side. Every province (even Assam), each one of the 2153 cities, nay, every important village has its own story of heroic resistance against the foreign coercion and of the will to freedom. In this history of torture on the one hand and self-sacrifice on the other the Mohammedans have come out as brilliantly as the Hindus, the women as honourably as the men.

The year 1921 has ended with prosecutions and imprisonments whose name is legion. In Calcutta the godowns and warehouses have been improvised by the government into prison-houses; and young men of Bengal while inviting incarceration and arrest have found it prudent to carry their own blankets along lest the prison-authorities should not be in a position to furnish the myriads of political prisoners each with a cover.

When men like Lajpat Rai, Motilal Nehru and Bhagavan Das are in prison, when the mother of the Ali Brothers is setting an example to all mothers, when Basanti Devi and Suniti Devi, the wife and sister of C. R. Das are under arrest, the masses can no longer remain blind to the seriousness of the situation. The "leaders" mean what they say! The call for self-sacrifice from such men and women will from henceforth have a special significance to the unlettered peasants and workers. With 1922 thus begins a new chapter in the psychology of relations between the masses and the classes in India.

2. All-round Boycott.

One form of the industrial boycott of England consists in the burning of English goods which is ceremoniously performed at all meetings of public importance. The import of English cotton-goods came down to 25 % in 1921 and in the course of a few months over 200,000 new handlooms have been introduced among the people in the villages.

The weavers of Bihar have met in conference to discuss the methods of economic warfare. In a meeting in 1921 about 20,000 persons were present. The same year notwithstanding the immense opposition of the proprietors, backed as they were by the Army and the Police, the congress of workingmen held its meeting at Jharia, a centre of coal-mining. The different workers' organizations were represented by 400 members and the number of visitors came up to 20,000. The working men discussed not only the purely economic questions such as those bearing on their wages, hours of

labour, conditions of work and so forth, but also gave their united support to the political movements existing within the country in favour of *Swaraj*.

The boycott of the universities and schools controlled by the government is no less important an item in the *Swaraj* struggle. In Bengal alone 50,000 students have severed their connections with these institutions, nick-named *golaṁ-khānās* (slave-manufacturing workshops). Many of these young men are employed in patriotic work of one sort or another, for example, in the teaching of cultivators in the villages and working men in the cities.

Not only in Bengal but also in Madras, Orissa, Bihar, Punjab, Bombay and in other provinces national councils of education have been established which are founding *vidyā-pīṭhas* (seats of learning) under the people's control in order to teach all that is necessary for modern life in a free state. At the Indian National Congress held in Ahmedabad, the chief city of Gujarat, Gandhi was in a position to welcome the delegates with the statement that he could count 31,000 scholars in the "national schools" of his own home-province.

3. National Organization.

In order to carry on this comprehensive struggle for freedom both in the negative boycott spirit as well as in a constructive manner a national fund has been collected, the present value of which is Rs 11,000,000 (£ 1 = Rs 15).

The beginnings of a *Swaraj* Treasury, named after the statesman Bal Gangadhar Tilak, have thus been laid. These taxes were realized not only from the intellectual politically-minded middle classes, but also from the merchants and bankers as well as from the proletariat and uneducated masses. India is presenting a united front against the common enemy.

About a generation ago the Indian National Congress started with a membership of less than 500 persons. To-day the number of registered members is 10,000,000. Corresponding to the growth of this central popular assembly there has been an unprecedented development in the provincial conferences as well.

The Anti-British movement in this its present form declared itself on April 6, 1919, the day, on which Rowlatt Act became law. The Act was designed to crush Indian independence in every phase of life and thought. The only reply to this arbitrary and tyrannical legislation was offered by the people through their unarmed riots at Ahmedabad, Bombay, Viramgam, Delhi and Cal-

cutta. At Amritsar more than 1,000 men, women and children were killed by the British army.

The present Indian rebellion is born of the desire for revenge on that atrocious "massacre of innocents." The movement has gained great strength also on account of the Treaty of Sèvres which through British intrigue led to the partition of Turkey and embittered the feelings of Indian Moslems against Great Britain.

4. Ideas of 1905.

All the same the revolution in its present form is not the sudden outburst of the last three years. It is but a natural development of the militaristic uprisings during the War period (1914—1918), in which the nationalists of Young India succeeded to a certain extent in creating the interest of the German General Staff and Foreign Office. All those efforts were rewarded, however, solely with several hundred executions and life-long imprisonments and several thousand internments in Bengal, Punjab and elsewhere. The impact of this activity was felt on public life in Japan and the United States where under pressure of the British Embassy the governments were compelled to bring forward cases against the revolutionists of India allied as they were with the German Empire.

Altogether, however, in the *Swaraj* rebellion of 1921 one should have to notice the logical and necessary fruition of the ideas of 1905 which have been cumulatively growing in intensity and extensity during seventeen years. For on August 7 of that year Young India had proclaimed not only the boycott of British goods and schools but also the establishment of *Swaraj* institutions in every walk of life, administrative, legal, educational and what not, as well as the founding of *swadeshi* i.e. indigenous industries.

That all-inclusive *Swadeshi* movement brought along with it the system of physical training among young men organized in clubs, known generally as *amusan-samiti*. These associations are similar in technique and objective to the *Turn-vereine* which were founded in Germany under the patronage of Stein and Hardenberg, after the disasters at Jena and Auerstadt (1806). In the natural course of events the bomb also made its appearance as a method in Indian politics (1907).

The ideas of 1905 were however mostly confined within the circle of intellectuals and specially among young men who contributed the martyrs of the period. In 1921 the triumph of Youth is complete,—for the elderly people, the sage and serious men of seventeen years ago have become converts to the enthusiasm

and idealism of the young. To-day again the ideas are shared much by the mercantile communities and employers of labour by the peasants and members of trade unions. Besides, during 1905—10 the *Swaraj* activity inspired the Bengalis, Marathas and Punjabis more intensely than it did the other peoples of India. But the movement has acquired such a powerful momentum that at the present moment the energism of resistance against the hated foreigner pervades the millions in every race, rank, profession and creed.

5. Social Service and Solidarity.

On the one side, the *swaraj* (self-rule) movement is anti-alien i.e. anti-British. But on the other side, this ideal of liberty, freedom or self-direction has an "internal use", i.e. a home aspect, as well. The manifold tendencies towards the social equalization of classes and the inner democratic reorganization of the people bespeak such currents in internal *swaraj*.

Democracy had become manifest in the very first fruits of the ideas of 1905, and in the positive work which they induced. The intellectual classes could not for long remain content with their enterprise among their own peers in cities. The message of Young India—the new cult of freedom they began to carry on the one hand to the villages among cultivators or railway workers and miners and on the other hand to the factory labourers and lower grade artisans of the towns. Thus originated the scholar-organizer-educationist, the travelling teacher or educational missionary movement.

The curriculum of such educational missionaries was simple and rudimentary. Sanitary rules and laws of health, cooperative credit and consumption, methods of agricultural improvement, and a general lift in the economic and social standard, — this is all that the peripatetic pedagogues sought to propagate among their flock. Patriotic efforts sometimes led to the establishment of permanent schools where the children of the poor could be taught for about 2 hours a night free of all costs. Under the auspices of the Ramkrishna-Vivekananda Mission several hospitals have also been founded in different parts of India,—in which medical men who have renounced the profession for personal ends devote themselves entirely to the relief of the destitute, those images of "God in poverty" (*Daridra Nārāyaṇa*).

Institutions like the Servants of India Society have often sought to entertain the factory workers and mill hands by offering them

chances for social intercourse through excursions to the sea-side or other healthy localities. The Arya Samaj of the Punjab, the Brahmo Samaj of Bengal, and the Social Service League of Bombay have all along tried to improve the social status of the "depressed" classes, the "pariahs". In the Social Conference of Madras (1921) C. Rajagopalachariar, although a high caste man, has gone so far in his advocacy of their claims that he has suggested to them the advisability of adopting "passive resistance" against the higher classes, should these latter continue still to be obsessed by their vested interests.

Such are the lines of social service which have served to bring about brotherhood and solidarity between the different orders of the people. And of course the *swaraj* animus of to-day has its moral backbone greatly strengthened by this communal and fraternizing, although non-political activities of the "upper ten thousands" among the masses.

6. Proletarianism and Class-Struggle.

But all these methods are likely to be described as but the traditional tactics of "bourgeois" democracy. For it is only by such sops to the economically exploited proletariat and socially down-trodden pariah that the masses can be "rallied" to the intellectuals in their nationalistic warfare against the alien Empire.

It is therefore necessary to point out that the homogeneity of interests and the "united front" which have been erected by the patriots of Young India must not be interpreted too liberally. The economic class-struggle is already on among the people although in its initial stages.

By participating in India's combined struggle for self-direction, self-legislation and self-taxation aimed against British administration, industry and commerce the peasants, working men and pariahs are getting used to the fact and ideal of their own rights as human beings, as economic agents and as moral forces. This self-consciousness of the exploited individual in its reactions to the other members of the community, in other words, this class-consciousness as against the actual and potential exploiters existing as they do in the same race, is an outstanding feature in India's public life of the last few years.

The reason is perfectly obvious. Economic determinism, like the law of gravitation, does not know latitude and longitude. If during all the epochs of world-culture previous to the advent of the steam-engine East and West have run parallel in agricultural

methods, serfdom, cottage industry, guilds of artisans, usury, markets and so forth, together with the legal system and so *Weltanschauung* adapted to such "primitive" or mediaeval industrial organization, it is but natural that "modernism" will also manifest itself in almost identical manner in Asia and Eur-America. The logic of human evolution is inexorable.

The mediaeval Indian industries and handicrafts were crushed during the first four decades of the nineteenth century by the adverse commercial laws of Great Britain. A new industrial England was reared on the grave of old industrial India. But in the course of time about 3000 modern workshops and factories of large dimensions have grown up on Indian soil. The number of these plants is certainly too small for a vast sub-continent like India. The complete industrialization of the people, such for instance as has taken place in England, the United States and Germany, has consequently been retarded. In any case, however, the little modern industry that there is has brought along with it in India the same Marxian industrial "problem" as in Eur-America.

Strikes are becoming almost a daily phenomenon in the economic system of cities. The demands of the workers in India are the same as those of their comrades in Eur-America, viz. higher wages, shorter hours, and better treatment from employers. Weavers, laundrymen, sailors, railway-workers, jute and cotton mill hands, and miners — all have their own unions. This unionization by arts and crafts is provincialized, i.e. territorialized, for instance, in the Madras, Bombay and Bengal Labour-Boards. These provincial labor-organizations have further been centralized or nationalized under the All-India-Trade-Union-Congress.

Economic warfare is patent likewise in the villages and on the fields and farms. The *kishans* (cultivators) are organizing themselves into unions known as *Kishan-sabhas*. The most prominent of these peasant-associations are to be found in the United Provinces and Bihar. Their chief grievances are high taxes, illegitimate taxes, and arbitrary taxes imposed on them by the landowners. The revolt of the peasants at Rai Bareilly and their demands in conference in Oudh in which 50,000 persons took part (1920) point to the directions in which the wind is blowing.

Since the masses have been denied the privilege of acquiring the rudiments of learning owing to the sinister educational policy of the foreign government the lead in all this revolutionary movement among the working men and peasants has automatically fallen into the hands of the intellectuals. The cooperation between brain

and brawn is appreciated not only by the exploited classes but also by the "natural leaders" of the society. This certainly is the consummation of the movement to rally the proletariat to the bourgeoisie for which the politicians have long endeavoured.

The peasants as well as workers share today in the creed of the intelligentsia, viz., that England's hostile policy in regard to Indian finance, agriculture, industry and commerce is responsible for the famines and epidemics as well as for sickness, premature death, and general cheerlessness of all the sections of the population. Under the leadership of Gauri Shankar Pandit the peasants, as under that of Baptista the working men, have therefore in open assemblies declared themselves in favour of the political *swaraj* without which the economic salvation, physical energism and moral resurrection of India are understood to be out of the question for any class.

Nevertheless there is no rest for the propertied classes. The owners of mills and landed proprietors as well as the "princes" of semi-dependent India have understood enough from the events of recent years to have their eyes opened. The fact of the awakening of the "teeming millions" as "hands and feet", i.e. as members of an economic system is too patent. The employers and landlords know that the employed and the tenants have economic grievances.

And these economic grievances are not exclusively those for which British capital, commerce and administration are responsible. Indians themselves constitute a class of exploiters. The grievances of the peasants and labourers cannot therefore be assuaged, as it is clear to Indian bourgeoisie, by mere political shibboleths, such for instance, as that a panacea will be brought about as soon as India achieves her freedom from foreign yoke.

The resistance from the exploited classes is tending to assume the same forms in India as in the West. The new problem of capital *vs.* labour has been introducing complexity in the older simpler problem of India *vs.* Great Britain. And this "enrichment" of the Indian question has found a substantial feeder in the events and policies of Russia since November 1917.

The "natural leaders" of India are, besides, in constant intercourse with the communists and syndicalists of Eur-America as well as with other "moderate" labour and socialist organizations in the Western world. Proletarianism has, moreover, succeeded in enlisting in its favour the thoughts of a rising school of writers who

Young India.

at the present moment in Hindi language have embarked creating a special *Kishan* literature.

The fact that India has begun so late in its political ca indicates that in industrialization the people are in a pos to derive benefit from the experiences and mistakes of the pion of modern industry in the West. On the other hand, it is evid also that Young India is not enamoured of 1789 nor even of ideas of 1848 but that while giving them their due in the histo perspective, it is prepared to bestow a part of its serious thougi on the latest experiment in freedom and democracy that manki has undertaken in and through the exploits of Russian idealists

2) As specimen of Young India's interest in proletarianism may cited Manabendra Nath Roy and Abani Mukherji's *India in Transit* (Geneva 1922), which, among other things, seeks to offer an "econom interpretation" of Indian history for the nineteenth century and after.

The Foreign Policy of Young India (1921).

1. India's Responses to the World.

Recently there has been founded in Paris an *association sociale et commerciale hindoue*, the social and commercial association of the Indians (1921).

The Indian merchants of Paris constitute a conspicuous commercial colony in France. Their subscription to the French soldiers' fund has been appreciated by the French government in generous terms.

The Paris Indians have kept touch with India also in almost every phase of her contemporary life. They have contributed financial assistance to the Gurukul at Hardwar, to the Servants of India Society at Poona, to the Amritsar relief fund, to the library at Bolpur, to the Bose Institute of Calcutta, and to the Tilak *Swarnaj* Treasury. They are going to found two scholarships for post-graduate students of Indian universities tenable in one or other of the industrial colleges of France.

In the United States last year, while merchants and bankers from Delhi, Mysore, Calcutta and Bombay were passing through New York and Chicago, the domiciled "Hindu" traders started the project of something like an Indian Chamber of Commerce. As is well known, the Hindus of the New World have made a name for themselves among the American public in various walks of life, — in engineering establishments, in chemical factories, in the silver market, in academic circles, in the Irish and Catholic world, in journalism, in the federal and state congresses, in labor associations, and also in political prisons for having organized in 1915—16, as was charged by the public prosecutor of San Francisco, the "naval invasion of a dependency of the King of England" and thus having violated the then neutrality of the United States. The impact of this name is already considerable not only on India at home but also on every nation, great and small, from China to Peru.

In Yokohama and Kobe also there are Indian commercial communities of substantial importance. The Hindu merchants of Japan have many good social acquaintances among the Japanese men of light and leading. One of their latest gifts for India has been announced in the papers. It consists of a donation of several

thousand rupees to the University of Bombay for founding scholarship to be granted to women students.

As one surveys facts of this order from the different corner of the two hemispheres, one feels the virility of India's life-force and the magnitude of Indian institutions outside of the geographical limits of India. To the manifold stimuli of the world India is responding in diverse ways. There has occurred a veritable expansion of India.

The country has grown not only intensively but also in extension. The "deepening" of India is being felt today by the tremendous power which our unlettered peasants and working men have been exerting on the *intelligentsia* and on public life. This is but an aspect of the new democracy which is fast conquering all mankind. But the widening of India is perhaps not yet consciously realized by many. It is, however, already a potent force among the chief spiritual agencies which are steadily internationalizing the world.

2. Greater India.

Wherever on earth there lives an Indian there is an India. We have thus an India in Japan, an India in Fiji, an India in Mauritius, an India in South Africa, an India in the Americas, and an India in every country of Europe. Greater India is made up of these Indias outside of India.

The citizens of this Greater India come from almost every district of India. They speak all Indian dialects and profess all creeds of the South-Asian sub-continent. Among them are to be found manual and intellectual workers of all grades. Farmers, artisans, sailors, chemists, physicians, engineers, journalists, poets, teachers, political agitators, religious preachers, shop-keepers, and captains of industry as well as representatives of commerce, all have contributed to this widening of India's horizon.

What has this Greater India done for mankind? And what does this Greater India seek to achieve for the world?

Greater India is a unit of enlarged experiences and thought-compelling discoveries. The first discovery of India abroad is that not every man among the independent nations is every day discovering the laws of gravitation, radio-activity, or relativity. Its second discovery is that not every woman among the free peoples is a Madame Curie, a Helen Keller, or an Ellen Key.

Not the least noteworthy among Greater India's discoveries in the course of its diversified development are the facts that the governments of the "great powers" are run in responsible

positions by persons whose capacity for administration, intellectual and moral, is entirely mediocre, not less so than is that of thousands of present-day Indians who might be invited to occupy the same offices, and that consequently the kind of men who organize the cabinets or manipulate the war-machines or are sent out to take charge of the embassy in foreign lands or to rule subject nations, are even now plentiful in each and every province of India.

Greater India has also discovered through its intimate camaraderie and social intercourse among foreign races that the intrigues, jealousies, meannesses and animosities which form the daily routine of public life in the independent world,—not only as between country and country, but also as between denomination and denomination, party and party, and individual and individual,—are nowhere less deep and less dehumanizing than are any such conflicts as prevail in India today or may have prevailed in the past.

In other words, Greater India has accomplished only one thing. Its experiences and discoveries in the realm of human values have established the equality of Indian men and women with the men and women of the leading races. The life-processes and self-realizations of Greater India have demonstrated that India's sons and daughters are capable of solving the same problems in industry, in arts, in science, and in politics, as are the men and women of Europe, America and Japan.

The moral of this self-consciousness is obvious. "Declare yourself to be a power," says Greater India to India at home, "and you are already a power. Force yourself into the notice of mankind, and mankind will take note of you. Seek the recognition of the world-powers as one of their peers, and they will tend to meet you half-way." The one thing that India needs today is the final great dose of dehypnotization.

As long as there was no Greater India the world was deprived of the free message of one-fifth of the human race. It was the interest of the chauvinists to keep India a "closed question" in interparliamentary discussions. But India's forced isolation was abruptly broken and her teeming millions opened up to the world when in 1905 Young India announced itself born.

Since then the greatest achievement of Young India has consisted in the creation of an "Indian problem" in the civilization of every nation that is worth anything. Every great power has now an "Indian portfolio" as an important section of its foreign affairs. All these "Indian questions" and "Indian interests" of the different peoples are but different phases of one vast, conquering, self-

conscious Greater India. And this interpenetration between the world and India bids fair to be the most far-reaching dynamic *shu* in the science and life of the coming decades.

3. The World-Test.

Equality between the East and the West,—this then is the message of Greater India.

From a certain standpoint it might be pronounced that international trade is at present perhaps the most important line of work in which India can demonstrate the equality of its methods, merits and achievements with the rest of the world. Every Indian who is successfully maintaining an office in foreign trade centres,—in Petrográd, in Berlin, in Rome, in Rio de Janeiro, in New York, in Tokyo, in Paris,—is thus automatically rendering one of the greatest services to our motherland.

The world is being taught by the sheer logic of facts, by the very fact of success, that the brains and morals of Indians are made up of the same stuff as are those of the nations who have the privilege of being represented by their armies, navies, air-fleets, and flags. Each and every Indian merchant abroad is the standing advertisement of India's spirit of adventure, of India's ability to compete with foreigners in the race for life's expansion, of India's will to conquer.

The standard of measuring life's values is one and the same for all mankind. The more frequent and varied, therefore, the chances that India obtains to come into unobstructed competition and cooperative intercourse with the creative nations, the more constant will be the opportunities to prove by comparison that India's mettle is of the same worth as that of her rivals.

Such an appraisal by the world-standard Young India has sought to establish in all its functions since the event of 1905. And this evaluation of India by comparative criticism has served, on the one hand, to rectify the erroneous notions which India used to entertain in regard to the world, and on the other, to demolish the superstitions which the world had propagated in regard to India.

In one word, the activities of Young India have been tending to open the eyes of all mankind. Indeed this methodology of objective comparisons is steadily contributing to an epoch-making revolution in the psychology of races.

. 4. Young India in the International Balance.

What now is this world-test? In what has consisted the breaking up of India's isolation? How has Young India managed to throw itself open to the play of *vishva-shakti* (World-forces)?

Let us be specific, although it is rather delicate to single out names. But perhaps the names may be taken to stand for types.

India has today a C. V. Raman of Madras whose investigations in the mechanism of musical instruments and in the theory of sound vibrations some times form a feature of the principal physical journals of Great Britain and America. The mathematicians of the world find in a Ganesh Prasad of Benares as good a colleague as do the mechanical engineers of all nations in a Shankar Abaji Bisey of Poona, inventor of type-casting machines. From Bengal comes a Jnan Chandra Ghosh whose work the world's chemists have honoured by conferring on it the patent of "Ghosh's Law," while the work of Birbal Sahni of Lahore has won as much recognition among botanists as that of Karamchand Bal of Lucknow among investigators in zoology.

Thus has India succeeded in exposing itself to the whirlpool of international currents. The world is not complete without India. And India's claim of equality with the nations is a claim of partnership on a dignified platform of mutual respect and appreciation. It is possible today to advance this claim simply because consciously or unconsciously India has come to be tried in the international balance,—in other words, because of the development of a Greater India or India's interpenetration with the world.

Nobody must have failed to notice that, curiously enough, almost every book written by an Indian, *which has been sent out for appraisal in Eur-America*, has invariably been able to win the reputation for its author as quite scientific, learned, original, first-rate and so forth. In American estimation a Vaman Govind Kale and a Radha Kamal Mukerjee are no mean economists; in French opinion a Jadu Nath Sarkar is a great historian representing a type of eminent men whom India can count in contemporary science; in the British press a Radha Kumud Mookerji and an S. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar are but specimens of a group of scholars whose critical handling of antiquities leaves hardly anything to be desired. Likewise do the ethnologists of the world value the work of a Sarat Chandra Ray or Rama Prasad Chanda.

It is not a mere Indian test nor a mere Asian examination through which India has been passing these sixteen years. Young India has

chosen to submit to a cosmic trial, to a world-test,—the same by which Japan, Germany, Russia, the United States, Italy, England and France are tried. And Young India has been coming out as A. I. in every field it has had a fair chance to attempt.

Take even politics. Come to any country on the surface of the earth, and be convinced by personal experience that one of the most influential foreign elements in the non-official politics of that nation is the young men and women of India who happen to be settled there. Young India by its idealism and heroic resistance to obstacles is enriching the civilization of every important people. The self-sacrifice of Young India is a perpetual object lesson to the youngsters of every race.

The world has come to realize that neither the idealism of Young Germany during the epoch of its War of Liberation in the early years of the nineteenth century nor the *Bushido* of Young Japan in its self-defence against the Russian avalanche in the early years of the twentieth can stand comparison with the *sādhana*, the strivings, the devotion to duty, and the undaunted pursuit of mission in the face of monumental difficulties which India's patriots have been exhibiting to the world, heedless of the fruits of their endeavor. Young India is accordingly a spiritual force in international politics and a powerful factor in world-culture.

And of course Young India is a very challenge to the *status quo* in world-order, to the powers that be. Young India is adored in Japan and admired in Germany. Young India is respected in Russia as it will be respected in Italy, in France, and in every other country which has an interest in the rearrangement of world-forces. And Young India is loved in the United States.

5. The Foreign Affiliations of Indian Politics.

Let us have a bit more of the world-appraisal of India's political might. In the United States, during the war period, all the subject nationalities of Europe used to hold united congresses in order to engineer the world's opinion in behalf of their right to *swarāj*. On one or two occasions India also happened to get a chance to place her claims before mankind. Her cause was represented by Lajpat Rai.

It was evident to onlookers that Lajpat Rai was not radical enough for Young India. One does not have to be partisan in a political controversy but one is still in a position to report that American statesmen as well as students of international relations from every nook and corner of Europe took no time to realize on the

spot that the political propagandists of Poland, Tchecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia or what not, did not present their case more emphatically nor more convincingly than did this people's ambassador from India, albeit a representative of her "moderate" leaders.

Those propagandists, be it noted, are today presidents or councillors of the newly manufactured republics in Central Europe. Mankind is therefore shocked to find that Lajpat Rai must have to vegetate on the banks of the Ravi because in sooth the world's obscurantists have decided that his countrymen are not as fit for sovereignty as are the Poles, the Bohemians, and their cognates! The more Lajpat Rais there are out of India, the greater and the more persistent will be humanity's appreciation of the quality, quantity and variety of India's contemporary achievements.

As is now well circulated throughout the world, last spring in New York City, John Haynes Holmes, a most powerful orator and liberal thinker among the Americans, was lecturing before his congregation at Community Church on the topic that "the greatest man in the world today is Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi." One is at liberty to have one's own views in regard to this statement, nor need one ditto every phrase that Gandhi employs. But nobody is senseless enough to ignore that we have here another instance of the kind of world-test to which Young India has become amenable on account of its foreign affiliations.

The recent news about the Tilak Swaraj Treasury, established with the initial amount of ever a crore of rupees, has likewise compelled the attention of the students of war-finance in Europe, America, and Japan to a new phase of India's public life. Free nations, used as they are to "liberty loans," "victory loans," and "war loans," are today amazed to see that the method of organization which the Indian campaign has employed in order to raise the allotted quotas from each district or from each group is none other than what the war-lords of the great powers would advise their financial experts in times of crisis.

The success of the Tilak Swaraj Treasury has served to create Young India's "credit" in the market for international loans. When it becomes necessary to float abroad a loan for India's public purposes this event can reasonably be cited as the first great monument of our organizing ability and economic power. For the first time also since 1905, it need be observed, the commercial communities of India have risen to the height of their responsibility in working shoulder to shoulder with the *intelligentsia*, a fact the moral of which has not been lost on the world's Kautilyas of "high

finance". India must now learn how to make business out of this reputation.

Altogether, it is clear that persons who previous to 1905 would have failed even to point out the place of India on the map of Asia are today seeking the alliance of Indian men and women in the great work of making the world safe from foreign domination. And all this simply because of Young India's kinship, not perhaps always conscious, with *vishva-shakti*, i.e., owing to the founding of a Greater India.

6. The Foreign Services of Young India.

The time has now come for planning out a conscious programme of India's foreign services. The need is all the greater, after a year of intensive struggle for *swaraj*, to finally break the barriers of isolation which have been imposed upon us by self-seekers. Our deliberate aim must be henceforth to invite on India and on Indian enterprise the unrestricted competition of the open market.

We have need to submit to this world-test in scientific discoveries, in mechanical inventions, in political idealism, in the creations of painting, sculpture and music, in athletics, in commercial activity, in short, in every function of life. The fields, factories, markets, and schools of India must no longer be dominated by any one system of theories and practices. No more of hegemony or monopoly,—no more of "closed doors"—in India's industry, science, politics, and culture. The very declaration of such an aim will forthwith generate the moral support of the leading industrial and cultural powers in behalf of India's *sādhana*.

The question of a continuous and systematic foreign policy thus assumes a most considerable importance in Young India's activities. India's intimate intercourse with the outside world must have to be provided for in a secure and permanent manner. And the reasons are not merely those of *swaraj* propaganda but also those of essentially vital interests which affect India's very existence as a unit in modern civilization.

In the first place, mankind is moving very rapidly in industrial technique, cultural synthesis, social engineering, political ideals as well as administrative methods. India can hardly keep pace with the march of world-progress except under certain specially-created favorable conditions. These conditions can be fulfilled only if well-trained Indian men and women are furnished with facilities for studying the latest developments in Europe, America and Japan. Further, there must have to be organized the instrumentalities by

which these Indian experts can regularly communicate the results of their investigation to the responsible persons and institutions at home.

In the second place, the activities of India during recent years in diverse fields are already quite momentous. As events of contemporary politics and culture they are significant enough to call forth the appointment of qualified persons to interpret them to the world. Our new experiences in public life and our attainments in the arts and sciences will thereby automatically come to be placed in the international balance. Naturally this publicity will have to be conducted in the different languages of the great powers and through the medium of their authoritative institutions.

It must be understood that the problem here set forth is not merely one of sending out Indian students, post-graduate scholars and professors to the chief culture-centres for higher education and research. India has arrived at a stage when bankers, engineers, medical men, labor leaders, museumists, newspaper-men, lawyers, and publicists,—all these of creative experience have to be on the move from country to country and watch the varying conditions in the barometer of human progress.

7. Indian Embassies and Consulates.

Nay, more. If *swaraj* is not far from being a question of practical politics, the fathers of the Indian Federation of Swarajes should betimes make it a point to station their official representatives in every capital city and in every important port of the world. The ambassadors, ministers, envoys, consuls and delegates of India's *Swaraj* must be counted as no less valuable office-bearers than are the members employed in the rural, sanitary, industrial, teaching, and other home services. A staff of not less than one hundred persons,—to be recruited from among lawyers, journalists, bankers, engineers, chemists, etc.,—should have to be mobilized immediately to form the nucleus of Young India's accredited diplomatic corps.

The importance of India's having her own embassies and consulates can hardly be overstated. The question has been put off too long. It must be seriously taken up right now.

In foreign countries our merchants, travellers, and students have long been submitting to untold inconveniences, discomforts and losses, not to speak of demoralizing indignities and humiliations, for no other reason but the simple fact that India's own trusted representatives are not to be found exactly where and when they are needed the most. A year or two ago the atrocities of the

British Embassy in Washington, D. C., in the two instances of the released Hindu political prisoners and of the Hindu working men, were exposed and condemned by the entire American public opinion. The incidents served to awaken American conscience to the danger to which India is normally exposed owing to the absence of her own ambassadorial authorities. The recent death (June 14, 1921) of Pandit Hariharnath Thulal (of the United Provinces) by suicide at Tokyo, where he had been professor of Hindi at the Foreign Language School since 1916, owing to the cumulative persecution, it is alleged, by the British Embassy in Japan, should arouse the moral sentiment of Young India up to the adequate constructive programme.

Wherever there is a British embassy or consulate there must have to be posted an authoritative Indian delegation to counteract all anti-Indian measures and to look after the development of actual or potential Indian interests. There is nothing in international law or practice to prohibit the establishment of such embassies or consulates as Young India may choose to locate in the different countries of the world.

Delegations, commissions, and travellers of all sorts, permanent as well as occasional, are deputed to foreign peoples as much by the Japanese, the Italians, and the Americans as by the Germans, the French and the Chileans,—of course by each nation to watch its own chances and promote its own interests openly or secretly. And naturally the country which sends out its agents and representatives as experts to investigate foreign movements on the spot or to interpret its own problems and achievements to the foreigners has also to look after their maintenance.

No foreign nation can then be expected to bear the expenses of the emissaries from India. India's representatives abroad will have to be maintained by Indian funds. The financial idealists of India must learn to pay an adequate price for her expansion in the world.

The statesmen of Young India are thus called upon to determine a percentage of their national funds such as may reasonably be ear-marked for keeping the foreign services at the proper level of efficiency.

Appendix.

Young India in Exact Science (1915-1921).

The following extracts are taken from the "World of Culture" section of the *Collegian* (Calcutta). The paragraphs appeared during the period from January 1920 to January 1922. Only a part of the work which Indian men of science have been doing in India or abroad and such as has been published in European or American scientific journals is announced in these notes. These, however, will not fail to furnish an index to the quality of the investigations.

On the Colours of the Striae in Mica.

In the *Proceedings of the Royal Society* (London), A. Vol. 96 we have a full investigation of the phenomenon of the coloured striae observed (when mica is examined by the Foucault Test) by Phanindra Nath Ghosh. A preliminary communication in *Nature* (November 14, 1918) by Chandrasekhar Venkata Raman and the present author briefly described the phenomenon.

The Geology of India.

The lack of a comprehensive and up to date manual accounts greatly for the indifference of college students to geology as a branch of study in the Indian universities. And yet geology is a "key" or basic science. The importance of geological knowledge, fundamental as it is, in the coming industrial revolution of the country, it is impossible to over-estimate. These are our uppermost thoughts while congratulating Professor D. N. Wadia of Kashmir on his *Geology of India* (London 1919). The chapters on physiography and economic geology will appeal to the general reader.

Indian Contributions to Recent Physics.

The vibrations of elastic shells partly filled with liquid form the subject of a paper in the *Physical Review* of the American Physical Society (March 1919) by Sudhansu Kumar Banerji, whose study of aerial waves generated by impact appeared in *Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science* (London) for July 1916 and January 1918. T. K. Chinmayanandam's investigation on the diffraction of light by an obliquely held cylinder, carried out in the laboratory of the Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, Calcutta, was printed in the *Physical Review* for October 1918,

which in its issue of January 1919 contained an article on the theory of superposed diffraction fringes by Chandi Prasad of Benares.

Besides publishing the contributions of Ganesh Prasad, D. N. Mallik and C. V. Raman, the *Philosophical Magazine* has "The Scattering of particles by Gases" by R. R. Sahni of Lahore (June 1915 and March 1917), Meghnad Saha's "Maxwell's Stresses" (March 1917), N. R. Sen's "Potentials of Uniform and Heterogeneous Elliptic Cylinders at an external point" (October 1919), and a note on the equivalent shell of a circular current by Satyendra Ray of Lucknow (January 1921). Meghnad Saha's contributions on the limit of interference in the Fabry-Perot Interferometer and on the mechanical and electrodynamic properties of the electron have been published in the *Physical Review* (Dec. 1917, Jan. and March 1919)..

"Hindu" Talent in Industrial Chemistry.

As we are watching with interest Abinash Chandra Bhattacharyya's preparation of alcohol from mahua fruit, and Biman Chandra Ghosh's synthetic manufacture of garjjan oil for the treatment of leprosy, it would be quite in place here to announce the industrial achievements of our chemists such as are being recognized and commercialized in American factories. V. R. Kokatnur (of Bombay) has won distinction in an alkali firm at Niagara Falls which specializes in the manufacture of caustic soda and chlorine products. He is in charge of the organic research laboratory and has to direct and supervise the work of a number of American chemists.

At a symposium on "Electro-Chemistry after the war" held at Atlantic City (New Jersey, Oct. 1, 1918), Kokatnur presented a paper on "Commercial Uses of Chlorine," which may be read in the *Transactions of the American Electro-Chemical Society*. Vol. XXXIV. In the January number (1919) of the *Journal of the American Chemical Society* he has a paper on "The Influence of Catalysis on the Chlorination of Hydro-Carbons."

Another organic chemist, whose ability as supervisor and organizer of chemical talent has been tested in a carbolic acid plant, is Dharendra Kumar Sarkar. His experience consists in developmental work in several factories (of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and New York) along the lines of coal tar, dyes, "intermediates," and recovery of cocoanut oil from copra. He is a specialist in the basic materials for the perfumery industry, e.g. in the distillation of sandal wood oil, oil of cloves etc. A manufacturing house of

established reputation has bought one of Sarkar's processes in a synthetic pharmaceutical.

Journals of Indian Learned Societies.

The Calcutta Mathematical Society at its tenth annual meeting (Febr. 8, 1920) has urged upon all original investigators to publish their best productions in the scientific journals of India and not in foreign periodicals. The call is a timely one, foreshadowing, as it does, a move in the direction of India's self-assertion. And while we do not at all approve of the Secretary's statement that writing for foreign journals "may add to the glory of the individual author and is not after all so much a national gain", we strongly advocate every measure that is calculated to strengthen the hold of our learned societies and their journals on the corresponding institutions of the world.

A Mechanical Designer.

Akhil Chandra Chakravarty has designed at least twenty new (original) machines for the American company which employed him in Chicago. Chakravarty has taken patents on some of his inventions. His "Automatic Vacuum Soldering Machine" is intended for the canning industry. It is likely to replace old-style machines and save the labour of about 40 men.

Varied Experience of a Chemical Engineer.

Baneswar Dass made a special study of metals and alloys with reference to their acid-resisting properties. For some time he did development work in a scientific apparatus manufacturing company with success. Subsequently he was chief of control laboratory in a firm which manufactures synthetic phenol and phenol derivatives. Then he sought employment in one of the most influential concerns of the U. S. located in New Jersey, which first appointed him as chief chemist of the carbolic acid division and then promoted him to the position of chief chemist of the coal tar products division. Dass has developed a modification in the manufacturing process of synthetic phenol and has successfully worked out electro-chemical problems, for instance, those in relation to waxes; shellac etc. for the composition of gramophone records, electrical storage batteries, and so forth.

Advance of Chemistry through Indian Research.

India has of late been quite in evidence in the world of chemistry. The papers contributed by our chemists are a regular

feature not only of the *Proceedings of the Chemical Society* of London but also of the *Journal of the American Chemical Society*.

The condensation of aromatic compounds is the subject of Sarat Chandra Chatterjee's and Ananda Kishore Das's investigations. Das in collaboration with Brojendra Nath Ghosh is also interested in the study of problems bearing on the electrolysis of water. Nihar Ranjan Chatterjee is engaged in the study of diketo-hydrindene. Panchanan Neogi's contributions to structural chemistry are well known. His researches lie in the field of organic nitrogen compounds.

Biman Bihari De and his colleagues are interesting themselves in the derivatives of benzene, while a new branch of chemistry is being opened up by Rasik Lal Datta in his series of investigations on the halogen family with special reference to the replacement of one member by another. His work in connection with the preparation of poison gas attracted the notice of the American Government during the war period. Datta's research is co-operative. With him have been working N. R. Chatterjee, Harababuttu Kumar Mitter, Phuldeo Sahaya Varma, Tarapada Ghosh, Jnanendra Nath Sen, Nagendra Prasad and others.

A War Chemist of India.

As a member of the Niagara Alkali Works of Niagara Falls (N.Y.) V. R. Kokatnur did some work on poisonous gases and also completed a work on a super-mastard gas more deadly than the one in use. One of his processes was useful during the war : the varnish of aeroplane wings. It consisted in the manufacture acetylene-tetra-chloride. This product had not been made in U. S. before the war, and his was the first to put in operation. Kokatnur has other processes to his credit, e.g. those for manufacturing chlorine-resisting lubricants, benzoic acid, benzaldehyde, c

India in Recent Physics.

India is continuing to be in evidence in the scientific output the contemporary world. Almost not a number of the *Philosophical Magazine* of London, which, by the bye, has nothing to do "philosophy" as it is a journal of physics (its old name being "philosophy") without some contribution from Indian research. January number of the present year (1920) has Satyendra "Equivalent Shell of a Circular Current" and C. V. Raman, Ashutosh Dey's "Sounds of Splashes", the February, D. N. and A. B. Das' "Quantum Theory of Electric Discharge" April, Meghnad Saha and Satyendranath Basu's "On the E.

of the State" and the May, C. V. Raman's "Mechanical Violin-player of Acoustical Experiments."

The Science of the Violin.

"In regard to the scientific aspects of sound theory the foremost prominence must be given", says *Science Progress* (London) of April 1920, to C. V. Raman's memoir published by the Indian Association for the Cultivation of Science, Calcutta, in 1918. The study is a dissertation on the mechanical theory of the vibrations of bowed strings and of musical instruments. "A judicious combination of theory and experiment is used to elucidate the nature of the vibration of the violin. The equations of motion are written down and solved for the strings and the bridge respectively."

An Indian Achievement in Invention.

At a meeting of the Executive Board of the National Institute of Inventors (New York) the name of an Indian was submitted as an "Inventor of International Fame" for having invented the "Ideal Type-Casting Machine" (August 11th 1920). The name of this Indian inventor is Sankar Abaji Bisey, a Maratha engineer of Bombay.

The Single Type Casting Machine

Mr. Bisey has earned this recognition by inventing a mould, universally adjustable, which will cast types of all sizes. The basis of the present invention was the Multiple Type-Casting Machine, first constructed by him in 1903 while in England. But since then, it has been improved and modified until the offer of a "new problem" by the Universal Type-Casting Machine Company of New York. Bisey set himself to, and succeeded in, designing a thoroughly new machine (April 1917). This is altogether different from and independent of his old patents. The present consummation has been the dream of the world's inventors since the 30's of the last century.

Bisey's Inventions.

The world came to know of Bisey's work for the first time in 1895 when he exhibited optical illusions in London through his own invented machines. In 1897 he won a British prize by inventing a machine for automatically weighing and delivering powdered goods. In this he defeated eighteen European competitors. The inventions of the period from 1899 to 1908 were various automatic-advertising machines. Some of these are revolving lamps with

lights of different colors for display, exhibited at the London Coronation Show, 1902. These were produced for the Bisey Inventions Syndicate in which Naoroji was financially interested. The type casting machines of the period were designed and manufactured under the auspices of the Bisotype Ltd of which Hyndman was the director. In the next series of inventions relating as they did to the improvement of type-casting machines, Tata's interest was awakened and the Tata-Bisey Inventions Syndicate was founded in London. Bisey is naturally a national hero among the Marathas. During his last sojourn in India in 1909 he was enthusiastically greeted with Marathi and English addresses. At the Indian Industrial Conference held in Madras in 1907 his work was brought to the notice of delegates by R. N. Mudholkar as president.

The Triumph of Jagadish Chunder Bose.

Once again has J. C. Bose's career been brought home to Young India with a message of aggressive energism and creative self-consciousness. The challenge which was thrown out to him in London from certain quarters of British science, although not without precedent in the scientific annals, is but typical of the tests to which Indians have perforce to submit the world over in every field of enterprise. The hopeful sign of the times, however, is that Indian merit is at last definitely on trial, and that India is getting a chance to be appraised by the world standard. And this circumstance is evoking the best that India is capable of. The greater the obstacles to the recognition of its achievements, the greater therefore is the will and determination to win it. Young India welcomes this struggle. And now that Bose has scored his triumph, the world of culture is going to be enriched by another chapter in the Expansion of India. Indian youths have not assimilated his philosophy of "Response" in vain.

The Bose Institute in the World of Science.

Investigations embodied in the *Annals of the Bose Institute* at Calcutta are awakening the interest of Europe in Young India's scientific attainments. The recent lecture tour (1920) of J. C. Bose in Sweden, Germany, and France has won for Hindu talent many warm admirers;—among them world-renowned scientists like Arrhenius, the physicist of Stockholm, Haberlandt, the physiologist of Berlin, and Deslandres, the physical astronomer of Paris.

Bose was "solemnly" presented to the *Académie des sciences* by its president Mons. Deslanders.

Bose in British Journals.

Sir Richard Gregory, editor of *Nature*, compares the importance of Bose's discoveries to that of gravitation in physics. And Lewis Mumford, editor of the *Sociological Review*, writing in the *Asiatic Review* says that Geddes' description of Bose's work is an "exceedingly capable illumination of a field of scientific thought which has undergone a revolution comparable only to that which has taken place in mathematics and astronomy through the researches of Einstein."

Dr. Bose in Paris.

Last December (1920) on the invitation of Mons. Mangin, director of the *Muséum d'Histoire naturelle*, Paris, Bose addressed a group of French biologists on the results of his latest researches. He gave also a public lecture at the *Musée Guimet*. In introducing the speaker, Daniel Berthelot, the chemist, said in part: "The waters of the Ganges have not yet ceased to be life-giving. Its currents are still needed for the inspiration and uplift of mankind."

An Indian at the Institut Pasteur.

An Indian doctor, Hemendra Nath Ghosh, late "house physician" of Carmichael Medical College Hospital, Belgatchia, Calcutta, is one of the assistants of Mons. Weinberg, who is in charge of the bacteriological laboratory at the *Institut Pasteur* of Paris. Ghosh is specially interested in the preparation of anti-serum and vaccine. His researches lie in the field of bacterial flora of appendicular abscess.¹⁾

Researches in Pure Physics.

Two papers containing the results of research made by Mr. H. Parameswaran in the Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge, deserve notice. One of the papers, reprinted from the *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philosophical Society*, deals with the "effect of a magnetic field on the intensity of the spectrum lines" and the other, which is extracted from the *Philosophical Magazine*, gives "An improved design from the friction cones of Searle's apparatus

1) *Vide* "Bacillus Reptans" by H. Ghosh in *Comptes rendus des séances de la Société de Biologie* (Séance du 6 mai 1922. — Tome LXXXVI, p. 914).

for mechanical equivalent of heat." We also learn that he read a paper on "A new type of interferometer" before a section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science during its last session at Cardiff.

Hindu Chemists before the American Chemical Society.

In the second week of September 1921 the American Chemical Society held its sixty second meeting at New York City.

At the symposium on vitamins in the division of biological chemistry Banerwar Dass of Bengal had a contribution on "food products rich in vitamins." V. R. Kokatnur of Bombay's paper on "the theory of molecular compound formation" was used in the section on physical and inorganic chemistry.

An Indian Physicist in Germany.

Megh Nad Saha is going back to India after six months of successful work in Germany. On the invitation of Professor Nernst, the greatest man of the world in *Physikalische Chemie*, Saha came to the University of Berlin as guest of the research department. Saha's investigations lie in the field of astrophysics. In Nernst's laboratory he obtained special facilities for working out several problems bearing on the application of thermodynamics to spectral analysis. The results of his researches are to be published in German journal of physics.

Saha's Lectures at German Universities.

Saha's work has served to attract the attention of scientific celebrities like Einstein (Berlin) and Sommerfeld (Munich) to the contributions of Young India to exact science. As readers of *Collegian* are aware, Saha himself is well known in the world of science for his publications (since 1917) on Maxwell's equations, electron, quantum theory, etc. in the *Philosophical Magazine* London and the *Physical Review* and the *Astro-Physical Journal* of the United States.

Recently he was invited by the *Physikalische Kolloquien* of the Universities of Munich and Berlin to address the public on some of his latest researches. Saha summarized in a part of his work done last year in the laboratory of the College of Science, London. The paper has been published in *Zeitschrift für Physik* (Berlin, Band 6, Heft 1, 1921) as "Zur Theorie der physikalischen Erscheinungen bei hohen Temperaturen."

turen mit Anwendung auf die Astrophysik (Attempt at a theory of physical phenomena at higher temperatures with applications in astro-physics).

The Late Ramanujan (1887—1920).

A very appreciative and extensive account of the work of the late Ramanujan, the first Indian F.R.S., appears in the *Proceedings of the Royal Society* (September 1, 1921) in the section on obituary notices. "I can compare him only with Euler or Jacobi", says G.H.H., the Cambridge mathematician, through whose interest Ramanujan was introduced to the world of science. He says further: "My belief is that all mathematicians think at bottom in the same kind of way and that Ramanujan was no exception." From 1914 to 1921 altogether 21 papers by Ramanujan have appeared in Europe. The *Journal of the Mathematical Society* (1911—1919) has published 12 papers from his pen.

Indian work in Biology.

Some very first class work is being done by Indian botanists and zoologists. The importance of their work is no less recognized in Europe and America than is that of our investigators in mathematics, physics and chemistry.

Contributions of the Punjab to Botany.

Sevaram Kasyap and Birbal Sahni of Lahore are two well known workers in botany. Kasyap's researches lie in the field of the organography of Himalayan cryptogams. His contributions published in the *Annals of Botany* (London) and the *Proceedings of the Royal Society* are highly spoken of by eminent botanists like Farmer and Oliver of London.

Birbal Sahni.

The Annals of Botany, No. 131, 1920, has published a paper on "certain archaic features in the seed of *Taxus* etc" by Sahni who has another article in the *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society* No. 253, 1920. A whole volume of the *Proceedings of the Royal Society* is given over to Sahni's monograph on the "Phylogeny of the Gondawana Flora." Sahni is known among students as the author of a *Text Book of Botany* published by the Cambridge University Press.

An Indian Mycologist.

Readers of the *Journal of the Indian Agricultural Society* are familiar with the work done by J. F. Dastur, supernumerary

mycologist at Pusa. He is chiefly interested in the sexology of *pyronema confluens* fungus. In the *Annals of Botany* for July 1921 Dastur has an article on "cytology of *tilletia tritici* (Bjerk-) Wint. Laymen will understand in this paper only such facts as that the bunted wheat seeds required for the investigation were collected for the author by a professor in Australia in 1918 and that the authorities cited are French and German.

Zoological Investigations by Indians.

The entomological volume of *Indian Fauna* has recently been revised by Samarendra Chandra Maulik of Calcutta. The contributions have agricultural significance. Karamchand Bal, professor of zoology at Lucknow, is noted for his work on the nervous system of the earthworm.

Sarkar's Gland.

In physiology Bijuli Bihari Sarkar has been working in a field associated with the name of Professor Gley of *College de France*, viz., the internal secretion of glands. His investigations have led to the discovery of a gland which is now named after himself. The *Proceedings of the Royal Society* (Edinburgh) is to be consulted for an account of "Sarkar's Gland."

Other Workers.

Prabhat Chandra Sarvadhikari has been working on the cytology of ferns with Professor Farmer of Imperial College, London. At Berlin, Krishna Das Bagchi is interesting himself in genetical problems bearing on rachymiosis. The work has importance in cotton cultivation. In the Botanical Institute of Berlin, likewise, Hara Prasad Chaudhuri is studying plant diseases. The investigation which is at present confined to (the mycology of) tomato and potato infection will hereafter be extended to the mango.

Young India in Science.

The *Philosophical Magazine* (London) of Sept. 1921 has a paper on the "variation of resistance of selenium with temperature" by Snehmay Datta. B. N. Chakravarty's "diffraction of light incident at nearly the critical angle on the boundary between two media" appears in the *Proceedings of the Royal Society* (September 1, 1921).

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Occident and elsewhere. Let us hope that translations into French, German and Italian will soon bring this monumental volume of capital importance to the knowledge of those who cannot read it in English". (Monsieur Jean Herbert, translator of the works of Ramakrishna, Vivekananda and Aurobindo, and editor of the *Great Spiritual Masters of Contemporary India Series* in French).

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